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ABSTRACT 
Corporate Governance is the set of structures and behaviours by which a company or other 
business entity is directed and managed (New Zealand Securities Commission, 2003). The 
structures and behaviours guide how the entity sets objectives, develops strategies and 
business plans, monitors and reports on performance, and manages risks. They also guide 
how directors and managers meet all expectations and that they are responsible and 
accountable in their respective roles. In 2004 the New Zealand Securities Commission 
(NZSC) adopted a principle-based corporate governance approach which was intended to 
contribute to high standards of corporate governance in New Zealand entities. The 
principles/guidelines are broad statement generally applied to the governance of entities that 
have economic impact in New Zealand or are accountable, in various ways, to the public.  
The economic entities are required to observe the principles/guidelines to the fullest extent 
that they reasonably can and depart only where they are subject to competing statutory or 
public policy requirements (NZSC, 2004). 
This thesis investigates the effect principle-based corporate governance practices have on the 
financial performance of publicly listed companies and public corporate entities in New 
Zealand.  The adoption of the principle-based approach was to encourage entities to develop 
governance structures that are specific to their context. Therefore, this research examines: (i) 
whether the NZSC recommendations have encouraged institutions to develop entity and/or 
industry specific governance structures; and (ii) whether the differences in governance 
practices at entity and industry level contribute to the differences in the financial 
performance.  
Prior studies have examined governance practices of larger corporations in large economies. 
The governance practices of companies in smaller economies have received little attention. 
This research extends the understanding of responses to smaller entities, both private and 
public sector, in a small open economy with a mature capital market. 
The focus of this thesis is on the governance variables that have been highlighted by the 
NZSC in 2004 and also other governance variables that are supported in the literature as 
providing an appropriate structure for the institutions in the environment in which it operates.  
ii 
 
Data for the small and large capitalisation (cap) companies were obtained from the New 
Zealand Stock Exchange (NZX) Deep Archive. The data for the small cap companies
1
 
covered the period 1999 to 2006 and for large cap companies
2
 the sampling period was from 
1999 to 2007. For public sector corporate entities, data were obtained from their respective 
annual reports for the period 2000 to 2007.  
Pooled data were analysed using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and two stages least 
squares (2SLS) regression techniques to evaluate: (i) whether entities have complied with the 
NZSC recommendations; (ii) whether those entities that were continuously compliant with 
the NZSC recommendations have superior financial performance; (iii) the entities‟ financial 
performance post-NZSC recommendations is better than pre-NZSC recommendations; and 
(iv) the difference in governance practices in different entities and industries and the effect 
they have on company financial performance.  
The findings indicate that small cap and large cap companies and public sector corporate 
entities have universally adopted the Securities Commission recommendations. Results for 
the large cap companies show that compliance with NZSC recommendations had a positive 
effect on financial performance, but empirical results show that compliance with NZSC 
recommendations has had a negative effect on the financial performance of small cap 
companies and public sector corporate entities.  
There is also evidence that governance practices in certain industries have contributed 
towards the differences in entities‟ financial performance. This suggests that a principle-
based governance approach led to the development of industry-specific governance structures 
in large cap companies and State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) as intended. However, the 
evidence for the small cap companies is specific to the finance/investment sector.  
As a result of this study, the relationship between „soft regulations‟ and entities‟ financial 
performance is better understood, and in terms of public/regulatory requirements, the issues 
associated with compliance cost burdens are better informed. This study offers insights for 
policy makers around the world who have adopted principle-based approaches and to those 
jurisdictions that are interested in adopting similar governance approaches in the future.  
                                                 
1
 Small cap companies are those companies that are not part of NZX50 companies. 
2
 Large cap companies are NZX50 companies. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCING THE STUDY 
 
1.0 INTRODUCTION 
The recent global financial crisis of 2007 to 2010 has seen the collapse of large companies in 
many countries including the UK and the USA. This crisis and the preceding Asian financial 
crisis of 1997 has revealed problems with corporate governance and the apparent inability of 
boards to monitor and control company performance, and the remuneration and performance 
of managers (OECD, 2009). However, these challenges are not new. For these reasons the 
corporate governance structures and practices over the years has been subject to extensive 
scrutiny, controversy and debate (Gugler, 2001). The focus primarily was on the managerial 
corporation inspired by the seminal work of Berle and Means (1932), that is, how managers 
with either very little or no investment in the organisation they manage, could be motivated to 
work in the best interest of the shareholders. Modern public corporations are managed by 
managers and monitored by a board of directors. The separation of the decision making role 
(the CEO) from the control role (the board) and from risk-bearing (shareholders) is thought to 
be a reasonable way to structure company governance (see Fama & Jensen, 1983a, 1983b; 
Jensen, 2000), so long as decisions made are in the best interest of the residual claimants and 
efficiency is maximised.  
However, poor company financial performance, scandals and failures over the years has 
revealed that the board has not been effective in monitoring managerial behaviour. A study 
undertaken by the Asian Development Bank (2000) revealed that poor governance practices 
was one of the major contributing factors that led to the Asian financial crisis in 1997. The 
failure of high profile companies such as Adelphia, Enron, Parmalat, Tyco, WorldCom, and 
HIH Insurance, among others, has also been linked to poor corporate governance practices. 
The debate after the crises focused on ways in which corporate governance practices could be 
improved to ensure (i) that investors‟ funds are not expropriated or wasted in value-
decreasing projects; and (ii) the survival of the company in the long-term (Bonn, 2004).  
Anecdotal evidence (Ingley & McCaffrey, 2007) and empirical evidence (Brown & Caylor, 
2006a, 2006b; Larcker, Richardson and Tuna2007; MacAvoy & Millstein, 2003; Millstein & 
MacAvoy, 1998) support the view that good governance practices lead to improved company 
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financial performance. Improved governance practices lead to an increase in company 
performance in two distinct ways: (i) they increase expected cash flows accruing to the 
investors and (ii) reduce the cost of capital. First, shareholders believe that with improved 
governance practices more of the company‟s free cash flow will be returned to them as 
dividend rather than being expropriated by the managers who control the company (Jensen, 
1986; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny2002; Shleifer & Wolfenzon, 2002). 
Second, good governance reduces the cost of capital to the extent that it reduces 
shareholders‟ monitoring and auditing costs (Lombardo & Pagano, 2002, cited in Beiner, 
Drobetz, Schmid & Zimmermann, 2004). This supports the view that agency costs can be 
controlled by limiting managerial discretion through the establishment of structures to 
monitor and control management behaviour (Burton, 2000). To this end, the appropriateness 
of a flexible principle-based governance approach versus a “one size fits all” rule-based 
approach to address governance concerns was debated by many countries. The United States 
has taken a distinctively rule-based approach regarding certain aspects of corporate 
governance with the adoption of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Whereas New Zealand, 
along with the UK, Canada and Australia, has adopted a more nuanced principle-based 
approach. The reason for adopting a principle-based approach was based on the view that it is 
voluntary, flexible and non-binding. It allows companies to develop company specific 
governance structures that will enhance efficiency. This led to a proliferation of corporate 
governance codes/principle and guidelines with particular emphasis on accountability and 
conformity (Edwards & Clough, 2005). Corporate governance codes such as the Cadbury 
code in the UK, the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) guidelines, New Zealand Corporate 
Governance Principles and Guidelines, and the OECD corporate governance principles can 
be found to contain certain assumptions about what governance factors make for a good 
performing organisation. These factors are company attributes that are assumed to lead to 
good company financial performance (Edwards & Clough, 2005). Emphasis is placed on an 
independent board of directors, independent chair and independent board sub-committees 
such as audit, remuneration and nomination. These structures have been prescribed as 
important corporate governance reforms in New Zealand and internationally.  
Although New Zealand was not directly affected by the high profile company crises that 
occurred in the US in 2001, the evidence of poor company financial performance (Healy, 
2003) and sub-standard governance practices (Godfrey & Horsely, 2003) were prevalent in 
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many sectors. The perception among investors (local and overseas) was that New Zealand did 
not sufficiently protect investors with appropriate reporting, compliance and governance 
standards. This was an influencing factor for a number of major listed companies during 
1980s and 1990s for shifting offices offshore (Farrell, 2005). These events provided a signal 
to New Zealand to enhance its corporate governance practices in order to promote and 
safeguard the integrity and efficiency of the market.  
The section that follows provides a brief discussion on the corporate governance environment 
in New Zealand. 
1.1 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ENVIRONMENT IN NEW 
ZEALAND 
The development of corporate governance practices in New Zealand is very much related to 
the history and development of the formation of corporations, and with that, the development 
of commercial law.  It is also associated with the capital markets participants‟ reaction to the 
events that occurred both locally and internationally. Prior to 1978, New Zealand did not 
have securities regulation that specifically protected minority investors‟ interest. The collapse 
of some major companies in the mid-1970s led to the enactment of the Securities Act 1978. 
However, the focus of the Securities Act 1978 was on controlling the activity of raising funds 
rather than the entity, which was raising funds.  The Companies Act 1955 was the exact copy 
of the United Kingdom Act of 1948 and did not provide any guidance on corporate 
governance structures and practices, apart from the requirement to have a board of directors. 
It became apparent during the 1987 stock market crash that the corporate governance 
practices and structures in New Zealand were not of the same standard as those practiced in 
other developed economies. After the stock market crash, an ensuing backlash against 
perceived corporate excesses provided New Zealand with its first set of rules, guidelines and 
legislation for corporate governance (Hossain, Prevost & Rao, 2001) with the enactment of 
the Securities Act 1988. However, there were no company guidelines or rules that specified 
directors‟ duties until the enactment of the Companies Act 1993. Insider trading3 was not 
outlawed until late 1990s, and there are examples of takeover cases and market manipulation 
activities that questioned the integrity of the New Zealand capital market. A poor standard of 
                                                 
3
 Insider trading is recognised as a behaviour which is damaging not just to individual companies and 
stakeholders, but also to the efficiency and integrity of the securities market as well (Kavanagh, 2005). 
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financial reporting and inadequate audit functions were contributory factors that lead to the 
failure of a number of companies during the late 1980s and 1990s, namely, Equiticorp, Chase 
and Fortex. There were also cases where poor quality corporate governance practices led to 
the erosion of shareholder wealth, examples of such companies were the Bank of New 
Zealand (BNZ), Air New Zealand and Brierley Investments Limited (BIL) (Healy, 2003). 
Poor company financial performance and sub-standard governance practices were not only 
restricted to the private sector; it was also apparent in the public and not-for-profit sectors as 
well. Poor governance practices in public sector entities were the reasons for the financial 
bailout of some significant educational institutions (McKinlay, 2003), and poor corporate 
governance practices relating to misuse of funds were experienced in the voluntary sector 
organisations as well (McKinlay, 2003). These cases of poor governance practices, among 
others, created the perception that investors were not protected that led to the deterioration of 
New Zealand‟s image internationally.  
Changes made to corporate governance practices in countries that suffered corporate failures 
have had an impact on the New Zealand capital market and on companies operating in New 
Zealand. Also, the deregulation of the economy in 1984 made it possible for New Zealand 
companies to attract foreign capital for investment and growth. These cases (among others) 
motivated market regulators in New Zealand to enhance corporate governance practices in 
order to encourage capital participation by local and international investors.  
New legislation was introduced
4
 with the aim of: first, promoting investor protection; second, 
promoting and safeguarding the integrity and efficiency of the New Zealand capital market; 
and third, improving New Zealand‟s image internationally by striving for cost effective 
securities regulation. The corporate governance practices between 1987 and 2004 underwent 
sustained change, influenced by the events occurring nationally and internationally. 
It was acknowledged that good corporate governance practices will not eliminate corporate 
failures or destruction in shareholder value. However, if implemented, monitored and updated 
regularly, they will reduce corporate fraud and assist in achieving maximisation of the 
shareholder wealth. As stated in the Higgs report: 
 
                                                 
4
 Refer to Table 3.1 on page 63 for details. 
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“Good corporate governance must be an aid to productivity, not an 
impediment. It is an integral part of ensuing successful corporate 
performance, but of course only a part. It remains the case that successful 
entrepreneurs and strong managers, held properly to account and 
supported by effective boards, drive wealth creation.” (Higgs, 2003) 
 
The business of business is risky and companies taking risks to create shareholder value may 
end up with either losses, breakeven, or profit situations. As far as the competitive market 
forces are at work, good governance practices will ensure that corporate resources are utilised 
in an efficient manner. The nine high level principles and guidelines recommended by the 
New Zealand Securities Commission (hereafter NZSC) in 2004 were intended to contribute 
to high standards of corporate governance in New Zealand entities. It was assumed that the 
principles and guidelines would improve shareholder confidence in governance processes and 
also harmonise corporate governance practices among the trading partners.  
1.2 CONTEXT AND GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
From a country perspective, quality of governance is determined by the following six 
governance dimensions: voice and accountability, political stability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption (Kaufmann, Kraay, & 
Mastruzzi, 2006). These dimensions are seen to reflect the effectiveness of the institutions 
and financial markets as they are determined by the behaviour of individuals within a society 
(Rutherford, 2001; The World Bank, 2009).  Governance in this context is the outcome of the 
effectiveness of the society‟s institutions (North, 1990) and if institutions are appropriate and 
effective, then governance dimensions are regarded as indicators of the quality of a country‟s 
institutions (Duncan, 2003). The growing body of empirical research that has evolved in this 
area has linked institutions with economic growth and measures of governance with 
economic performance (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2004; Knack, 2001b; Rutherford, 
2001). La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 1998). This builds on a long 
tradition of scholars including Coase (1937), Alchian (1965), Demsetz (1964), Cheung (1970, 
1983), North (1981, 1990) who have stressed the interaction between property rights and 
institutional arrangements shaping economic behaviours. La Porta et al. have also emphasised 
the importance of law and legal enforcement of the governance of firms, the development of 
markets and economic growth. From this perspective, the nature of corporate governance 
practiced by companies in a country is very much dependent on the nature and purpose of the 
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companies, and the place of corporate law and practices within the wider national and 
international frameworks of governance. 
Therefore, a system of governance is mainly determined by the nature and purpose of the 
company. An understanding of the nature and purpose of a company is drawn from the 
following company characteristics: the degree of ownership; the level of control the 
shareholders have; identity of the controlling shareholders; board accountability, that is, 
whether it is shareholder or stakeholder focused; the legal and regulatory environment; and 
the level of market competition faced by the company (La Porta et al., 1998; Maher & 
Anderson, 1999; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). The differences in these company characteristics 
traditionally reflected the differences in corporate governance practices of different 
companies in a single country and also, across countries. The extant literature focusing on 
different models of governance (Analytica, 1992; Bianchi, Bianco & Enriques, 1999; Black 
& Coffee, 1993; Brecht & Roell, 1999; Franks & Mayer, 1994; Garrett, 1996; Isaksson & 
Skog, 1994; Monks & Minnow, 1995; Porter, 1992; Preston, 1996) reveal that there are no 
specific governance structures that are suited to every company and all countries. Also, these 
structures tend to change over time and there is evidence of convergence of different 
practices over time. For example, concentrated ownership structures, commonly found in 
insider (bank-based) systems, are now present in outsider (market-based) systems, which 
have a strong recognition of minority shareholder rights as well as a greater emphasis on 
transparency. Also, familial control, common in insider systems, is also common in Anglo-
Saxon countries like Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.  
The model of corporate governance practised in New Zealand is referred to as market-based 
or an outsider system of governance. This form of governance is typical in Anglo-Saxon 
countries, where the role of the board of directors is prescribed in law. The role of 
management and directors is to maximise shareholder value through allocative, productive 
and dynamic efficiency. The distinguishing features of the shareholder model are: (i) 
dispersed ownership structure with a large institutional holding; (ii) the existence of a unitary 
board; (iii) the supremacy of shareholders‟ interests is recognised in corporate law; (iv) a 
strong emphasis is placed on the protection of minority investors through securities law and 
regulation; and (v) a relatively strong requirement for disclosure promoted through principles 
and guidelines.  
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The underlying problem for governance in the market-based system is the agency problem 
arising from the separation of ownership and control. Therefore, the framework for this 
research is drawn from the agency theory perspective and analysis of governance-
performance relationship is to determine whether or not different corporate governance 
structures impact or constrain executive behaviour and whether it has an impact on company 
financial performance. The test of the governance–performance relationship provides 
confirmation that the relationship conforms to theoretical predictions.  
1.3 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the corporate governance practices of 
publicly listed companies and public sector corporate entities in New Zealand have an effect 
on their financial performance. In order to achieve this aim, the following specific objectives 
are presented: 
1. To determine the relationship between corporate governance practices of small cap 
companies and financial performance measured by Tobin‟s Q, Market to Book, 
Return of Assets and Return on Equity. 
2. To determine the relationship between corporate governance practices of large cap 
companies and financial performance measured by Tobin‟s Q, Market to Book, 
Return on Assets and Return on Equity. 
3. To determine the relationship between corporate governance practices of public sector 
corporate entities and financial performance measured by Return on Assets, Return on 
Equity, Sales to Total Assets and Cost to Revenue. 
4. To ascertain whether or not sectoral and entity-level differences in corporate 
governance practices have an effect on financial performance. 
5.  To ascertain whether compliance of NZSC recommendations has an effect on 
financial performance. 
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
Studies using data from the UK and the US show that better-governed companies reduce 
control rights that shareholders and creditors confer on managers, increasing the probability 
that managers invest in shareholder value-creating projects (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
Claessens, Djankor, Fan and Lang (2003) posit that better governed companies have easier 
access to finance, lower cost of capital, better financial performance and also have favourable 
treatment by all stakeholders. They argue that weak corporate governance not only leads to 
poor company performance and risky financing patterns, but is also conducive to 
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macroeconomic crises. However, the focus of past research has mainly been on larger 
economies and therefore the nature of governance practices in companies in smaller 
economies is not well understood. It is not clear whether the findings of large companies 
from the larger economies also hold for small and large companies in smaller economies.  
Since the New Zealand economy is dominated by small and medium sized companies 
compared to larger economies overseas, the conjecture is that the improved governance 
practices by small cap companies will also lead to an increase in financial performance. This 
study extends the current literature by providing an understanding of the nature of corporate 
governance practices in small cap companies in New Zealand and the effect such practices 
have on financial performance. 
The conjecture that improved governance practices by large cap companies in New Zealand 
will also lead to an increase in financial performance is derived from the results of large 
companies in larger economies. This study provides an understanding of the nature of 
corporate governance practices in large publicly listed companies in New Zealand and the 
effect such practices have on their financial performance. 
The surveys undertaken by the NZSC since 2004 provide evidence that listed companies, in 
general, have complied with the corporate governance recommendations (NZSC, 2005, 2006, 
2007, 2008). However, little has been said about the impact compliance has on company 
financial performance. It is not clear whether an increase in financial performance is large 
enough (if any) to compensate for the incremental compliance cost incurred by the 
shareholders in order to comply with the NZSC recommendations. If the net present value of 
incremental free cash flows derived from the increased performance is not sufficient to 
compensate shareholders for the additional costs incurred, it will lead to the destruction of 
shareholder value. In such circumstances, the motivation of shareholders to remain 
committed to the NZSC recommendations becomes questionable.  
Corporate governance codes/principles and guidelines have only been in existence since 1992 
(revised in 2004) and surprisingly little research has been undertaken on their underlying 
mechanisms. An understanding of the dynamics of so-called „soft regulation‟ in general is 
rather limited. It is difficult to ascertain whether changes to corporate governance practices in 
New Zealand have been made for the benefit of the shareholders or simply to fit with 
regulation applied in other countries. This study adds to our understanding of the workings of 
the so-called „soft regulations‟ and their effect on financial performance.  
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The availability of only a small pool of directors for board positions in New Zealand has 
created an overboarding problem in large companies where some directors sit on many 
different companies‟ boards (Keown, 2009). According to Quinn, some people are engaged 
in boards of four to ten different companies (Keown, 2009), thus taking risks, as they are 
unable to spend sufficient time with the companies for which they are legally responsible. 
Large companies offer attractive remuneration packages (in New Zealand terms) and also, 
being a board member of a large company creates a better reputation in the marketplace for 
future board career prospects.  Arguably, small cap companies cannot compete with large 
companies in terms of resources, and therefore have difficulty attracting experienced 
directors. People opting for board positions in small cap companies generally tend to be less 
experienced (Directions - Understanding Governance, 2007) than boards members for large 
companies and possess expertise in certain specific areas only. To acquire all the required 
skills at board level, small cap companies may have to engage many people at board level. In 
large companies, the effect that overboarding has on governance is not clear.  
Healy (2003) reported that foreign institutions and corporations collectively held 54% of 
equity in New Zealand listed companies while local institutions held a meagre 15%. With the 
institutional ownership geographically spread, it is unlikely that such ownership structures 
will generate significant incentives for effective collusion and monitoring (Bhabra, 2007). 
The popular press has  made scathing criticism of institutions relating to the complete lack of 
shareholder activism in New Zealand compared to the US, UK and Australia (Bhabra, 2007). 
In support, Korn/Ferry International (2000) adds that no companies in New Zealand have 
been seriously questioned by their investors at the annual general meetings on corporate 
governance issues. It is not clear what role institutional shareholders play in publicly listed 
companies in New Zealand in terms of monitoring and directing.  
The Companies Act 1993 requires full disclosure of ownership of directors and other relevant 
governance related information, and such information is obtainable from the company‟s 
annual reports. The availability of such information makes this study possible. With the 
conflicting results obtained from previous studies, it is suggested that using data from a 
country that is significantly different will add to our understanding and contribute to the 
growing body of knowledge that examines governance-performance relationship. 
Since the focus of past studies has mainly been on publicly listed companies, the corporate 
governance practices of public corporate entities are not well understood. Therefore the 
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governance-performance relationship in public sector companies and institutions is not well 
understood. The public sector reforms that started in the 1980s have transformed many public 
sector organisations into private sector company look-a-likes. These transformations require a 
board of directors to be appointed to the public corporate entities to take responsibility for 
making key strategic decisions in the management of those organisations. This development 
is seen to be important for public sector corporate entities as they take on the task of 
operating under the private sector guidelines. It was assumed that a change in structure and 
ownership would bring about improved performance in public sector corporate entities. 
Sufficient time has passed since New Zealand public sector organisations were transformed 
into private sector look-alikes, which makes it possible to study: (i) the nature of corporate 
governance practices in the public corporate entities in New Zealand; and (ii) whether the 
improved governance practices in the public sector corporate entities also lead to improved 
financial performance similar to the private sector companies.  
Norman (2006) and Devlin (2006) point out that there are key differences in the way 
governance practices are undertaken in public sector corporate entities compared with private 
sector organisations. State-appointed directors have to be politically acceptable. Performance 
is overwhelmingly based around compliance and micro-management; and, the rewards seem 
to be more to do with recognition, payback and egos than with financial recompense for 
skilled direction (Norman, 2006). Since board members in public corporate entities are 
appointed for political or diversity reasons, they do not necessarily contribute to or prescribe 
the policies themselves. So, in reality, such boards are, in fact, management committees 
overseeing the activities of their managers rather than setting the strategic direction of their 
organisations. A survey of directors on boards of state-owned entities found that the process 
for selection employed by the Crown Company Monitoring Advisory Unity (CCMAU) was 
„too drawn out‟ and did not sufficiently involve boards and their chairpersons (Norman, 
2006). 
The relative youth of most of the public corporate entities means that there has hitherto been 
no stock of retired executives or past experienced directors to lead boards of these 
enterprises. Ensuring that boards have the correct mix of experience, skills and competencies 
remains central to the performance of the entities. The government can draw on these skills to 
strengthen the technical knowledge of these boards. 
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The Public Finance Act 1989 introduced new systems of financial management and 
accountability into the state services. The 1989 Act introduced new and more transparent 
financial reporting and management systems, as well as improved accountability 
mechanisms, to allow government and parliamentary monitoring. The responsibility for 
achieving the contracted outputs rests with the chief executive of the relevant department or 
agency who is accountable to the relevant minister. The State Sector Act 1988, and later the 
Employment Contracts Act 1991, provided the tools necessary for managing the employment 
dimension of the „new‟ state sector. The Crown Entities Act 2004 provided a legislative 
clarification on the roles of the Crown companies and this is one of the key initiatives 
designed to support the government‟s goal of improving trust in government organisations. 
The reforms have been subject to a range of evaluations and scrutiny highlighting their 
advantages, disadvantages and unintended consequences (Pittard & Weeks, 2007). Although 
many commentators note that the reforms have resulted in major management and efficiency 
gains, there been a cost to the state sector in terms of employment, performance and 
accountability. Given that the underlying structural reforms are now over a decade old, their 
longer-term consequences have become more apparent (Pittard & Weeks, 2007).   
CCMAU has also adopted the nine high-level corporate governance principles and guidelines 
recommended by NZSC in 2004. In NZSC‟s view, the nine high level principles and 
guidelines would contribute to a high standard of corporate governance practices in New 
Zealand business entities. The key elements of the NZSC‟s principles and guidelines include: 
independence of the chair, non-executive/independent directors, audit independence, non-
audit services, board committees, adoption of international accounting standards and 
continuous disclosure. Although the focus of the NZSC‟s recommendations is towards listed 
companies, it does provide good guidelines for improving corporate governance practices in 
public corporate entities as well.  No study has been undertaken on the governance practices 
of the public sector entities in New Zealand. 
This study focuses on the wider range of variables, including governance practices 
recommended by the NZSC, variables identified in other governance studies to be important 
in mitigating agency problem, and variables that have not received much attention in other 
governance studies. Collectively these factors indicate that there exists an environment that is 
very different from those that have been the focus of earlier studies. 
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This research looks at the control mechanisms within a corporate governance structure that 
could be used to align the interest of ownership and control. Although previous research has 
added to our knowledge of the relationship between corporate governance practices and 
financial performance, the present study provides a contribution and uniqueness to the 
literature in terms of the small country -New Zealand- the size of companies and sectoral 
differences (see Andjekovic, Boyle & McNoe, 2002; Fox, 1996a, 1996b; Fox & Hamilton, 
1994; Fox & Walker, 1995a, 1995b, 1998; Hossain, Cahan & Adams, 2000; Hossain et al., 
2001). Most of the studies on corporate governance practices and financial performance are 
based on larger developed economies like the US and the UK. Their findings are not usually 
generalisable to smaller countries which have different economic structures and companies 
smaller in size compared to the companies in larger economies. 
Also, the studies on corporate governance practices and financial performance to date tend to 
focus on publicly listed companies only. This study aims to extend the literature by providing 
corporate governance practices by different sectors, specifically, small cap companies, large 
cap companies and public sector corporate entities. This study will control for the industry 
and entity-specific factors, allowing for more precise observation of the governance-
performance relationship to be undertaken. 
As stated above, the study relating to small and large cap companies is notable in a number of 
ways. First, New Zealand has a very small capital market compared to the UK and the US 
(which were the focus of prior studies) meaning that managerial decisions are likely to be 
more transparent. New Zealand‟s domestic market capitalisation in 2007 was approximately 
US$48 million in comparison to the US (US$20 billion), UK (US$4billion), Canada (US$2.1 
billion) and Australia (US$1.3 billion) (World Federation of Exchanges, 2010).   A high level 
of transparency may lead to a more competitive market for managerial labour (Fama, 1980) 
and as a consequence, may have potential for a greater convergence of interest. Second, the 
enactment of the Companies Act 1993, the amendments thereafter and the Securities Act 
1988 and the amendments thereafter, have substantially increased director accountability in 
New Zealand by strengthening internal control mechanisms. This could impact the alignment 
of the interests between managers and shareholders, which consequently has the potential to 
impact on the relationship between insider ownership and company financial performance. 
Third, this study focuses on small cap and large cap companies instead of just large 
companies which were the focus of governance research undertaken overseas. Fourth, large 
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companies in New Zealand are comparatively smaller than similar type companies in larger 
economies which may provide evidence that is different from studies conducted overseas. 
Fifth, the effect of small cap companies‟ compliance on performance is not widely 
researched. Sixth, small companies are not ranked highly by potential board members who 
are seeking board appointments and the problem is exacerbated in New Zealand because the 
pool of directors available for board appointments is small. This makes the study of small cap 
companies in New Zealand more interesting than large cap companies. Seventh, the 
overboarding by some board members in large companies raises questions about their 
accountability and financial performance. Eighth, the governance practices in the public 
sector corporate entities are not well understood. Finally, this study focuses on the wider 
range of variables, including governance practices recommended by the New Zealand 
Securities Commission which have not received attention in other governance studies. 
Collectively, these factors indicate that there exists an environment which is very different 
from those that have been the focus of earlier studies. 
1.5 ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS 
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows. In Chapter 2 a review of the corporate 
governance variables and companies‟ financial performance literature is undertaken. This 
review is primarily based on previous studies that focused on corporate governance practices 
and company financial performance. Chapter 3 provides a discussion on the corporate 
governance practices in New Zealand. It includes a brief discussion on the development of 
corporate governance regulatory regimes in publicly listed companies and the role of various 
monitoring organisations. It also provides a discussion on the development of governance in 
public sector corporate entities and the role of the monitoring agencies. Chapter 4 describes 
the measurement of variables, data and the methodology undertaken for the empirical 
analysis. Chapter 5 provides a discussion on the empirical results for the governance practices 
in small cap companies in New Zealand. Chapter 6 provides a discussion on the empirical 
results for the governance practices in large cap companies in New Zealand. Chapter 7 
provides a discussion on the empirical results for the governance practices in public sector 
corporate entities in New Zealand. Chapter 8 presents the conclusions, contributions, policy 
implications and future directions for governance research.   
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CHAPTER 2  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
The question as to whether corporate governance matters in terms of company value has, 
been extensively debated in corporate governance literature over the last 40 years or so. The 
root of this debate can be traced to Adam Smith who, as early as 1776, raised concerns 
regarding the separation of ownership from control, as stated below:  
 
The directors of such [joint-stock] companies, however, being the managers 
rather of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, 
that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which 
the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like 
the stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small 
matters as not for their master’s honour, and very easily give themselves a 
dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, must 
always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a 
company (Smith, 1776 & 1939 cited in Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
 
In Adam Smith‟s view, the separation of ownership and control in corporations created poor 
incentives for professional managers to operate companies efficiently. Adam Smith 
postulated that if shareholders want managers to operate companies in their own best interest, 
then they need to devise ways to control managers‟ actions. 
Echoing Adam Smith‟s views, Berle and Means (1932) in their seminal work pointed out that 
the modern corporations have diffused ownership structure which allows managers to have 
discretionary power over the company. According to Berle and Means, large corporations 
have many owners each making only a small investment in the company who either do not 
have an interest
5
 and/or resources (knowledge, time and money) to monitor managers‟ 
actions. The costs incurred by small shareholders in monitoring managers‟ actions tend to 
outweigh the benefits they derive from it. For these reasons, the small shareholders tend to 
leave the role of monitoring to the large shareholders, while enjoying the benefits of 
                                                 
5
 They can always exit by selling their shares in the company. 
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monitoring without incurring any costs. As a result, the consequences are free-rider 
problems
6
 (Grossman & Hart, 1980) and absenteeism from general meetings. This  leaves 
managers unchecked to pursue self-interest activities (such as, shirking and other 
opportunistic behaviour) at the expense of the shareholders (Berle & Means, 1932). 
In both Adam Smith and Berle and Means‟ view, the separation of ownership from control 
made modern corporations an untenable form of organisation. The challenge then became to 
find mechanisms that allowed shareholders to have control over managers‟ actions so that 
managers continuously worked towards maximising company value.  
There are differing views in the literature as to how the issues arising from the separation of 
ownership and control could be resolved. Some believed that tighter regulation would ensure 
that managers would act in an honest and responsible manner (Cary, 1974; Gilbert, 1956; 
Ruder, 1965). Others argued this was not a viable strategy (see below). Neo-classical 
economists believed that competition would cure all market illnesses and would force 
companies to adopt optimal structures that would lead to the maximisation of the company 
value. The company that did not adopt cost-effective structures would fail to survive 
competition and therefore vanish.  
The extant literature highlights a number of factors that are present in a competitive market 
that have potential to discipline managers to act in the best interests of companies‟ owners, 
including: (i) product market competition (Alchian, 1950; Stigler, 1958); (ii) the market for 
corporate control (Manne, 1965); and (iii) labour market pressure (Fama, 1980). However, 
the deficiencies in the product, factor and capital markets arising from market failures, such 
as principal-agent problems, asymmetric information, and fund hold-up issues, tend to divert 
companies from wealth maximising equilibrium. A general lack of market for corporate 
control in some countries, (especially in New Zealand, Japan and Continental Europe) further 
reduces the range of mechanisms available in the market to discipline managers to engage in 
performance enhancing activities.  The product, factor and capital market deficiencies 
provide managers with opportunities to expropriate shareholders‟ rent (Berle & Means, 1932; 
Roe, 1994). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that while competition tends to reduce 
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 Full cost of monitoring is born by the monitoring shareholders and only a fraction of the benefits are 
appropriated. The rest is claimed by the non-monitoring shareholders. 
16 
 
expropriation by managers, in itself, it may not be sufficient to engender company financial 
performance.  
A relatively recent development within the economics discipline has been an emergence of 
new literature so-called institutional economics which attempts to extend the range of 
neoclassical theory by highlighting the importance of institutions that are fundamental to the 
effective functioning of market-based economies, such as law and order, property rights, 
contracts, and governance structures (Rutherford, 2001). The role of institutions in the 
process of economic growth has long been emphasised by North (1990) and Duncan (2003). 
The importance of the financial system for growth and poverty reduction has been established 
by Levine (1997) and World Bank (2001). As companies work within a governance 
framework set by law, by regulation, by the companies‟ own constitution, by those who own 
and fund them, and by the expectations of those they serve; therefore their choice of internal 
governance is only a reflection of the appropriate and enforceable legal system (Cadbury, 
2003). Also governance framework tends to differ from country to country, owing much to 
history and culture (and it involves both rules and institutions). The standard of corporate 
governance therefore are determined by the measures which companies take for themselves 
to improve the way they are directed and controlled, and by the legal, financial, and ethical 
environment in which they work (Cadbury, 2003).  
From the 1970s onwards, starting in the US, many companies sought to attract managerial 
talent by offering executive stock options. In addition, there has been development in the 
market for corporate control and regulation. These are some of the examples of the market‟s 
response to address market failures. Studies also show that market competitiveness is 
enhanced by a strong regulatory and legal environment (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). The views 
presented by Berle and Means (1932), Coase (1937) and later by Williamson (1970)
7
 that 
different agents have different interests made economists realise that competition alone 
would not cure the problems faced by modern corporations involving managers‟ 
performances, financing and corporate control. The need to explore other measures in 
addition to competition to control managers‟ behaviour became the focus of the research. The 
                                                 
7 Williamson (1970) used transaction cost economics (also referred as TCE) to explain the issues around writing 
contracts and the possible costs associated with it when one is not able to write perfect contracts. 
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agency-theoretic literature identifies a number of mechanisms that are internal and external to 
the company that shareholders can use to control managers‟ behaviour. These mechanisms 
are tools shareholders can use to minimise the effect of agency costs on company value 
(Becht, Bolton & Roell2002; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Tirole, 2001). The section below 
discusses agency theory and the mechanisms that have been supported in the literature that 
have the potential to motivate managers to pursue the interests of their shareholders by 
maximising the value of the company, and not the size or diversity of their organisation. 
2.1 AGENCY THEORY 
Agency theory is based on the proposition that there is a separation between ownership and 
control. Jensen and Meckling (1976) used agency theory to show that a manager who owns 
anything less than 100% of the residual cash flow rights of the company has potential 
conflicts with the outside shareholders (Denis, 2001; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). According 
to Jensen and Meckling, the owner (principal) and the manager (agent) have different 
interests and they refer to the divergence of interest as an agency problem. The agency 
problem is based on two limitations, regarding human beings ability to make allocative 
decisions (Williamson, 1970). First, adverse selection or bounded rationality problems 
prevent investors (principals) from knowing a priori whether the managers (agents) they have 
employed are good or bad resource allocators. Second, the problem of moral hazard or 
opportunism reflects proclivity, which is inherent in an individualistic society, whereby 
managers as agents use their positions as resource allocators to pursue their own self-interests 
and not necessarily the interests of the companies‟ principals. Because of these limitations, 
companies‟ shareholders are unable to write perfect contracts ex ante. To minimise the effect 
of agency problems on company value, shareholders have to incur costs and these costs are 
referred to in the literature as the agency costs.  
The literature identifies four sources through which agency costs could arise from 
shareholders‟ inability to write perfect contracts for the agents. These are: (i) managerial 
shirking and consumption of perquisites; (ii) managers‟ desire to remain in power; (iii) 
managerial risk aversion; and (iv) free cash flow (see Denis, 2001). The least costly and the 
most obvious of the four sources of agency costs is managerial shirking and consumption of 
perquisites. By virtue of managers having control over the companies‟ operations, they have 
the ability to realise private benefits which effectively are borne by the shareholders ex post.  
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The other three sources of agency costs are less obvious but are more costly to the 
shareholders. Agency costs arise from managers who are not able to create value for the 
company but wish to remain in power. Not having the management team focused on creating 
value leads to the divergence of interest between managers and shareholders. Companies‟ 
shareholders face agency costs from managers who are risk averse. Finance theory suggests 
that owners with well-diversified portfolios will not be averse to company-specific risk 
(Brealey & Myers, 1995). Since shareholders hold well-diversified portfolios, they would like 
managers to maximise the value of their investment by investing in risky projects that have 
higher expected returns. However, a managers‟ human capital is specific to the company only 
and would lose more if the project failed. Therefore, managers may be unwilling to invest in 
projects that are worthwhile from the shareholders‟ point of view. In addition, managers have 
access to the company‟s free cash flows as well.  
Shareholders also face agency costs from companies‟ free cash flows not being invested in 
value generating projects. Shareholders would like managers to invest free cash flows in 
positive net present value (NPV) generating projects. However, managers would like to hold 
cash flows and/or may even invest in negative NPV projects rather than return cash flows to 
the companies‟ shareholders. Research shows that managers aim to increase the size of the 
company and not the return because executive compensation plans often reward company 
size (Chalmers, Koh & Stapledon, 2006; Murphy, 1985; Shah, Javed & Abbas, 2009; Tosi, 
Werner,Katz & Gomez-Mejia, 2000). 
The extant literature is motivated by the assumption that, by managing the principal-agent 
problem between shareholders and managers, companies will operate more efficiently and 
perform better. In this regard, the agency theory literature identifies a number of mechanisms 
which shareholders could use to ensure managers strive to achieve outcomes that are in 
shareholders best interest (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). These mechanisms can either be internal 
and/or external to the company. The mechanisms that are internal to the company include: 
insider ownership (ownership by officers and the board), board independence, board size, 
board diversity, board committees, leverage, and dividends.  The mechanisms that are 
external to the company include: block ownership, institutional ownership, market for 
corporate control, product market competition, labour market competition and legislation (see 
Barnhart & Rosenstein, 1998; Byrd, Parrino & Pritsch, 1998; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; 
Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998). 
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Being rational entrepreneurs, shareholders continuously evaluate the costs and benefits of 
employing particular monitoring mechanisms to oversee management. It is assumed that 
shareholders will agree to certain governance mechanisms depending on: (i) whether it 
narrows the gap between the shareholder interests and the managers‟ interests; and (ii) 
whether it increases shareholders‟ value. Theoretically, if the answer to the first question is 
yes, then the answer to the second question should also be yes as well. 
The section that follows provides a theoretical explanation of the effect of the use of the 
internal and external governance mechanisms on company value. 
2.1.1 INSIDER OWNERSHIP 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) proposed an incentive alignment hypothesis to mitigate agency 
problems arising from separation of ownership and control. They suggest shareholders will 
benefit by making management want the same things as they do, that is, by making 
management benefit – financially or otherwise, from an increase in the value of the 
company‟s common stock. In other words, giving managers shares in the company is one 
way of aligning managers‟ interest with those of the shareholders, thus reducing agency costs 
to some extent. Based on this incentive alignment hypothesis, Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
propose a linear relationship between managerial ownership and corporate financial 
performance, that is, performance increases with the level of management or insider 
ownership
8
 in a company.  
On the other hand, Demsetz (1983) argues that the increased level of insider ownership will 
reduce company financial performance . This is referred to in the literature as an 
entrenchment hypothesis, which is in direct contrast to the incentive alignment hypothesis of 
Jensen and Meckling (1976). Proponents of the entrenchment hypothesis argue using the 
expropriation effect (expropriation hypothesis) of minority shareholders, that by providing 
managers with share ownership to align their interests with the shareholders may not 
effectively solve the agency problem (Johnson, Boone & Breach, 2000; Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997).  The entrenchment effect happens when large shareholders use company resources for 
                                                 
8
 Although Jensen and Meckling (1976) initially focused on only managerial ownership as an incentive to align 
interest of managers and shareholders, this argument has been extended to board members as well. Different 
categories of insider ownership used in research include: CEO equity, managerial equity, officer and director 
equity, inside board equity, and outside board equity (Dalton, Daily, Trevis & Roengpitya, 2003).  
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their own benefit, at the expense of the minority shareholders. The ex-post expropriation by 
large (or controlling) shareholders is likely to lead to sub-optimal levels of investment by 
minority investors and other stakeholders (Maher & Anderson, 1999), and according to 
Faccio and Lang (2002), this effect happens in companies when large shareholders are 
present. 
Other studies have suggested that the relationship between managerial ownership and 
corporate financial performance is non-monotonic. Studies by Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990, 1995), Stulz (1988), Steiner (1996) and Han and Suk 
(1998)
9
 show that the relationship between managerial ownership structure and company 
value is non-linear, although the inflection points found in these studies are not 
homogeneous. These studies show that at low levels of managerial ownership, managerial 
ownership aligns the interest of managers and outside shareholders by reducing managerial 
incentives for perk consumption, utilisation of insufficient effort and engagement in non-
maximising projects (alignment effect). However, after some level of managerial ownership, 
managers exert insufficient effort, collect private benefits and entrench themselves at the 
expense of other investors (entrenchment effect).  
The theory does not provide any guidance on the level of insider ownership at which 
shareholder value is maximised and/or the exact nature of the relationship between insider 
(managerial) ownership and financial performance. However, empirical evidence does 
provide support for the view that some low levels of insider ownership increases financial 
performance and at some higher levels of insider ownership the tendency is for financial 
performance to decrease. Being rational entrepreneurs, shareholders continuously evaluate 
the costs and benefits
10
 of employing a particular monitoring mechanism to oversee 
                                                 
9
 Others who found similar results include: Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), Kole (1996) and Wruck (1989). 
Hermalin and Weisbach found performance measured by Tobin‟s Q increases in the managerial ownership 
range of 0%-1% and decreases in the range of 1%-5%. Kole found performance measured by Tobin‟s Q 
increases in the managerial ownership range of 0%-5%. Wruck (1989) found performance measured by 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) increases in the managerial ownership range of 0%-5% and decreases in the 
range of 5%-25%.  
10
 The incomplete contracting literature views the standard financial instrument (e.g. equity) as conferring both 
control rights and rights to a return stream on income for their holders (Berglof, 1990). 
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management. It is assumed that shareholders will agree to a level of insider ownership that 
will maximise their benefit.  
Scholarship in agency theory seeks to determine the level of insider ownership that will 
minimise agency costs; the costs of monitoring, motivating and ensuring the commitment of 
the agent (Davies & Thompson, 1994). In this regard, the focus of corporate governance 
research since 1976 has primarily been based on agency theory, which is also characterised as 
“a theory of the ownership (or capital) structure of the company” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, 
p. 309). Despite substantial empirical research undertaken to determine the relationship 
between managerial ownership and company financial performance, the findings are 
inconsistent, thus limiting theory development in this field (Sánchez-Ballesta & García-Meca, 
2007). The inconsistencies in the findings are attributable mainly to the differences in the 
investigation effort reflecting different points in time, varying geographical contexts, and 
different terminologies, definitions and variables.  
Extant literature reflects two common themes in regard to using insider (managerial) 
ownership to mitigate agency costs. First, interest alignment that provides managers with 
equity stakes in the company enables shareholders to align managers‟ interest with their own. 
Presumably, financial performance improves as managers concurrently work for their own 
and shareholders‟ benefit (Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Perry & Zenner, 2000). Second, control 
can be attained by having concentrated ownership and there is a stream of literature 
indicating that shareholders can exercise control by appointing the board of directors (see 
Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Bethel, Liebeskind & Opler, 1998; Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand & 
Johnson, 1998).  
2.1.2 CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP 
One way of controlling managers‟ actions is to have concentrated shareholding in the 
company. Two types of concentrated shareholding from outsiders mentioned in the literature 
are by institutions and blockholders. Empirical evidence suggests that concentrated holding 
may mitigate a number of agency problems inherent in the company (Prowse, 1994). 
Although agency theory does not differentiate between different types of large equity holders, 
research undertaken recently shows that the identity of such owners has implications for 
companies because different owners have different objectives (Bushee, 1998; Thomsen & 
Pedersen, 2000).  
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When institutions and blockholders hold substantially large equity stakes in the company, it 
gives them power to make management serve their interest (Agrawal & Mandelker, 1990; 
Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Hill & Snell, 1988, 1989; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986) and thus 
improves company financial performance (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985, p. 1174). Agrawal and 
Mendelker (1990) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue using the active monitoring 
hypothesis that concentrated shareholdings are better monitors than other shareholders.  
However, agency theory is based on the assumption that an efficient capital market and the 
value of the residual claims held by shareholders are reflected in the share price on the stock 
market. Efficient capital markets allow companies to have access to cheaper sources of funds. 
The market efficiency serves as the mechanism to discipline a company‟s governance 
structures that is reflected in its share price. In countries where corporate control activities 
(mergers, acquisitions and takeovers) are inactive (or not well developed), the role of the 
capital market in providing the monitoring role tends to be ineffective compared to those 
countries where there has been a shift towards reliance on other control mechanisms (Jensen, 
1983) such as concentrated shareholdings. For example, the presence of weak minority 
investor protection rights, a weak capital market  and a lack of anti-takeover regulations has 
led to a concentrated ownership structure in listed companies in New Zealand (Anderson & 
Marshall, 2007; Gunasekarage & Reed, 2008).  Given that the monitoring benefits for the 
shareholders are proportionate to their equity stake (see Grossman & Hart, 1988), a small or 
average shareholder has little or no incentive to exert monitoring behaviour. It is argued that 
only concentrated shareholders (individual and institutions) have the incentive to undertake 
monitoring or other costly control activities.  
Although concentrated shareholding is restricted
11
 in Anglo-Saxon countries, evidence shows 
that it is on the rise (Gugler, 2005). Anyone holding five percent or more of voting equity in 
Anglo-Saxon countries is required to declare it in the company‟s annual reports. Whereas, it 
is common in continental Europe
12
 for large shareholders to hold, on average, 30% to 55% of 
the voting power in companies. In these countries, the capital market is not well developed 
and the agency problem arising from the separation of ownership and control is not an issue. 
                                                 
11
 Equity holdings by financial institutions are restricted in Australia, Canada, the United States and New 
Zealand but not in the UK. 
12
 Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Spain 
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The issues regarding corporate governance in these countries is the conflict of interest arising 
between large shareholders and minority owners.  
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Gugler (1999) provide empirical evidence that concentrated 
shareholders do receive private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. La Porta et 
al. (2002) state that the existence of concentrated shareholding is a reflection of weak 
minority shareholder rights. It is argued that in countries that have strong regulations 
protecting minority shareholder rights (Anglo-Saxon), concentrated shareholding can act as 
an effective mechanism to control management‟s opportunistic behaviour. 
2.1.3 BOARD OF DIRECTORS   
In addition to having equity ownership by managers and concentrated shareholders to control 
managers‟ actions, the role of the board of directors is also regarded as an important internal 
control mechanism to resolve the agency problem in modern corporations. Fama and Jensen 
(1983a) discuss the role of organisational mechanisms in mitigating agency conflicts and 
better aligning management interests with those of residual claimants. Among the most 
important organisational controls is the board of directors. The board of directors can reduce 
agency conflict by separating the management and control aspects of the decision making 
processes. The management aspects include the initiation and implementation of decisions, 
while the control aspect involves the ratification and monitoring of decisions (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983a, 1983b). While management is delegated by the board to initiate and 
implement various decisions, it is the board that has the control and authority to ratify and 
monitor major policy initiatives and to hire, fire, and set the compensation of top level 
managers (Fama & Jensen, 1983a). It is the role of the board to replace poorly performing 
managers. The board of directors is legally and ethically responsible for the owners. A board 
of directors is an efficient and less expensive governance mechanism than other internal and 
external mechanisms. 
The literature highlights a number of characteristics of boards of directors that have the 
potential to enhance board performance, including: board composition, board size and board 
diversity.  
2.1.3.1 BOARD COMPOSITION  
The structure and composition of the board tends to differ in different countries. Germany has 
a two-tier board structure, that is, a non-executive supervisory board and management board. 
Traditionally, Japanese boards are large, having thirty or more members, and mainly 
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dominated by executives. In the United States, boards are smaller and mainly made up of 
outsiders. In Britain, Australia, Canada and New Zealand, boards have a mix of insiders and 
outsiders. In some countries, the board is prescribed in law, in others by custom. One thing 
common to all countries is that the board is ultimately responsible for the conduct of the 
company. This highlights the importance board plays in monitoring management. 
Studies undertaken in Anglo-Saxon countries show that boards have been ineffective in 
recognising problems faced by the company and standing up to management, especially when 
tough decisions are necessary (Jensen, 1983). Denis (2001) points out that on average, the 
role of the boards of directors in monitoring companies has been poorly executed.  According 
to Davis, Lukomnik and Pitt-Watson (2006), boards have insufficient information, exert 
improper influence and in some cases are even incompetent. In most cases the non-executive 
directors are not given all the information about the company they need to make quality 
decisions as most information is held by the CEO. Lack of information restricts even talented 
boards from performing to their level of expertise. These have been factors that have 
conspired to corrode board performance. 
The demise of high profile companies such as Adelphia, Enron, Parmalat, Tyco and 
WorldCom (to name a few) demonstrates how there has been a diversion of board loyalty 
from the shareholders to the CEOs, evidenced by the extraordinary excesses in executive pay 
awarded by directors to CEOs (Davis et al., 2006). The board not being independent of 
management is the reason for the abrogation of accountability by directors to owners. Board 
independence is compromised by having board duality
13 
or joint board leadership.  
In a two-tier board structure, executive boards are comprised of the top-level management 
team, while the supervisory board is completely composed of outside experts with a broader 
control function (Moerland, 1995). Supervisory boards composed only of outside 
independent directors, who do not have any affiliation with the management, are considered 
to be important for controlling agency costs (Daily & Dalton, 1992, 1994). 
Taking this view, the proponents of the board-as-monitors argue that a board that is 
independent of management and dependent on shareholders will be more effective in aligning 
the interests of managers and owners (Bebchuk & Fried, 2004). Recent policy statements 
                                                 
13
 Occurs when CEO is also chair of the board, also referred to as joint board leadership (Daily & Dalton, 1997). 
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such as Cadbury (1992), Greenbury Report (1995) and Hampel Report (1998) focused 
attention on boards‟ monitoring responsibilities and highlighted the special contribution that 
non-executive and independent directors can make to this process (Young, 2000). Two key 
recommendations from these reports included the separation of the board chair and CEO role, 
and that the boards should contain sufficient numbers of non-executive and independent 
directors to help ensure managerial accountability to shareholders. These recommendations 
have influenced the platform in which board effectiveness is now debated in different 
countries.  
The failure of high profile companies in the US in 2001 raised concerns that the current 
system of corporate governance practices was not working and there was a need to improve 
the quality of governance practices in order to maintain the confidence of investors in the 
capital market. The focus primarily was on two broad issues: (i) how to make boards 
independent of management; and (ii) how to improve the quality of the corporate governance 
practices of each company. To this end, the appropriateness of a flexible-based governance 
approach versus a “one size fits all” rule-based approach to address governance concerns was 
debated by many countries. The need for regulation to influence corporate governance 
structure and disclosure is often challenged in the academic as well as in the professional 
literature. Jensen (1983) points out that, “The legal/political/regulatory system is too blunt an 
instrument to handle the problems of wasteful managerial behaviour effectively.” Despite this 
argument, the United States has adopted a rule-based governance structure - Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002. Whereas other countries (including Australia, Canada, the UK and New 
Zealand), have adopted a nuanced principle-based approach.  The principles, guidelines and 
the Codes of Best Practice emphasise the importance of having an independent chair and as 
well as non-executive and independent directors on the board.  
The New Zealand Securities Commission (NZSC, 2004) published nine high level principles 
and guidelines for all economic entities in New Zealand. It articulated that the majority of the 
board members should be non-executive and a minimum of one third of the board members 
should be independent
14
. The role of the chair and the CEO position should be separated and 
                                                 
14
 A non-executive director is classified as independent only where s/he does not represent a substantial 
shareholder and where the board is satisfied that s/he has no direct or indirect interest or relationship that could 
reasonably influence their judgement and decision making as a director. 
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the chair should be an independent director only. It emphasised the need to have an audit 
committee which should have at least three members and comprise only of non-executive and 
independent directors with a majority being independent. At least one member of the audit 
committee should be a chartered accountant or have another form of financial expertise. The 
chair of the audit committee should be an independent director and not be chairperson of the 
board. All entities, particularly those with large boards, are also encouraged to have a 
remuneration committee as well as a nomination committee. Proponents claim that such 
practice will be a significant step towards better governance. 
Principles, guidelines or codes do not have a force of law; the proposal on board composition 
is best viewed as a statement of best practice rather than a regulatory intervention. 
Compliance is voluntary and companies remain free to choose their own board composition. 
In New Zealand, the stock exchange listing rules require companies to publish a statement 
explaining why the principles, guidelines or best practice were not followed. The securities 
regulator (for example, NZSC) assesses the information disclosed in the annual reports of 
each company against the set guidelines. This is intended to improve the quality of corporate 
governance practices of each company.  
However, the quality of information disclosed by companies in the annual reports is not 
assessed in most countries apart from Canada (Labelle, 2002). Also, the quality of 
explanations provided by companies that do not follow set guidelines are not assessed. 
Opponents argue that comply-or-explain policies fail to provide motivation for companies to 
disclose quality governance information in their annual reports. Theory provides two reasons 
why companies would elect to adopt governance provisions. First, adoption of such 
provisions could act as a signalling device to ensure prospective investors that the company is 
well-governed. Such signals could enable the company to access external funds on better 
terms, which is beneficial for company valuation. Second, governance provisions could also 
act as a bonding device, where companies commit to investors to adhere to better governance 
standards (Chhaochharia & Laeven, 2007). 
The opponents also claim that the greater use of non-executive and independent directors for 
monitoring and control purposes is either irrelevant, excessively costly, or a threat to board 
unity. Fama and Jensen (1983a) suggest that executive directors represent an important 
source of company-specific knowledge and that their presence on the board can lead to more 
effective decision making. Rosenstein and Wyatt (1997)  present evidence that, under certain 
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conditions, the appointments of additional executive directors is associated with an increase 
in company value.  
With arguments for and against a move towards greater non-executive and independent 
director representation on the board, the precise outcome of recent changes remains an open 
question. However, there is a general consensus that there should be a balance between 
executive, and non-executive and independent director representation on the board.  
2.1.3.2 BOARD SIZE  
In addition to board composition, the size of the board seems to impact company financial 
performance. Studies show that there is a strong relationship between company size and 
board size (Reddy, Locke, Scrimgeour & Gunasekarage, 2008a). Theoretically, there is an 
optimal board size for each company. Jensen (1983) suggests that a board should have a 
maximum of seven to eight members to function effectively. Organisational behaviour 
researchers argue that when boards grow larger, total productivity exhibits diminishing 
returns (Hackman, 1990). Forbes and Milliken (1999) argue that larger boards are difficult to 
coordinate and have difficulties in making value-maximising strategic decisions. Lipton and 
Lorsch (1992) suggest that larger boards may be less effective monitors because of the 
inability of members to fully express their ideas and concerns during the limited time 
available at board meetings. This inability allows the CEO to exert considerable control over 
meetings of larger boards and hinders the board‟s monitoring effectiveness.  
However, the proponents for larger boards argue using resource dependency theory (Dalton, 
Daily, Johnson & Ellstrand, 1999; Hillman, Cannella & Paetzold, 2000; Johnson, Daily & 
Ellstrand, 1996) that large boards tend to provide an increased pool of expertise and 
environmental linkages that companies need (Goodstein, Gautam & Boeker, 1994). Also, 
Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2004),  Klein (2002a) and Monk and Minnow (1995) find that 
larger boards provide greater degrees of freedom for optimal committee assignments, thus 
improving the quality of monitoring. 
On the other hand, the proponents for small board size argue that smaller boards are more 
likely to reach consensus and also allow members to engage in genuine debate and interaction 
(Firstenberg & Malkiel, 1994). Boone, Field, Karpoff and Raheja (2007), Coles, Daniel and 
Naveen (2006), Linch, Netter and Yang (2006) and Raheja (2005) state that optimality of 
board size is situational, that is, it depends on the nature of the company. It is assumed that 
28 
 
when determining the appropriate size of the board, the skills directors have and the skills 
that are required are the factors that are considered.  
2.1.3.3 BOARD DIVERSITY 
As women and minorities are becoming a larger proportion of the workforce in the modern 
economy, corporations are experiencing significant changes in pools of potential candidates 
for high-ranking officer positions (Berke, 1997; Berke & Nelson, 2002; Conyon & Mallin, 
1997; Holton, 1995). The diversification of these resource pools impacts the composition of 
boards of directors and subsequently corporate governance (Shrader, Blackburn & Iles, 
1997). While diversity within boards of directors may be a highly visible effort to 
demonstrate an absence of discrimination, it is unclear if diversity within boards of directors 
has an impact on organisational performance (Erhardt, Werbel & Shrader, 2003). The 
diversity literature suggests diversity adversely impacts group dynamics, but improves group 
decision-making. Two categories of board diversity mentioned in the literature include 
observable diversity (which is readily detectable) and less visible diversity (background of 
directors) (Milliken & Martins, 1996). Observable diversity includes race/ethnicity, 
nationality, gender and age. Less visible diversity includes education, functional and 
occupational background, industry experience and organisational membership. The 
advantages of having board diversity is that it improves the understanding of the market 
place, increases creativity, innovation and effectiveness when problem solving (Carter, 
Simkins & Simpson, 2003). Board diversity can also promote more effective global 
relationships and increase board independence because people with different gender, 
ethnicity or cultural backgrounds might ask questions that would not come from directors 
with similar backgrounds (Arfken, Bellar & Reeb, 2004).  
2.1.3.4 BOARD COMMITTEES 
The NZSC (2004) recommends that companies should have audit committees to oversee the 
audit of the financial statements and a remuneration committee for setting remuneration of 
executive officers and directors. The appointment of such committees is expected to have a 
positive effect on company financial performance. Empirical research focusing on the 
presence of an audit committee has associated companies with fewer financial reporting 
problems (McMullen, 1996). John and Senbet (1998) report empirical evidence that the 
presence of monitoring committees (audit and nominations) is positively related to factors 
associated with the benefits of monitoring. Klein (2002b) shows that independent audit 
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committees reduce the likelihood of earnings management, thus improving transparency. 
However, Baxter (2006) finds no significant relationship between audit committee and 
financial reporting quality.  
On the other hand, Main and Johnston (1998) and Weir and Laing (2000) report that the 
existence of a remuneration committee has a positive effect on financial performance. Klein 
(1998) finds evidence of a positive relationship between the presence of a remuneration 
committee and company financial performance but notices this relationship is not highly 
significant.  
Despite the NZSC recommendations and guidelines to incorporate board committees, very 
few studies, to date, have focused on the relationship between board committees and 
company financial performance. Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand and Johnson (1998) provide a 
similar view, that relatively little research has been undertaken in the relationship between 
board sub committees and financial performance. In addition to the corporate governance 
mechanisms mentioned above, corporate governance literature identifies other mechanisms 
that have potential to enhance board vigilance and therefore, mitigate the agency problem 
(see Barnhart, Marr & Rosenstein, 1994; Byrd, Parrino & Pritsch, 1998; Demsetz & Lehn, 
1985; Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998). These governance mechanisms include CEO 
compensation, CEO influence (CEO age, tenure, and education), debt, dividends, and the 
market for corporate control, the managerial labour market competition, the product market 
competition, and legislation.  
2.1.4 CEO COMPENSATION, AGE, TENURE AND EDUCATION 
The executive compensation literature suggests that managers can be induced with incentives 
to act in the best interests of the shareholders. By linking managerial compensation (such as, 
salaries, cash bonuses, equity and stock options) to company financial performance allows 
compensation to be subject to similar risks faced by the shareholders, thus aligning 
managerial interest with shareholder interests. Since the remuneration packages vary across 
countries, optimality of contingent performance-based compensation depends on whether or 
not direct monitoring alternatives are available.  
Evidence shows that CEOs are paid target performance pays even if they do not meet their 
financial performance targets (Gunasekarage & Reed, 2008). This shows that the 
performance pay system is not working effectively (Davis et al., 2006; Moyle, 2008) and by 
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linking target payments to financial performance could improve productivity. Studies also 
show links between company size, CEO pay (Walking, 2008) and CEO age, tenure and 
education tend to influence CEO compensation  (Palia, 2001) and the level of influence 
CEOs have on the board. In order for the board to provide vigilance over CEO performance, 
governance reform focuses on board composition and remunerating board members to ensure 
the board‟s loyalty lies with the shareholders.  
2.1.5 DEBT 
Debt is viewed as an internal corporate governance mechanism that can voluntarily be used to 
transfer the functions of monitoring and evaluating managerial performance to the 
participants of the capital market (debtholders) (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Begley & 
Feltham, 1999; Jensen, 1986).  In this regard, the literature provides two directions regarding 
the monitoring function of debt financing. First, increased debt means a large part of the 
company‟s cash flow will be returned to the debtholders. Therefore, debt tends to reduce the 
discretionary power of the managers. Second, given the size of a company, debt financing 
decreases the company‟s need for new share issues and allows voting rights to be more 
concentrated in the hands of the remaining shareholders. Debt forces managers to consume 
fewer perquisites and become more efficient, as this lessens the probability of bankruptcy and 
the loss of control and reputation (Grossman & Hart, 1982). Harris and Raviv (1991) provide 
a comprehensive survey of the theories and related empirical evidence on the use of debt to 
mitigate agency conflicts and information asymmetry. They conclude that the evidence is 
broadly consistent with the theory.  
Debt can also create an agency problem. According to Novaes and Zingales (1999) the choice 
of debt from the viewpoint of shareholders differs from the choice of debt from the view 
point of managers. The conflict of interest between managers and shareholders over the 
financing policy arises for three reasons. First, managers are less diversified than 
shareholders, that is, in addition to holding stock and stock options of the company, their 
human capital is also specific to the company (Fama, 1980). Second, a larger level of debt 
pre-commits managers to work harder to generate and pay off the company‟s cash flows to 
outside investors (Jensen, 1986). Last, managers may increase leverage beyond the “optimal 
capital structure” to increase the voting power of their equity stakes and reduce the likelihood 
of a takeover and the resulting possible loss of job tenure (Harris & Raviv, 1988; Stulz, 
1988). A relatively high debt to assets ratio may be used to make a company less attractive as 
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a takeover target, substituting for other takeover defence mechanisms (Agrawal & Knoeber, 
1996; Begley & Feltham, 1999; Byrd & Stammerjohan, 1997; Knoeber, 1985). Also, a high 
level of debt may subject the company to agency costs of debt, especially in the form of risk 
shifting incentives. Shareholders may prefer riskier projects to compensate for additional risk 
faced by a high level of debt financing, thus raising a company‟s earnings volatility.  
With the argument for and against debt as a monitoring device, the consensus is that a lower 
level of debt is better for the company. The capital structure theory also suggests that there is 
an optimal level of debt for each company that will lead to the maximisation of their return.  
2.1.6 DIVIDENDS 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) argue that dividend policy is irrelevant under perfect market 
conditions. However, existence of market imperfections, such as differential tax rates, 
information asymmetry, agency problems, transaction costs, flotation costs and irrational 
investor behaviour, makes the dividends decision relevant (Hughes, 2008). In this respect, 
financial decisions are related to value as they convey information about future profitability. 
Dividend payments  and changes in dividend policies are regarded as conveying information 
(signalling effect) about permanent earnings (Baker, Veit & Powell, 2001; Brainard, Shoven 
& Weiss, 1980).  
Easterbrook (1984) argues that dividends play a role in controlling equity agency problems 
by facilitating primary capital market monitoring of the company activities and performance. 
The reason is that higher dividend payouts increase the likelihood of a company having to 
sell common stock in primary capital markets. In recent theoretical studies, Fluck (1998) and 
Myers (2000) provide agency-theoretic models of dividend behaviour, where managers pay 
dividends in order to avoid disciplining action by shareholders. Also, continued dividend 
payments help to dissipate cash which might otherwise be wasted on non value-maximising 
projects, therefore reducing the extent of over investment by managers (Jensen, 1986). 
The company‟s target ratio of dividend to earnings operates as a control instrument, just like 
debt financing. The higher the payout ratio, the smaller the amount of free cash flows 
available. Also, dividends impose much less severe constraints on a company‟s cash flow 
because payment of a dividend is not mandatory. Studies undertaken by Smith (1977), 
Hansen and Torregrosa (1992) and Jain and Kini (1999) recognise the importance dividend 
payments play in terms of improving monitoring by investment bankers in new equity issues. 
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2.1.7 MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL, LABOUR MARKET 
COMPETITION AND PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION 
2.1.7.1 MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 
Agency theorists believe that the capital market can determine corporate control and mitigate 
conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders. Through the process of mergers and 
acquisition capital market tends to discipline inefficient management. Theoretically, the 
takeover process occurs when the market perceives that the current management team is 
inefficient, based on certain performance indicators. Ideally, the market is supposed to react 
by offering an alternative to such management through a friendly or hostile takeover. The 
objective of this mechanism is to ensure that incumbent managers perform competently, in 
case the market acts in response to discipline them. 
The efficiency of the takeovers as a disciplinary mechanism is a hotly debated and an 
unresolved issue. Studies show that takeovers may have adverse effects on the dynamic 
efficiency of the company if the stakeholders reduce their company-specific investments. For 
example, if stakeholders think that takeovers will increase the probability that they will be 
expropriated ex-post, they may provide sub-optimal levels of company-specific investment 
ex-ante. Takeovers may also aggravate short term behaviour that may impinge on innovative 
activity and dynamic efficiency (Jarrell, Brickley & Netter, 1988). In some countries the 
market for corporate control is non-existent and in some countries (e.g. New Zealand) it is 
very small, which makes it difficult for takeovers to play a monitoring device for the 
managers. Therefore it is argued that there may be obstacles in the market for corporate 
control mechanisms to work effectively in some countries. 
2.1.7.2 LABOUR MARKET COMPETITION  
Fama (1980) investigated the governance properties of the managerial labour market and 
reported that managerial behaviour is shaped by the discipline and the opportunities for 
human capital provided by the labour market. Research suggests that managerial human 
capital is tightly linked to company financial performance. The higher the job competition 
among managers within and/or outside the company, the higher will be the manager‟s 
knowledge and responsive efforts to improve a company‟s financial performance (Brett & 
Stroh, 1997; Mahoney & Mahoney, 1993; Ocasio, 1999). This suggests that competition in 
the managerial labour market will lead to company financial performance.  
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2.1.7.3 PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION 
Competition in the product market is generally associated with allocative and productive 
efficiency. Competition encourages the supply of goods and services at the lowest price to 
reflect the underlying costs of provision. The monitoring function of the product market relies 
on the degree of competitive pressures faced by a company‟s output, which is related to its 
industry and level of product diversification. Publicly traded companies may be faced with a 
product market concentration where the competition is relatively low, or a highly competitive 
market where a large number of companies compete under the same conditions (Fama, 1980; 
Williamson, 1986). The empirical evidence provides support for the view that the 
discretionary behaviour of managers is also disciplined by the pressure of other companies 
competing in the same product market (Collin, 1998; Haye, 1997; Nickell, Nicolitsas & 
Dryden, 1997). This forces companies to implement devices to efficiently monitor the 
performance of a company‟s entire team as well as its individual members.  
However, countries that have complex patterns of ownership, such as, cross-shareholdings 
and familial control, tend to create large corporate groupings and high product market 
concentration. This leads to ownership concentration which promotes monopoly exploitation 
and allocative inefficiency. Monopoly abuse by keiretsu groups in Japan has been resolved by 
the establishment of competing industrial groups. This shows that in the presence of 
competition, efficient forms of governance can emerge by their own accord. The alternative 
view is that competition in the product market (allocative efficiency) may encourage 
competition for ownership in the corporate control market (productive efficiency), which may 
undermine the development of long-term relations between the various stakeholders, which 
are required for dynamic efficiency. Alternative governance mechanisms are required to gain 
productive efficiency in the presence of product market competition. Product market 
competition allows managers to align their decisions with owners‟ interests in an attempt to 
avoid bad performance, the loss of their job and reputation. 
2.1.8 LEGISLATION  
Studies show that market competitiveness is enhanced by the presence of a strong regulatory 
and legal environment, which in turn influences corporate governance structures. Countries 
that have a weak legal environment tend to have a weak and ineffective governance structure. 
Since corporate governance structures have an impact on company financial performance 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), countries that have weak governance structures generally tend to 
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have poor company financial performance. Therefore, the regulatory and legal environment is 
important for creating a strong competitive market, effective corporate governance systems 
and company financial performance. Hossain, et al. (2001) studied the effect of legislation 
passed in New Zealand in 1994 on company financial performance and concluded that 
effective corporate governance can be legislated. They found that the effect of the Companies 
Act and related legislation were relatively benign in influencing company financial 
performance and outside board representation. Reddy, et al. (2008b) studied the effect of the 
New Zealand Securities Commission‟s recommendations on company financial performance 
and found that compliance with the recommendations improved performance.  
The above sections provide theoretical explanations for the effect various governance 
mechanisms ought to have on company financial performance. As each company is organised 
differently, the effect each mechanism has on different companies may vary in practice and 
the sections that follow present results of the empirical findings of studies undertaken 
concerning various governance mechanisms and company financial performance. 
2.2 GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS AND FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE 
The effect internal and external governance mechanisms to control agency problems have on 
company financial performance has been the subject of a number of empirical studies. This 
section summarises the empirical studies that have been based on governance mechanisms 
(insider ownership, board composition, board committees, board size, board diversity, CEO 
influence (age, tenure and education), CEO compensation, debt, dividend policy) and 
company financial performance. 
A number of studies in accounting, economics, finance, and management disciplines have 
linked corporate governance practices to company performance. Both theoretical (Jensen, 
1986; La Porta et al., 2002; Shleifer & Wolfenzon, 2002) and empirical evidence (MacAvoy 
& Millstein, 2003; Millstein & MacAvoy, 1998; Reddy et al., 2008b) support the view that 
improved governance practices lead to improved company financial performance. However, 
previous research has focused mainly on large companies that are based in the United States 
and the United Kingdom. This tends to portray the view that findings from the US and the 
UK based research are automatically applicable to other environments.  
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As a result, little is known about the governance practices of companies outside these 
countries, especially New Zealand. Little is also known about the governance practices of 
small and medium sized companies and companies in the public sector.  
Demb and Neubauer (1992) state that the mechanisms that different countries use to guide 
and monitor their corporations are path dependent, that is, they have their roots in the nation‟s 
history. The relative impact and structure of each element differs across national settings 
which in turn reflects its importance based on cultural values, history and traditions (Demb, 
1996). While these arguments reject the notion of universal governance practices, also 
suggests that policy and research will be more effective if it takes account of the potential 
differences in the governance practices that exist in different companies, sectors and 
countries. 
Despite these shortcomings, previous research has come up with many possible governance 
mechanisms that shareholders could use to mitigate the agency problem. Their empirical 
findings are discussed below. 
2.2.1  INSIDER OWNERSHIP AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
A number of studies provide empirical evidence of a direct relationship between equity 
ownership by insiders (officers and directors) and company‟s financial performance. Mehran 
(1995) examined the executive compensation structure of 153 large and small manufacturing 
companies in the US and reported that company financial performance measured by Tobin‟s 
Q15 was positively related to the percentage of equity held by managers as well as to the 
percentage of their compensation that was equity-based. Welch (2003) studied 114 
companies listed in the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) and reported that company 
financial performance (Tobin‟s Q) was dependent on ownership. Kim, Lee and Francis 
(1988) studied 157 companies and found a significant positive relationship between insider 
ownership and stock returns. Oswald and Jahera, Jr. (1991) studied 645 companies listed in 
the New York and American Stock Exchanges between 1982 and 1987 and found that insider 
ownership was positively associated with company financial performance measured by 
excess stock returns. Ang, Cole, and Lin (2000) examined 1,708 small corporations in the US 
and found that agency costs (measured by the ratio of operating expenses to annual sales) 
                                                 
15
 Tobin‟s Q was measured by the market value of all firm‟s securities to replacement cost of all tangible assets. 
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were inversely related to the proportion of shares owned by the managers. Singh and 
Davidson III (2003) replicated the studies by Ang, Cole and Lin (2000) on 1,528 large 
companies in the US and found similar results that agency costs (measured by asset 
utilization) wee inversely related to insider ownership. A study conducted in New Zealand by 
Hossain, at al. (2001) reported that insider ownership (measured linearly) had a strong 
positive influence on Tobin‟s Q. Also, Elayan, Lau and Meyer (2003) found a statistically 
significant relationship between Tobin‟s Q and both CEO compensation and executive share 
ownership, suggesting that managers are being rewarded for high company financial 
performance with higher compensation and shares.  
These studies support the view that a low level of insider ownership has a positive effect on 
company financial performance. Gelb (2000) documents that companies with lower levels of 
managerial ownership tend to provide more extensive disclosures in their annual reports, 
suggesting that lower levels of managerial ownership mitigates agency costs and reduces 
investors‟ information needs. In summary, the studies mentioned above do provide support 
for the interest alignment hypothesis that insider ownership does lead to improved financial 
performance.  
Other empirical studies have reported a non-linear relationship, that is, the positive 
relationship between the level of insider equity ownership and company financial 
performance only increases up to a point, after which performance declines. Empirical studies 
conducted by Chen, Hexter and Hu (1993), Griffith (1999), McConnell and Servaes (1990), 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) among others, found that when insider ownership is 
increased from zero to a certain level, company performance measured by Tobin‟s Q 
increases and insider ownership above that level leads to a decline in company financial 
performance. While these studies report inconsistent results in terms of the level of insider 
ownership, they do report that the relationship between Q ratio and insider ownership is non-
linear, that is, within some range of insider ownership, Q ratio is positively related to insider 
ownership, but in other ranges, a negative relationship is found. The range of insider 
ownership positively associated with the Q ratio is inconsistent. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 
report insider ownership between zero and five percent, whereas McConnell and Servaes 
report up to 40%. However, studies conducted by Morck, et al. (1988) and McConnell and 
Servaes (1990) are based on larger economies like the US. A study conducted in New 
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Zealand by Hossain, et al. (2001) did not find any evidence of a curvilinear relationship 
between insider ownership and company financial performance measured by Tobin‟s Q.  
Similar to Morck et al., McConnell and Servaes, Fama and Jensen (1983a), and Stulz (1988) 
found that managers owning a large block of stock leads to entrenchment problems. Greater 
stock ownership by managers increases the power of the internal constituency (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983a; McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Morck et al., 1988; Stulz, 1988), but decreases 
the power of the external constituency in influencing corporate financial performance. 
Research shows that incentive-based compensation
16
 decreases when blockholders are 
present (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2001; Mehran, 1995) showing a negative relationship 
between insider ownership and ownership concentration. It could be that blockholders 
appoint outside directors to represent them on the board and they tend to be more vigilant 
about CEO performance. This is supported by the findings of Bhagat and Black (2001) 
reporting an inverse relationship between insider ownership and board composition. These 
studies support the view that a high level of insider ownership has a negative effect on 
company financial performance measured by the Q ratio.  
However, these studies considered insider ownership as an exogenous variable. There are 
growing concerns that insider ownership may be endogenously determined. The proponents 
of this view argue that managers are rewarded with stock and stock options when companies 
exceed target performance. This goes against the popular view promoted by Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) that when mangers have stock ownership in the company it leads to 
improved company financial performance. To this end, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) 
considered the endogeneity of ownership and found a nonmonotonic relationship between 
ownership and performance. Cho (1998) also reported that performance determines 
ownership. Reddy et al. (2008a) considered endogeneity of insider ownership in small cap 
companies in New Zealand and found a negative relationship between insider ownership and 
financial performance when measured by Tobin‟s Q. They concluded that insider ownership 
in New Zealand small cap companies was not at optimal. This  reasoning is in line with the 
argument provided by Demsetz (1983), that company financial performance will increase 
only if the insider ownership is in disequilibrium. So, when insider ownership is at 
                                                 
16
 It represents the percentage of executive compensation that comes from new stock options, restricted stocks, 
and performance shares. 
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equilibrium, company performance will be at the maximum and there will be no relationship 
between ownership and financial performance. However, if ownership is below equilibrium, 
then company financial performance will improve by moving towards the equilibrium. If 
ownership is above equilibrium, then there will be a negative relationship between ownership 
and financial performance.  
Owner(s) who start the company tend to hold a fraction of shares in the company after going 
public and also take up officer and director positions. Evidence also shows that concentrated 
ownership structure is common in New Zealand, where the top twenty shareholders on 
average hold 69.3% of the shares (Gunasekarage & Reed, 2008; Reddy et al., 2008a, 2008b). 
It is argued that because of weak minority investor protection regulations and a small and 
weak capital market, companies in New Zealand have a tendency to use insider and 
concentrated ownership mechanisms to mitigate agency problems.  
In summary, the evidence shows that a level of insider ownership increases company 
financial performance but a high level of managerial ownership leads to management 
entrenchment. There also exists a view that insider ownership may be determined by 
company financial performance instead of insider ownership determining financial 
performance. 
2.2.1  CONCENTRATED OWNERSHIP AND FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE 
Ownership concentration is viewed in the literature as a mechanism for mitigating agency 
costs because it provides better monitoring incentives to maximise shareholder value. The 
shareholder model suggests that managers are less likely to engage in shareholder value 
maximising behaviour if strict monitoring is provided by the shareholders. Therefore, the 
presence of ownership concentration under the stakeholder model would enhance company 
financial performance. Empirical research supports the claim that a higher ownership 
concentration leads to better monitoring which enhances company financial performance. 
In a survey of empirical studies (conducted in the US and the UK) of ownership 
concentration on company financial performance, Gugler (1999) reported that owner-
controlled companies outperform manager-controlled companies. The owner-controlled 
companies were classified as those that had a single block of equity exceeding 5% or 10%. 
The dependent variables used in these studies were net income/net worth, rate of return on 
equity or Tobin‟s Q, or the riskiness of returns.   
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The beneficial effect of direct monitoring by ownership concentration also had an effect on 
managerial turnover and unrelated diversification. Franks and Mayer (1994) found a large 
turnover of directors when ownership concentration was present. Amihud and Lev (1991) 
reported that companies controlled by large block shareholders were less likely to engage in 
(value reducing) unrelated mergers and acquisition. Hill and Snell (1989) and Hoskisson, 
Johnson and Moesel (1994) found that large blockholder ownership were negatively related 
to product diversification. Kang (1986) found that concentrated ownership enhanced 
company financial performance measured by accounting and stock-price-based measures. 
These studies show that ownership concentration has a potential to minimise agency costs 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983a; Jensen, 1989, 1993). Ownership concentration influences managers, 
thus reflecting on company strategy in regard to profit goals, dividends, capital structure and 
growth (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). 
One of the problems with the above studies is that they are based on US or UK data and the 
findings are not necessarily reflective of countries that have a relatively high ownership 
concentration. For example, studies conducted in New Zealand, Germany, France and Japan 
provide evidence that manager-controlled companies outperform owner-controlled 
companies. Thonet and Poensgen (1979) found that manager-controlled companies in 
Germany outperformed owner-controlled companies in terms of profitability. Jacquemin and 
de Ghellinchk (1980) using French data found no difference in performance between familial 
and non-familial controlled companies. Prowse (1994) found no relationship between 
ownership concentration and profitability in Japanese companies. Fitzsimons (1997) and 
Hossain et al. (2001) state that in the absence of a takeover code (prior to July 2001), New 
Zealand was an attractive environment for overseas companies to acquire controlling 
influence in companies without paying a full takeover premium. Most of these acquisitions 
were undertaken with the short term view of maximising current income rather than creating 
long term company value. Other authors that have noted the role of governance in aiding 
economic performance include Gani ; Barro (2001), Fischer, Alonso-Gamo and Von Allmen 
(2001), Knack (2001a). Gani (2007) reported strong correlation between the rule of the law; 
control of corruption; regulatory quality; government effectiveness and political stability and 
foreign direct investment (FDI).  
However, the US and the UK studies do show that company financial performance increases 
as ownership concentration increases and financial performance declines as ownership 
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concentration increases above certain level (see Franks, Mayer & Renneboog, 1995; 
McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Morck et al., 1988; Wruck, 1989). In addition, Zeckhauser and 
Pound (1990) state that the industry in which a company operates is also important for 
company financial performance. They found that owner-controlled companies have superior 
performance in industries that have a relatively low level of asset specificity
17
, but no 
difference in industries that had high asset specificity.  
In countries that have a relatively high ownership concentration (Continental Europe, Japan, 
and Korea), the objectives and identity of different owners become important for company 
financial performance as well. Ownership concentration may have a negative effect on 
financial performance if it insulates companies from efficiency-enhancing takeovers. 
Ownership concentration may also lead to self enrichment at the expense of small 
shareholders by paying out too much dividend relative to the company‟s investment and 
growth opportunities. On the other hand, ownership concentration may have a positive effect 
on financial performance if it provides close monitoring and expertise. The benefits provided 
by alignment of cash flow rights and control rights may outweigh the costs associated with 
low diversification opportunities or rent extraction by majority owners. 
2.2.2  INSTITUTIONAL OWNERSHIP AND FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE 
Existing literature recognises that institutional investors serve a significant role as external 
monitors in the stock market (Agrawal & Mandelker, 1990). Investment made by institutional 
investors is so large that they do not have the ability to divest their holding without severely 
affecting share price (Pound, 1992). As a result, institutional investors have a strong long-
term interest in the financial success of the companies (see Gilson & Kraakman, 1991; 
Holderness & Sheehan, 1988a; Smith, 1996) and may play an active role in monitoring top 
management (Hoskisson, Johnson & Moesel, 1994).  
There is an alternative view that institutional investors have failed to monitor managers. This 
perception seems to arise from two sources: (i) the dispersed nature of institutional 
shareholding, and (ii) being short-term returns focused. While institutional investors hold a 
large fraction of companies, the fraction of shares held for each company is very small in 
                                                 
17
 High asset specificity means that investment is specific to the industry (or the company) and has relatively 
few alternative uses. The opposite is true of low asset specificity investment. 
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proportion to their total shareholding. This is seen as a consequence of both portfolio 
diversification and regulatory constraints placed on majority ownership. The portfolio 
diversification view seems to outweigh the maximisation of returns view at the expense of 
good corporate governance. Another view exists that institutional investors are predominately 
concerned with short-term earnings. Institutional investors are represented by managers 
whose primary objective is to maximise current returns because of their own reward systems, 
which emphasises quarterly performance (see Fortune, 1993; Starks, 1987). Managers receive 
a percentage of the value of assets and a bonus or penalty, based on how their funds perform 
relative to an index calculated quarterly. This pressure for short-term profitability, coupled 
with the potential difficulty of selling a large block of stocks without a loss, may result in a 
preference for projects with a high probability of short-term payoff.  
However, the potential benefit of moving investments to another company may be 
outweighed by transaction costs. This may encourage institutional investors to closely 
monitor managerial actions, or provide shareholder activism and force institutional investors 
to better scrutinise board decision making. Stapledon (1996) provides evidence of active 
institutional involvement in the UK. He reports that institutional interventions to change 
management in the UK have occurred since the 1950s and their prevalence in the 1990s 
suggests that they may be a substitute for takeovers. However, their intervention was mainly 
in small and medium sized companies because institutional shareholdings were too small to 
allow effective coalitions to be formed in the larger companies. 
Statistics show that a large part of the equity market in New Zealand is owned by institutional 
investors (Healy, 2003, p.197). This highlights the importance of institutional investors in the 
functioning of the capital market and the economy. 
2.2.3  BLOCK OWNERSHIP AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
The presence of blockholders has similar benefits to those of ownership concentration in 
providing supervision and monitoring. However, a problem arises when blockholders extract 
private benefit at the expense of minority shareholders and other stakeholders. One of the 
consequences of this is that minority shareholders reduce their level of investment, thus 
causing illiquidity in the stock market and reducing diversification opportunities.  In a survey 
of corporate governance literature, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Gugler (1999) report 
evidence that blockholders do receive benefits at the expense of the minority shareholders. 
Barclay and Holderness (1989, 1992) report from US experience that large blocks of equity 
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trade at a substantial premium to the post-trade price of minority shares, and on average these 
stocks trade at a 20% premium. DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1985), Jarrell and Poulsen (1988), 
and Zingales (1995) found that shares with superior voting rights trade at a premium, but the 
premium is small. However, Zingales (1995) reported that the premium rises sharply in 
situations where control is contested.   
The evidence from other countries where concentrated ownership is a norm suggests that 
expropriation of private benefits by controlling blockholders is a major problem. Rydqvist 
(1987) found a 6.5% average voting premium for Sweden, Levy (1982) found a 45.5% 
premium in Israel, Horner (1988) found a 20% premium for Switzerland, and Zingales (1994) 
found an 82% voting premium on the Milan stock exchange. The evidence from Israel and 
Italy suggests that the agency cost can be very large in some countries.  
However, in a US study Holderness and Sheehan (1988a, 1988b) found no evidence of 
expropriation of private benefits by blockholders and, Asquith and Wizman (1990) reported 
that the benefits were very small, if any. The evidence of expropriation from Israel and Italy 
does suggest this may be only relevant to the US where a strong protection of minority 
shareholder rights exists. 
The expropriation by controlling shareholders can deter minority shareholders from 
investing, resulting in a small and illiquid equity market. The evidence of this can be found in 
countries, such as Austria, Italy, Spain, and Germany, where expropriation is a major 
problem and companies rely more on debt financing. The capital market remains 
underdeveloped in these countries compared to the US and UK, where investor protection is 
high. The investor protection law induces controlling shareholders to reduce their control or 
stake, thus increasing liquidity and dispersion of ownership.  
The empirical evidence supports the view that the potential conflicts of interest between 
dominant shareholders and other stakeholders in countries that have low investor protection 
rights may have detrimental effects associated with expropriation. The conflict of interest is 
the result of structure of ownership and the legislation that protects investor rights. 
2.3  BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE 
A number of studies have examined the relationship between board characteristics (board 
independence, board size, board committees, and board diversity) and company financial 
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performance. The section below provides literature relating to board characteristics and 
company financial performance. 
2.3.1  BOARD COMPOSITION AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
The effectiveness of the board in monitoring managers is associated with board composition, 
in other words, board independence. In this regard, board composition becomes significant as 
the primary responsibility in keeping the board independent (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 
1983a; Weisbach, 1988; Zahra & Pearce II, 1989). Outside, unrelated (independent) directors 
are viewed as professional referees who can objectively assess managerial performance, 
determine their remuneration, and replace them if necessary (Boeker, 1992).  
The empirical research on board composition and company financial performance found 
mixed results. Some authors (see Ezzamel & Watson, 1993; Hossain et al., 2001; Vance, 
1964) found a positive relationship between board composition and company financial 
performance. Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and Baysinger and Butler (1985) found a very 
weak relationship. Lawrence and Stapledon (1999) found inconsistent evidence of a direct 
relationship between board composition and company financial performance in Australia. 
These studies support the view that there is evidence of a (weak) positive relationship 
between board composition and company financial performance. 
In contrast, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Yermack (1996) found a negative relationship 
between board composition and company financial performance measured by Tobin‟s Q. 
Klein (1998) found a significant negative relationship between a change in market value of 
equity and the proportion of independent directors, but an insignificant relationship for return 
on assets and raw stock-market returns.  
Other studies (Byrd & Hickman, 1992; Chin, Vos & Casey, 2003; Daily & Dalton, 1992; 
Mace, 1986) found no relationship between board composition and company financial 
performance.  
Most studies related to board composition are based on Anglo-Saxon countries which have a 
unitary board. The countries that have a compound board structure have not received much 
attention. Since countries that follow the stakeholder system also face similar challenges to a 
shareholder system, the inclusion of independent directors may also improve their 
performance. 
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In summary, the effectiveness of the board in monitoring the actions of managers has been a 
positive function of the proportion of outside, unrelated directors (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; 
Core, Holthausen & Larcker1999; Gagnon & Pierre, 1995). Therefore, an increase in non-
executive directors may increase board vigilance. 
2.3.2  BOARD SIZE AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
Organisational behaviour research suggests that as group sizes grow larger, total productivity 
exhibits diminishing returns (Hackman, 1990; Steiner, 1972). Based on this view, a number 
of researchers have looked at whether or not board size has an effect on company financial 
performance. Holthausen and Larcker (1993) failed to find consistent evidence of a negative 
relationship between company financial performance and board size. However, Yermack 
(1996) found an inverse relationship between company financial performance (measured by 
Tobin‟s Q) and board size. Eisenberg, Sundgren and Wells (1998) found similar results for 
small and medium sized companies in Finland. Hossain et al. (2001) found similar results for 
companies in New Zealand. 
Since board size has a negative effect on financial performance, the long term effect of this 
will be a decline in board members. In support, Bacon (1990) reported that the number of 
board members in large companies declined from 14 in 1972 to a median of 12 in 1989. Fox 
(1996b) found similar results in New Zealand, showing board size declined from 7 in 1970 to 
6 members in 1993. Reddy et al. (2008a, 2008b) found that the average board in New 
Zealand ranged between 6 to 8 members. 
Hossain et al. (2001) using data from 1991 to 1997 reported  that board size in New Zealand 
was positively related to company size. This means that bigger companies will have bigger 
boards and smaller companies will have smaller boards. This finding is also supported by 
Reddy, et al. (2008a, 2008b). 
2.3.3  BOARD COMMITTEES AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
The NZSC (2004) recommends that companies should have audit committees to oversee the 
audit of financial statements and a remuneration committee for setting remuneration for 
executive officers and directors. The appointment of such committees is expected to have a 
positive effect on company financial performance. Empirical research focusing on the 
presence of an audit committee has associated these with companies with fewer financial 
reporting problems (McMullen, 1996). John and Senbet (1998) report that the presence of 
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monitoring committees (audit and nominations) is positively related to factors associated with 
the benefits of monitoring. Klein (2002b) shows that independent audit committees reduce 
the likelihood of earnings management, thus improving transparency. However, Baxter 
(2006) finds no significant relationship between audit committees and financial reporting 
quality.  
On the other hand, Main and Johnston (1998) and Weir and Laing (2000) reported that the 
existence of a remuneration committee had a positive effect on financial performance. Klein 
(1998) found evidence of a positive relationship between the presence of a remuneration 
committee and company financial performance but noticed this relationship was not highly 
significant.  
Despite the NZSC recommendations and guidelines to incorporate board committees, very 
few studies, to date, focus on the relationship between board committees and company 
financial performance. Dalton et al. (1998) provide a similar view, that relatively little 
research has been undertaken in the relationship between board sub committees and financial 
performance. Reddy at al. (2008b) found that a remuneration committee had a positive effect 
on company financial performance measured by Tobin‟s Q, market-to-book and return on 
assets. International and New Zealand evidence suggests it is likely that empirical research 
regarding board sub-committees and company financial performance will be positive. 
2.3.4  BOARD DIVERSITY AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
The diversity literature suggests diversity adversely impacts group dynamics, but improves 
group decision-making (Erhardt et al., 2003). However, little research has been conducted to 
date with boards of directors investigating the impact of board of director diversity on 
company financial performance. Shrader, et al. (1997)  examined company financial 
performance with gender diversity in the middle-and upper management, and at the board of 
director level for large companies. They found general organisational effects, but few top-
level diversity effects on financial performance and, in general, reported a positive link 
between women (diversity) in management positions with company financial performance. 
Shrader et al. (1997) explain the positive performance relationship by suggesting that these 
companies were recruiting from a relatively larger talent pool, and subsequently recruited 
more qualified applicants regardless of gender. Richard (2000), examined the relationship 
between organisation-wide diversity, business strategy and company financial performance in 
the context of the banking industry. Performance was measured by productivity return on 
46 
 
equity, and market performance measured from 64 banks in three states. He reported that 
diversity added value and was perceived as a relative competitive advantage for banks. 
Focusing specifically on boards of directors, Catalyst (1995) reported that of the top 100 US 
companies in terms of revenue, 97 had at least one woman board member. In an earlier study 
by Catalyst (1993), 82% of the 50 most valuable Fortune 500 companies were found to 
include at least one woman director on the board. Burke (2000a) found significant correlation 
between the number of women directors and revenue, assets, number of employees and profit 
margins for Canadian companies. Reddy et al. (2008a) suggest that female directors on 
boards of small cap listed companies in New Zealand had a positive effect on company 
financial performance (Reddy et al., 2008a).  
2.4  CEO COMPENSATION, TENUREAND FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE 
The transaction cost and incomplete contract theories of the company suggest that from time 
to time, a company‟s contract may deviate from optimality (Tirole, 2008). This allows 
managers to expropriate shareholder rent. The corporate governance literature and more 
specifically the executive compensation literature suggest that managers can be induced by 
giving incentives to act in the best interests of the shareholders. By linking managerial 
compensation (such as, salaries, cash bonuses, equity and stock options) to company financial 
performance, compensation becomes subject to risks similar to those faced by shareholders, 
thus aligning managerial interest with shareholder interests.  
Remuneration packages vary across countries, suggesting optimality of contingent 
performance based compensation depends on whether monitoring alternatives are available. 
Maher and Andersson (1999) state that the executive pay in Germany and Japan tends to be 
considerably lower than in the US and UK, which is a reflection of a closer relationship 
between controlling shareholders and managers. Basing empirical evidence on the US, Kole 
(1997) reported that the presence of family representatives in management or on the board 
reduces the probability of adopting an equity-based compensation plan. Conyon and Leech 
(1994) also provide evidence that the level of director compensation is lower in companies 
that have a higher share ownership concentration or are owner-controlled. The empirical 
evidence confirms that there is a substitution effect between direct monitoring by owners and 
compensation incentives. 
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Research also focused on managerial compensation and the company financial performance 
relationship. Generally it was found that there was no evidence that higher pay leads to higher 
financial performance. Murphy (1985), Coughlin and Schmidt (1985) and Barro and Barro 
(1990) found pay-performance sensitivity in the range of 0.10 to 0.17, suggesting a 10% rise 
in profitability leads to a 1% to 1.7% rise in CEO compensation (consisting of salary and 
bonus).  Although sensitivity of pay to performance is very small, Hall and Liebman (1998) 
suggested that these studies ignored changes in the book value of stocks and stock options. 
When stock and stock options are considered, Hall and Liebman found a mean pay-
performance elasticity of 4.5, suggesting a 10% rise in performance leads to 45% increase 
CEO remuneration. Furthermore, Murphy (1998) found that most of the increases in pay 
were attributable to a general increase in the stock market and that there was little evidence 
that higher pay leads to higher stock market performance. Furthermore, Main, Bruce and 
Buck (1996), Conyon and Leech (1994), and Gregg, Machin and Szymanski (1993) found 
that company size, and changes in company size were more significant determinants of 
managerial compensation than financial performance. This evidence suggests that managers 
are more likely to engage in mergers and acquisition that lead to pay increases rather than 
improving company financial performance.  
Research also linked compensation plans to short-term behaviour of managers. As managers 
become aware of improvements in company financial performance, they influence their board 
to award equity-based performance pay. Yarmack (1997) supports the short-term behaviour 
of managers as she reports that the timing of stock options coincides with favourable 
movements in company stock prices.  
Research has also focused on other mechanisms to align the interest of the managers with 
shareholders. Separation of the chair and CEO has been proposed as a mechanism to prevent 
boards becoming entrenched. However, Conyon and Leech (1994) found no evidence that 
separation of the chair and CEO has any effect on compensation levels. Mehran (1995) 
reported that the presence of independent directors increases the percentage of equity-based 
compensation instead of decreasing it.  Cosh and Hughes (1997) found no evidence of 
relationship between institutional holding and compensation or pay-performance in the UK. 
While shareholder monitoring is a good substitute for compensation incentives, the evidence 
provided above suggests monitoring by board and institutional investors are relatively weak 
monitoring devices and not a good substitute for direct monitoring.  
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In summary, the empirical evidence available indicates that share or share options do not 
align managerial interest with the shareholders. The apparent conflict of interest between the 
board of directors and shareholders also raises doubts whether the former should be 
responsible for setting the key elements of managerial contracts. However, the evidence 
available does provide support for the view that owners are better monitors and therefore 
should be responsible for setting executive remuneration packages. 
2.5  DEBT AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
According to Novaes and Zingales (1999) the choice of debt from the viewpoint of the 
shareholders differs from the choice of debt from the viewpoint of the managers. The conflict 
of interest between managers and shareholders over financing policy arises for three reasons. 
First, managers are less diversified than shareholders, that is, in addition to holding stock and 
stock options of the company, their human capital is specific to the company (Fama, 1980). 
Second, a larger level of debt precommits managers to work harder to generate and pay off 
the company‟s cash flows to outside investors (Jensen, 1986). Lastly, managers may increase 
leverage beyond the “optimal capital structure” to increase the voting power of their equity 
stakes and reduce the likelihood of a takeover and the resulting possible loss of job tenure 
(see Harris & Raviv, 1988; Stulz, 1988). A relatively high debt to assets ratio may be used to 
make a company less attractive as a takeover target, substituting debt for other takeover 
defence mechanisms (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Begley & Feltham, 1999; Byrd & 
Stammerjohan, 1997; Knoeber, 1985). Also, a high level of debt may subject the company to 
agency costs of debt, especially in the form of risk shifting incentives. Shareholders may 
prefer riskier projects to compensate for additional risk faced by a high level of debt 
financing, thus raising a company‟s earnings volatility.  
However, other studies support the view that debt reduces the agency costs of the company 
and enhances company value. Berger, Ofek and Yarmack (1997) reported that managerial 
entrenchment has a significant impact on companies‟ capital structure.  They found a lower 
level of debt in companies where the CEO appears to be entrenched, that is, where CEOs 
have had a long tenure, and compensation plans are not closely linked to company 
performance. Also, they found lower debt in companies where the CEO does not face 
significant monitoring that is large boards with few outside directors and no large 
blockholders. They reported that companies significantly increase their leverage when they 
experience some discipline (such as a takeover attempt, involuntary CEO departure, or arrival 
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of outside blockholders) or receive enhanced managerial incentives through the management 
compensation contract. 
Therefore, debt is viewed as an internal corporate governance mechanism that can voluntarily 
be used to transfer the functions of monitoring and evaluating managerial performance to the 
participants of the capital market (debtholders) (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Begley & 
Feltham, 1999; Jensen, 1986).  In this regard, the literature provides two directions 
concerning the monitoring function of debt financing. First, increased debt means a large part 
of the company‟s cash flow will be returned to the debtholders, therefore debt tends to reduce 
the discretionary power of the managers. Second, given the size of a company, debt financing 
decreases the company‟s need for new share issues emissions and allows voting rights to be 
more concentrated in the hands of the remaining shareholders. Therefore debt forces 
managers to consume fewer perquisites and become more efficient as this lessens the 
probability of bankruptcy and the loss of control and reputation (Grossman & Hart, 1982). In 
addition, Harris and Raviv (1991) provided a comprehensive survey of the theories and 
related empirical evidence on the use of debt to mitigate agency conflicts and information 
asymmetry. They concluded that the evidence was broadly consistent with the theory.  
In summary, the agency framework indicates that debt reduces agency costs of the company 
and enhances company value.  
2.6 DIVIDENDS AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
Easterbrook (1984) argues that dividends play a role in controlling equity agency problems 
by facilitating primary capital market monitoring of the company‟s activities and 
performance. The reason for this is that higher dividend payouts increase the likelihood that 
the company will have to sell common stock in primary capital markets. In theoretical 
studies, Fluck (1998) and Myers (2000) presented agency-theoretic models of dividend 
behaviour where managers pay dividends in order to avoid disciplining action by 
shareholders. However, Jensen (1986) argued that continued dividend payments help to 
dissipate cash which might otherwise have been wasted in non-value maximising projects, 
therefore reducing the extent of overinvestment by managers. The company‟s target ratio of 
dividend to earnings operates as a control instrument just like debt financing. The higher the 
payout ratio, the smaller the amount of free cash flows. Also, dividends impose much less 
severe constraints on companies‟ cash flows because their payments are not mandatory. 
However, the opposing view is provided by Zeckhauser and Pound (1990). Zeckhauser and 
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Pound document that within an industry there is no significant difference in dividend payout 
ratios between companies with and without large shareholders. More importantly, their study 
also suggests that, after controlling for company industry, the effect of dividend policy on 
other governance mechanisms may be indirectly controlled. The financial literature also links 
dividend payments to a company‟s future profitability.  
The section below discusses the empirical studies based on external governance mechanisms, 
i.e., ownership concentration, large (blockholders) shareholders, and institutional investors, 
market for corporate control, labour market competition, product market competition and 
legislation and company financial performance. 
2.7 MARKET FOR CONTROL, PRODUCT MARKET 
COMPETITION, LABOUR MARKET COMPETITION AND 
COMPANY PERFORMANCE 
2.7.1 MARKET FOR CONTROL AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
Under the stakeholder system of corporate governance, there is little reliance on the market 
for corporate control to discipline managers because controlling shareholders act as monitors 
themselves. However, under a shareholder system of corporate governance, takeovers play a 
key role in disciplining poorly performing managers. Managerial theorists such as Mueller 
(1985), suggest that takeovers meet the size and growth objectives of managers, that is, to 
grow the company by acquisition. Studies also show that takeovers may have adverse effects 
on the dynamic efficiency of the company if stakeholders reduce their company-specific 
investments. For example, if stakeholders anticipate that takeovers increase the probability 
that they will be expropriated ex-post, they may provide sub-optimal levels of company-
specific investment ex-ante. Also, takeovers may aggravate short term behaviour that may 
impinge on innovative activity and dynamic efficiency (Jarrell et al., 1988). 
Empirical research supports the view that target company shareholders benefit more from 
tender takeover offers than the acquiring company‟s shareholders. Jarrell and Poulsen (1988) 
reported that in large successful tender offers in the US, the target company‟s shareholders 
gained a premium of 19% in the 1960s, 35% in the 1970s and 39% in the 1980s. Higson and 
Elliot (1998) reported similar results for UK companies for the period 1975-1990, with 
returns to target company shareholders averaging 37% and positive in 88% of the cases. 
Many other studies (DeAnglo, DeAnglo & Rice, 1984; Franks & Mayer, 1996; Jensen & 
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Ruback, 1983) reported similar results. However, for the acquiring companies, returns were 
close to zero (Bradley, Gregg & Kim, 1984; Franks & Harris, 1989). 
In addition, a majority of studies found no significant improvement in company financial 
performance following a merger. Studies also found that takeovers in the US and UK were 
motivated by other objectives, such as changes in corporate strategy or rent seeking 
behaviour (Franks & Mayer, 1996). Other studies have suggested that tax motives have been 
a contributory factor for merger and acquisition activities rather than value-maximising or 
efficiency-gaining motives (Auerbach & Reishus, 1988; Bhagat, Shleifer & Vishny, 1990; 
Lehn & Poulsen, 1987). This raises concerns as to whether hostile takeovers are in fact an 
effective means of disciplining poorly performing managers in the shareholder system of 
governance. 
Although evidence does not support the view that takeovers act to rectify managerial 
inefficiencies, the threat of takeover itself may serve as a mechanism for disciplining poorly 
performing managers. Therefore a threat of takeover rather than actual takeover has potential 
to be an effective control device. Mechanisms that inhibit takeovers need to be observed with 
apprehension. Franks and Mayer (1996) concluded that there are tradeoffs between different 
methods of correcting managerial failure. Fama and Jensen (1983b) and Kini, Kracaw and 
Mian (1995) found that takeovers can serve as a substitute for outside directors when there 
are few outside directors on the board. Brickley and James (1987) found that in countries 
where takeovers are more restricted, the number of outside directors and ownership 
concentration are effective substitute mechanisms for monitoring. Schranz (1993) also noted 
a substitutability between ownership concentration and takeovers as disciplining devices. 
Although there are concerns regarding the effectiveness of takeovers as a disciplining device, 
the evidence supports the view that takeovers should be allowed to function without 
restriction. 
2.7.2 MANAGERIAL LABOUR MARKET AND FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE  
Fama (1980) investigated the governance properties of the managerial labour market and 
reported that managerial behaviour is shaped discipline and the opportunities for human 
capital provided by the labour market. Research suggests that managerial human capital is 
tightly linked to company financial performance. The higher the job competition among 
managers within and/or outside the company, the higher will be the managers‟ knowledge 
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and responsive efforts to improve a company‟s financial performance (Brett & Stroh, 1997; 
Mahoney & Mahoney, 1993; Ocasio, 1999). This suggests that competition in the managerial 
labour market will lead to improved company financial performance. 
2.7.2 PRODUCT MARKET AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
Competition in the product market is generally associated with allocative and productive 
efficiency. Competition encourages the supply of goods and services at the lowest costs and 
prices to reflect the underlying cost of provision. The monitoring function of the product 
market relies on the degree of competitive pressures faced by a company‟s output, which is 
related to its industry and level of product diversification. Publicly traded companies may be 
faced by a product market concentration where the competition is relatively low, or a highly 
competitive market where a large number of companies compete under the same conditions 
(Fama, 1980; Williamson, 1986, 1996). Empirical evidence provides support for the view that 
the discretionary behaviour of managers is also disciplined by the pressure of other 
companies competing in the same product market (see Collin, 1998; Haye, 1997; Nickell et 
al., 1997). This forces companies to implement devices to efficiently monitor the 
performance of a company‟s entire team as well as its individual members.  
However, countries that have complex patterns of ownership, such as, cross-shareholdings 
and familial control, tend to create large corporate groupings and high product market 
concentration. This leads to ownership concentration, which promotes monopoly exploitation 
and allocative inefficiency. However, monopoly abuse by keiretsu groups in Japan has been 
resolved by the establishment of competing industrial groups. This shows that in the presence 
of competition, the efficient forms of governance can emerge in their own accord. 
The alternative view is that competition in the product market (allocative efficiency) may 
encourage competition for ownership in the corporate control market (productive efficiency), 
which may undermine the development of long-term relations between stakeholders that are 
required for dynamic efficiency. This requires alternative governance mechanisms to be used 
to gain productive efficiency in the presence of product market competition. Product market 
competition allows managers to align their decisions with owners‟ interests in an attempt to 
avoid bad performance, along with the loss of their job and reputation. 
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2.8  LEGISLATION AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
Studies show that market competitiveness is enhanced by the presence of a strong regulatory 
and legal environment, which in turn influences corporate governance structures. Countries 
that have a weak legal environment tend to have a weak and ineffective governance structure 
in place. Since corporate governance structures have an impact on company performance 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), countries that have weak governance structures generally tend to 
have poor company performance. Accordingly, the regulatory and legal environment is 
important for creating a strong competitive market, effective corporate governance systems 
and company financial performance. 
Hossain, et al. (2001) studied the effect of legislation passed in New Zealand in 1994 on 
company financial performance and concluded that effective regulation leads to improved 
firm financial performance. They found that the effect of the Companies Act and related 
legislation were relatively benign in influencing company financial performance and outside 
board representation. Reddy, et al. (2008b) studied the effect of New Zealand Securities 
Commission recommendations on company financial performance and found that compliance 
with the recommendations improved financial performance.  
2.9 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN NEW ZEALAND 
During the period 1984-1990 New Zealand undertook a series of economic reforms to reverse 
the trends of the previous 30 years (Dalziel, 2002). These include  unacceptable levels of 
poverty and difficulties with housing, health care and meeting essential family needs (ESC, 
1984).  Evans, Grimes, Wilkinson and Teece  (1996) termed New Zealand economic reform 
programme a „laboratory which will animate economic debate and policy throughout the 
world.‟ According to Dalziel (2002), the New Zealand experiment did not succeed, despite 
achieving greater microeconomic efficiency in some industries and obtaining its intermediate 
objectives of price stability and fiscal balance. In support, Evans (2009)  provides evidence 
that the New Zealand domestic equity market declined relative to GDP over the period 1996 
to 2007 and the number of listed companies fell even further from a low level in 1996 and 
relative to the comparative countries (Australia, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway, 
Singapore, Sweden and Switzerland). Evans (2009), also indicates that the average size of 
listed companies in New Zealand remained constant but the size of listed companies 
increased in comparative countries. Over this period there has been no significant change in 
number of companies listed, but the number of foreign owned companies listed in New 
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Zealand declined (Lawrence, Sharman, & Chapple, 2009).  Thomsen and Vinten (2007), state 
that delisting is influenced by factors such as investor protection and corporate governance 
requirements, as well as firm specific factors. La Porta et al. (1997), show that countries with 
poor investor protection have smaller and narrower capital markets than countries with higher 
levels of investor protection. According to Evans, Quigley and Counsell (2009), New 
Zealand has the weakest private property rights protection among the OECD countries which 
may be the reason for the low number of foreign owned companies being listed in New 
Zealand. The weak property rights are a reflection of the standard of the corporate 
governance practiced in New Zealand.  As Prevost, et al. (2002) point out that the commonly 
accepted tenets of effective corporate governance practices, such as a majority of outside 
directors on boards, separate CEOs and board chairs, etc, were not commonly observed in 
New Zealand until the late 1980s. It was common practice in New Zealand to have boards 
dominated by a major executive director-shareholder who had a controlling ownership stake 
(Goulter, 1997). The large shareholding
18
 is another common phenomenon in New Zealand 
companies. This was a response to inadequate protection provided in the capital market (La 
Porta et al., 2002). In terms of developments in guidelines or rules for companies on 
corporate governance, there was none that specified directors‟ duties. Standards of care 
expected by directors were only expressed at the common law level (Companies Act 1955) 
and essentially were that directors would be liable only for acts of gross negligence. The 
definition of what constituted an act of gross negligence was left to the courts to decide. 
This position led to the perception that the New Zealand capital market was not sufficiently 
protective of investors with appropriate reporting, compliance and governance standards 
(Godfrey & Horsely, 2003, p.27). The on-going concerns about poor financial performance, 
excessive remuneration packages
19
 (Healy, 2003, p.27), discriminatory takeover practices
20
 
                                                 
18
 Fitzsimons (1997) states that over 80% of firms in New Zealand have one shareholder owning more than 20% 
of equity or more, which allows corporate transfers to take place without involving the general body of 
shareholders. These transfers were usually uncontested and involved a very limited number of large 
blockholders. 
19
 FORTEX, Brierley Investments Limited (BIL) and Air New Zealand provide evidence where poor 
performance and excessive remuneration has been a factor in the wealth erosion experienced by shareholders 
(Healy, 2003).  
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(Godfrey & Horsely, 2003, p.27) and ineffective governance practices led to a backlash after 
the 1987 stockmarket crash. The backlash provided New Zealand with its first set of rules, 
guidelines and legislation for corporate governance.  
The Securities Markets Act came into force in 1988 highlighting requirements for the 
immediate disclosure of securities traded by company directors and officers. In 1989, the 
New Zealand Securities Exchange (NZSE) introduced its first set of listing rules stressing 
appropriate disclosure requirements and a set of guidelines for principles of corporate 
governance and accountability. The Financial Reporting Act was also passed in 1993, which 
defined the nature and presentation of financial information to shareholders. It was not until 
the introduction of the Companies Act 1993 that an explicit definition of the “standard of 
care” expected from the board of directors was provided.  
Evidence from the US and the UK showed that when boards had a majority of independent 
directors there was increased transparency of the board‟s decision-making processes and 
increased shareholder confidence in the governance processes. The calls for a majority of 
independent directors on New Zealand company boards were initiated by the Companies 
1993 Act. However, the number of independent directors on boards was left to companies to 
decide. To improve the capital market image, the Takeover Code was reintroduced in 2001 
with powers to block takeovers that breached the rules.  
In the aftermath of 2001 scandals, many countries including the US, UK and Australia 
developed a new set of guidelines for corporate governance practices.  To harmonise 
corporate governance practices with trading partners and boost investor confidence, the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of New Zealand (ICANZ), the Securities Commission 
(NZSC), and the New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZX) promulgated corporate governance 
principles for New Zealand companies. The tripartite study was released as a report in 2004. 
It comprised nine high level statements or principles, each supported by suggestions or 
guidelines as to how the Principle should be implemented. The Principles articulated: the 
need for ethical behaviour; the need for balance in the composition of boards; the role of 
effective board committees; the critical importance of integrity in reporting; the basics of 
good remuneration policy; the need for risk management processes; the imperative auditor 
                                                                                                                                                        
20
 In 1998, Kirin Breweries took control of Lion Nathan by over-taking Douglas Myers and his fellow directors‟ 
shares without having to make a full bid. 
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independence; the importance of constructive shareholder relations; and the potential 
significance of other stakeholders in a governance context (NZSC, 2004).  
Although the 2004 corporate governance principles and guidelines are not mandatory, all 
listed corporate entities are required to observe the Principles to the fullest extent and only 
depart where they are subject to competing statutory or public policy requirements. 
Acknowledging that the NZX Listing Rule 10.5.3(h) does not cover all the corporate 
governance areas of the Principles, companies reporting on corporate governance practices 
are required to cover all the Principles recommended by the Securities Commission. Any 
departures must be explained to the shareholders (NZSC, 2004). This indirectly puts pressure 
on companies to implement the Securities Commission recommendations.  
Critics argued that the corporate governance recommendations focused strongly on 
monitoring and control, which could compel boards to concentrate their efforts more on 
avoiding any breach of rules and regulations rather than on creating value for shareholders. 
NZSC studies show some evidence of companies, in general, have complied with the 
recommendations relating to certain governance structures (NZSC, 2005). However, little has 
been said about the impact of compliance on corporate performance. It remains to be seen 
whether the current corporate governance structure enables organisations to sustain a level of 
entrepreneurial activity which generates growth on the one hand and a satisfactory return on 
investment on the other.  
Corporate governance studies in New Zealand have focused mainly on board composition, 
particularly on board size (Firth, 1987; Fogelberg & Laurent, 1974; Laurent, 1971). Turner 
(1985) examined CEO duality among listed companies for 1984. Chandler and Henshall 
(1982) examined board size, the incidence of executive chairmanship and the proportion of 
outsiders on the boards of listed companies. Fox (1996b) looked at changes in board structure 
in New Zealand between 1962 and 1993 and reported that there were fewer board members 
in 1993 than in 1962.  
Fox and Walker (1998) looked at boards of directors and board committees in New Zealand 
and compared them to cases in the US, UK and Australia. Hossain, et al. (2001) examined the 
relationship between company financial performance and the presence of outside directors in 
New Zealand companies both before and after the 1994 Companies Act. This Act was issued 
in 1994 with the intention of enhancing the financial performance of New Zealand companies 
through better monitoring by boards. Hossain, Prevost and Rao found a positive relationship, 
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i.e., a higher fraction of outside directors lead to better financial performance. However, they 
found no evidence that the strength of that relationship was affected by the Companies Act. 
The cross-sectional variation in executive compensation during the first year of public 
disclosure (1997) was examined by Andjelkovic, Boyle and McNoe (2002) who found no 
evidence of a positive relationship between pay and financial performance, regardless of 
company size, leverage and board structure. Instead, they found CEO pay primarily depended 
on company size. Elayan, et al. (2003) examined the relationship between executive incentive 
compensation schemes (ICS) and company performance. Their results suggested that neither 
the compensation level nor adoption of an ICS was significantly related to returns to 
shareholders or returns on assets (ROA). However, they found a statistically significant 
relationship between Tobin‟s Q and CEO compensation and executive share ownership. 
Chin, et al. (2003) examined the relationship between company performance and board 
composition, size and equity ownership structure using a sample of 426 annual observations 
of New Zealand companies across a five-year period. They found no statistically significant 
relationship between company performance and board composition, size and equity 
ownership structure. 
In summary, the research findings related to governance mechanisms and company financial 
performance have been mixed. This was mainly the result of inconsistencies relating to the 
measurement of variables, differences in data used, different performance measures used and 
different methodologies employed. Corporate governance research conducted overseas and in 
New Zealand focuses mainly on listed companies where the focus has been on establishing 
whether there exists any relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and 
company financial performance.  
This research aims to extend existing corporate governance literature by focusing on the 
effect good governance practices recommended by the NZSC have had on company financial 
performance in New Zealand. The extant literature provides evidence that, due to variables 
being omitted from the model, some of the research findings report spurious correlations. 
This study aims to extend the methodology that accounts for unobserved variables and also 
endogeneity.  
In addition, this study explores the size and industry effect of corporate governance practices 
on company financial performance and provides insight into the governance practices of 
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public corporate entities as well. To date, little is known about the corporate governance of 
public corporate entities in New Zealand and its effect on financial performance. Hence, this 
study will contribute new knowledge and facilitate a comparative analysis of governance 
practices applied in the two different sectors of New Zealand. 
Moreover, this research is timely given the recent global financial crisis  which started in the 
US and quickly spread to the rest of the world (Stiglitz, 2009). The root cause of the problem 
is yet again being attributed to the breakdown of shareholder monitoring and ill conceived 
managerial incentives (Erkens, Hung, & Matos, 2009). As a consequence, the effectiveness 
of the principles-based guidelines been increasingly questioned by academics and markets 
and regulators (Bianchi, Ciavarella, Novembre, & Signoretti, 2010). A key issue debated in 
the literature and policy circles is whether “comply, and or explain” principles are effective in 
prompting better governance through the adoption of best practices (de Jong, DeJong, 
Mertens, & Wasley, 2005).  
2.10 CONCLUSION 
This chapter surveyed existing literature pertaining to the relationship between corporate 
governance practices and company financial performance whilst also identifying the 
contribution to be made through this research. An overview of corporate governance was 
presented followed by a discussion on corporate governance mechanisms. Relevant empirical 
studies relating to internal and external governance mechanisms and company financial 
performance was then presented with a concluding discussion on corporate governance 
development and research relating to New Zealand. 
Chapter 3 provides a broad overview of the corporate governance environment in New 
Zealand, It will also provide discussion on the changes in corporate governance practices 
overtime and development of relevant regulations/policies that have enhanced governance 
practices in New Zealand.  The role of various organisations that influence the standard of 
corporate governance practiced in New Zealand is also discussed. 
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CHAPTER 3  
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE NEW ZEALAND 
CONTEXT 
 
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
The historical development of corporate governance practices in New Zealand is very much 
related to the history of the formation of corporations and adoption of commercial law in 
New Zealand. Prior to western colonisation in the mid-19th century, tribal governance 
structures existed where each tribe possessed their own leaders and governed their own 
geographic areas to maintain and sustain their individual economic, political and social 
organisations (Reddy & Tremaine, 1996). After western colonisation in the 1840s, New 
Zealand was governed by the Parliament at Westminster. A development in 1865 saw New 
Zealand receive limited legislative powers and then in 1931 the United Kingdom Parliament 
passed the Statute of Westminster which basically removed the limitations on New Zealand‟s 
(and other dominions) legislative powers (Greville, 2002). In 1947, New Zealand passed the 
Statute of Westminster Adoption Act and became the driver of its own legislative destiny. 
Despite gaining liberation from legislative dictation, New Zealand still seeks jurisprudential 
guidance from the UK as well as from other countries. The New Zealand Companies Act 
1955 was an almost exact copy of the United Kingdom Act of 1948 but, as noted by the Law 
Commission (New Zealand Law Commission, 1989, p.29), the UK company law had become 
increasingly influenced by European law, and was considered to no longer provide an 
obvious model for New Zealand. For this reason, New Zealand, over the last 20 years or so, 
started to look further afield for legislative models, particularly in the more commercially 
flavoured subject areas.  
Prior to 1978, securities regulation in New Zealand was relatively unsophisticated. Although 
a number of pieces of legislation dealt with some areas of securities law, in general, they did 
not have a significant impact on securities regulation in New Zealand (Fitzsimons, 1994). 
The collapse of some major companies in the mid-1970s raised concerns regarding investor 
protection in New Zealand (Fitzsimons, 1994). These companies had set up their fund-raising 
activities so that they were largely able to avoid existing regulations and the protections 
provided for the investing public by those regulations. The enactment of the Securities Act 
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1978 was the government‟s response to public pressure. The view taken by government was 
to improve investor protection, with the proviso that the commercial community not be 
burdened with excessive and inflexible regulation. 
There are two parts to the Securities Act 1978. Part I of the Act deals with the establishment 
of the NZSC as a securities law reform body. The intention of the Act was to allow NZSC to 
impose liabilities on insiders of public issuers who have inside information about the public 
issuer and who also buy or sell securities of the public issuer. The liability extended to an 
insider of a public issuer who advises or encourages any person to buy or sell securities and 
to insiders of a public issuer who have inside information about another public issuer and 
who buy and sell securities in that other public issuer.
21
 Part II of the Act provided 
substantive provisions dealing with the registering, issuing, and advertising of securities 
which were to be offered to the public. The Act provided protection against insider trading in 
terms of immediate disclosure of any securities trading by company directors and officers. 
However, the shortcomings of the Securities Act 1978, as noted by Lindroos and Walker 
(1994), was that the focus was on controlling the “activity” of raising funds from the public, 
rather than the “entity” which was raising funds. Also, the Act only dealt with transactions 
that related to the primary securities market
22
 and did not control transactions involving 
securities once they have been issued to the public (secondary market). The gap in the 
regulation prompted certain types of behaviour in the secondary market which, from view of 
investors, was not a good characteristic of an efficient capital market such as market 
manipulation and insider trading. 
The NZSC moved to engage in broader securities law reform issues from the date of its 
establishment in 1979, however, having powers only to review and comment meant that 
enforcement of regulation was difficult (Kavanagh, 2005). As Kavanagh (2005), a member of 
the NZSC, points out: 
                                                 
21
 See Securities Amendment Act 1988 ss.7-14 
22
 Primary securities market is the market in which securities are offered to the public for the first time. A 
security is defined in s 2(1) of the Act and includes shares (a form of equity security), debentures (a form of debt 
security), and interests in bloodstock or forestry partnerships (a form of participatory security). With the 
exception of certain securities referred to in ss 6 and 6A of the Securities Act 1978, the Act does not control 
transactions involving securities once they have issued to the public (Fitzsimons, 1994). 
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“We regularly come across dubious conduct for which there is no clear 
remedy, or those who are directly affected do not have the means or the 
motivation to take action. In these cases not only is harm done to individual 
issuers or investors who are directly affected, but there is a wider damage 
to the integrity and efficiency of the markets as a whole.” 
 
There was also evidence of errant behaviour by directors in the boardroom. For example, the 
directors who destroyed the value of Air New Zealand in 2001 were still part of the board of 
directors after that time. There was also evidence of entrenched executives being part of 
boards (for example in Brierley Investment Limited and Fletcher Challenge) (Healy, 2003), 
and the feeling among investors was that companies had been hijacked by executives and 
directors (Williams, 1999).  According to Godfrey and Horsely (2003), these behaviours 
created a perception - locally and internationally – that the New Zealand capital market had 
not sufficiently protected investors with appropriate reporting, compliance and governance 
standards.  
After the October 1987 stockmarket crash, it became apparent that the corporate governance 
practised in New Zealand was not of the same standard as our major trading partners. In 
terms of guidelines or rules for companies on corporate governance, there were none. 
Standards of care expected by directors were only expressed at the common law level and 
were essentially that directors would be liable only for acts of gross negligence (Hossain et 
al., 2001, p. 123). The definition of what constituted an act of gross negligence was 
essentially left to the courts to decide. Whilst the UK, Australia and the US were observing 
such tenets as the inclusion of independent directors (Hossain et al., 2001), that was not the 
case in New Zealand. This, to some extent, started the corporate governance debate in New 
Zealand. In comparison, the corporate governance debate in larger economies engaged 
academics and regulatory authorities much earlier; the United States since the late seventies 
and the United Kingdom since 1992, with the issue of the Cadbury Report
23
.   
The economics literature supports the view that capital markets‟ success relies on good 
regulation (Diplock, 2006a). Rigorous and relevant regulation decreases the cost of equity 
                                                 
23
 This was a voluntary response of the British corporate community to the Maxwell affair and other abuses of 
corporate responsibility. 
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capital because there are wider shareholder bases, and regulatory-mandated transparency 
reduces transaction costs, thus providing incentives for further participation and therefore 
liquidity in the marketplace. New Zealand‟s restrictive regulatory environment was 
detrimental to the development of the capital market as it constrained financial products‟ 
innovation and discouraged savings. The narrow range of the financial products offered and 
the lack of protection for the minority investors were the key factors that were seen to have 
contributed to the slow growth of the capital market in New Zealand (Capital Market 
Development Taskforce Secretariat, 2009). Healy (2003) notes that the market capitalisation 
of the NZX was approximately 43% of the gross domestic product (GDP) in 2001 and in 
2009, it is 36%. However, Australia in the same period experienced a quadrupled growth rate 
of 110% of the GDP. In the UK and US equity markets were approximately 190% and 120% 
of GDP respectively (Healy, 2003, p.213). These figures provide support for the view that 
New Zealand‟s lack of capital market regulations has not been conducive to the growth of the 
market. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2003) add that an efficient financial system 
will have the legal systems to support creditor rights (in particular, the rights of the minority 
shareholders), sound governance and effective legal enforcement mechanisms. Regulations 
protecting investors‟ interests will promote good governance and enhance investors‟ 
confidence (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 
1999, 2000). A  study undertaken by La Porta et al. (2000) show that countries that have 
regulations promoting investor rights tend to be positively related to financial development 
and hence innovation and growth.  
The deregulation of the economy in 1984 increased the reliance of local companies on 
foreign capital for investment and growth (Brash, 1995). The perception and the mood in the 
New Zealand capital market was that foreign investors would invest in New Zealand if we 
have good governance structures in place (Diplock, 2006b). These factors also played an 
important role in the development of corporate governance practices in New Zealand. 
A combination of the factors stated above initially led New Zealand to adopt light-handed 
securities regulation by international standards, which was first articulated in the Roche 
Report, 1991. Direct regulation of markets has been the responsibility of self-regulatory 
organisations such as the New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZSX) and the New Zealand 
Futures and Options Exchange (NZFOE). This was seen as appropriate in the context of the 
small and isolated New Zealand capital market and the burdens that can be imposed by 
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compliance costs in such a market. In the 21st century, New Zealand's light-handed 
regulatory approach became unsuitable as developments on the technological front made 
traditional boundaries borderless and securities markets global (Holland, 2007). To attract 
investment, and to be accepted in the international financial community, New Zealand needed 
to have regulation that aligned with similar jurisdictions overseas (Todd, 2007). As Kavanagh 
(2005) states, New Zealand markets and the New Zealand economy need to be well regarded 
by the international regulatory and investing community. The high profile corporate collapses 
in early 2001 raised international awareness of corporate governance practices which 
prompted practitioners and regulatory authorities in New Zealand to review their governance 
practices and procedures.  The view taken was that given New Zealand‟s small and isolated 
capital market, as well as predominately small size of companies, it would be appropriate to 
adopt governance practices that would impose a low cost of compliance.  
The failure of 87 finance companies (majority unlisted) between 2006 and 2008 raised further 
concerns about investor confidence in the New Zealand capital market and prompted New 
Zealand to review its securities laws. One of the recent developments includes the 
requirement for non-bank financial institutions to meet prudential supervisory requirements 
similar to registered banks, and comply with the disclosure requirements as stipulated by the 
Financial Advisers Act 2008 (which comes into effect in 2010).  
Table 3.1 provides a list of the securities laws that have been enacted since 1978 to improve 
the integrity of the capital market and to improve the standard of governance practices in 
New Zealand companies. Guidelines for improving corporate governance practices by the 
NZX, IOD and NZSC are also included. 
Table 3.1: 
Rules, Guidelines and Legislation for Corporate Governance in New Zealand 
Year Description Purpose in relation to corporate governance 
1978 Securities Act 1978  Establishes the NZSC and its powers and functions. 
 Sets out laws related to initial offerings of securities 
by “issuers”, including the requirement for a 
prospectus, and responsibilities of directors and 
promoters. 
 Establishes the requirement for a trust deed in debt 
securities and collective investment schemes, and the 
responsibilities of trustees. 
 Sets out the sanctions available through the courts 
1983 Securities Regulations  Sets out rules in relation to registration of 
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Year Description Purpose in relation to corporate governance 
1983 prospectus, and contents of prospectus and 
investment statements, as well as advertisement for 
offer of securities. 
 Minimum requirements for contents of trust deeds 
and, in the case of “participatory securities”, deeds of 
participation. 
1988 Securities Markets Act 
1988 
 In general, the laws governing the fair operation of 
secondary markets for securities. 
 Continuous disclosure requirements on issuers about 
information significant to investors, and about 
substantial security holders.  
 Specific provisions and prohibiting insider trading 
and market manipulation. 
 Registration of exchanges, including the requirement 
for listing and conduct rules. 
 Recognises the general desirability of co-regulation 
of listed markets by the registered exchanges and the 
NZSC, and sets out specific rules around the 
provision of information by registered exchanges to 
the NZSC (enabling oversight by the NZSC). 
1989 Listing Rules on 
Corporate Governance 
NZX  
 To ensure appropriate disclosure and to set out the 
principles of corporate governance and 
accountability. 
1993 Code of Proper 
Practice for Directors 
NZ Institute of 
Directors (IOD) 
 Outlines the standard of conduct required of the IOD 
members. 
1993 The Companies Act 
1993 
 Establishes the powers of the Registrar of 
Companies, including the power to prosecute issuers, 
directors and promoters for breaches of both 
securities and company law. 
 Provides investor protection on a range of issues 
including equal distribution of all shares, providing 
certain information to shareholders and banning 
delinquent directors. 
1993 The Financial 
Reporting Act 1993 
 Sets out requirement for issuers to prepare and 
publish financial statements in accordance with 
generally accepted accounting practice (GAAP). 
1993 Takeovers Act 1993  Encourages competition for control of companies, 
while ensuring fair treatment of all shareholders with 
substantial shareholdings. 
1996 The Investment 
Advisers (Disclosure) 
 Deals with the full disclosure of information. 
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Year Description Purpose in relation to corporate governance 
Act 1996 
2001 The Takeovers Code  To ensure that all shareholders in a public company 
take part in any offer to takeover that company. 
2002 Securities Markets 
Amendment Act 2006 
 Provided laws for insider trading, market 
manipulation and new disclosure rules for 
investment advisers. 
2004 Promulgation of 
Corporate Governance 
recommendations 
NZSC 
 Aimed at tightening the existing corporate 
governance rules with a view to boost investor 
confidence and increase shareholder and stakeholder 
value.  
2008 The Finance Advisers 
Act 2008 and The 
Financial Service 
Providers (Registration 
and Dispute 
Resolution) Act 2008 
 Establishes the power of the NZSC to register and 
supervise financial advisers, including the 
requirement for a Commissioner for Financial 
Advisers.  
 Deals with the scope and depth of information given 
including fees and remuneration. 
Source: Prada and Walter (2009);NZX (2008); Ministry of Economic Development (2009) 
The next section provides an overview of the various securities regulations and corporate 
governance guidelines stated in Table 3.1 above and their importance in terms of developing 
a structure for corporate governance practices in New Zealand. The sections that follow will 
provide a brief discussion of the role various regulatory or investor protection bodies (namely 
the NZSC - securities regulator, NZX, New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
New Zealand (NZICA), Institute of Directors (IOD), The New Zealand Treasury, The 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ), and New Zealand Shareholders Association) play in 
terms of developing a framework for corporate governance laws in New Zealand. A brief 
discussion of the roles that the Ministry of Economic Development, Registrar of Companies, 
Trustees Corporations, Commerce Commission, Serious Fraud Office, Ministry of Consumer 
Affairs, and Banking Ombudsman play in regard to monitoring and enforcing various 
securities laws in New Zealand and their relationship to the NZSC will also be provided.  
3.1 SECURITIES MARKETS ACT 1988 
Public outcry in regard to insider trading and poor standards of governance practices in listed 
companies after the stockmarket crash led to the enactment of the Securities Markets Act 
1988.  The aim of the Act was to allow: 
 investors who have suffered loss at the hands of an insider to seek compensation; 
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 the right of a company to recover from an insider an amount of money where he or 
she traded on confidential information;  
 the disqualification of an insider trader from holding office in a company, and  
 the right of the court to revoke a shareholder‟s licence where a sharebroker traded as 
an insider (NZSC1988).  
Following the enactment of the Securities Markets Act 1988, the NZX in 1989 published the 
Listing Rules on Corporate Governance practices for all publicly listed companies. This was 
an initial attempt to establish appropriate disclosure and a standard of principles for corporate 
governance practices and accountability for all listed companies in the NZX.  
Although the NZX listing rules introduced in 1989 did set some ground rules for corporate 
governance practices, the lack of rules or guidelines that specified directors‟ duties meant that 
any breaches were difficult to prosecute. The standards of care expected by directors were 
only expressed at the common law level provisioned under the Companies Act 1955. In 
addition, the securities market statutory regulator, the NZSC, was only given a limited 
enforcement role - primarily through “review and comment” powers (Kavanagh, 2005). As a 
result, many cases of dubious practices in the securities market went unpunished as the 
companies and shareholders did not have the means or motivation to take action and, most 
importantly, there existed no clear laws against such practices. For example, although insider 
trading
24
 was regarded as an undesirable practice in the capital markets, there were no laws 
that restricted such practices; such actions could not be prosecuted in a criminal environment. 
An example of such an occurrence is provided by Kirin Breweries, which, in 1998, used 
inside information to take control of Lion Nathan by overtaking Douglas Myers and his 
fellow directors without having to make a full bid (Godfrey & Horsely, 2003, p. 27). There 
were also cases of market manipulation (Mr. Hyslop‟s purchase of FCL shares, 1999), insider 
trading (McCollam Printers Limited, 1998) and investment advisers allowing illegal offers 
(Gideon Investments Limited and Morison Guildford & Associates Limited) (Kavanagh, 
2005). These practices were harmful to the individual issuers or investors directly affected, 
                                                 
24
 Insider trading is recognised as a behaviour which is damaging not just to individual companies and 
stakeholders, but also to the efficiency and integrity of the securities market as well (Kavanagh, 2005). 
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and also inflicted systemic damage on the integrity and efficiency of the New Zealand capital 
market as a whole.  
It became apparent that New Zealand‟s light-handed approaches to securities market 
regulations were no longer appropriate to maintain the integrity and efficiency of the market. 
Adding to these challenges were developments on the technological front that made 
traditional boundaries borderless and securities markets more global. This provided potential 
for globalised capital markets to fuel economic growth and prosperity in countries that had 
regulations to promote integrity and stability of the market. As Goran Persson, Sweden‟s 
Prime Minister and the then chair of OECD Ministers‟ Forum stated: 
 
“Globalisation offers opportunity for all mankind. Our task is to seize on 
the potential of globalisation while combating its costs and disadvantages” 
(c. i. Diplock, 2005). 
 
To capture the opportunities in globalised capital markets, New Zealand needed regulation 
that promoted fairness, efficiency, transparency, and investor confidence.  
In order to boost investor confidence and align New Zealand‟s commercial regulatory 
framework with international jurisdictions, New Zealand looked to its trading partners. The 
view taken was that regulation already in place in other jurisdictions could be modified to fit 
New Zealand‟s economic model,  and could also provide an opportunity to eliminate 
differences that may create barriers in trade and investment (Diplock, 2005). The 
convergence of New Zealand‟s regulations with international best practice in financial 
reporting, corporate governance and market regulation would also enhance the reputation of 
New Zealand‟s capital markets (NZSC2002). In this regard, New Zealand in the past had 
tended to adopt UK legislation, but has recently adopted a more North American approach 
(Farrar, 2002). For example, New Zealand‟s Commerce Act 198625 and Fair Trading Act 
                                                 
25
 The aim of the Commerce Act is to promote competition in markets within New Zealand.  It prohibits conduct 
that restricts competition (restrictive trade practices) and the purchase of a business's shares or assets if that 
purchase leads to a substantial lessening of competition in the market. 
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1986
26
 were primarily sourced from the Australian Trade Practices Act, which in turn has 
been developed from US models in American antitrust laws (Greville, 2002). Greville (2002) 
also asserted that the Companies Act 1993 and the Consumer Guarantees Act 1994
27
 were 
based on a Canadian model.  
The Companies Act was part of a larger law reform package passed in 1993. A number of 
other amendments were also codified into law with the Companies Act 1993, and include the 
Receiverships Act, the Companies Re-Registration Act, the Financial Reporting Act and the 
Takeover Act. The Companies Act 1993 was an attempt to remedy the frustrations faced by 
the Law Commission in implementing the Companies Act 1955 which did not explicitly 
codify the duties of directors and were inaccessible, unclear and extremely difficult to 
enforce.  
3.2 COMPANIES ACT 1993 
The Companies Act 1993 provides investor protection on a range of issues including equal 
distribution of all shares, disclosure of information to shareholders and banning delinquent 
directors. The Companies Act 1993 provided the fundamental corporate governance 
framework for companies, codifying and expanding directors‟ duties and shareholders‟ rights 
previously exiting under common law. Most importantly, the 1993 Act expanded on the 
existing legislation of the time regarding the boards‟ duties by explicitly stating that 
directors‟ obligations are: to act in good faith (Section 131); to exercise powers for a proper 
purpose (Section 134); never cause or allow the business of the company to be carried out in 
such a way that creates a risk of serious loss to the company‟s creditors (Sections 135 and 
136); and to exercise a duty of care – exercise care, diligence, and skill that a reasonable 
person would exercise in the same circumstances (Section 137). The Companies Act 1993 
                                                 
26
 The Fair Trading Act was developed with the Commerce Act to encourage competition and to protect 
consumers from misleading and deceptive conduct and unfair trading practices.  The Act applies to all aspects of 
the promotion and sale of goods and services - from advertising and pricing to sales techniques and finance 
agreements.  
27
 The Consumer Guarantees Act (CGA) sets out guarantees that goods and services must meet when sold by 
someone in trade - that is, a retailer or service person. From 8 July 2003, the Consumer Guarantees Act also 
applies to electricity, gas, water, and computer software. From this date, the Consumer Guarantees Act also 
applies to services relating to the supply of electricity, telecommunications, gas, water, and the removal of 
wastewater. 
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also recognised the importance of the role of an independent auditor. It was specifically 
stated that an auditor of a company must ensure that their judgement is not impaired by 
reason of any relationship with or interest in the company or any of its subsidiaries. The 
significant development in the 1993 Act was that shareholders are able to bring direct legal 
action against directors for breaches of compliance.  
The Act emphasised that the management of the business and affairs of the company is the 
responsibility of the company‟s board of directors, whereas, the control of a company rests 
with the shareholders.  Central to that control is the right, conferred on the holder of a share, 
to a vote on all matters put to the annual meeting of the company. A special shareholders‟ 
meeting may also be called by shareholders holding at least five percent of the voting rights 
of a company. At annual and special meetings, shareholders are entitled to raise proposals for 
discussion or resolution. The Act reserves certain fundamental governance powers to the 
shareholders, including: appointing the directors of the company; adopting or altering the 
constitution of the company; appointing and removing the auditor; approving any transaction 
involving the acquisition or disposition of assets, the value of which is more than half the 
value of the company‟s total assets (defined as a major transaction); approving an 
amalgamation of the company; and putting the company into liquidation (New Zealand 
Parliament, 1993). 
Under the Act, directors are allowed to delegate certain powers and functions, however, they 
are not permitted to delegate the management function itself. The Act lists certain board 
powers that cannot be delegated, including the power to: issue shares; make distributions and 
provide shareholders‟ discounts; offer to acquire the company‟s shares; make stock exchange 
acquisitions of the company‟s shares; redeem shares; provide financial assistance; and 
transfer shares (New Zealand Parliament, 1993). 
To improve the standards of financial reporting and auditing functions in listed companies, 
the Financial Reporting Act (hereafter FRA) was also enacted in 1993. Under the FRA all 
companies and issuers (entities which issue securities to the public) are required to comply 
with generally accepted accounting practices (GAAP) and give a true and fair view of their 
financial affairs. The FRA requires companies to produce a prescribed set of financial 
statements within five months of their annual balance date. For listed companies these must 
also be audited, with directors subject to substantial penalties for non compliance. NZX 
Listing Rules impose shorter reporting deadlines: companies must announce annual and half 
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year financial results within 60 days of the end of the relevant reporting period and present 
annual and half year reports within three months of relevant balance dates. The FRA also 
established the Accounting Standards Review Board (ASRB) whose primary function is to 
review and approve financial reporting standards, which are standards that prescribe the 
content of financial statements. In particular, FRA gave a legal force to the financial reporting 
standards and also made it a statutory obligation for companies to provide timely financial 
statements. To align with international organisations, the ASRB announced on 19 December 
2002 that New Zealand entities would adopt International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) for periods commencing 1 January 2007, with the option to adopt for the period 
commencing 1 January 2005. The purpose of IFRS is to make financial reporting consistent 
in every country. The International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO), of 
which New Zealand is a member, assists with the implementation of IFRS by creating a 
database through which members can share information and refer to any varying 
interpretations relating to IFRS. 
Also crucial to the Companies Act 1993 is the “solvency test” which simply requires that 
before any distribution is made to shareholders enough assets are to be retained to allow the 
company to meet its obligation (Section 52(2)) (Jones, 1993). Failure to comply with the 
solvency test is regarded as a criminal offence which may lead to penalties of up to NZ$5000 
(Section 373(1). The Act also emphasised that from 1st July 1997 there must be full 
disclosure of the directors‟ activities, business interests, names and remuneration of each 
director, as well as, their share dealings in the annual reports (Section 211(1)).  
To assist with compliance with the Companies Act 1993 and the related laws, the NZX in 
1993 provided listing rules to publicly-listed companies, particularly in relation to the 
conduct of directors. The NZX listing rules required listed companies to provide a statement 
of any corporate governance policies, practices and processes adopted or followed to be 
disclosed in their annual reports. The IOD in New Zealand issued a Code of Proper Practice 
for Directors in 1993 which were mainly best practice guidelines for corporate governance 
structures. The Code of Proper Practice also extended the requirements for directors to 
include moral and ethical responsibilities. 
The Companies Act 1993 and related laws were based on overseas models where tenets of 
good corporate governance practices such as the separation of the CEO and chair positions, 
independent directors and board committees were observed. However, there was no guidance 
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provided under the Act to have the same practices implemented in New Zealand. The NZX 
listing rules (NZX Code) and the IOD‟s Code of Proper Practice provided guidelines based 
on their own view of what reflected corporate governance best practice. A summary of the 
elements emphasised by each code is given in Table 3.2 below.  
The IOD‟s code tended to focus on best practice as observed in Australia, Canada, the US 
and the UK.  On the other hand, the NZX Code offered flexibility to companies, with a 
comply or explain rule. In this regard, the NZX Code required all publicly listed companies 
to disclose how their corporate governance policies, practices and processes deviated from 
the NZX Code. Due to a lack of regulatory guidance in terms of what constituted good 
corporate governance practices, both the NZSE and the IOD developed somewhat differing 
views.  
Table 3.2: 
A Summary of Corporate Governance Guidelines Provided by Both the IOD and the 
NZX to its Members in 1993 
 IOD Code of Proper 
Practice 
NZX Code 
Separation of 
Chairman and 
CEO 
positions 
Yes No 
Definition of 
a Non-
Executive or 
Independent 
Director 
A person who is not 
recently employed by the 
company, does not 
represent a major 
shareholder or creditor of 
the company, is 
independent of 
management and is free 
from any business or other 
relationship that could 
materially interfere with the 
exercise of their 
independent judgement. 
A person who is not an executive of the 
company. He or she must also have no 
material relationship with or interest (direct or 
indirect) in the company which could 
reasonably interfere with that person‟s ability 
to freely act in the best interests of the 
company and its shareholders. 
A six month cooling off period is included to 
recognise the period of time that must elapse 
before a person can be considered 
independent of their previous interest. 
Minimum 
number of 
independent 
directors 
Majority of the members of 
the board should be 
independent. 
Two or one-third of the total number of 
directors, whichever is the greater.  
Those boards with eight members should 
have at least three independent directors on 
the board. Those having fewer than eight 
members or more than nine members may 
round down to the nearest one third. 
Audit 
Committees 
Yes, should consist of three 
directors all of whom, if 
possible, should be non-
Yes, majority of the members should be 
independent directors and at least one 
member should have an accounting or 
72 
 
 IOD Code of Proper 
Practice 
NZX Code 
executive. financial background. 
Remuneration 
Committee 
Yes, should consist of three 
directors all of whom, if 
possible, should be non-
executive. 
Depending on practicality and size of the 
company, majority of the members should be 
independent directors.  
Nomination 
Committee 
Yes, should comprise of the 
Chairman, deputy chairman 
and the CEO 
Depending on practicality and size of the 
company, majority of the members should be 
independent directors. 
Source: Institute of Directors in New Zealand (Inc) (2009); NZX (2008) 
Company takeover issues were another problem area for investors in the securities market. 
The Takeovers Act 1993 was specifically designed to ensure that there is equal treatment of 
target company shareholders and to enhance informed decision-making by all parties. The 
Takeovers Code is administered by the Takeovers Panel, also established under the 
Takeovers Act 1993. The Code requires any share acquisitions in a company above a 
shareholding threshold of 20% to proceed only by way of a full or partial offer made on equal 
terms to all shareholders (unless a majority of the latter approve other terms). The Panel has 
extensive powers to challenge non compliance. The Panel may grant exemptions from the 
Code in particular situations. The Takeovers Act sets a broad objective of encouraging 
competition for control of companies, while ensuring fair treatment of all shareholders. The 
Code establishes procedural rules for takeovers, including a requirement for target company 
directors to obtain independent appraisal of a takeover offer and make a recommendation to 
their shareholders. NZX Listing Rules also set out takeover provisions for issuers that are 
non-code companies.  
The overall intention of the Companies Act 1993 and the related laws was to make directors 
legally accountable for their fiduciary responsibilities. By bearing greater responsibility for 
managerial malfeasance and poor financial decisions, board members would have a greater 
incentive to prevent the mismanagement of corporate resources and managerial departure 
from the value maximising goal. Hartford (1994) added that the 1993 Act brought the 
responsibility of the directors in line with other professionals like accountants, lawyers and 
doctors who also operate under a threat of personal liability if they act recklessly or 
negligently. Some commentators view a threat of litigation to have a positive influence on 
board behaviour with respect to influencing company performance. There is also a possibility 
that a threat of litigation may force some directors either to leave or acquire skills in order to 
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provide services under the new laws. This may make the market for directors more efficient 
in New Zealand and also, directors may become more concerned about reputation signalling 
(Bhagat & Black, 1998; Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983a). 
3.3 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES AND 
GUIDELINES  
Many countries including Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, the UK and the US responded to 
the high profile corporate debacles by enacting new laws and regulations aimed at improving 
corporate disclosure and governance practices. The United States took a distinctively rule-
based approach regarding certain aspects of corporate governance with the adoption of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (Diplock, 2003) . Although New Zealand did not suffer scandals 
to the extent reported in larger economies, such as the US, UK and Australia, concern with 
poor  performance (Healy, 2003) and sub-standard governance practices, were highlighted by 
local and international market participants (Godfrey & Horsely, 2003). There were cases of 
corporate collapse, namely, Equiticorp, Chase and Fortex, resulting from poor financial 
reporting and inadequate audit functions. There were also cases where the poor quality of 
corporate governance practices has been the reason for the erosion of wealth experienced by 
shareholders in companies, such as the Bank of New Zealand (BNZ), Air New Zealand and 
Brierley Investments Limited (BIL) (Healy, 2003). Poor governance practices were also 
exhibited in public sector entities, leading to the financial bailout of significant educational 
institutions such as Wairarapa Polytechnic, Wanganui Polytechnic (McKinlay, 2003), 
Western Institute of Technology in Taranaki (WITT) and Te Wananga o Aotearoa. There 
were also reported cases of poor corporate governance practices experienced in voluntary 
sector organisations such as the Northland Health, social services provider Te Hau Ora O Te 
Taitokerau and the Pipi Foundation (McKinlay, 2003). Lastly but not least, the failure of 87 
finance companies between 2006 and 2008 raised further concerns for investor confidence in 
the New Zealand capital market. These failures and sub-standard corporate governance 
practices signal that urgent attention was required from policy makers should New Zealand 
wished to maintain integrity in the capital market.  
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Debate in New Zealand focused primarily on whether to adopt a flexible principle-based 
governance approach
28
 compared to a “one size fits all” rule-based approach similar to the 
US. The challenge for the regulators in New Zealand was to balance investors‟ needs for 
transparency and certainty with corporate needs for minimized compliance costs (Gilbertson 
& Brown, 2002). The consensus was that due to the relatively small nature of the economy, 
many measures adopted in the US would be unsuitable in New Zealand. As a result, New 
Zealand adopted a more nuanced principle-based approach similar to the UK, Canada and 
Australia. 
To harmonise corporate governance practices with trading partners and boost investor 
confidence the NZSC promulgated corporate governance principles for New Zealand 
companies. In 2004, the NZSC released a report highlighting the nine high-level statements 
or principles, each supported by suggestions or guidelines, as to how the Principle should be 
implemented. The Principles articulate: the need for ethical behaviour; the need for balance in 
the composition of boards; the role of effective board committees; the critical importance of 
integrity in reporting; the basics of good remuneration policy; the need for risk management 
processes; the imperative of auditor independence; the importance of constructive 
shareholder relations; and the potential significance of other stakeholders in a governance 
context (NZSC2004).  
It was agreed that the corporate governance principles and guidelines would not be 
mandatory; however, all economic entities are required to observe the Principles to the fullest 
extent and only depart where they are subject to competing statutory or public policy 
requirements. Under the NZX Listing Rule 10.5.3(h) companies reporting on corporate 
governance practices are required to cover all the Principles recommended by the NZSC. Any 
departures must be explained to the shareholders (NZSC2004). As a result, many companies 
have changed their charters and altered their board structures. 
                                                 
28
 Also referred as „Codes of Best Practice‟ in some countries. These are „soft law‟ (see Mörth, 2004) or „soft 
regulation‟ (see Sahlin-Andersson, 2004) that are non-binding and are issued by a collective body relating to the 
internal governance of corporations (Weil & Manges, 2004).  The first serious „Code of Best Practice‟ was the 
Cadbury Report 1992 issued by a committee that was set up by the London Stock Exchange and the Financial 
Reporting Council. The precursors of the Cadbury Report were the codes issued in the USA in 1978 and Hong 
Kong in 1989. However, these codes were relatively general and did not receive much attention (Seidl, 2006) 
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According to the NZSC, the corporate governance principles and guidelines apply to all 
entities that have an economic impact in New Zealand or are accountable, in various ways to 
the public. These include issuers of securities, both listed and unlisted, state-owned 
enterprises, community trusts and public sector corporate entities. The corporate governance 
practices and guidelines proposed by the NZSC in the areas of separation of chair and CEO 
positions, independent directors, board committees, board remuneration and appointment of 
auditors are summarised in Table 3.3 below. 
Table 3.3: 
NZSC Principles and Guidelines for Corporate Governance Best Practices for New 
Zealand Business Entities, 2004 
Separation of 
Chairman and CEO 
positions 
Yes 
Definition of a Non-
Executive 
Independent Director 
A non-executive director being formally classified as independent 
only where he or she does not represent a substantial shareholder 
and where the board is satisfied that he or she has no other or 
indirect interest or relationship that could reasonably influence their 
judgement and decision making as a director 
Minimum number of 
independent 
directors 
Majority of the members of the board should be non-executive and 
a minimum of one third should be independent directors. 
Audit Committees Yes, should consist of all non-executive directors, a majority of 
whom should be independent.  
At least one director should be a chartered accountant or have other 
forms of financial expertise. 
Chairperson of the committee should be an independent director and 
who is not the chairperson of the board. 
Remuneration 
Committee 
Depending on practicality and size of the company. 
Nomination 
Committee 
Depending on practicality and size of the company. 
Source: New Zealand Securities Commission  (2004) 
The corporate governance guidelines provided by the NZSC in 2004 were not materially 
different from what was proposed by the NZSX code in 1993. The view taken by many was 
that corporate governance approaches needed to be flexible and that they also reflect on New 
Zealand‟s model of economic management. This model is simply based on the disciplines of 
the market, and the ability of interested parties to hold directors and managers accountable. 
Another reason for adopting a principle-based (comply or explain) approach to corporate 
governance practices in New Zealand was that a similar structure was already in place in the 
banking sector where the Reserve Bank laid out the corporate governance and reporting 
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standards for all banks, and thereafter looked largely to commercial imperatives and 
marketplace accountabilities to deliver stability in the banking and payments system. To 
quote Reserve Bank Governor Allan Bollard:  
 
“Our supervisory framework is deliberately light-handed in nature, in the 
sense that we minimise our intrusion into the management of banks’ risks 
and the structure of their operations. Instead, we try to foster robust self 
discipline in banks through the corporate governance and disclosure 
frameworks we have established.” (c.i. Quinn, 2005, p.3) 
 
The NZSC saw parallels between the way the Reserve Bank provided supervision and 
monitoring role to registered banks and its role as a statutory regulator. In NZSC‟s view 
capital market stability and performance could be achieved by having companies with sound 
corporate governance structures and processes putting a strong emphasis on reporting and 
enabling owners to exercise ultimate control (Quinn, 2005). The shortcomings in the 
Securities Market Amendment Act 1988 and the Investment Adviser (Disclosure) Act 1996 
were that they placed heavy reliance on private litigation to enforce the law and deter bad 
practices. The experiences from New Zealand and overseas showed that private litigation was 
not a sufficient deterrent to those who were prepared to engage in unscrupulous practices 
(Kavanagh, 2005). Therefore, a public action against conduct that damages the integrity of, or 
confidence in, the markets was needed. The passing of the Securities Markets Amendment 
Act 2006 was aimed at changing New Zealand‟s regulatory framework and bringing it closer 
to alignment with international expectations.  
3.4 SECURITIES MARKETS AMENDMENT ACT 2006 
The passing of the Crown Entities Act 2004 allowed NZX to be demutualised and become a 
publicly listed company. This development brings NZX in line with other stock exchanges 
that have been demutualised over the years
29
. The NZX adopted the Corporate Governance 
                                                 
29
The Stockholm Stock Exchange was demutualised in 1993, the Helsinki Stock Exchange in 1995, the National 
Stock Exchange of India was created as a demutualised exchange in 1995, the Copenhagen Exchange in 1996, 
the Amsterdam Exchange in 1997, the Australian Exchange in 1998, the Toronto, Hong Kong, and London 
stock exchanges in 2000, the Bombay Stock Exchange in 2005, the New York Stock Exchange in 2007 
(Aggarwal, Ferrell & Katz, 2007). 
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Practice Code in 2003. In terms of monitoring the behaviour of the market participants, the 
Securities Markets Amendment Act provided a co-regulatory arrangement between the NZX 
as the front-line regulator enforcing the conduct rules, and the NZSC as a statutory regulator 
concerned with breaches of the law. The NZSC also has the responsibility for monitoring the 
performance of NZX as the front-line regulator. The Securities Markets Amendment Act 
2006 introduced reforms in five key areas: market manipulation; insider trading; investment 
adviser disclosure; substantial security disclosure; and enforcement provisions of the 
Securities Act.  
A lack of dedicated laws against market manipulation was cited as one of the most obvious 
gaps found in New Zealand‟s securities market regulations. The Securities Markets 
Amendment Act 2006 included specific prohibitions against making false or misleading 
statements regarding listed securities, and a general prohibition against misleading or 
deceptive conduct in relation to securities. A more specific prohibition against disseminating 
false or misleading information to manipulate trading in listed securities, and causing a 
misleading appearance of trading in listed securities, is backed with civil and criminal 
liability provisions. The maximum civil penalty that can be awarded in any case is the greater 
of:  
 The consideration for the transactions; or  
 3 times the gain made or loss avoided by the offender; or 
 $1 million. (Kavanagh, 2005) 
In addition, it is a formal criminal offence to knowingly engage in market manipulation, with 
maximum penalties of five years imprisonment and a fine of up to $300,000 for an 
individual, or a fine of up to $1 million for a body corporate.  
The Securities Markets Amendment Act 2006 recognised that insider trading is harmful to 
the integrity and efficiency of the securities market as a whole and, therefore, allowed the 
NZSC to bring a public issuer‟s cause of action against an insider. It also removed the “safe-
harbour” provision that was provided for directors‟ share trading. Directors‟ share trading is 
now required to take place at times when the market is clearly informed about the company, 
and when directors in question are not in possession of inside information. 
Under the Securities Markets Amendment Act 2006, investment advisers are required to give 
clients more information upfront before giving advice or receiving any money. It also 
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requires disclosing all fees and other remuneration relevant to that advice or service. The 
NZSC is given powers to ban advertisements by investment advisers where they are deemed 
to be deceptive, confusing, or misleading. It also allows NZSC to order advisers to comply 
with their investment adviser disclosure obligations, and to issue corrective statements where 
they have breached the law. Serious breaches will lead to civil penalties up to a maximum of 
$1 million. The Securities Markets Amendment Act 2006 also gives power to the Court to 
freeze an investment broker‟s accounts or freeze a transfer of broker‟s funds into trust 
accounts. The Securities Markets Amendment Act 2006 also allows for the NZSC to apply 
for banning orders where an adviser has breached disclosure obligations or been convicted of 
a crime of dishonesty. The disclosure obligation is extended to anyone who gives investment 
advice as part of their business, that is, lawyers, accountants, financial planners and share 
brokers.  
The market disclosure of substantial holdings in listed issuers is a vital element of the 
securities market legislation because it enhances integrity of the market by providing 
transparency about who has control over significant holdings. The Securities Markets 
Amendment Act 2006 requires all listed companies to disclose all new material information 
that could affect the price of their securities. The new disclosure rule also applies to the 
substantial security holders who hold five per cent or more of a company‟s shares. 
The changes introduced by the Securities Markets Amendment Act 2006 are intended to 
improve New Zealand‟s capital market regulations and to bring New Zealand regulations in 
line with other jurisdictions and the International Organisation of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO) Principles. 
3.5 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES IN PUBLIC 
SECTOR CORPORATE ENTITIES 
Galal, Jones, Tandon, and Vogelsang (1994), Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) and Dyck and 
Wruck (1999), among others, suggest that while public ownership may be inferior to private 
ownership, it is possible to improve performance in the public sector through properly 
designed organisational structures and contracts. The public sector reforms in New Zealand 
that began in the mid-1980s were based on this assumption. The objective of the New 
Zealand reforms was to improve the performance and efficiency of Government owned 
entities by improving their organisational design (e.g., see Spicer, Emanuel & Powell1996, 
for a review of the reforms). The public sector reform introduced decentralised decision 
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making and a culture of accountability. The change mostly was driven by the economic 
imperatives of the time; a shift in perspective about the role of Government in the economy; 
and a desire to make the State sector more responsive to ministerial demands (Schick, 1996; 
Scott, 2001). The strategies implemented included: State-owned enterprises (SOEs); 
privatisation; corporatisation; separation of functions between different agencies; the use of 
formal “contracts” to govern relationships between different stakeholders; and delegation of 
managerial responsibilities to those best placed to respond to individual issues (Cook, 2004). 
These shifts were initiated by the implementation of the following Acts: SOE Act 1996; State 
Sector Act 1988; Public Finance Act 1989; Crown Research Institutes Act 1992; and Crown 
Entities Act 2004. Some aspects of the reform have also been made possible by the Official 
Information Act 1982 and were extended in some areas through changes introduced under 
later legislation, particularly the Employment Contracts Act 1991 and the Fiscal 
Responsibility Act 1994 (Petrie & Webber, 2006). These legislative changes provided for the 
development and implementation of a system based on performance management (clear 
specification of objectives, freedom to manage and accountability), supported by institutional 
design issues focused on the separation of activities (Cook, 2004). More specifically, the New 
Public Management (NPM) model provided an emphasis on setting clear, non-conflicting 
goals by; giving authority to managers and boards to manage their businesses; and 
simplifying accountability arrangements (Scott, 2001, cited in Cook, 2004).  
All these changes were predominantly based on economics theories (that is, public choice 
theory, agency theory and transaction cost economics) that hold a central view that 
„individuals are maximisers of self-interest and if left unchecked will maximise their own 
personal goal.” The problem for governance in public sector corporate entities arises from 
two sources: first, since citizens have ownership rights but no control rights, managers of 
public sector companies are left free to pursue goals that differ from the goals of the owner-
citizen and second, due to political reasons owners (ministers) may pursue goals that 
maximise voter support rather than operating the company efficiently. Therefore, active 
political ownership may undermine profitability and cost efficiency in public sector 
companies. In order to mitigate these risks, corporate governance practices in the public 
sector need to focus on leadership, managing the environment, risk management, monitoring 
and legislation (Ryan and Ng, 2000, cited in Bhatta, 2003). These attributes have the potential 
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to emphasise good corporate governance practices and ensure bureaucrats are held 
accountable for their actions. 
Reforms in other areas were also necessary to ensure managers were accountable for their 
actions.  The State Sector Act 1988 brought state industrial relations and employment largely 
into line with the private sector. The Employment Contracts Act 1991, which applied to both 
the state and private sectors, allowed the introduction of significant changes in industrial 
relations. On top of these reforms sat the Public Finance Act 1989 which introduced new and 
more transparent financial reporting and management systems, as well as improved 
accountability mechanisms, to allow government and parliamentary monitoring. The 
responsibility for achieving the contracted outputs rests with the chief executive of the 
relevant department or agency who is accountable to the relevant minister. The State Sector 
Act and later the Employment Contracts Act provided the tools necessary for managing the 
employment dimension of the „new‟ state sector. The Crown Entities Act 2004 provided a 
legislative clarification on the roles of the Crown companies and was one of the key 
initiatives designed to support the Government‟s goal of improving trust in government 
organisations. 
The sections that follow provide a brief overview of the following legislation: SOE Act 1986, 
Crown Research Institutes Act 1992, and Crown Entities Act 2004. These Acts provide 
guidelines for the governance practices to be established in SOEs and Crown Research 
Institutes (CRIs).  SOEs and CRIs are also required to comply with the Companies Act 1993 
in the same way as private publicly listed companies.  
3.5.1 SOE ACT 1986 
The SOE Act 1986 (which became effective from September 1986) provided the basis for 
converting old trading departments and corporations into enterprises along private sector 
guidelines, so that they too are subjected to the same antitrust and company laws. A large 
number of departmental trading activities were restructured and established as limited 
liability companies owned by the Crown. A group of 14 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) was 
established in 1987. Changes over the years have slightly altered the number of SOEs; 
currently there are 17 SOEs in operation. A list of SOEs established between 1986 to 2007 is 
provided in Appendix A. 
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All SOEs are required to operate on the principles and procedures contained in the SOE Act 
1986. One of the most important principles of the SOE Act is that the Board of Directors 
should be drawn from the private sector and the board should have complete autonomy on 
operational matters, such as, appointing chief executive officers and meeting performance 
targets (Hay, 2001, p.143). Similar to publicly listed companies in the private sector, the SOE 
boards are also required to report to Cabinet (owner). However, the powers of the Cabinet 
(owner) are limited to giving directions regarding the annual statement of intent produced by 
the directors, requiring dividends to be paid and appointing and removing directors (Hay, 
2001, p.137). All SOEs are monitored by the State-Owned Enterprises Steering Committee 
and the Crown Company Monitoring Advisory Unit (CCMAU) (formerly State-owned 
Enterprises Unit). All SOEs are also required to prepare annual reports under the Companies 
Act 1993 similar to publicly listed companies in the private sector. Although the SOE Act 
stipulates a clear division of responsibility between the owner (minister) and the board, in 
practice the division is not clear and the evidence of political interference raises concerns 
about boards‟ independence. In public corporate entities, the appointment of the chair and the 
deputy chair is done by the shareholding minister, unlike publicly listed companies where 
appointment is done by the board, which raises concerns about their political affiliation to the 
minister. A survey of directors on boards of state-owned entities indicates that the process for 
selection employed by CCMAU was „too drawn out‟ and did not sufficiently involve boards 
and their chairpersons (Norman, 2006). The feeling among board members is that a selection 
process based on political or diversity reasons is not focused on balancing the skills required 
in the boardroom for effective governance. For these reasons there is a relatively high 
turnover among directors, and limited engagement by these directors, in terms of assessing 
the long term strategy of the entities. Also, the relative youth of most of the public sector 
corporate entities means that there has hitherto been no stock of retired executives or past 
experienced directors to lead boards of these enterprises. Ensuring that boards have the 
correct mix of experience, skills and competencies remains central to the performance of the 
entities upon which the Government could draw to strengthen the technical knowledge of 
these boards. 
3.5.2 CRI ACT 1992 
A number of Crown companies were established under the Crown Research Institute Act 
1992. Prior to this, Government science activities were conducted by government 
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departments. Most Crown companies have a founding Act that establishes their principal 
purpose and objectives, and principles of operation. Some principles of operation apply to all 
Crown companies, while others are unique to individual companies or types of companies. 
All Crown companies are required to report under the Crown Entities Act 2004 and 
Companies Act 1993.  A list of Crown Research Institutes established between 1992 and 
2007 is provided in Appendix B. 
3.5.3 CROWN ENTITIES ACT 2004 
Crown entity companies fall into three categories, that is: (i) Crown Research Institutes 
(CRIs); (ii) other Crown entity companies; and (iii) autonomous Crown entities. The Crown 
Entities Act 2004 provides a legislative clarification on the roles of the Crown companies and 
one of the key initiatives designed to support the Government‟s goal of improving trust in 
government organisations. It imposes a number of additional requirements on Crown entity 
companies as summarised in Table 3.4 below. 
Table 3.4: 
Additional Requirements Imposed by the Crown Entities Act 2004 of Crown Entity 
Companies 
Appointment and removal 
of board members 
 
 The Act sets out the criteria for the appointment of board 
members and lists automatic disqualification criteria, for 
example for undischarged bankrupts. 
 Responsible ministers can remove appointed members of 
Crown agent boards at their discretion.  However, the 
minister must have a reason to justify such a removal from 
more autonomous or independent entities. 
Duties of board members 
 
 The collective and individual duties of board members of 
Crown entities are clearly set out in the Act.  
 Board members may be removed from office if the board 
fails to comply with its duties.  An entity may also bring an 
action against a board member for breach of an individual 
duty. 
Conflicts of interest  The definition of "interested" in the Act is more detailed 
and extensive than in many Crown entities' enabling 
statutes and is not limited to pecuniary interests.  This 
means that, for many Crown entities, what constitutes a 
conflict of interest under the Act will be wider than what 
formerly constituted a conflict of interest under their own 
Acts.  
 However, the Act also provides that the chairperson of an 
entity may permit an interested member to act if the 
chairperson considers that it is in the public interest to do 
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so.  Previously, for many Crown entities, this power was 
reserved for the responsible minister. 
Whole of government 
directions 
 
 The Act makes provision for the Minister of State Services 
and the Minister of Finance jointly to direct Crown entities 
to comply with specified requirements in order to both 
support a whole of government approach and improve 
public services.  This is a new power of direction for most 
Crown entities. 
Protections from liability 
 
 Before the Act, the enabling statutes of Crown entities 
contained a number of different provisions for protection 
from liability, and some made no provision for the issue.  
The Act imposes a standard regime for immunity, 
indemnities and insurance.  
 Generally, board members and employees will not be 
personally liable provided that they act in good faith and in 
performance, or intended performance, of the entity's 
functions. 
Validity of acts 
 
 The Act provides that an act of a statutory entity is invalid 
if it is outside the authority of the Act or done for a purpose 
other than performing the entity's functions. 
 However, this does not prevent a third party dealing with a 
statutory entity from enforcing such a transaction unless the 
third party had known, or ought reasonably to have known 
that the act was invalid.  The third party will have to prove 
that it did not have, or ought reasonably to have had, this 
knowledge. 
Reporting obligations 
 
 The provisions for reporting obligations came into effect 
from the 2006/07 financial year.  
 The Act requires that all Crown entities have a Statement of 
Intent.  
 Crown entities will also be obliged to disclose more non-
financial performance intentions and results than are 
currently required. 
Investment, borrowing, 
guarantees, indemnities 
and derivative transactions 
 The Act places limits on a Crown entity's ability to acquire 
securities, borrow money, give guarantees and indemnities, 
and enter into derivative transactions  
 These provisions came into force on 1 April 2005. 
(New Zealand Parliament, 2004) 
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3.6 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MONITORING 
AGENCIES 
The cornerstone of New Zealand's securities regulation since 1978 has been the disclosure of 
information to investors and the market. Disclosure of information focuses on the products, 
disclosure by substantial security holders, liability for insider trading, and disclosure by 
investment advisers and brokers. Regulating the standards of disclosure is the responsibility 
of various monitoring agencies belonging to each sector. The section below provides an 
explanation of the various monitoring agencies and their roles. Adoption and compliance 
with good governance practices by economic entities in New Zealand relies on the 
monitoring role of various supporting institutions. However, many regulatory bodies are 
involved in the regulation of New Zealand‟s securities market which is described as “a 
mishmash” and “a whole panoply of regulators” (Prada & Walter, 2009). According to Prada 
and Walter (2009),  the involvement of various monitoring agencies relating to securities is 
more to do with history than due to logic or functionality. 
3.6.1 NEW ZEALAND SECURITIES COMMISSION (NZSC) 
Table 3.5 below provides a list of functions and powers that the NZSC has under the 
Securities Act 1978, the Securities Regulations 1983, the Securities Markets Act 1988 and 
the Financial Advisers Act 2008. 
Table 3.5: 
Functions and Powers of the NZSC under the Securities Act 1978, the Securities 
Regulations 1983, the Securities Markets Act 1988 and the Financial Advisers Act 2008 
Functions Powers 
 Market surveillance 
(including financial 
reporting) 
 Enforcement (including 
investigation and 
prosecution) 
 Oversight of the New 
Zealand Stock Exchange 
(NZX) 
 Supervision (including 
powers arising under 
Financial Advisers Act 
2008 (not yet 
implemented) 
 To receive evidence as to securities law and practice, 
with power to summons people and documents and to 
carry out inspections. 
 To ban misleading and illegal offer documents and 
advertisements. 
 To enforce securities law and the law relating to insider 
trading and market manipulation, and disclosure by 
substantial security holders and investment advisers. 
 To enforce continuous disclosure law and to make 
orders requiring disclosure by issuers. 
 To require an exchange to provide information and 
assistance to the Commission. 
 To accept enforceable undertakings. 
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Functions Powers 
 Exemption and 
authorisation 
 International cooperation 
and recognition and 
 Public understanding of 
the law and practice of 
securities 
 To publish reports and comments. 
 To make orders requiring disclosure by unregistered 
exchanges. 
 To exempt persons from compliance with provisions of 
the Securities Act or Regulations under the Act. 
 To authorise certain market participants. 
 To recommend law reform. 
 To hear appeals against certain decisions of the Registrar 
of Companies. 
(Source: Prada & Walter, 2009) 
The NZSC is an independent Crown entity in terms of the Crown Entities Act 2004. Other 
legislation the NZSC works with includes the Financial Reporting Act 1993, the Investment 
Advisers (Disclosure) Act 1996, the Securities Act (Contributory Mortgage) Regulations 
1988, and the Securities (Fees) Regulations 1998. The NZSC may also consider certain 
matters arising under the Corporations (Investigation and Management) Act 1989 (in 
particular, directions to “at risk” corporations and recommendations about statutory 
management). 
The NZSC seeks to foster capital investment in New Zealand by promoting the efficiency, 
integrity and cost-effective regulation of New Zealand‟s capital markets (Todd, 2007). This 
involves, among other things, regulating the standards of disclosure required of issuers. 
Issuers must provide investment statements to subscribers prior to issuing securities to them. 
Registered prospectuses must be provided to investors on request. The intent of the law is that 
the prospectus should contain a true and fair description of the terms of the offer of the 
securities, the financial position and performance of the issuer of the securities and the 
material interests of those who make or promote the offer.  
Under the Securities Markets Amendment Act 2006 the NZSC now has extensive powers to 
make recommendations about securities and companies law. Under the Investment Advisers 
(Disclosure) Act 1996, the NZSC is also empowered to recommend to the Governor-General 
that regulations be introduced in respect of the disclosure requirements of investment 
advisers. However, the Investment Advisers (Disclosure) Act 1996 did not extend the powers 
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of the NZSC to be able to enforce the law. In addition, most disclosures were only 
mandatory, given only on request by investors.  
The Financial Advisers Act 2008 and the Financial Service Providers (Registration and 
Dispute Resolution) Act 2008 extend the scope and depth of the information to be given to 
clients, especially about fees and remuneration. Under the Act, full disclosure must be made 
up-front by investment advisers before investment advice is given to members of the public 
and by investment brokers before receiving investment money from members of the public. 
Investment advisers' disclosure must include the following: their experience and 
qualifications; criminal convictions; the nature and level of fees charged; other interests and 
relationships (including all remuneration); and the types of securities the adviser advises on 
(Todd, 2007). Investment brokers' disclosure must include: criminal convictions; and 
procedures for dealing with investment money and investment property (Todd, 2007).  
Recent reforms have given NZSC a co-regulatory role, that is, NZX as the front line regulator 
enforcing the conduct rules, and the NZSC as the statutory regulator concerned with breaches 
of the law. The NZSC is also responsible for the monitoring of the NZX's performance as the 
front-line regulator. By giving the NZSC the statutory regulator role, the continuous 
disclosure rules also have been given recognition. "Continuous disclosure" requires listed 
companies to immediately disclose all material information that could affect the price of their 
securities. There are also new disclosure obligations for directors and officers of listed 
companies who trade in their own company's securities. The Securities Markets Amendment 
Act 2006 has also given powers to the NZSC to bring civil proceedings on behalf of a public 
company and its shareholders. Previously any such action was left to shareholders. The 
benefits of NZSC bringing civil proceeding is that the individual litigant may only bear the 
cost of litigation to the extent of any presumed loss to that litigant but where others can show 
that they have also been affected may also benefit from the Court's decision without incurring 
any additional costs.  
The disclosure of financial information under NZ GAAP (New Zealand Generally Accepted 
Accounting Practice), NZ IFRS (New Zealand International Financial Reporting Standards) 
and also the statement regarding corporate governance practices are reviewed by the NZSC 
on an annual basis. The NZSC publishes reports on its Financial Reporting and Surveillance 
Programme (FRSP). Reviewing annual reports and providing feedback raises the quality of 
financial reporting and enhances investors‟ confidence in the credibility of information 
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provided by issuers. The focus of the review is mainly on compliance by issuers with 
Financial Reporting Standards and other elements of Generally Accepted Accounting 
Practice (NZ GAAP). In addition, listed companies are required to report on all 
recommended corporate governance principles, and any departures from set guidelines must 
be explained to the shareholders (NZSC2004).  
3.6.2 NEW ZEALAND STOCK EXCHANGE (NZX) 
The NZX currently operates under the authority of the Sharebrokers Act Amendment 1981 
which came into effect in 1983. Two sorts of rules come under the purview of the Act: (i) 
business rules, which govern the operations and procedures of the Exchange; and (ii) listing 
rules which impose requirements on companies that wish to list or remain listed – 
information disclosure, voting rules, takeover rules, directors‟ duties, and board composition, 
nature of business and so forth (Bowden, 1996). Under the rules of the NZX, a company must 
first meet the „listing‟ requirements before its shares can be quoted on either the „main board‟ 
or the „second board‟. The latter was established in November 1986, specifically for the 
trading of securities of smaller companies which do not qualify for listing on the main board. 
The key differences between listing requirements for the main board and the second board 
relate to the level of required issued capital, limitations on the concentration of ownership 
and voting rights for shareholders. In addition to the listing requirements, companies are also 
required to make any initial public offering of shares through the issue of a prospectus which 
must be approved both by the NZX and the NZSC. Currently many different types of 
securities
30
 as well as ordinary shares are listed by the NZX. Diagram 3.1 below provides the 
structure of the NZX and its markets. 
The New Zealand stock market has grown steadily since its inception and in May 2009 its 
total market capitalisation was $48.3 billion, with the NZSX being $47.8 billion of this total. 
The market capitalisation of the NZDX was valued at $14.5 billion. The issuers listed on the 
NZDX include government, banks and corporate (Prada & Walter, 2009). 
 
                                                 
30
 Includes preference shares of various kinds, equity warrants; and debt instruments such as convertible notes, 
capital notes, unsecured notes, debentures, equity options, instalment receipts and miscellaneous registered or 
bearer bonds. It also lists overseas securities, mainly equities. 
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Diagram 3.1: Structure of the NZX and its Markets 
 
 
(Source: http://www.sec-com.govt.nz/publications/documents/nzx-2006/01.shtml) 
 
In comparison to countries
31
 in the OECD, the growth in stock market capitalisation in New 
Zealand has been very slow. Lack of regulation providing investor protection on one hand 
and a restrictive regulatory regime on the other, have been contributory factors. As a 
consequence, businesses and investors faced reduced choices in terms of raising capital 
which in turn affected the development of the capital market as well as economic 
development in New Zealand (Healy, 2003). 
To boost confidence in the New Zealand capital markets, NZX through its listing rules, 
ensures that publicly listed companies do comply with good governance practice guidelines. 
The monitoring is effected by constant and vigilant surveillance of market activity. NZX's 
regulatory functions include: supervising listed issuers' (companies and other entities that 
issue securities) compliance with NZX Listing Rules; supervising market participants such as 
NZX Companies; and NZX Advisers and assisting the Securities Commission (as a co-
regulator) as required under the Securities Markets Act 1988 (NZX, 2009). 
As a front line regulator of its markets, NZX formulates rules and practices. These rules and 
practices reflect the following core principles: all shareholders should be treated fairly and 
equitably; listed issuers should provide full, timely and accurate disclosure information; 
investors and market intermediaries should be protected against systemic risk; any unfair 
                                                 
31
 The stock market in Australia quadrupled in size and is equal to 110 per cent of GDP, the Irish stock market 
grew from being less than 30% of the New Zealand market at the turn of 1990s to 300% larger in 2001. The UK 
and US equity markets are approximately 190 per cent and 120 per cent of GDP respectively (Healy, 2003). 
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share trading practices should be detected and met with effective remedies; market rules 
should be backed by effective mechanisms for investigation, surveillance and enforcement, 
with strong sanctions against deliberate breach of the rules; and the costs of regulatory 
compliance should be minimised without compromising achievement of the other principles 
(NZX, 2009). 
NZX formulates the standards required of listed issuers and market participants in its Listing 
Rules and Participant Rules with reference to these principles. Companies that do not comply 
with these rules are disciplined or delisted.  
3.6.3 NEW ZEALAND INSTITUTE OF CHARTERED ACCOUNTANTS 
(NZICA) 
The ministerial committee investigating the 1987 stockmarket crash criticised the quality of 
the financial reporting and the level of non-compliance with accounting standards in New 
Zealand.  The committee made a number of recommendations that included: legal backing 
being given to accounting standards; an Accounting Standard Review Board (ASRB) to 
approve accounting standards be established; and sanctions being introduced for non-
compliance with standards (Deegan & Samkin, 2009). 
The Financial Reporting Act 1993 (hereafter FRA) gave legislative backing for accounting 
standards. Section 22 of the FRA established ASRB whose main purpose was to review and 
where appropriate, approve financial reporting standards. The ASRB is constituted as a body 
corporate under the FRA and is a Crown entity under the crown Entities Act 2004.   
The ASRB announced in October 2002 that effective from 2007, listed issuers would have to 
comply with IRFS issued by the International Accounting Standard Board (IASB). This 
means that the Statement of Concepts for General Purpose Accounting Reporting is replaced 
by the New Zealand Equivalent to the IASB Framework for the Preparation and Presentation 
of Financial Statements.  
3.6.4 INSTITUTE OF DIRECTORS 
The Institute of Directors has developed a number of best practice statements for directors 
called a Code of Proper Practice for Directors which covers, for example, audit committees, 
conflicts of interest, key competencies for non-executive directors, and overseeing financial 
reporting. It also provides recommendations regarding frequency of board meetings as well 
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as proposals for the accreditation of directors. This is important as the implementation of 
corporate governance principles and guidelines ultimately rests with the directors. 
3.6.5 THE NEW ZEALAND TREASURY 
The Treasury plays an influential role in the development of securities regulation in New 
Zealand. The influence of the Treasury mainly comes from its central role in the 
government‟s policy-making processes. Although Cabinet is the decision-maker on all 
important matters of public policy, advice for the Cabinet potentially comes from a number 
of sources including the Treasury.  
Since the 1980s, Treasury has had a varying degree of influence on public policies with both 
the Labour and the National Governments.  Treasury‟s influence on government policies 
means that economic theory and concepts play a part in the decision making processes 
(Fitzsimons, 1994).  Any law reform that does not take account of economic concepts or 
evaluate it on economic terms is challenged by the Treasury. This was apparent in the 
proposals put forward by the NZSC in the 1980s which were based on legal principles and 
concepts rather than on economic benefits (Patterson, 1975).  
3.6.6 THE RESERVE BANK OF NEW ZEALAND (RBNZ)  
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) established by an Act of Parliament in 1933 was 
endowed with the basic central bank functions of being the sole issuer of notes and coins, the 
government banker, and the banker of the trading banks. In 1936, the role of the RBNZ was 
widened to include setting reserve asset ratios for financial institutions, which later evolved 
into a prudential supervision role (Moore, 1992).  The RBNZ is responsible for setting 
corporate governance and reporting standards for all banks, and thereafter looks largely to 
commercial imperatives and marketplace accountabilities to deliver stability in the banking 
and payments system.  
In addition, banks are now offering a much wider range of product to customers and potential 
customers than what was once regarded as usual bank services. A number of these products 
are "securities" for the purposes of the Securities Acts. These can include, providing access to 
equities through sharebroking activities, the issue of debt securities, selling collective 
investment scheme units and life insurance issued by the bank or by organisations other than 
the bank itself (Abernethy, 2001). As a result financial institutions including banks and their 
staff are required to be familiar with the law covering the issue and sale of those products. 
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The powers of the RBNZ have been extended to include supervision of the non-bank 
financial institutions as well. 
3.6.7 CROWN COMPANY MONITORING ADVISORY UNIT (CCMAU) 
CCMAU, formed in 1993, was given monitoring functions in addition to the responsibility 
for board appointments and governance policy for Crown entities, such as, State–owned 
enterprises (SOEs), health-provider companies and Crown research institutes CRIs).  
Table 3.6: 
Competencies Required for Being Board Members in the Public Sector Corporate 
Entities 
 An ability to add value.  
 An ability to communicate clearly, orally and in writing.  
 The ability to take a wide perspective on issues.  
 Common sense, integrity and a strong sense of ethics.  
 Organisational and strategic awareness.  
 An appreciation of the role of the Crown as a shareholder.  
 Knowledge of the responsibilities of a director and an ability to distinguish corporate 
governance from management.  
 Financial literacy.  
 A well-developed critical faculty.  
 The confidence to ask questions.  
 An ability to work in a team. 
(www.ccmau.govt.nz) 
The appointment of the board of directors in Crown entities including state-owned 
enterprises, Crown research institutes, Crown companies and other statutory entities is 
undertaken by the shareholding ministers with guidance from CCMAU.  All board members 
in Crown companies are deemed to be independent and members are required to have the 
competencies as given in Table 3.6 above. 
In general terms, everyone is eligible to be considered for appointment to a Crown company 
board, although the reasons outlined in section 151(2) of the Companies Act 1993, which 
disqualify a person from becoming a director, also apply to Crown companies. Public 
servants from core government departments are generally not eligible for appointment to 
Crown company boards, and the staff of a Crown company cannot be appointed to the board 
of their own organisation (although they may be appointed to subsidiary boards). In addition 
to having the above skills, effort is also made to include people who reflect the Government's 
wish that Crown company boards align with the country‟s demographic make-up 
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(www.ccmau.govt.nz). There is a tendency for public corporate entities‟ boards to be more 
diverse than the boards of publicly listed companies. This provides an opportunity for diverse 
views and perspectives to be presented in meetings. 
Guidelines developed by CCMAU indicate that directors in Crown companies are typically 
appointed for terms of up to three years (www.ccmau.govt.nz). Directors may be reappointed 
for a second term of up to three years and, in response to a particular need, a director may be 
appointed for further periods. Second and third terms are not automatic, and ministers will 
make their decisions based on the company‟s business needs, the availability of candidates 
for the role (including the incumbent), the incumbent‟s performance and the make-up of the 
board. A director appointed to the position of chair in the course of his or her term may be 
appointed for a further period. Unlike typical private sector companies where boards appoint 
their own chair, ministers appoint the chair and deputy chair (where there is one) of Crown 
company boards. There is a possibility that the chair and the deputy chair may have political 
affiliation and other directors appointed may have similar views on policy direction as the 
government. This raises concerns about the collective willingness of boards to think 
differently and independently.  
Shareholding ministers‟ expectations of Crown company boards are formally outlined in the 
Owner‟s Expectations Manual (OEM). This document clarifies the environment within which 
the shareholder expects boards to meet their responsibilities and shareholding ministers‟ 
expectations. The OEM outlines expectations in a number of areas including board duties, 
reporting requirements, financial governance, and the way in which the board deals with 
strategic issues. 
Boards of Crown companies account for their performance through a set of parameters and 
targets contained in: 
 A Statement of Corporate Intent (SCI) for Crown research institutes and State-owned 
enterprises.  
 A Statement of Intent (SOI) for Crown entity companies, statutory entities and 
council-controlled trading organisations.  
The content of these documents is prescribed by the Crown companies founding legislation 
and by ministers‟ expectations. Boards prepare their SCI/SOI each year and, once accepted 
by shareholding ministers, are tabled in Parliament. These then become public documents. 
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The company‟s actual performance against its SCI or SOI targets is later outlined in its 
annual report, which is also tabled in Parliament. 
Shareholding ministers are in turn accountable to Parliament for the performance of Crown 
companies. Parliamentary select committees review company performance, and members of 
the boards of Crown companies may be asked to appear before committees. 
The reporting requirements for Crown companies are greater than the obligations imposed on 
other companies by the Companies Act 1993. For example, annual reports must include 
additional information and state-owned enterprises and Crown research institutes are required 
to provide half-yearly reports. In practice, they also provide confidential quarterly reports. 
Crown companies also provide ministers with their draft business/strategic plans that contain 
considerably more information (often commercially sensitive) than is required to be included 
in the SOI/SCI. 
The Crown Entities Act 2004 sets a framework that is consistent for all Crown entities to 
follow, to improve governance and accountability of Crown entities and to achieve better 
integration of Crown entities with the rest of the state sector. The Act clarifies the board 
position in terms of the rules regarding such matters as appointment and removal, conflicts of 
interest, their duties, liabilities and protection from liability.  
Together with the Treasury, CCMAU conducts a review of each document and reports to 
ministers on its overall soundness. It is not clear whether CCMAU scrutinises the corporate 
governance practices of public corporate entities to the same extent as the NZSC does for 
public companies. The NZSC evaluates the quality of governance practices of public 
companies against set guidelines each year and the outcomes help public companies to 
improve their practices each year and also help investors in deciding their investment options. 
3.6.8 NEW ZEALAND SHAREHOLDERS ASSOCIATION  
The existence of a weak regulatory regime in terms of investor protection and the inability of 
the regulator - NZSC, due to lack of funds, to embark on enforcement activities led to the  
establishment of the New Zealand Shareholders‟ Association Incorporated in May 2001. The 
New Zealand Shareholders Association aims to provide an effective voice for small 
shareholders who do not have the resources (knowledge, time and money) and/or the interest 
to monitor managers‟ actions. Since the costs of monitoring outweigh the benefits, the small 
shareholders tend to exit rather than voice, which leaves entrenched managers and boards free 
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to pursue self interest activities (Berle & Means, 1932).  Furthermore, Korn/Ferry 
International (2000) note that no companies in New Zealand have been seriously questioned 
by their investors at annual general meetings on corporate governance issues. This further 
raises concerns about accountability, as New Zealand investors tend to be passive and do not 
like to draw attention to themselves during annual general meetings by raising objections or 
asking questions. There is also a tendency among investors to rely heavily on (and trust) 
internal control systems (Gunasekarage & Reed, 2008). Also there is a perception that large 
shareholders will do the monitoring as they have large stakes tied up in companies.  
In the absence of active investor monitoring, the role the New Zealand Shareholders 
Association play in matters relating to the understanding and interpretation of annual reports 
as well as monitoring, has been beneficial to investors.   
3.6.9 OTHER RELEVANT MONITORING BODIES 
There are other organisations that either provide a monitoring role or assist with enforcement 
and prosecution. For example, the Ministry of Economic Development (MED) provides 
policy advice and overall monitoring of the regulatory system. The Registrar of Companies 
provides registration and review of prospectus and has powers to ban directors. The Trustees 
Corporation provides monitoring of the financial position and investment practices of the 
issuers on behalf of the holders of debt and collective investment scheme securities, in 
accordance with a published trust deed. The Serious Fraud Office has enforcement powers in 
relation to fraudulent offers of major securities. The Takeovers Panel provides administration 
of the Takeover Code and shares such information with the NZSC. The Ministry of 
Consumer Affairs provides information, education and policy advice to consumers and warns 
to the public about scams. The Banking Ombudsman deals with complaints about banks.  
3.7 CONCLUSION 
The focus of the securities framework since 1978 has primarily been on the disclosure of 
information. The emphasis is placed on the disclosure of information relevant to an 
investment decision, either through an offer of securities to the public or through secondary 
markets. An offer of securities has to meet prescriptive requirements concerning the 
prospectus or investment statement. Secondary markets are governed by detailed rules 
requiring continuous disclosure and prohibiting insider trading and market manipulation. 
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Although the Securities Markets Act 1988 was an improvement from the previous legislation 
in terms of requiring immediate disclosure of securities traded by company directors and 
officers, the guidance in terms of what constituted an act of gross negligence was left to the 
courts to decide. The cases involving insider trading and market manipulation primarily went 
unpunished as there were no laws against such practices. Also, a lack of cost effective 
remedies to enforce disclosures relating to substantial security holders, apart from the 
provision of costly and time consuming High Court proceedings, meant that optimal 
disclosures could not be obtained in a timely manner. The limited powers of the statutory 
regulator of the securities market, the NZSC, meant that insider trading and market 
manipulation activities could not be prosecuted.  
Three major law reforms since 2000 have developed New Zealand's regulatory framework 
and brought it into closer alignment with international expectations. The first reform was the 
adoption of the Takeovers Code in 2000. The Takeovers Code is enforced by the Takeovers 
Panel, which is a separate independent agency. The second reform became effective from 
2002, by demutualising the New Zealand Stock Exchange. The NZX was demutualised in 
2002 after a Private Bill was passed by Parliament. The third significant reform was the 
Securities Markets Amendment Act 2006, which amends the Securities Act 1978 and the 
Securities Markets Act 1988. The new laws made important and wide-ranging changes 
regarding insider trading, market manipulation and disclosure rules for investment advisers.   
In addition to the changes made to the securities laws to align with the trading partners, there 
also been changes made to improve the standard of corporate governance practised in New 
Zealand. All economic entities are required to observe the principles and guidelines to the 
fullest extent and only depart where they are subject to the competing statutory or public 
policy requirements. The Companies Act 1993 codified and expanded directors‟ duties and 
shareholders‟ rights under common law. The NZSC in 2004 provided nine high level 
principles and guidelines to improve the standard of statutory or public policy requirements. 
Companies reporting on corporate governance practices under the NZX Listing Rules are 
required to cover all the principles recommended by the NZSC and any departures are to be 
explained to shareholders.    
To improve the standards of corporate governance practices in the public sector corporate 
entities, the CCMAU also adopted the NZSC 2004 recommendations. The Crown Entities 
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Act 2004 further clarifies the role of Crown Entity Companies, the role of the board and the 
duties of the directors under the Act.  
Chapter 4 will provide the research method, framework, hypotheses and empirical models 
used in this study.  
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CHAPTER 4  
RESEARCH METHODS: RESEARCH FRAMEWORK, 
HYPOTHESES AND EMPIRICAL MODELS 
 
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 3 provided a background on corporate governance practices, laws  and regulations in 
New Zealand. This chapter introduces the framework for this research, develops hypotheses, 
presents empirical models and describes methods for investigating the relationships between 
corporate governance mechanisms and company performance in New Zealand. 
4.1 RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
Both normative statements and anecdotal evidence unequivocally support the view that good 
corporate governance practices play a significant role in improving transparency and 
accountability in managerial decision making (Psaros, Ingley & McCaffrey, 2007; 2009). 
However, research on the interaction between governance and company performance has 
been rather limited and the empirical evidence is mixed and inconclusive. Past studies have 
focused only on the specific features of corporate governance, which makes it difficult to 
establish an overall relationship between corporate governance and corporate financial 
performance (Bauer, Frijns, Otten, & Tourani-Rad, 2008). Relating corporate financial 
performance to a specific aspect of corporate governance may not capture the relationship 
unless that specific aspect is controlled for other aspects of governance (Bohren & Odegaard, 
2003). To add to our understanding of the effect of governance practices on financial 
performance, researchers have recently suggested that there is a need to undertake research 
that involves a wider set of governance variables. 
Past studies that reported a causal relationship between insider ownership and financial 
performance have failed to consider the endogeneity effect of ownership (Hu & Izumida, 
2008). Endogeneity occurs when mechanisms are internally related, as when agency theory 
argues that outside concentration and insider holdings are substitute governance tools. 
Reverse causation is when financial performance drives governance, as when privately 
informed insiders ask for stock bonus plans before unexpectedly high earnings are reported. 
Recent research in governance acknowledges that there is a possibility of a reverse direction 
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of causality from company financial performance to ownership structure. Evidence suggests 
that financial performance is at least as likely to affect ownership as ownership structure is to 
affect financial performance (Sánchez-Ballesta & García-Meca, 2007). Many researchers 
including Agrawal and Knoeber (1996), Loderer and Martin (1997), Cho (1998), Demsetz 
and Villalonga (2001), Bhagat and Jefferis (2002) among others have considered the 
endogeneity and reverse causation in a governance–performance setting. Their findings differ 
markedly from those of single equation methods (Becht, Bolton & Roell2002). In particular, 
the significant relationships between governance and financial performance in single equation 
models often disappear. This research takes a similar view to Demsetz (1983) and Demsetz 
and Lehn (1985), among others, that when examining the effect of ownership structure on 
company financial performance, the endogeneity of ownership structure should be accounted 
for.   
Most extant research deals with large US and UK companies that have a majority dispersed 
ownership structure. The top 20% of companies in the UK have 80% of their shares held by 
non-controlling shareholders, whereas in the US it is 90% (Kapopoulos & Lazaretou, 2007). 
These countries also have an active market for corporate control which plays an active role in 
disciplining managers‟ behaviour. The research findings from these large economies may not 
be relevant to a small country like New Zealand where there are predominately small 
companies, a small capital market and weak minority shareholder protection rights. The 
market for corporate control is not well developed and the role of the capital market in 
providing a monitoring role tends to be ineffective. In the absence of such mechanisms, New 
Zealand has tended to rely on other control mechanisms such as concentrated shareholding 
structures to mitigate agency costs. However, the expected effect of concentrated ownership 
on financial performance is unclear, as it reflects the net impact of several benefits and costs 
which are difficult to rank a priori. Since theory cannot specify the relative importance of 
these costs and benefits, the shape of the relationship between concentration and financial 
performance must be determined empirically (Bohren & Odegaard, 2003).  
A study by Miguel, Pindado and De Da Torre (2004) focused on the governance structures of 
several counties (US, UK, Australia, Japan, Germany and Spain). They concluded that the 
relationship between governance and financial performance is significantly affected by the 
nature of the prevailing governance system. This, coupled with the conflicting findings 
(particularly for the larger UK and US markets), suggests that a study using data from a 
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country which differs significantly in several ways from the larger economies could add to 
our understanding and contribute to the growing body of work that examines this 
relationship.  
Furthermore, corporate governance principles and guidelines have been in existence in New 
Zealand since 2004 and, surprisingly, little research has been undertaken on their underlying 
mechanisms. An understanding of the dynamics of so-called soft regulation in general is 
rather limited. It is difficult to ascertain whether changes to corporate governance practices in 
New Zealand have been made for the benefit of shareholders or simply to align with 
regulation changes applied in other countries. 
This study extends the current literature on five different levels. First, by studying a wide 
range of governance variables compared to past studies, it adds to our understanding as to 
how different mechanisms interact with financial performance. This approach allows us to 
get closer to capturing the full picture and to also explore the validity of more partial 
approaches reported in other studies (e.g., Demsetz and Lehn (1985); Morck, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1988); McConnell and Servaes (1990); Gugler (2001)). Second, the effect of 
endogeneity and reverse causality of ownership is underexplored both empirically and 
theoretically. This study adopts a two stages least squares regression (2SLS) technique to 
control for the effect of ownership endogeneity and reverse causality on financial 
performance. Third, by examining the efficacy of the corporate governance practices 
recommended by the NZSC (soft regulation) on companies‟ financial performance, this study 
adds to the understanding of the workings of the underlying mechanisms of so-called „soft 
regulations‟ and its effect on financial performance. The result also contributes to 
understanding of how good governance mechanisms work in the global economy. Four, the 
corporate governance disclosure approach in New Zealand encourages listed companies 
either to comply with all the recommended principles and guidelines or explain to the 
shareholders why they have deviated. The “comply or explain” policy is not mandatory; 
however, it allows companies to choose company-specific governance structures based on 
cost/benefit tradeoff. This implies that different companies and industries may adopt different 
governance structures. According to Gillan, Hartzell and Starks (2003) and Himmelberg, 
Hubbard and Palia (1999), industry and company effects are important, implying that 
governance structures are a function of the expected costs and benefits of different 
mechanisms. They report that industry specifics are a dominating factor in explaining 
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variation in overall governance structure. Most of the existing research supports the positive 
relationship between size of the company and its level of corporate governance (Drobetz, 
Schillhofer & Zimmermann, 2004; Guillen, 2000; Guriev, Lazareva & Rachinsky, 2003; 
Klapper & Love, 2003). Since governance mechanisms consume corporate resources, which 
are more efficiently borne by larger companies than smaller companies, suggests large 
companies have better governance structures. The more complicated business structure of 
large companies may also require better governance. Based on this finding, it is assumed that 
there will be company, industry and size effects on governance structures. Finally, the focus 
of previous studies has predominantly been on publicly listed companies; however, little 
effort has been devoted to understanding corporate governance practices of public sector 
corporate entities. In excess of $41trillion is invested in public sector corporate entities assets 
in New Zealand and therefore it is important to understand the nature of corporate 
governance practices being undertaken to ensure the investment provides maximum return 
for taxpayers.  
Therefore, this study examines whether companies in different sectors and industries and 
those of different size do have different governance structures and the effect those structures 
have on company financial performance.  
This study in particular investigates companies in three different sectors. They are:  
 Companies listed on the NZX  
o Small cap companies 
o Large cap companies  
 Public sector corporate entities 
o SOEs and CRIs 
Companies that are listed in the main board of NZX are classified into six different sectors, 
which include: primary (agriculture & fishing, mining, forestry, building), energy (energy 
processing), goods (food, textile & apparel, intermed & durables), property, services 
(transport, ports, leisure & tourism, consumer, media & communication, finance & other 
services) and investment. In order to examine the industry effect of the corporate governance 
practices of different companies in different industries, a similar classification as that 
provided by NZX is used for publicly listed companies. For public sector corporate entities, 
the industry classification of SOEs and CRIs are used.  
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A comparative analysis of findings from a principle based framework with the findings of 
studies conducted under the US rule-based model contributes a more fundamental 
understanding of the governance-financial performance nexus. The ensuing discussion of the 
effects that the rule-based versus principle-based model have on financial performance from 
an international perspective, including the effect (if any) international financial reporting 
standards (IFRS) will have on such practices in the future, contributes significantly to 
understanding how governance contributes to value.  
The findings of this study will also enable us to better understand the nature of corporate 
governance practices in publicly listed companies and public sector corporate entities. In 
particular, the similarities and differences in corporate governance practices of companies in 
these sectors.  
4.1.1 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Figure 4.1 presents the conceptual framework for this study. On the left hand side are the 
governance variables which both previous studies have indicated to be important and/or are 
stated in the NZSC‟s principles and guidelines which listed companies have to comply with. 
These are namely: Insider Ownership, Block Ownership, Board Independence, Board Size, 
Board Committees (Audit Committee and Remuneration Committee), Board Diversity, 
Leverage and Dividends. This is linked to company performance on the right hand side, 
measured by Tobin‟s Q, Return on Assets (ROA), and Return on Equity (ROE), Market to 
Book (MB), Operating Income Return on Assets (OPINC), Sales to Total Assets (S2TA) and 
Cost to revenue (C2REV). The link between governance characteristics and the company 
performance is affected by company specific variables such as size, risk, intangible assets, 
marketshare, industry and sector. 
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Figure 4.1:  
A Model of Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Company Financial Performance 
 
 
The next section provides theoretical and empirical links between governance mechanisms 
and company financial performance and develops the research hypotheses. 
4.2 GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS 
To address the fundamental question, whether company financial performance is driven by 
governance practices, this study examines the corporate governance mechanisms identified in 
the conceptual framework in Figure 4.1. These mechanisms are classified as internal or 
external to the company. Internal mechanisms include ownership by managers and the board, 
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independence of the board, size of the board, establishment of the board committees, board 
diversity and dividend policy. External examples are block ownership, and the level of debt 
financing (Barnhart and Rosenstein, 1998; Denis, 2001). Each of these mechanisms is 
discussed and relevant hypotheses developed in the following section. 
4.2.1 INSIDER OWNERSHIP 
Since Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976) have suggested that 
increasing equity ownership of corporate insiders (officers and directors) will lead to better 
alignment of their interests with that of outside shareholders, a number of researchers have 
been engaged in exploring such a link. The findings of empirical studies that link insider 
ownership to company financial performance are inconsistent and inconclusive. These 
findings can be grouped into three broad categories. One group of researchers report a 
positive linear relationship between insider ownership and financial performance (Elayan et 
al., 2003; Hossain et al., 2001; Kim et al., 1988; Mehran, 1995; Oswald & Jahera Jr., 1991; 
Welch, 2003) thus supporting the convergence-of-interest hypothesis, that is, equity 
ownership by insiders is associated with company financial performance due to lower agency 
costs.  
Another group of researchers report the relationship between insider ownership and company 
financial performance to be non-monotonic (Chen et al., 1993; Griffith, 1999; McConnell & 
Servaes, 1990; Morck et al., 1988; Short & Keasey, 1999). Their findings support 
convergence-of-interest hypothesis at some low levels of insider ownership and an 
entrenchment hypothesis at higher levels of insider ownership. The argument for the 
entrenchment effect is that greater stock ownership by insiders increases the power of the 
internal constituency (Fama & Jensen, 1983a; McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Morck et al., 
1988; Stulz, 1988), but decreases the power of the external constituency in influencing 
corporate financial performance. Using a quadratic relationship, Stulz (1988), McConnell and 
Servaes (1990), and Han and Suk (1998) reported that the insider ownership up to a 
maximum of  40%-50% is associated with company financial performance for the US market. 
Mudambi and Nicosia (1998) reported a range up to 11% for the UK market. Researchers 
who used cubic relationships discovered that at higher levels of insider ownership, 
performance increases again because of interest alignment as the manager and owner tend to 
be the same person. The cubic relationship was reported by Morck et al. (1988), Cho (1998), 
and Holderness, Kroszner and Sheehan (1999) for the US market, and by Short and Keasey 
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(1999) and Faccio and Lasfer (1999) for the UK market. When cubic relationships are used, 
the maximum point up to which insider ownership is linked to financial performance in the 
US is around 5%-7%, which is significantly different from the results reported using 
quadratic relationships. The studies that reported cubic relationships in other countries 
include Miguel, Pindalo and De Da Torre (2004) for Spain and Kumar (2003) for India. In a 
more recent study, Davies, Hillier and McColgan (2005) reported even more disturbing 
results for UK companies. Using a simultaneous equations framework in the presence of 
conflicting managerial incentives, Davies et al. (2005) reported that the relationship between 
managerial ownership and company value is essentially quintic (double-humped) and not just 
cubic as reported in Short and Keasey (1999). Collectively, these conflicting findings suggest 
that the debate over the precise functional form of the insider ownership–company financial 
performance relationship is far from conclusive.  
Although these studies report inconsistent results in terms of the level of insider ownership at 
which convergence-of-interest and entrenchment effect becomes relevant, they do report that 
the relationship between Q ratio and insider ownership is non-linear, that is, within some 
range of insider ownership, Q ratio is positively related to insider ownership, but in other 
ranges, a negative relationship is found.  
A third group of researchers claim that there is no relationship between insider ownership and 
financial performance (Demsetz, 1983; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Demsetz & Villalonga, 
2001). They argue that insider ownership is endogenously determined and therefore cannot 
be a determinant of company financial performance. Their argument is based on the view that 
competitive capital market forces ensure that every company chooses its value maximising 
ownership structure. Therefore, any observed correlation of ownership and financial 
performance is spurious. In fact, the relationship between insider ownership and financial 
performance might arise due to some company characteristics that are unobservable for the 
econometrician. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) show that unobserved company heterogeneity 
(company size, volatility, return on assets, industry affiliation) are relevant explanatory 
variables for the ownership structure of US companies. In this regard, the literature used 
econometric techniques to control for endogeneity and report that company financial 
performance does not seem to be affected by insider ownership.  Himmelberg, Hubbard and 
Palia (1999) using a fixed effects panel data model and instrumental variables to control for 
possible unobserved company heterogeneity, report that insider ownership does not affect 
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company financial performance to an econometrically observable extent. Loderer and Martin 
(1997) constructed a simultaneous equation system that handles financial performance and 
insider ownership as endogenous variables for a set of companies involved in acquisitions 
and reports that insider ownership does not have a predictive effect on financial performance 
in their model, but vice versa, financial performance has a negative effect on insider 
ownership.  Cho (1998), after having replicated the results of Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 
builds a simultaneous equation system consisting of three equations, where insider 
ownership, financial performance and investment are treated as endogenous variables and 
reports similar results to Loderer and Martin (1997), that is, financial performance influences 
ownership but not vice versa. Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) presented evidence of 
interdependence among seven corporate governance mechanisms, insider ownership being 
one of the mechanisms in a study comprising a large sample of US companies. They find the 
positive effect of insider ownership disappears in an integrated model, thus supporting 
Demsetz‟s theory of the optimal use of control mechanisms. In a similar study, Bhagat and 
Jefferis (2002) find evidence that takeover defenses, takeovers, management turnover, 
corporate financial performance, capital structure, and ownership structure are interrelated, 
suggesting such relationships should be examined using simultaneous equations. However, 
they do point out that such a system of equations is nontrivial and even looks less feasible for 
studies of non-US markets, where data availability and quality is often a serious problem 
(Kasener & Moldenhauer, 2008). Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) treated different dimensions 
of ownership as endogenous and found no relationship between insider ownership and 
company financial performance.  
The differences in findings reported above are that an optimal ownership structure exists for 
each company where financial performance is maximised. Large transaction costs prevent 
companies from moving to the optimal structure. When the distance away from the optimum 
is large, the benefits to shareholders of realigning ownership structure will exceed the 
transaction costs of doing so. Within the bounds of those costs, various ownership research 
results reflect the objective function that the company maximises in the absence of such 
costs. Stulz (1988) models the offsetting costs and benefits of managerial ownership. In the 
model company, incentive-alignment effects dominate when insider ownership is low but, as 
managerial ownership increases, the beneficial effect of incentive-alignment are overtaken by 
the cost of an increased managerial ability to pursue non-value-maximising activities. In 
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countries where capital markets are ineffective in providing a monitoring role, the presence of 
high costs makes it uneconomical for any mechanism to be used at its optimal. In such 
situations, shareholders being rational investors, will continuously evaluate the cost and 
benefits of utilising different mechanisms to maximise value. Where one mechanism may be 
used more, others may be used less, based on cost/benefit analysis. Also, the corporate 
collapses, poor company financial performance in the last decade and the recent financial 
crisis have indicated that managers can immune themselves from certain governance 
mechanisms. It is not clear whether similar situation arise in other countries where different 
corporate governance regimes exist.  
Insider ownership is a relatively underdeveloped practice in New Zealand. However, the 
trend to issuing warrants and shares to senior staff is growing. The evidence available 
(Elayan et al., 2003; Hossain et al., 2001; Reddy et al., 2008a) supports the view that the 
proportion of insider ownership in New Zealand is still less than optimal. Therefore, it is 
assumed that any increase in insider ownership will have a positive effect on company 
financial performance. The small capital market practically eliminates the market for 
corporate control activities in New Zealand, thus allowing managers to shelter themselves 
from corporate control activities. In the absence of a capital market providing the monitoring 
role, managerial ownership incentives may align management interests closely with the 
shareholders thus encouraging them to consume fewer perquisites and provide vigilance so 
that large shareholders do not expropriate outside small shareholders‟ interests. Furthermore, 
as suggested by Kole (1995), in small cap companies the convergence-of-interest may hold 
for a larger range of insider ownership compared to large cap companies. Since public sector 
corporate entities are wholly owned by the Crown, the effect of different ownership structure 
is not relevant. 
Therefore, the following hypotheses are postulated in regard to insider ownership: 
H1a: Insider ownership is positively associated with small cap company financial 
performance. 
H1b: Insider ownership is positively associated with large cap company financial 
performance. 
However, Demsetz (1983), Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) argue 
that when endogeneity of insider ownership is considered, the relationship between 
ownership and performance will disappear. For this reason the research uses panel data as 
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suggested by Börsch-Supan and Köke (2002), and two stage least squares (2SLS) regression 
technique, suggested by Himmelberg et al. (1999) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), to 
reduce the effect of endogeneity on empirical analysis. Instrumental variables are used to 
control the effect of unobserved company heterogeneity on the analysis, as suggested by 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Himmelberg et al. (1999). 
Therefore, the following hypotheses are postulated in regard to the endogeneity of insider 
ownership: 
H1c: Having taken account of endogeneity of insider ownership, there will be no 
statistically significant relationship between insider ownership and performance in 
small cap companies. 
H1d: Having taken account of endogeneity of insider ownership, there will be no 
statistically significant relationship between insider ownership and performance in 
large cap companies. 
4.2.2 BLOCK OWNERSHIP 
A shareholding of 5% or more of a company‟s stock is considered a blockholding (Denis, 
2001; NZSC, 2006). Blockholders may be individuals, corporations, or institutional investors. 
The roles that blockholders play may range from passive to very active, and the methods of 
those who are active range from informal conversations with management to formal proxy 
contests (Denis, 2001). Research provides evidence that blockholders, or their 
representatives, serving on boards as directors or officers, have an opportunity to influence 
managerial decisions (Holderness, 2003). Shleifer and Vishny (1986) provide support for the 
view that blockholdings are important elements for controlling agency cost. Blockholders 
may be motivated by the shared benefit of control as well as the private benefit of control. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Gugler (1999) indicate that blockholders do receive private 
benefits at the expense of the minority shareholders.  
Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990), Fama and Jensen (1983a), and Stulz 
(1988) find that managers owning a large block of stock generate entrenchment problems. 
Greater stock ownership by managers increases the power of the internal constituency and 
decreases the power of the external constituency in influencing corporate financial 
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performance. Incentive-based compensation
32
 decreases when blockholders are present, 
(Mehran, 1995) suggesting that insider ownership is negatively related to insider block 
ownership. A high level of ownership has a negative effect on company financial 
performance measured by the Tobin‟s Q as management is able to build special relationship 
with block investors and/or their representatives on the board, negating the positive effect on 
financial performance (Cornett, Marcus,  Saunders & Tehranian, 2004). 
The expected effect of block ownership on financial performance is unclear, as it reflects the 
net impact of several benefits and costs, which are difficult to rank a priori (Bohren & 
Odegaard, 2003). The corporate governance literature list of  benefits associated with 
blockholding include the principal‟s monitoring of his/her agents (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986), higher takeover premia (Burkart, 1995), 
and reduced free-riding by disperse shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). The costs 
associated with blockholding include reduced market liquidity (Chordia, Subrahmanyam & 
Anshuman, 2001), lower diversification benefits (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985), increased 
majority-minority conflicts  (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, 2000; Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1997), and reduced management initiative (Burkart, Gromb & Panunzi1997). 
Since theory cannot specify the relative importance of these costs and benefits, the shape of 
the relationship between concentration and financial performance must be determined 
empirically. 
Blockholding is a common feature of the ownership structure of small and large companies in 
New Zealand. In small companies, the founder(s) tends to hold a large portion of the shares 
and, based on interest alignment, this could lead to an improvement in company financial 
performance. The average block ownership of 76.3% in New Zealand companies (Hossain et 
al., 2001) is consistent with New Zealand‟s weak minority shareholder rights. Also, the 
existence of weak regulations regarding shareholder rights allows initial owners to continue 
to hold large blocks of shares in companies after going public. Since blockowners hold 
undiversified large stakes, it is argued (consistent with the interest alignment hypothesis), that 
blockholders will provide a similar level of vigilance as if they owned the company 
themselves. Blockholding also solves the free-riding problem, making manager monitoring 
                                                 
32
 It represents the percentage of executive compensation that comes from new stock options, restricted stocks, 
and performance shares. 
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easier (Agrawal & Mandelker, 1990; Hill & Snell, 1988, 1989; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). 
Since blockholding is an important feature of the company ownership structure in New 
Zealand, it is assumed that its presence will have a positive effect on company financial 
performance. There is no effect of outside block holding on financial performance of public 
sector corporate entities as they are wholly owned by the Crown. 
Therefore the following hypotheses are postulated in regard to block ownership: 
H2a:  Blockholders will be positively associated with a small cap company‟s financial 
performance. 
H2b:  Blockholders will be positively associated with a large cap company‟s financial 
performance. 
As per the previous discussion, endogeneity remains a concern and therefore the following 
hypotheses are postulated in regard to the endogeneity of block ownership: 
H2c:  Having taken account of endogeneity of block ownership, there will be no statistically 
significant relationship between block ownership and financial performance in small 
cap companies. 
H2d:  Having taken account of endogeneity of block ownership, there will be no statistically 
significant relationship between block ownership and financial performance in large 
cap companies. 
4.2.3 BOARD INDEPENDENCE 
The effectiveness of the board in monitoring management is associated with board 
independence. Fama (1980), Fama and Jensen (1983a), Weisbach (1988), Zahra and Pearce 
(1989), among others, suggest that board independence can be achieved by having outside 
unrelated (independent) directors on the board who can professionally and objectively assess 
managerial performance, determine their remuneration, and replace them if necessary. To 
improve board vigilance, Cadbury (1992) suggested that the boards of companies should be 
independent of management. Rhoades, Rechner and Sundamurthy (2000) suggest that non-
executive/independent directors are financially independent from management which makes 
it easier for them to exert control over managerial self-interest and opportunism. In this 
regard, a number of reforms have been undertaken to promote sound corporate governance 
regarding board independence, which include: a majority of non-executive/independent 
directors on the board; standards for determining a member's independence; creating board 
sub-committees composed predominantly of outside directors with professional 
qualifications; minimising management's control over the appointment of board and 
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committee members; and encouraging the review of performance of the board and of each 
board member (Gani & Jermias, 2006). In the same vein, the NZSC (2004) recommended 
that all publicly listed companies should have an independent chair, the majority of their 
members should be non-executive/independent directors and a minimum of one-third of the 
members should be independent directors. 
Despite the widely-held belief that board independence can lead to improved company 
financial performance, empirical studies examining the relationship between board 
independence and company financial performance have reported mixed results. A number of 
studies have reported evidence that board independence has a positive effect on company 
financial performance (Brickley & James, 1987; Brickley, Coles & Terry, 1994; Byrd & 
Hickman, 1992; Chung, Wright & Kedia, 2003; Hossain, Cahan & Adams, 2000; Lee, 
Rosenstein, Rangan & Davidson III, 1992; Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1990; Weisbach, 1988). 
However, a number of studies reported either a negative association between board 
independence and company financial performance (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Bathala & 
Rao, 1995; Baysinger, Kosnik & Turk, 1991; Bhagat & Black, 1998; Chaganti, Mahajan & 
Sharma, 1985; Gunasekarage, Locke, Reddy & Scrimgeour, 2006; Hutchinson, 2002; Klein, 
1998; Yermack, 1996) or board independence has no impact on financial performance (Bryd 
& Hickman, 1992; Chin et al., 2003; Daily & Dalton, 1992; Mace, 1986; Prevost, Rao & 
Hossain, 2002; Singh & Davidson III, 2003; Young, 2003).  
Despite these opposing views, it is widely accepted that board effectiveness is improved by 
having a high proportion of outside (unrelated) directors (Mizruchi, 1983; Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978; Zahra & Pearce II, 1989). This is because outside (unrelated) directors can bring a 
variety of perspectives (skills, resources, experience and networking) that enhance 
environmental analysis and organisational problem-solving techniques (Milliken & Martins, 
1996). Also, outside (unrelated) directors represent shareholder interest at the „upper 
echelons‟ (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) of the organisations which might not be the case if the 
board comprised only insiders. These studies suggest that outside (unrelated) directors can be 
an effective mechanism to monitor managerial behaviour provided they have sufficient 
influence over management (Bonn, 2004).  
Studies conducted by Hossain et al. (2001) and Reddy et al. (2008a)  relate to this current 
study as they show that New Zealand companies do have a majority of non-
executive/independent directors on their boards. It is argued that in a small capital market 
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where the market for corporate control is inactive, investors tend to rely on internal control 
systems, such as outside directors, on the board. Also, having only a small pool of directors 
from which to choose for board appointments makes it difficult for companies to attain the 
right mix of skills. There is a tendency for New Zealand companies to have larger boards and 
a high proportion of outside/independent directors compared to companies in the UK and the 
US (Dedman & Filatotchev, 2008). Based on these findings, it is argued that non-
executive/independent directors are an instrumental mechanism for mitigating agency 
problems in New Zealand companies. Therefore, it is assumed that there will be a positive 
relationship between the proportion of non-executive/independent directors on the board and 
company financial performance. 
Although numerous studies have examined the board independence-performance link in 
private sector settings, empirical studies investigating the effectiveness of board 
independence in public sector corporate settings are lacking. However, it is assumed that 
board structure matters in the public sector in the same way as it matters in the private sector. 
Therefore, making the board independent of management in the public sector will lead to an 
improvement in monitoring as well, thus improving public corporate entity financial 
performance. 
Therefore, the following hypotheses are formulated in regard to board independence: 
H3a:  The proportion of non-executive/independent directors on the board is positively 
associated with small cap company financial performance. 
H3b:  The proportion of non-executive/independent directors on the board is positively 
associated with large cap company financial performance. 
H3c:  The proportion of non-executive/independent directors on the board is positively 
associated with public sector corporate entity financial performance. 
4.2.4 BOARD SIZE 
There is no one optimal „size‟ for a board. However, organisational behaviour research 
suggests that as group sizes grow larger, total productivity exhibits diminishing returns 
(Hackman, 1990). Consistent with this view, Jensen (1983) suggests that a board should have 
a maximum of seven or eight members to function effectively. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) 
favour a board size of eight or nine members. In Australia, the boards of the 250 largest 
companies have on average 6.89 members (Psaros, 2009). From an agency perspective, 
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smaller boards are more likely to reach consensus and also allow members to engage in 
genuine debate and interaction (Firstenberg & Malkiel, 1994).  
Alternatively, larger boards tend to provide an increased pool of expertise, greater 
management oversight, and access to a wider range of contracts and resources (Goostein, 
Gautam & Boeker, 1994; Psaros, 2009). However, Forbes and Milliken (1999), Yawon 
(2006), Pye (2000), and Mak and Kusandi (2005) argue that larger boards suffer from higher 
agency problems because they are difficult to coordinate and find it difficult to make value 
maximising strategic decisions. Consequently, they fail to implement strategies that maximise 
company value. Pye (2000) and Yermack (1996) argue that the additional benefits achieved 
by having a larger board do not exceed additional costs involved with larger boards. 
Based on these conflicting views, a number of researchers have chosen to investigate whether 
or not board size has an effect on company financial performance. Yermack (1999) and 
(Guest, 2009) find an inverse relationship between board size and company financial 
performance as measured by Tobin‟s Q. Eisenberg et al. (1998) notes similar results for small 
and medium sized companies in Finland. Hossain et al. (2001) and Reddy et al. (2008a) 
report similar results for small companies  in New Zealand.  
It is important to note that the median board size for companies in New Zealand is eight 
members, which Jensen suggests to be an optimal board size for companies in the US.  
However, it is argued that a board size of eight members is less than optimal for companies in 
New Zealand. In New Zealand, there is only a small pool of directors available for companies 
to choose from and it may be difficult to obtain the right balance in terms of skills, expertise 
and environmental linkages required in the board room with a smaller board size. It is argued 
that to balance the skills required in the board room, New Zealand companies may require a 
larger board size than might otherwise be the case in larger economies. Therefore, it is 
assumed that board size will have a positive effect on company financial performance. The 
same logic extends to public sector entities. 
The availability of only a small pool of directors for board appointments in New Zealand may 
become problematic for small cap companies in terms of attracting good directors, because of 
the companies‟ limited resources and size. Also, becoming a director for a small company 
may not be seen as enhancing a director‟s reputation in the same way joining the board of a 
larger company might do. In order for small cap companies to have the required level of 
expertise in the boardroom they may be required to have a larger board with each member 
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having expertise in different areas of business rather than achieving the required level of 
broad expertise with fewer good experienced directors. Therefore, larger board sizes may also 
be found in small cap companies which may have a positive effect on company financial 
performance. 
Therefore, the following hypotheses are formulated in regard to board size: 
H4a: Board size will be positively associated with small cap company financial 
performance. 
H4b:  Board size will be positively associated with large cap company financial 
performance. 
H4c: Board size will be positively associated with public sector corporate entity financial 
performance. 
4.2.5 BOARD DIVERSITY 
Significant governance issues faced by modern corporations are board diversity and board 
independence (Milliken & Martins, 1996). Although there has been mixed evidence and 
constant debate regarding the effect of board composition (de Andres, Azofra & Lopez, 2005; 
Dulewicz & Herbert, 2004), diversity of board membership is still considered desirable for 
two important reasons. First, prior literature suggests that diversity of group membership 
increases discussion, the exchange of ideas and group performance (Hoffman & Maier, 1961; 
Knippenberg, De Dreu & Homan2004; Schippers, Hartog, Koopman & Wienk2003; Watson, 
Kumar & Michaelsen1993). In this case, diversity has been advocated as a means of 
improving organisational value and performance by providing the board with new insights 
and perspectives (Barnhart et al., 1994; Carter et al., 2003; Coffey & Wang, 1998; Siciliano, 
1996). Second, if the function of the board is to protect the interests of the corporation‟s 
stakeholders, then it stands to reason that the board should comprise members that are 
representative of these stakeholders (Huse & Rindova, 2001). Therefore, board diversity is 
imperative for the promotion of better understanding of the market place, increased creativity, 
innovation and effective problem solving (Carter et al., 2003). Board diversity can also 
promote more effective global relationships and increase board independence because people 
with different gender, ethnicity or cultural backgrounds might ask questions that would not 
come from directors with more traditional backgrounds (Arfken et al., 2004). 
Women directors are seen as a key element in providing board diversity. Taking this view, 
McGregor (2008) provides statistics of women on boards in different countries. For example, 
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in Norway the coalition government in 2002 threatened to require companies to have 40% 
female membership (if they did not do it voluntarily). By 2007, 37% of listed companies had 
female directors on their boards. In the USA, 14.8% of the Fortune 500 companies had 
female directors in 2007. In the UK, 11% of the FTSE 100 had female directors in 2007. In 
Australia, 8.7% of ASX 200 companies had female directors in 2007. In Sweden, only 2% of 
women are CEOs (Ripley, 2003). In Ireland, only 30% of the listed companies have women 
on their boards and comprise 4.3% of all board directors (Brennan & McCafferty, 1997). In 
New Zealand, 8.65% of NZX listed companies had female directors on their boards 
(McGregor, 2008; Rotherham, 2009). 
While research on board diversity has been growing in recent years, most empirical research 
has been restricted to USA data (Hyland & Marcellino, 2002; Vafeas & Theodorou, 1998) 
and there is a lack of evidence regarding such practices in Australian and New Zealand 
companies (Psaros & Seamer, 2003). Kang, Cheng and Gray (2007) find industry type, board 
size, and shareholder concentration are related to board diversity and independence. They 
find that shareholder concentration is found to be a significant factor in determining gender 
diversity in Australia. Reddy et al. (2008a) find female directors have a statistically 
significant effect on small cap companies financial performance in New Zealand.  
According to Brennan and McCafferty (1997), women on the board can increase a 
corporation‟s value because: (i) women are not part of the “old-boys” network, which allows 
them to be more independent; and (ii) they may have a better understanding of consumer 
behaviour, the needs of customers, and opportunities for companies to meet those needs. 
Based on these views, it is not unreasonable to posit that board diversity will have a positive 
effect on financial performance. 
Therefore, the following hypotheses are formulated in regard to board size: 
H5a:  Board diversity will be positively associated with small cap company financial 
performance. 
H5b:  Board diversity will be positively associated with large cap company financial 
performance. 
H5c:  Board diversity will be positively associated with public sector corporate entity 
financial performance. 
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4.2.6 BOARD COMMITTEES 
Empirical research shows that companies with audit committee have fewer financial 
reporting problems (McMullen, 1996). John and Senbet (1998) report that the presence of 
monitoring committees (audit and nominations) is positively related to factors associated with 
the benefits of monitoring. Klein (2002b) shows that independent audit committees reduce 
the likelihood of earnings management thus improving transparency. However, Baxter (2006) 
finds no significant relationship between having an audit committee and financial reporting 
quality.  
On the other hand, Main and Johnston (1998) and Weir and Laing (2000) report that the 
existence of a remuneration committee has a positive effect on financial performance. Klein 
(1998) finds evidence of a positive relationship between the presence of a remuneration 
committee and financial performance but notices this relationship is not highly significant.  
Despite the NZSC recommendations and guidelines to incorporate board committees, very 
few studies, to date, focus on their relationship with company financial performance. Dalton 
et al. (1998) provide a similar view, that relatively little research has been undertaken in the 
relationship between board sub committees and financial performance. However, the 
international evidence suggests that it is likely that empirical research in New Zealand will 
find a positive link between board sub-committees and company financial performance. 
Reddy et al. (2008b), report a positive effect of a remuneration committee on financial 
performance of large companies in New Zealand. With a strong emphasis on accountability 
typically prevalent in the public sector, it is likely there will be a linkage between committees 
and financial performance as well. 
Therefore, the following hypotheses are formulated in regard to board committees: 
H6a: Existence of a functioning Board Audit Committee will be positively associated with 
small cap company financial performance. 
H6b: Existence of a functioning Board Remuneration Committee will be positively 
associated with small cap company financial performance. 
H6c: Existence of a functioning Board Audit Committee will be positively associated with 
large cap company financial performance. 
H6d: Existence of a functioning Board Remuneration Committee will be positively 
associated with large cap company financial performance. 
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H6e: Existence of a functioning Board Audit Committee will be positively associated with 
public sector corporate entity financial performance. 
H6f: Existence of a functioning Board Remuneration Committee will be positively 
associated with public sector corporate entity financial performance. 
4.2.7 USE OF DEBT 
Berger, Ofek, and Yarmack (1997) report that managerial entrenchment has a significant 
impact on capital structure.  They observe a lower level of debt in companies where the CEO 
appears to be entrenched. They also find lower debt in companies where a CEO does not face 
significant monitoring, has large boards with few outside directors and no large blockholders. 
They report that companies significantly increase their leverage when they experience some 
discipline (such as a takeover attempt, involuntary CEO departure, or the arrival of outside 
blockholders) or receive enhanced managerial incentives through a management 
compensation contract. Harris and Raviv (1991) provide a comprehensive survey of the 
theories and relate empirical evidence on the use of debt to mitigate agency conflicts and 
information asymmetry. They conclude that the evidence is broadly consistent with the debt 
theory.  
Conversely, Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) and Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid and Zimmermann 
(2003) find that there is no relationship between debt and company financial performance. 
Fama (1980) states that managers are less diversified than their shareholders, i.e., in addition 
to holding stock and stock options, their human capital is also specific to the company. 
Consequently, managers may increase leverage beyond the “optimal capital structure” to 
increase the voting power of their equity stakes and reduce the likelihood of a takeover and 
the resulting possible loss of job tenure. A relatively high debt to assets ratio may be used to 
make a company less attractive as a takeover target, substituting debt for the use of other 
takeover defence mechanisms (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Begley & Feltham, 1999; Byrd & 
Stammerjohan, 1997; Knoeber, 1985). In summary, the above research suggests that debt 
may have either a positive or a negative effect on company financial performance.  
Gunasekarage et al. (2006) reported that the average debt to assets ratio for large companies 
in New Zealand was 48% which indicates that large New Zealand companies tend to rely on 
debt as a source of finance, and debtholders tend to provide a source of external scrutiny 
which may have a positive effect on company financial performance. Small cap companies 
may also rely on debt as a source of funding. In New Zealand, companies have relied on debt 
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as a source of capital and debtholders have a tendency to safeguard their investment by 
monitoring company financial performance on a regular basis. Therefore, it is assumed that 
the use of debt will have a positive effect on company financial performance.    
Being wholly owned by the Crown, public corporate entities in New Zealand do not face the 
same level of threat of bankruptcy as private sector companies. The existence of a perceived 
guarantee from the owner (government) to bail ailing entities weakens the benefits of using 
leverage. Also, knowing that the owner (government) will bail public entities may make the 
provider of funds less rigorous in terms of monitoring public entities‟ financial performance.  
However, managers of public corporate entities still have to generate returns from debt in 
order to continue to be employed by the organisation. By generating reasonable return, they 
also enhance their reputation in the industry. Therefore, it is assumed that the use of debt will 
have a positive effect on public sector entities‟ financial performance. 
Therefore, the following hypotheses are formulated in regard to debt: 
H7a: Debt will be positively associated with small cap company financial performance. 
H7b: Debt will be positively associated with large cap company financial performance. 
H7c: Debt will be positively associated with public sector corporate entity financial 
performance. 
4.2.8 DIVIDENDS 
Rozeff (1982) reported evidence of a strong relationship between dividend payouts and a set 
of variables proxying for agency and transaction costs in a large sample of US companies for 
the period 1974 to 1980. In a cross-sectional analysis, Crutchley and Hansen (1989) show 
evidence of dividend policy acting as a corporate monitoring vehicle. Farinha (2003) 
provides empirical evidence of dividend policy reducing agency problems, either by 
increasing the frequency of external capital raising and associated monitoring by investment 
bankers and investors (Easterbrook, 1984) or by eliminating free cash-flow (Jensen1986). 
Based on this evidence, it is reasonable to assume that dividend payouts will have a positive 
effect on company financial performance. 
Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) suggest (after controlling for company size and industry) that 
the effect of dividend policy on other governance mechanisms may be indirectly controlled. 
In New Zealand, it could be directly used as a mechanism to monitor manager behaviour. 
With a small pool of directors available for board appointments, it may become difficult for 
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companies to engage good directors. Also, there is a tendency in New Zealand for the same 
person to be sitting on many boards (overboarding) thus making it difficult to remain 
focused. In such circumstances, utilising dividend payouts as a means of getting capital 
market involvement in monitoring a manager‟s performance may lead to performance 
enhancement. 
Therefore, the following hypotheses are formulated in regard to dividends: 
H8a: Dividends will be positively associated with small cap company financial 
performance. 
H8b: Dividends will be positively associated with large cap company financial 
performance. 
H8c: Dividends will be positively associated with public sector corporate entity financial 
performance. 
4.3 DATA AND RESEARCH METHODS 
This section describes the research methods used to test the research framework and research 
hypotheses presented above. The sections that follow describe the methodology used for data 
collection, measurement of the variables, empirical models and techniques for data analysis. 
4.3.1 DATA 
Data for this study were obtained from NZX Deep Archive databases for the small and large 
cap companies listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZX). For the small cap 
companies, the sampling period is 1999 through to 2006. The sample companies cover all 
sectors of the economy: primary, energy, goods, property, services and investment. 
Companies that did not have all the required information were excluded from the sample. 
From the 880 company-year observation in the sample period, 226 company-year 
observations were excluded because of missing information; the remaining 562 company-
year (71.3%) were included in the pooled data set for this study of small cap companies. 
Data for the top 50 publicly listed companies (large cap companies) on the NZX cover the 
period 1999 through 2007. The top fifty companies were chosen because they constitute the 
NZX50 index and the findings of this study will be more readily comparable to international 
studies of the larger company sector in respective countries. It is to be noted that the NZX50 
was introduced in New Zealand on 3 March, 2003, and prior to this date, the top 40 
companies were used to determine the NZX40 index. Therefore, the sampling period 1999 to 
2002 uses the top 40 companies in each year, and the years 2003 to 2007 includes the top 50 
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companies in each year. In total, there are 410 company-year observations included in the 
sample covering all sectors of the economy, including primary, energy, goods, property, 
service and investments. Seventy company-year observations are excluded from the sample 
because they did not have all the information, while the remaining 340 company-year 
observations (78.3% of the sample) have all the information and are included in the pooled 
data set for this study for large cap companies.  
Data for public sector corporate entities were obtained from the annual reports of SOEs and 
Crown-owned companies listed in the CCMAU database for the period 2000 to 2007. In total, 
there are 183 entity-year observations in the sample period. Two companies‟ annual reports 
for 2007 were not available at the time of data collection. Accordingly, 181 organisations‟ 
data are included in the sample. The number of Crown companies increased during the 
period, from 15 in 2000 to 30 in 2007. Table 4.1 below shows the number of small cap, large 
cap companies and Crown entities in each year from 1999 to 2007.   
Table 4.1:  
Number of Listed Companies and Public Sector Entities’ data included in this study 
each year 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
33
 Total 
Small Cap 
Companies 
43 44 64 63 75 92 102 79 - 562 
Large Cap 
Companies 
31 33 34 36 38 38 42 43 45 340 
Crown 
Entities 
- 15 17 19 22 23 27 30 30 183 
 
4.3.2 VARIABLES 
The sections that follow describe the dependent variables and independent (explanatory) 
variables used in this study. 
4.3.2.1  DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Tobin‟s Q as the financial performance measure is commonly used as a dependent variable 
(Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Chung & Pruitt, 1994; Hossain et al., 2001; Kang & Stulz, 1996; 
                                                 
33
 In 2007, only 28 public sector corporate entities‟ data was available. Two companies annual report was 
released at the time of data collection. 
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Loderer & Peyer, 2002; Perfect & Wiles, 1994; Reddy et al., 2008a). An accounting-based 
performance measure, return on assets (ROA),  has been used by Demsetz  and Villalonga 
(2001), Finch and Shivadasani (2006), Thomsen, Pedersen & Kvist (2006). Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001) argue that both financial performance measures have pitfalls. For example, 
futuristic and forward-looking measure Tobin‟s Q is typically estimated as: 
AssetsTotal
DebtTSNetDebtTLMVE
QsTobin'  
where MVE (the market value estimate) is the product of a company‟s share price and the 
common stock outstanding, L/T Debt is the book value of long term liabilities; Net S/T Debt 
is the book value of current liabilities less current assets. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) 
argue that although the numerator of Tobin‟s Q partly reflects the value that investors assign 
to a company‟s intangible assets, the denominator does not include the investment the 
company has in intangible assets, such as reputation, brand equity and research and 
development. These items are simply treated as expenses. This distorts the performance 
comparison of companies that rely on the differing degrees of intangible capital (see 
Demsetz, 1979; Telser, 1969; Weiss, 1969). To overcome this problem, recent studies use the 
depreciated book value of tangible assets. Tobin‟s Q is estimated in the same way for this 
study.  
The accounting-based performance measure, ROA is also used in this study. The accounting-
based profit measure is criticised as being backward-looking and it only partially estimates 
future events in the form of depreciation and amortization.  On the other hand, Tobin‟s Q is 
greatly influenced by a wide range of unstable factors, such as investor psychology, and 
market forecasts. Considering the above concerns, both measures of financial performance 
are used in this study. 
ROA is computed by dividing net income by book value of total assets, that is:  
(
AssetsTotal
IncomeNet
ROA  
The ratio of market value to book value of equity (MB) is also used in this research: 
(TE)Equity Total
SharesofNo.*PriceStock
MB  
where TE is equal to net assets, that is, assets less debt (TE = A – L). 
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The dependent variable – Tobin‟s Q is commonly used in governance studies as a proxy for 
company performance of publicly listed companies (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Bhagat & 
Black, 1998; Bhagat & Jefferis, 2002; Reddy et al., 2008a; Weir, Laing & McKnight, 2002; 
Yermack, 1996). Since Crown companies are not publicly listed, it becomes difficult to 
estimate the market value of their common equity. However, the commonly used accounting 
measures of company performance such as, Return on Assets (ROA), Return on Equity 
(ROE), Operating Income Return on Assets (OPROA), Total Sales to Total Assets (S2TA) 
and Total Cost to Net Revenue (C2REV) are appropriate choices for the dependent variable. 
Studies that have used a ratio of total assets to total sales, and a ratio of operating expenses to 
total sales as the proxy for agency costs in the private sector settings include Ang, et al. 
(2000), and Singh and Davidson III (2003).    
These ratios are selected because they are commonly used in empirical studies that tend to 
focus on the stakeholder viewpoint. Public sector entities do have a stakeholder focus, so it is 
deemed appropriate to use measures that reflect stakeholder attributes. The dependent 
variables are estimated as follows: 
ROA - is computed by dividing net income by book value of total assets  
(
AssetsTotal
IncomeNet
ROA ;  
ROE -  is computed by dividing net income by total shareholders‟ equity  
(
EquityrsShareholde
IncomeNet
ROE ;  
OPROA - is computed by dividing EBITDA (earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and 
amortisation) by total assets (
AssetsTotal
EBITDA
OPROA ;  
S2TA - is computed by dividing net revenue by total assets   
(
SalesTotal
SalesNet
TurnoverAssetsTotal ; 
C2REV - is computed by dividing total costs (Net Revenue – EBITDA) by net revenue  
(
RevenueNet
EBITDARevenue
C2REV .  
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A high ratio represents a favourable financial performance apart from C2REV where a low 
ratio represents greater efficiency.  
Since no consensus exists in the literature concerning a reliable financial performance 
measure, a variety of measures are used. 
4.3.2.2 EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
The independent variables employed in this study are factors that are found in the literature to 
have an influence on company financial performance, either positively or negatively. The 
variables and the way they are determined in this study are given as follows: Insider 
ownership (MOWN) is the proportion of shares held by all members of the board of directors, 
including top officers of the company who are members of the board, divided by total 
ordinary shares outstanding. Blockholding (BOWN) is the proportion of shares held by the 20 
largest shareholders of the company. Non-Executive/Independent Directors (NED) is the 
proportion of non-executive/independent directors on the board. According to the NZSC 
(2004),  
 
a non-executive director is formally classified as independent only where 
he/she does not represent a substantial shareholder and where the board is 
satisfied that he/she has no other direct or indirect interest or relationship 
that could reasonably influence their judgement and decision making as a 
director.  
The boards of publicly listed companies should have a majority of non-
executive directors and a minimum of one third should be independent 
directors. Boards taking care to meet all disclosure obligations concerning 
directors and their interests, include information about the directors, and 
identify which directors are independent (p. 11). 
 
Although board independence is regarded as an important element in good governance, there 
is a general lack of consensus in terms of what constitutes “independent”. Prior to 2004, New 
Zealand companies reporting on directors identified directors as either “executive” and “non-
executive” directors, and disclosed very little information regarding the directors to external 
stakeholders. This leads to inconsistencies in interpreting the definition of independence. A 
general lack of disclosure of such information by companies in their annual reports and in 
other forms of corporate communications also means these inconsistencies cannot be 
corrected. Empirical studies examining director independence also find it difficult to compare 
one company‟s definition of director independence to other companies. Some previous 
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studies have avoided the word “independence” by using “outside directors” to describe 
directors who are presumed to be independent from management (Ajinkya, Bhojraj & 
Sengupta, 2005; Hossain et al., 2001), or simply consider potential differences between “non-
executive” and “executive” directors. Other studies acknowledge a director‟s independence 
when he/she is independent from senior management of the company (Anderson, Mansi & 
Reeb, 2004; Dulewicz & Herbert, 2004; Hooghiemstra & van Manen, 2004). 
Notwithstanding the lack of consensus on the definition of outside or independent directors, it 
is still perhaps the most “recommended” practice of good corporate governance that 
corporations should, in an effort to enhance the effectiveness of the board, constitute a board 
with a majority of outside directors. The publication of the NZSC principles and guidelines in 
2004 clarifies, to some extent, what constitutes an independent director.  Consequently, there 
will be some consistency in the reporting of independent directors after 2004. However, there 
exists mixed information in the companies‟ annual reports prior to 2004 regarding director 
independence. A director may have been reported to be independent but is not, or a director 
may have not reported to be independent, but is. To reduce the effect of any bias arising from 
the inconsistent reporting of independent directors, non-executive/independent directors 
(NED) are used, that is, directors who are reported to be either non-executive and/or 
independent. 
The board size (BDS) is the natural log of the total number of directors on the board. 
Leverage (LEV) is the proportion of debt defined as long term liabilities plus short-term 
liabilities divided by the total assets. Company size (Log (TA)) is the natural log of total 
assets which is a proxy for size. This measure is also used by Anderson and Reeb (2004). 
Dividend (DIV2TA) is the book value of the dividend paid by the company divided by book 
value of the total assets.  
The NZSC recommends that publicly listed companies should establish an audit committee of 
the board with responsibilities to: 
recommend the appointment of external auditors; to oversee all aspects of 
the entity-audit company relationship; and to promote integrity in financial 
reporting (p.13).  
The members of the audit committee should comprise all non-executive 
directors with a majority being independent directors. At least one director 
should be either a chartered accountant or have another form of financial 
expertise. The chairperson should be an independent director who is not the 
chairperson of the board (p. 13). 
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The NZSC also recommends that listed companies should also establish remuneration 
committees (where necessary) to determine the appropriate remuneration structure of the 
chief executives, and executive and non-executive directors. To study the effect these 
committees have on companies‟ financial performance, two committee variables are created. 
The Audit Committee (ACOM) is set equal to “1” if companies have an audit committee; 
otherwise it is set equal to “0”. A Remuneration Committee (RCOM) is set equal to “1” if 
companies have a remuneration committee; otherwise it is set equal to “0”. Company level 
risk (FMRISK) is the standard deviation of the daily stock price of the company for the 
period 1999 through to 2007. BUSRISK is business level risk which is the standard deviation 
of the five year return on assets. To study the effect NZSC recommendations have on 
company financial performance, a variable AFTER2003 is created. AFTER2003 is equal to 1 
if the year is after 2003; otherwise it is set equal to 0. A variable COMPLIED is created to 
measure the effect the NZSC recommendations has on company financial performance. 
COMPLIED is equal to 1 if the company complies with the NZSC recommendations (that is, 
has non-executive/independent directors, audit committee and remuneration committee); 
otherwise is equal to 0.  To capture the effect of compliance after 2003 on performance, a 
variable ComAft is created. ComAft is the interaction between COMPLIED and AFTER2003 
(ComAft = COMPLIED * AFTER2003). In practice, each company has different corporate 
governance structures and those structures are assumed to be similar for companies that are in 
the same industry. Previous studies have looked at the industry effect on company financial 
performance (Cho, 1998; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). In a similar 
way, to study the effect corporate governance practices of different industries have on 
financial performance, industry dummy variables are created. NZX classifies all listed 
companies into six sectors; primary (agriculture & fishing, mining, forestry, and building), 
energy, goods (food, textile & apparel, intermed & durables), property, service (transport, 
port, leisure & tourism, media & communication, finance & other services) and investment. 
Using NZX classification, six industry dummy variables are introduced. IND1 is the dummy 
variable equal to 1 if the company belongs to primary, IND2 for energy, IND3 for goods, 
IND4 for property, IND5 for service and IND6 for investment. For public sector corporate 
entities, the classification of whether it is a SOE or CRI is used. Therefore, “1” is when the 
entity is a SOE, otherwise equal to “0”. 
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There are a number of companies that were in the small cap list, NZX Top40 list in 1999 and 
SOE list in 2000 but are not in NZX small cap list in 2006 or NZX Top50 list in 2007, or are 
in the SOE list in 2007, thus raising concerns regarding the effect that non-surviving 
companies have on the results. To control the effect of non-survivorship companies on the 
results, a variable SURV is created which is equal to “1” if the company is continuously 
present in all the years of the sampling period from 1999 to 2007, otherwise it is equal to “0”. 
The variable CSURV measures the effect on company performance of companies that 
survived through the sampling period and also complied with NZSC recommendations. It is 
calculated by multiplying COMPLIED by SURV. 
To study the effect of the growth of New Zealand economy had on company financial 
performance, a variable RGDP is created. RGDP is the yearly real growth rate. 
Table 4.2 below provides a summary of the dependent and control variables used in this 
research  
Table 4.2:  
Governance and Performance Variables 
VARIABLES MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUE 
Dependent  
Tobin‟s Q Ratio of MVE (market value of shareholders‟ equity) + (L/T Debt (book 
value of long term debt) + Net S/T Debt (Current Liabilities – Current 
Assets) to book value of total assets. 
ROA Ratio of net income to total assets. 
MB Ratio of the market value of equity to total shareholders‟ equity (Total 
Assets – Total Liabilities). 
ROE Ratio of net income to total shareholders‟ equity. 
OPROA Ratio of EBITDA (earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and 
amortisation) to total assets. 
S2TA Ratio of net revenue to total assets. 
C2REV Ratio of net revenue less EBITDA (earnings before interest, tax, 
depreciation and amortisation) to net revenue. 
Independent  
(Explanatory) 
 
IOWN Proportion of shares held by insider. 
BOWN Proportion of twenty top shareholding. 
NED Proportion of non-executive/independent directors on the board. 
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VARIABLES MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUE 
BDS Log of board size. 
FD Proportion of female directors on the board. 
ACOM Equals to “1” if the company has audit committee, otherwise “0”. 
RCOM Equals to “1” if the company has remuneration committee, otherwise “0”. 
LEV Long term liabilities plus short-term liabilities divided by total assets. 
DIV2TA Dividend paid per year to total assets. 
Control   
CR Ratio of current assets to current liabilities. 
Log(TA) Proxy for size which is the natural log of total assets. 
Log(REV) Proxy for size which is the natural log of total revenue. 
BUSRISK Standard deviation of the 5-year return on assets. 
FMRISK Standard deviation of the daily stock price for the each year. 
RGDP Real growth rate of the gross domestic product. 
AFTER2003 Equals to “1” if the year is after 2003, otherwise “0”. 
COMPLIED Equals to “1” if the company has non-executive/independent directors, audit 
committee and remuneration committee, otherwise “0”. 
ComAft Is the interaction between COMPLIED and AFTER2003. 
SURV Equals to „1” if the company survives the sample period, otherwise equal to 
“0”. 
CSURV Is the interaction between COMPLIED and SURV. 
Intangible2ta Totals assets less current assets and net fixed assets to total assets. 
Marketshare Total sales revenue of the company to the total sales revenue of the industry 
to which the company belongs. 
IND1 Dummy variable equal to “1” if the company is in the primary industry, 
otherwise “0”. 
IND2 Dummy variable equal to “1” if the company is in the energy industry, 
otherwise “0”. 
IND3 Dummy variable equal to “1” if the company is in the goods industry, 
otherwise “0”. 
IND4 Dummy variable equal to “1” if the company is in the property industry, 
otherwise “0”. 
IND5 Dummy variable equal to “1” if the company is in the services industry, 
otherwise “0”. 
IND6 Dummy variable equal to “1” if the company is in the investment industry, 
otherwise “0”. 
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VARIABLES MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUE 
IND7 Dummy variable equal to “1” if the company is also listed in other stock 
exchanges, otherwise “0”. 
INDPS Dummy variable equal to “1” if the public sector corporate entity is an SOE, 
otherwise “0”. 
 
4.3.3 MODEL SPECIFICATION 
4.3.3.1  MODEL SPECIFICATION FOR SMALL AND LARGE CAP COMPANIES 
Most of the literature uses univariate or multivariate regression analysis to test the 
relationship between corporate governance factors and company financial performance. 
These studies consider ownership as an exogenous variable. Based on these prior studies, an 
ordinary least squares regression (OLS) is employed to establish if governance and control 
mechanisms have an effect on company financial performance. The models estimated are: 
)1(eRGDPβ
SURVβIND7βIND6βIND5βIND4βIND3βIND2β
IND1βCOMPLYβBUSRISKβFMRISKβRCOMβACOMβ
log(TA)βDIV2TAβLEVβBDSβNEDβBOWNβIOWNβαFP
31
30292827262524
232221201918
171615141312111
 
)2(eRGDPβ
SURVβIND7βIND6βIND5βIND4βIND3βIND2β
IND1βComAftβBUSRISKβFMRISKβRCOMβACOMβ
log(TA)βDIV2TAβLEVβBDSβNEDβBOWNβIOWNβαFP
42
41404039383736
353431302928
272625242322212
 
)3(eOVER20βBET1020βBET510βBET15β
LESS1βIND7βIND6βIND5βIND4βIND3βIND2β
IND1βComAftβBUSRISKβFMRISKβRCOMβACOMβ
log(TA)βDIV2TAβLEVβBDSβNEDβBOWNβIOWNβαFP
55545352
51494847464544
434241403938
373635343332313
  
where  FP  = Company Financial Performance measured by Tobin‟s Q, MB and ROA 
Equation (1) determines the relationship between financial performance and governance 
mechanisms of companies that were continuously noncompliant with NZSC 
recommendations since 1999.  This is undertaken for three company financial performance 
measures. Equation (2) determines the relationship between financial performance and 
governance mechanisms for companies that complied with the NZSC recommendations after 
2003. This is also undertaken for three financial performance measures. Equation (3) 
estimates whether a piecewise linear relationship exists between insider ownership and 
company financial performance. This is undertaken for IOWN less than 1%, between 1% and 
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5%, between 5% and 10%, between 10% and 20% and over 20%. Dummy variable LESS1 is 
equal to 1 if IOWN is less than 1, otherwise equal to 0.  Dummy variable BET15 is equal to 1 
if IOWN is less than 1, otherwise equal to 0.  Dummy variable BET510 is equal to 1 if 
IOWN is less than 1, otherwise equal to 0.  Dummy variable BET1020 is equal to 1 if IOWN 
is less than 1, otherwise equal to 0.  Dummy variable OVER20 is equal to 1 if IOWN is less 
than 1, otherwise equal to 0.   
To study whether the companies that complied with NZSC recommendations after 2003 
improved financial performance compared to the period before 2003, a financial performance 
measure FPdiffAV is created. FPdiffAV for the small cap companies is the difference 
between average company financial performance for the periods 2004-2006 and 2001-2003.  
The FPdiffAV for the large cap companies is the difference between 2004-2007 and 2000-
2003. 
)4(eComAftβ
BUSRISKβFMRISKβRCOMβACOMβlog(TA)β
DIV2TAβLEVβBDSβNEDβBOWNβIOWNβαFPdiffAV
52
5150494847
4645444342414
 
4.3.3.1.1 ROBUSTNESS 
Studies  undertaken by Demsetz (1983), Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Himmelberg et al. 
(1999),  Palia (2001) and Gugler and Weigand (2003) show that problems arise with OLS 
regression if two or more variables are jointly endogenous. They argue that both company 
ownership and financial performance are explained by common company characteristics, 
some of which are unobservable, and the omission of these unobservable characteristics in 
the value model leads to biased conclusions regarding the influence of ownership on value 
because of the relationship between the former and the omitted variables (Pindalo & de la 
Torre, 2009).  
The panel data methodology allows control for heterogeneity through individual effect, in 
which the common determinants of ownership and value will be included. However, if an 
endogeneity problem stems from the lack of consideration of the potential inverse causality, 
then ownership variables will be correlated with random disturbances (i.e., E(xit. eit) ≠ 0), 
once the individual effect has been controlled for. To control the effect of inverse causality, 
this study uses the 2SLS regression technique. In the first stage, ownership is determined by 
using OLS regression techniques, and in the second stage; values determined for ownership 
are used to determine financial performance. The models formulated are based on Tobin‟s Q, 
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MB and ROA as dependent variables. The following variables SIZE, LEV, Intangible2ta and 
Marketshare are treated as instrumental variables. Marketshare is the proxy for the 
company‟s market power in the industry, which is determined by dividing the company‟s 
sales revenue by total sales revenue for the industry in which the company belongs. 
Intangible2ta is the proxy for the level of intangible assets held by the company, determined 
by subtracting current assets and net fixed assets from total assets and dividing by total assets. 
The systems of equations formulated for this study is: 
)5(e2taIntangibleβeMarketsharβ
FMRISKβlog(TA)βLEVβBDSβNEDβBOWNβFPβαIOWN
5857
565554535251505
 
)6(
e2taIntangibleβeMarketsharβBUSRISKβFMRISKβ
log(TA)βDIV2TAβLEVβBDSβNEDβIOWNβFPβαBOWN
70696867
666564636261606
 
)7(eRGDPβ2taIntangibleβeMarketsharβ
IND7βIND6βIND5βIND4βIND3βIND2βIND1β
CSURVβComAftβBUSRISKβFMRISKβLog(TA)βRCOMβ
ACOMβDIV2TAβLEVβBDSβNEDβBOWNβIOWNβαFP
929190
89888786858483
828180797877
767574737271707
 
4.3.3.2  MODEL SPECIFICATION FOR PUBLIC SECTOR CORPORATE ENTITIES 
Using panel data for the years 2000 to 2007, the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
technique is used to measure the effect corporate governance mechanisms and control 
variables have on entity financial performance measured by ROA, ROE, OPROA, S2TA and 
C2REV. Börsch-Supan and Köke (2002) state that the problem of reverse causality in 
governance research can be resolved by panel data as it provides for instruments that are not 
available in cross-section data. The model being formulated is given as: 
FP = α8 + β81NED + β82BDS + β83FD + β84ACOM +β85RCOM + β86LEV + β87DIV2TA 
 + β88CR +  β89Log(TA) + β90FMRISK + β91INDPS + e                  --------------------- (8) 
Where,  
FP = Entity Financial Performance measured by ROA, ROE, OPROA, S2TA, and 
C2REV 
To study whether public sector corporate entities that complied with the NZSC 
recommendations after 2003 improved financial performance compared to the period before 
2003, a financial performance measure DiffAvROA is created. DiffAvROA is the difference 
between the average ROA for the 2004-2007 and 2000-2003. 
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DiffAvROA = α9 + β91NED + β92BDS + β93FD + β94ACOM +β95RCOM + β96LEV  
     +β97DIV2TA + β98CR + β99Log(TA) + β100FMRISK + β101COMPLIED       
             + β102SURV + e      --------------------- (9) 
To measure the effect of the time period when NZSC recommendations came into effect, a 
dummy variable AFTER2003 is used. AFTER2003 is equal to “1” if the year is after 2003, 
otherwise equal to “0”. It is assumed that public corporate entities that have adopted the 
NZSC‟s recommendations from 2004 will have a positive effect on financial performance. 
Therefore, AFTER2003 will be statistically significant and positive. Also, board and 
performance may be explained by common entity characteristics, some of which are 
unobservable, and the omission of these unobservable characteristics in the value model leads 
to biased conclusions regarding the influence of the board on financial performance. 
Himmelberg, et al. (1999) argue that the existence of both intangible assets in the product 
market increases corporate value. Therefore, to overcome the problem of endogeneity, this 
study controls the effects of marketshare and intangible assets on company value.  
The revised model incorporating these two variables is given as: 
FP = α10 + β101NED + β102BDS + β103FD + β104ACOM +β105RCOM + β106LEV  
              + β107DIV2TA + β108CR + β109Log(TA) + β110FMRISK + β111Marketshare  
  + β112Intangible2ta  + β113AFTER2003  + β114SURV + β115INDPS + e    ---------------- (10) 
To measure the effect NZSC recommendations have on the public corporate entities 
performances, a dummy variable COMPLIED is used. COMPLIED is equal to “1” if public 
corporate entities complied with all the NZSC‟s recommendations (that is, have an 
independent chair, independent directors are on the board, board committees) otherwise equal 
to “0”. If adopting NZSC recommendations leads to an increase in company financial 
performance, the coefficient of COMPLIED will be positive and significant.  To determine 
whether the public sector corporate entities improved financial performance after complying 
with the NZSC recommendations is measured by the variable Comaft. Comaft is determined 
by multiplying COMPLIED by AFTER2003. The revised model is given as: 
FP = α11  + β111NED + β112BDS + β113FD + β114ACOM +β115RCOM + β116LEV  
   + β117DIV2TA + β118CR + β119Log(TA) + β120FMRISK + β121Marketshare       
   + β122Intangible2ta + β123AFTER2003 + β124SURV + β125ComAft + β126INDPS  
   + e            --------------------- (11) 
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4.3.4 CHECK FOR MULTICOLLINEARITY 
According to Field (2005),  the variance inflation factor (VIF) indicates whether a predictor 
has a strong linear relationship with other predictor(s). However, there is no clear guidance 
provided regarding the value of the VIF that should cause concern. Myers (1990) suggests 
that a value of 10 is a good value at which to worry and Bowerman and O‟Connell (1990) 
suggest that if the average VIF is greater than 1, then multicollinearity may be biasing the 
regression model. Also, Field suggests that tolerance statistic (which is reciprocal of VIF 
(1/VIF)) should not be less than 0.1 and Menard (1995) suggests that tolerance statistics 
should not be less than 0.2.  Field also suggests that pairwise correlation above 0.8 is of 
concern.  
To test for multicollinearity among predictor variables, both VIF and tolerance statistic will 
be calculated. 
4.3.5 ESTIMATION OF STANDARD ERRORS 
Petersen (2008) and Wooldridge (2004) provide an analysis of the impact of correlated 
residuals on the bias in standard errors in the panel datasets. The residuals of a given 
company may be correlated across years (time-series dependence) or unobserved company 
effect (Worldridge, 2007) and,  alternatively, the residuals of a given year may be correlated 
across different companies (cross-sectional dependence) (Petersen, 2008).  
According to Petersen, in the presence of a company effect [e.g., ]0),(COV kitkititit XX , 
standard errors are biased when estimated by OLS. White, Newey-West (modified for panel 
data sets), Fama-MacBeth, or Fama-MacBeth corrected for first-order autocorrelation. The 
standard errors clustered by company are unbiased and produce correctly sized confidence 
intervals whether the company effect is permanent or temporary. The fixed effect and random 
effects model also produces unbiased standard errors but only when the company effect is 
permanent. In the presence of a time effect [e.g., ]0),(COV tktkitit XX , Fama-MacBeth 
produces unbiased standard errors and correctly sized confidence intervals. Standard errors 
clustered by time also produce unbiased standard errors and correctly sized confidence 
intervals, but only when there are a sufficient number of clusters. When there are too few 
clusters, clustered standard errors are biased even when clustered on the correct dimension. 
When a company and a time effect are both present in the data, researchers can address one 
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parametrically (e.g., by including time dummies) and then estimate standard errors clustered 
on the other dimension.  
When estimating the governance–performance relationship in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, OLS with 
fixed effects estimator including company and year fixed effects and also OLS with fixed 
effects estimator with clustered (Rogers) standard errors, will also be reported. When 
estimating the governance–performance relationship using 2SLS methodology, standard 
errors adjusted for clustering (Rogers‟s standard errors) will be reported.  
4.4 SUMMARY 
This chapter describes the research framework for this thesis and presents conceptual model 
for the empirical analysis. The governance mechanisms are described and the sample and 
data used in this study are also presented. Variables are also defined and a summary of 
variables are given. It also explores on research methods used for data analysis to test the 
hypotheses. Various hypotheses to be investigated are provided along with empirical models 
used to test the hypotheses.  
Chapter 5 provides the empirical results for the relationship between corporate governance 
practices and financial performance of small cap companies in New Zealand  
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CHAPTER 5  
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES AND 
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE IN SMALL 
CAPITALISED COMPANIES: AN EMPIRICAL 
INVESTIGATION
34
 
 
5.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the results of the empirical study of the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and small cap company financial performance in New Zealand. A 
description of sample size used in this study is provided in Chapter 4, Table 4.1. Description 
of the governance and financial performance variables used in this chapter is provided in 
Chapter 4, Table 4.2. This chapter has three sections. First, a description of the sample 
descriptive statistics is provided. This is followed by a presentation of results from data 
analyses and discussion and finally, the conclusion is provided.  
5.1 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The sample comprised 788 small cap companies listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange 
for the period 1999 to 2006.  Companies that did not have all the required information were 
removed from the sample and, as a result, the final sample comprised 562 company-years 
data or 71.3% of the companies. Table 5.1 provides the sample‟s descriptive statistics.  
Table 5.1 provides a summary of descriptive statistics for the pooled data, including means, 
medians, minimum, maximum and inter-quartile ranges. The mean Tobin‟s Q is 1.24, with a 
median of 0.95. The average Tobin‟s Q is greater than one, which means that companies (on 
an average basis) have created value for the shareholders. However, the median Tobin‟s Q of 
0.95 indicates that fifty percent of small cap companies have a Tobin‟s Q below 0.95, 
indicating destruction of shareholder value over the sampling period. The mean (median) of 
MB is 1.78 (1.46) and both values are above one indicating creation of shareholder value. 
                                                 
34
 A version of this chapter has been published in the International Journal of Business, Governance and Ethics, 
2008, vol. 4(1), pp.51-78 
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The mean (median) of ROA is -10% (3%) and the mean (median) of ROE is –13% (7%). 
Both accounting measures of company financial performance (ROA and ROE) have negative 
values indicating the majority of small cap companies have destroyed shareholder value over 
the sampling period. 
The mean proportion of insider ownership (IOWN) is 26% with a median of 14%. The 25
th
 
percentile is 1% and the 75th percentile is 50%. Reddy, et al. (2008a) studied 355 small cap 
companies in New Zealand between  2001–2005 and reported mean (median) IOWN of 
31.3% (26.3%) and lower and upper percentiles of 6.5% and 53.1%, respectively. 
Table 5.1  
Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Medium Minimum Maximum Inter-quartile Range 
Dependent      
Q 1.24 0.95 -0.16 5.76 0.53 – 1.52 
MB 1.78 1.46 -2.25 6.87 0.92 – 2.22 
ROA -0.10 0.03 -1.95 0.39 -0.08 – 0.08 
ROE -0.13 0.07 -5.24 1.80 -0.09 – 0.15 
Governance      
IOWN 0.26 0.14 0.00 0.95 0.01 – 0.50 
BOWN 0.71 0.75 0.06 0.98 0.60 – 0.85 
NED 3.8 6 0 10 2 - 5 
BDS 5.6 6 3 12 5 - 7 
FD 0.25 0 0 2 0 - 1 
ACOM 0.79 1 0 1  
RCOM 0.60 1 0 1  
LEV 0.49 0.40 0.00 1.38 0.21 – 0.62 
DIV2TA 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.28 0.00 – 0.04 
Control      
Log(TA) 4.70 4.68 2.58 5.40 4.00 – 5.40 
FMRISK 0.25 0.13 0.01 2.11 0.05 – 0.30 
BUSRISK 0.18 0.09 0.00 1.07 0.02 – 0.21 
IND1 0.17 0 0 1  
IND2 0.04 0 0 1  
IND3 0.12 0 0 1  
IND4 0.03 0 0 1  
IND5 0.48 0 0 1  
IND6 0.15 0 0 1  
Note: For the details of the measurement methods for the variables stated above, refer to Table 4.2 in Chapter 4. 
The insider holding in the larger sample is lower compared to the smaller sample size used by 
Reddy et al. in 2008. In the sampling period 1999-2006, 9% of the companies have zero 
IOWN, 8% have IOWN less than 0.01% and 9% have IOWN less than 1%. In comparison, 
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Bhagat and Black (1998) report a mean (median) combined top management and director 
stock ownership of 9% (3%) in the US. Whereas, Short and Keasey (1999) report an average 
IOWN of 13% for the UK. Morck et al (1988) report that 58% of companies in the US have 
an IOWN level of 5% or less and in the UK the equivalent figure is 48% (Short & Keasey, 
1999). The figure for New Zealand is 37%. The mean (median) figures for IOWN reported 
for New Zealand are comparably higher to values for the US. Insider ownership is higher in 
New Zealand due to initial owners retaining a fraction of the shares of the company after 
going public and taking up officer and director positions in the company as well.  
The average proportion of stock held by the 20 largest shareholders (BOWN) is 71%. The 
median BOWN is 75%. The inter-quartile range for BOWN is 60–85%. In the sample, 14% 
of the companies have BOWN less than 50%. Reddy et al. (2008b) reported mean (median) 
BOWN of 63% (65%) and the inter-quartile range of 47–77% for the large companies in New 
Zealand. The equivalent percentage for the US is only 37.66% (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). The 
reason for the comparatively smaller blockholding in the US companies is attributable to the 
US legislation restricting equity investment by insurance companies to a maximum of 2% of 
assets in a single company with a cap at 20% for investment in equities (Bhabra, 2007). As a 
consequence, insurance companies in the US hold a smaller proportion of stock compared to 
New Zealand. In the absence of such restrictions, insurance companies in New Zealand have 
tended to hold larger stakes in companies and therefore have the potential to exert significant 
influence in monitoring managers (Fox & Walker, 1995a). BOWN is an important 
component of small company ownership structure and the BOWN ratio is slightly higher in 
small cap companies compared to large companies. The introduction of new legislation that 
restricts blockholding in New Zealand companies has not made any significant effect on the 
ownership structure of companies. From a corporate governance point of view, the figures for 
both IOWN and BOWN indicate these are mechanisms to control the agency problem in 
small cap companies. 
The mean (median) number of non-executive/independent directors (NED) is 3.8 (6) with the 
narrow inter-quartile range of 2–5. The proportion of NED in small cap companies in New 
Zealand is 67%, whereas Switzer and Tang (2008) report 85% for the US. The outsider-
dominated boards are signs of strong board independence. The typical board has 5.6 members 
with an inter-quartile range of 5-7 members. Switzer and Tang (2008) report that in the US 
board size ranges from 4 to 15 with  an average of 7 or 8 directors. This figure is the widely 
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accepted number of directors in an effective board (Jensen, 1983). In New Zealand, the 
average board size is slightly less than 7 which are reflective of the size of the companies. 
The board seems to play an important role in mitigating agency conflicts. The minimum 
number of female directors on boards is 0 and the maximum is 2. This indicates that there is 
awareness among some shareholders about having diversity in the boardroom. This is 
supported by McGregor (2008), that there is a need to have more women directors in listed 
company boardrooms. On an average, 79% of the boards have audit committees and 60% of 
the boards have remuneration committees in small cap companies. Reddy et al. report that 
92% of the large companies in New Zealand have audit committees and 77% have 
remuneration committees. This shows that small cap companies have largely complied with 
New Zealand Securities Commission recommendations regarding the appointment of audit 
and remuneration committees. 
The mean (median) dividend to total assets is 3% (0%) and inter-quartile range is between 0-
4%. This indicates that dividend payments in the small cap companies are at a very low level. 
The mean (median) leverage in small companies is 49% (40%) indicating small companies 
are not highly leveraged. This may be because small companies have difficulty obtaining 
leverage compared to large companies.  
The mean (median) Log(TA) is 4.49 (4.68). The mean (median) company risk is 25% (13%). 
The risk in small companies is higher compared to large companies which have a mean 
(median) risk of 5.6% (2.8%). The mean (median) business risk is 18% (9%). Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985) argue that the scope for moral hazard is greater for managers of riskier 
companies, which means that managers have to hold a higher level of ownership stake in 
riskier companies to align incentives. Since managers hold non-diversified portfolios and 
company riskiness makes it even more costly for them to hold such portfolios. The tendency 
among managers is to maximise personal wealth by maximising shareholder value because 
they can only reduce their human capital risk at the company level. 
The companies in the sample belong to six different industry types, namely: 17% primary, 
4% energy, 12% goods, 3% property, 48% services and 15% investment.  
5.1.2 PAIRWISE CORRELATION BETWEEN INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
A pairwise correlation matrix for the independent and control variables is provided in Table 
5.2. The highest correlation is between RCOM and ACOM at 0.62. It suggests that boards 
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that have an audit committee are also likely to have a remuneration committee as well. The 
second highest correlation is between Log(TA) and BDS at 0.60. This suggests that larger 
companies have larger boards and vice versa. The other high correlations are between ACOM 
and BDS (0.43), log (TA) and ACOM (0.42), RCOM and BDS (0.41). With these exceptions, 
other correlations range between –0.36 and 0.37. None of the pairwise correlations between 
independent variables are above 0.62, indicating that the likelihood of multicollinearity issues 
arising in the OLS regressions is low.  
5.1.3 OLS REGRESSION OF TOBIN’S Q, MB, ROA AND ROE ON 
OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL VARIABLES 
Table 5.3 presents the OLS regression of equation 1. Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 of Table 5.3 
provide coefficients of independent variables that are used in equation 1. Table 5.3 column 2 
provides coefficients of the independent variable using Tobin‟s Q as a dependent variable. 
The independent variables BOWN, LEV and DIV2TA have positive coefficients, indicating 
that these variables have a positive effect on companies‟ financial performance measured by 
Tobin‟s Q. All three of these variables are statistically significant at a 1% level. The results 
show that blockholders provide better monitoring of managers performance which leads to 
improved company financial performance. This is because blockholders hold substantial 
equity stakes in the company which give them the power to make management serve their 
interest and they also have the resources to undertake monitoring and other costly control 
activities compared to other types of owners. This supports the monitoring hypothesis of 
blockholders provided by Holderness (2003) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986). LEV has a 
positive effect on financial performance, indicating that lenders provide vigilance on 
company financial performance and have potential for mitigating the agency problem (Berger 
et al., 1997; Harris & Raviv, 1991). This supports Jensen (1986) hypothesis that leverage 
increases the risk level of the company, which requires managers to work harder to generate 
and pay off cash flows to the outsiders. DIV2TA also has a positive effect on financial 
performance, indicating that dividend payments are regarded by capital markets as better 
utilisation of company cash flows.  
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Table 5.2: 
Pairwise Correlation Matrix for the Independent Variables 
Note: For details regarding the measurement methods for the variables refer to Table 4.2 in Chapter 4 
 IOWN BOWN NED BDS FD ACOM RCOM LEV DIV2TA Log(TA) FMRISK BUSRISK 
IOWN -            
BOWN 
0.236*** 
(0.000) 
-           
NED 
-0.043 
(0.306) 
-0.055 
(0.192) 
-          
BDS 
-0.143*** 
(0.000) 
-0.085++ 
0.044) 
0.128*** 
(0.003) 
-         
FD 
-0.077 
(0.070) 
-0.031 
(0.459) 
-0.102† 
(0.016) 
-0.066 
(0.119) 
-        
ACOM 
-0.084++ 
(0.047) 
-0.036 
(0.400) 
0.215*** 
(0.000) 
0.426*** 
(0.000) 
-0.055 
(0.192) 
-       
RCOM 
0.043 
(0.315) 
0.004 
(0.928) 
0.130*** 
(0.006) 
0.414*** 
(0.000) 
-0.034 
(0.418) 
0.615*** 
(0.000) 
-      
LEV 
-0.036 
(0.389) 
0.008 
(0.853) 
0.079 
(0.061) 
-0.090† 
(0.033) 
-0.040 
(0.339) 
0.034 
(0.421) 
0.062 
(0.146) 
-     
DIV2TA 
-0.078 
(0.066) 
0.034 
(0.417) 
-0.001 
(0.982) 
0.060 
(0.153) 
0.016 
(0.711) 
0.110++ 
(0.009) 
0.099† 
(0.021) 
-0.134*** 
(0.000) 
-    
Log(TA) 
-0.107** 
(0.012) 
0.131*** 
(0.002) 
0.047 
(0.268) 
0.601*** 
(0.000) 
0.101++ 
(0.017) 
0.416*** 
(0.000) 
0.349*** 
(0.000) 
-0.162*** 
(0.000) 
0.009 
(0.831) 
-   
FMRISK 
-0.099++ 
(0.019) 
0.023 
(0.581) 
0.109*** 
(0.010) 
0.370*** 
(0.000) 
0.065 
(0.122) 
0.177*** 
(0.000) 
0.177*** 
(0.000) 
-0.003 
(0.936) 
0.008 
(0.858) 
0.317*** 
(0.000) 
-  
BUSRISK 
-0.074 
(0.080) 
-0.104*** 
(0.013) 
0.081 
(0.056) 
-0.267*** 
(0.000) 
-0.102*** 
(0.010) 
-0.169*** 
(0.000) 
-0.105*** 
(0.013) 
0.002 
(0.962) 
-0.045 
(0.292) 
-0.403*** 
(0.000) 
-0.130++ 
(0.002) 
- 
*** denotes correlation is significant at 0.01 level (2-talied); ++ denotes correlation is significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed) ; † denotes correlation is significant at 0.1 level (2-tailed)  
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FMRISK has a positive coefficient and is statistically significant at a 5% level, indicating that 
financial performance measured by Tobin‟s Q is positively related to the risk undertaken. 
This shows that managers work harder when risk levels are high because managers hold 
undiversified portfolios and will lose more if the company fails. These results support 
hypotheses H2a (Blockholding), H7a (Leverage) and H8a (Dividends). 
The negative coefficient of RCOM which is statistically significant at 5% level suggests that 
the presence of remuneration committees has not contributed positively towards company 
financial performance measured by Tobin‟s Q. This could be because the members of the 
remuneration committee in small cap companies are not independent and therefore the 
tendency among committee members is to reward themselves.  The Sheffield survey provides 
support to the view that managers in New Zealand are rewarded for reasons other than 
meeting financial performance targets (Gunasekarage & Reed, 2008; Hembry, 2008). The 
result is the rejection of hypothesis H6b. Among the control variables, Log(TA) has a 
negative coefficient, which is statistically significant at 1% level, indicating that company 
size has a negative effect on Tobin‟s Q. This is similar to findings in the US; company size 
and financial performance are inversely related (Fama & French, 1992). 
COMPLIED has a positive coefficient and is statistically significant at the 5% level. This 
indicates that compliance with the NZSE 2004 recommendations has contributed positively 
towards company financial performance measured by Tobin‟s Q. The negative coefficient of 
SURV, which is statistically significant at 1% level, indicates that companies that survived 
the sampling period contributed negatively towards financial performance measured by 
Tobin‟s Q. In summary, the OLS regression results in Table 5.3 using Tobin‟s Q as a 
dependent variable support hypotheses H2a, H7a and H8a. 
The OLS regression results using MB as the dependent variable found DIV2TA supporting 
the hypothesis (H8a). The coefficient of DIV2TA is positive and statistically significant at the 
5% level, indicating that dividend payment is regarded by the market as a better utilisation of 
free cash flows. LEV has a negative coefficient and is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
This supports the findings of Byrd and Stammerjohan (1997), Knoeber (1985) that higher 
debt can increase the agency costs of debt. Debtholders can force smaller companies to adopt 
overly conservative investment strategies. Also, small companies with limited access to 
capital markets may face a higher cost of debt. Alternatively, managers may be using a higher 
debt level to increase the power of internal equity.  
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Table 5.3: 
OLS Regression of Tobin’s Q. MB, ROA and ROE on Ownership and Control 
Variables 
 Q MB ROA ROE 
  
Standard 
Error  
 
Standard 
Error  
 
Standard 
Error  
 Standard 
Error  
Const. 
1.76*** 
(4.15) 
0.424 
0.78*** 
(12.17) 
0.065 
0.22*** 
(3.61) 
0.061 
0.27*** 
(3.70) 
0.072 
IOWN 
-0.25 
(-1.61) 
0.156 
0.04 
(0.15) 
0.239 
-0.01 
(-0.10) 
0.047 
-0.01 
(-0.07) 
0.173 
BOWN 
1.18*** 
(4.59) 
0.258 
0.10 
(0.25) 
0.402 
0.03 
(0.28) 
0.120 
0.40 
(1.28) 
0.315 
NED 
-0.11 
(-0.74) 
0.143 
-0.20 
(-0.91) 
0.219 
-0.06 
(-1.60) 
0.063 
-0.29 
(-1.63) 
0.180 
BDS 
0.47 
(1.27) 
0.366 
0.58 
(0.93) 
0.628 
0.29 
(0.61) 
0.469 
0.09 
(0.25) 
0.375 
FD 
0.33 
(0.84) 
0.388 
-0.08 
(-0.15) 
0.501 
0.11 
(1.00) 
0.108 
0.35 
(1.46) 
0.236 
ACOM 
0.11 
(0.71) 
0.146 
0.14 
(0.63) 
0.214 
-0.10 
(-0.51) 
0.189 
-0.08 
(-0.50) 
0.166 
RCOM 
-0.51† 
(-2.18) 
0.233 
-0.02 
(-0.03) 
0.474 
0.07 
(0.72) 
0.101 
-0.09 
(-0.24) 
0.373 
LEV 
0.09*** 
(4.15) 
0.023 
-0.18*** 
(-3.87) 
0.046 
-0.01 
(-0.34) 
0.015 
0.17++ 
(2.80) 
0.060 
DIV2TA 
1.32++ 
(2.69) 
0.492 
1.81† 
(2.26) 
0.805 
0.87*** 
(6.78) 
0.124 
0.82++ 
(2.92) 
0.282 
Log(TA) 
-
0.41*** 
(-5.45) 
0.023 
-0.17 
(-1.45) 
0.114 
0.08++ 
(2.55) 
0.031 
0.13 
(1.77) 0.718 
FMRISK 
0.23† 
(2.22) 
0.102 
0.12 
(0.75) 
0.165 
0.04 
(0.78) 
0.048 
0.01 
(0.15) 
0.066 
BUSRISK 
0.43 
(1.54) 
0.281 
0.24 
(0.61) 
0.385 
-0.92++ 
(-2.52) 
0.366 
-0.77*** 
(-3.25) 
0.237 
COMPLIED 
0.53† 
(2.24) 
0.238 
-0.06 
(-0.12) 
0.479 
-0.06 
(-0.01) 
0.124 
0.06 
(0.16) 
0.405 
SURV 
-
0.43*** 
(-3.87) 
0.112 
-0.61*** 
(-3.90) 
0.156 
0.17 
(0.186) 
0.092 
0.08 
(0.90) 0.087 
RGDP 
4.82 
(1.02) 
4.709 
1.56† 
(2.46) 
0.637 
-4.33 
(-0.01) 
3.184 
1.73† 
(2.48) 
0.070 
Industry 
Dummy35 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
F 10.18 
(0.000) 
 7.83 
(0.000) 
 9.78 
(0.000) 
 5.65 
(0.000) 
 
R2 0.21  0.11  0.23  0.17  
N 562  562  562  562  
*** denotes coefficient is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed); ++ denotes coefficient is significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed); † 
denotes coefficient is significant at 0.1 level (2-tailed). Standard errors are also provided for each variable. 
                                                 
35
 OLS regression results for the industry dummy variables are reported in the Appendix C, Table 1. 
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The variable SURV has a negative coefficient and is statistically significant at 1% level. This 
indicates that companies that survived the sampling period contributed negatively towards 
financial performance measured by MB. The positive coefficient of RGDP indicates that the 
growth in the economy has contributed positively towards company financial performance 
measured by MB. The result is statistically significant at 10% level. This shows that the 
growth in New Zealand‟s real GDP between 1994 and 2008 has been beneficial for the listed 
companies. The coefficient of the IND6 is positive and statistically significant at 10% level 
and indicates variation in financial performance measured by MB can be explained by 
industry effect. This evidence supports the view that principle-based governance practices 
have allowed IND6 (Investment) to develop industry-specific governance structures which 
have contributed positively towards company financial performance measured by MB. In 
summary, hypothesis H8a is supported. 
The OLS regression results using ROA as the dependent variable found DIV2TA supporting 
the hypothesis (H8a). The coefficient of DIV2TA is positive and statistically significant at 
1% level. This indicates that dividend payment is regarded positively by the market. NED has 
a negative coefficient which indicates that non-executive/independent directors contribute 
negatively towards financial performance measured by ROA. Small companies which are 
tightly owned and controlled with non-executive independent directors providing vigilance 
above what has already been provided by the blockholders seem to have a negative effect on 
financial performance. Log(TA) is positive and statistically significant at 1% level indicating 
larger companies contribute positively towards financial performance measured by ROA. 
BUSRISK has a negative coefficient and is statistically significant at 5% level, indicating that 
the business risk undertaken by the company has a negative effect on financial performance.  
In summary, hypothesis H8a is supported. 
The OLS regression results using ROE as the dependent variable found both LEV and 
DIV2TA supporting the hypotheses H7a and H8a. The coefficients of both the variables are 
positive and statistically significant at 5% level, indicating that debt and dividend payment 
are regarded by the market as better utilisation of free cash flows. The control variable 
BUSRISK has a negative coefficient and is statistically significant at 5% level, indicating that 
the business risk undertaken by the company has a negative effect on performance.  The 
coefficient of RGDP is positive and statistically significant at the 10% level indicating that 
growth in the economy contributes positively towards company financial performance 
measured by ROE. In summary, hypotheses H7a and H8a are supported. 
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OLS results reported in Table 5.3 have tolerance (1-R
2
) values ranging from 0.77 to 0.89 and 
variance inflation factor (VIF) (1/Tolerance) values ranging from 1.12 to 1.30, which are 
acceptable values. According to Menrad (1995), tolerance below 0.2 and VIF above 10 are 
worthy of concern, which needs to be further investigated. These results indicate that there is 
no evidence of multicollinearity in the data. 
In summary, the results in Table 5.3 support hypotheses H2a (Blockholding), H7a (Leverage) 
and H8a (Dividends). There is evidence that compliance with the NZSC recommendations 
has a positive effect on financial performance measured by Tobin‟s Q. Also, companies that 
survived contributed negatively towards financial performance measured by Tobin‟s Q and 
MB. 
5.1.4 OLS REGRESSION OF TOBIN’S Q, MB, ROA AND ROE ON 
OWNERSHIP, CONTROL AND COMPLIANCE VARIABLES 
The effect of the time period after the NZSC corporate governance recommendations became 
effective is captured by the dummy variable AFTER2003. The effect NZSC 
recommendations have on companies that were always in compliance with the NZSC 
recommendations since 1999 is captured by the dummy variable COMPLIED. The 
companies that were continuously present throughout the sampling period are measured by 
the dummy variable SURV. The variable ComAft measures the effect of complying with the 
NZSC recommendations after 2003 on financial performance. ComAft is the interaction 
between COMPLIED and AFTER2003 (COMPLIED * AFTER2003). CSURV measures the 
effect of complying with the NZSC recommendations and also surviving the sampling period. 
CSURV is the interaction between SURV and COMPLIED (SURV * COMPLIED). 
The results for equation 2 are provided in Table 5.4. The coefficients of independent 
variables are given in columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 and standard errors are reported in columns 3, 5, 
7 and 9 of Table 5.4. The results of all variables are very similar to the results reported in 
Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 of Table 5.3. However, the interesting finding reported in Table 5.4 is 
the coefficient of ComAft is positive for all dependent variables, suggesting it has a positive 
effect on financial performance. The coefficient of CSURV is negative and statistically 
significant at a 5% level for the dependent variables Tobin‟s Q and MB.  The result suggests 
that companies that complied with the NZSC recommendations and also survived the 
sampling period have contributed negatively towards company financial performance 
measured by Tobin‟s Q and MB.  
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Table 5.4:  
OLS Regression of Tobin’s Q. MB, ROA and ROE on Ownership and Control 
Variables 
 Q MB ROA ROE 
  
Standard 
Error  
 
Standard 
Error  
 
Standard 
Error  
 Standard 
Error  
Const. 
0.55*** 
(3.03) 
0.550 
0.78*** 
(11.65) 
0.067 
0.22*** 
(3.56) 
0.063 
0.27*** 
(3.57) 
0.074 
IOWN 
-0.06† 
(-1.99) 
0.028 
0.09 
(0.33) 
0.285 
-0.01 
(-0.06) 
0.061 
-0.02 
(-0.13) 
0.196 
BOWN 
1.18*** 
(4.95) 
0.042 
0.03 
(0.05) 
0.554 
0.09 
(0.53) 
0.168 
0.41 
(1.25) 
0.330 
NED 
-0.09 
(-0.53) 
0.170 
-0.17 
(-0.55) 
0.303 
-0.12 
(-1.71) 
0.069 
-0.29 
(-1.42) 
0.205 
BDS 
0.50 
(1.05) 
0.470 
0.65 
(0.85) 
0.758 
0.30 
(0.63) 
0.480 
0.09 
(0.22) 
0.394 
FD 
0.47 
(1.01) 
0.466 
0.14 
(0.24) 
0.563 
0.08 
(0.76) 
0.112 
0.32 
(1.22) 
0.260 
ACOM 
0.16 
(0.88) 
0.183 
0.20 
(0.69) 
0.285 
-0.10 
(-0.52) 
0.193 
-0.09 
(-0.59) 
0.157 
RCOM 
0.22 
(0.99) 
0.217 
0.14 
(0.45) 
0.300 
0.01 
(0.09) 
0.105 
-0.10 
(-0.66) 
0.153 
LEV 
0.09++ 
(3.25) 
0.027 
-0.19*** 
(-3.35) 
0.056 
-0.01 
(-0.38) 
0.014 
0.17++ 
(2.80) 
0.061 
DIV2TA 
1.34++ 
(2.66) 
0.503 
1.86++ 
(2.38) 
0.782 
0.88*** 
(7.50) 
0.117 
0.83++ 
(3.03) 
0.273 
Log(TA) 
-0.43*** 
(-4.10) 
0.149 
-0.19 
(-1.34) 
0.145 
0.09++ 
(3.10) 
0.008 
0.13 
(1.55) 
0.085 
FMRISK 
0.27 
(1.82) 
0.149 
0.17 
(0.84) 
0.205 
0.01 
(0.11) 
0.084 
0.01 
(0.07) 
0.084 
BUSRISK 
0.41 
(1.11) 
0.368 
0.21 
(0.50) 
0.426 
-0.90*** 
(-3.36) 
0.366 
-0.77*** 
(-3.09) 
0.246 
ComAft 
0.04 
(0.28) 
0.128 
0.24 
(1.32) 
0.180 
0.02 
(0.49) 
0.037 
0.02 
(0.19) 
0.112 
CSURV 
-0.04† 
(-2.13) 
0.212 
-0.57† 
(-2.12) 
0.268 
0.19 
(1.62) 
0.043 
0.11 
(0.89) 
0.120 
RGDP 
3.83 
(0.87) 
4.411 
1.61† 
(2.41) 
0.669 
0.05 
(0.08) 
0.621 
-1.71† 
(-2.31) 
0.737 
Industry 
Dummy36 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
F 10.86 
(0.000) 
 5.01 
(0.000) 
 18.04 
(0.000) 
 5.16 
(0.000) 
 
R2 0.29  0.16   0.21  0.17  
N 562  562  562  562  
*** denotes coefficient is significant at 0. 01 level (2-tailed); ++ denotes coefficient is significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed);  
† denotes coefficient is significant at 0.1 level (2-tailed). Standard errors are also provided for each variable. 
                                                 
36
 The OLS regression results of the industry dummy variables are reported in  Appendix C, Table 2.  
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This suggests that the companies that survived the sampling period were not valued highly by 
the market. The result for RGDP is similar to the results reported in Table 5.3 in that it 
contributes positively towards the financial performance of small cap companies. This 
indicates that the small cap companies did take advantage of the growth of the economy by 
creating value for the shareholders. The coefficient of the IND6 is positive and statistically 
significant at 10%. This indicates variation in financial performance measured by MB can be 
explained by industry effect. 
In summary, the OLS regression results reported in Table 5.4 are similar to the results 
reported in Table 5.3, thus supporting the hypotheses relating to blockholding (H2a), leverage 
(H7a) and dividend payouts (H8a). Therefore, hypotheses pertaining to insider ownership 
(H1a), board independence (H3a), board size (H4a), board diversity (H5a), and board 
committees (H6a, H6b) are rejected. There is evidence that compliance with the NZSC 
recommendations has had a negative effect on the small companies‟ financial performance. 
There is evidence that growth in the economy has contributed positively towards financial 
performance measure MB. There is also evidence that the principle–based governance 
approach has allowed industry-specific governance structures to be developed in the 
investment industry (IND6) and that has contributed positively towards small company 
financial performance measured by MB. Also, there is consistent evidence that company size 
has a negative effect on financial performance measured by Tobin‟s Q.   
5.1.5 PIECEWISE REGRESSIONS 
The governance literature provides no consensus regarding the nature of the relationship 
between insider ownership and company financial performance. Past researchers have 
reported the relationship to be either linear (Elayan et al., 2003; Hossain et al., 2001; Kim et 
al., 1988; Welch, 2003) or non-monotonic (Davies et al., 2005; McConnell & Servaes, 1990; 
Morck et al., 1988). Following on this view, this study also investigates whether a piecewise 
linear relationship exists between insider ownership and financial performance in New 
Zealand, as was reported by Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) using the 
US data, and Hossain et al. (2001) for New Zealand data. 
The results for Equation 3 are reported in Table 5.5 showing that there is no evidence of a 
piecewise relationship between insider ownership and financial performance in small cap 
companies in New Zealand. This is because there exists no link between pay-performance in 
New Zealand (Gunasekarage & Reed, 2008; Hembry, 2008).  
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Table 5.5:  
OLS Regression of Tobin’s Q, MB, ROA and ROE as the Dependent variables 
 Q MB ROA ROE 
  
Standard 
Error  
 
Standard 
Error  
 
Standard 
Error  
 Standard 
Error  
Const. 
0.36*** 
(4.29) 
0.084 
0.78*** 
(11.25) 
0.069 
0.23*** 
(3.62) 
0.064 
0.24*** 
(3.16) 
0.076 
Less1 
0.18 
(0.79) 
0.223 
0.10 
(0.20) 
0.335 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.102 
-0.39 
(-1.03) 
0.388 
BBT15 
0.05 
(0.24) 
0.213 
-0.13 
(-0.39) 
0.342 
-0.04 
(-0.62) 
0.071 
-0.09 
(-0.42) 
0.256 
Bt1020 
-0.01 
(-0.00) 
0.205 
0.06 
(0.17) 
0.370 
-0.23 
(-1.09) 
0.212 
0.01 
(0.06) 
0.199 
Over20 
-0.08 
(-0.33) 
0.230 
0.04 
(0.12) 
0.304 
-0.17 
(-0.20) 
0.082 
-0.13 
(-0.58) 
0.223 
BOWN 
0.20*** 
(4.64) 
0.043 
0.05 
(0.08) 
0.564 
0.13 
(0.09) 
0.155 
0.50 
(1.28) 
0.394 
NED 
-0.09 
(-0.50) 
0.172 
-0.15 
(-0.49) 
0.301 
-0.11 
(-1.62) 
0.069 
-0.05† 
(-2.01) 
0.024 
BDS 
0.50 
(1.08) 
0.466 
0.65 
(0.87) 
0.753 
0.28 
(0.61) 
0.455 
0.16 
(0.37) 
0.439 
FD 
0.42 
(0.92) 
0.452 
0.07 
(0.13) 
0.548 
0.12 
(0.87) 
0.139 
0.40 
(1.26) 
0.324 
ACOM 
0.18 
(0.92) 
0.191 
0.21 
(0.72) 
0.292 
-0.09 
(-0.46) 
0.193 
-0.12 
(-0.69) 
0.178 
RCOM 
0.23 
(1.04) 
0.223 
0.15 
(0.47) 
0.311 
-0.03 
(-0.03) 
0.090 
-0.14 
(-0.82) 
0.174 
LEV 
0.08++ 
(2.80) 
0.029 
-0.20*** 
(-3.41) 
0.057 
-0.01 
(-0.68) 
0.014 
0.19++ 
(2.95) 
0.064 
DIV2TA 
1.25++ 
(2.40) 
0.521 
1.78++ 
(2.21) 
0.804 
0.83*** 
(6.96) 
0.119 
1.06++ 
(2.79) 
0.380 
Log(TA) 
-0.46*** 
(-4.23) 
0.108 
-0.21 
(-1.37) 
0.151 
0.02† 
(2.67) 
0.009 
0.18 
(1.68) 
0.109 
FMRISK 
0.03*** 
(3.60) 
0.084 
0.15 
(0.72) 
0.211 
0.04 
(0.06) 
0.081 
0.03 
(0.33) 
0.092 
BUSRISK 
0.39 
(1.06) 
0.366 
0.16 
(0.39) 
0.421 
-0.89*** 
(-3.58) 
0.248 
-0.72++ 
(-3.09) 
0.233 
ComAft 
0.04 
(0.31) 
0.132 
0.23 
(1.25) 
0.183 
0.03 
(0.86) 
0.040 
0.02 
(0.17) 
0.116 
CSURV 
-0.04† 
(-2.20) 
0.021 
-0.56† 
(-2.16) 
0.261 
0.10 
(1.65) 
0.047 
0.08 
(0.69) 
0.122 
RGDP 
3.80 
(0.86) 
4.428 
1.64† 
(2.44) 
0.073 
0.06 
(0.10) 
0.622 
-1.72† 
(-2.33) 
0.740 
Industry 
Dummy37 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
F 10.06 
(0.000) 
 4.78 
(0.000) 
 15.27 
(0.000) 
 5.82 
(0.000) 
 
R2 0.19  0.10  0.22  0.18  
N 562  562  562  562  
*** denotes coefficient is significant at 0.01 level (2-talied); ++ denotes coefficient is significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed); † 
denotes coefficient is significant at 0.1 level (2-tailed). Standard errors are also provided for each variable. 
                                                 
37
 The OLS regression results of the industry dummy variables are reported in Appendix D, Table 1. 
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A trend in New Zealand is to reward managers for reasons other than financial performance. 
Also, rewarding managers with shares and options is a new phenomenon in New Zealand and 
therefore its effect is not yet reflected in company financial performance. Consideration for 
squared and cubed insider ownership (IOWN
2
, IOWN
3
) and block ownership (BOWN
2
, 
BOWN
3
) finds no significant results. The other results in Table 5.5 are similar to the results 
reported in Table 5.3 and 5.4 respectively. Consistent evidence reported in Tables 5.3 and 5.4 
for compliance with NZSC recommendations as indicated by the CSURV has a negative 
effect on financial performance when measured by the Tobin‟s Q and MB. Also, there that 
evidence the growth in the economy has contributed negatively towards company financial 
performance measured by ROE. 
 
5.1.6 OLS REGRESSION OF THE DIFFERENCE IN TOBIN’S Q 
(BETWEEN 2003 AND 2006) ON OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 
VARIABLES 
Table 5.6 reports the regression results of Equation 4 provided in Chapter 4. The dependent 
variable AvQ(2003) is the average Tobin‟s Q for the years 2001-2003 which is regressed on 
the company data for 2003. The dependent variable AvQ(2007) is the average Tobin‟s Q for 
the years 2004-2006 which is regressed on the company data for 2006. The dependent 
variable FPdiffAV is the difference between AvQ(2006) and AvQ(2003). The variable 
FPdiffAV measures whether companies that complied with the NZSC recommendations 
create value in 2006 compared to the companies in 2003. The AvQ(2003) is 1.24,  
AvQ(2006) is 1.31 and FPdiffAV is 0.07. Since the value of FPdiffAV is greater than zero 
and is positive, this signifies that companies in 2006 (on an average basis) created more value 
compared to companies in 2003.   
The results reported in column 6 of Table 5.6 show that the CSURV has a positive coefficient 
and is statistically significant at the 5% level. This indicates that companies that complied 
with the NZSC recommendations and also survived through the sampling period improved 
company financial performance in 2006 compared to 2003. It can be concluded that 
compliance with the NZSC recommendations has contributed positively towards company 
financial performance in 2006. This indicates that between the period 2004 to 2005 the small 
cap companies incurred costs to set up good governance structures and benefits are slowly 
starting to show in 2006.  
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Table 5.6:  
OLS Regression Estimates Using AvQ(2003), AvQ(2006) and FPdiffAV as the 
Dependent variables 
 AvQ(2003) AvQ(2006) FPdiffAV 
  
Standard  
Error  
 
Standard  
Error  
 
Standard  
Error  
Const. 
0.46† 
(2.59) 
0.185 
1.00*** 
(5.27) 
0.191 
1.99 
(1.55) 
1.286 
IOWN 
0.62 
(1.05) 
0.595 
-0.46 
(-1.06) 
0.438 
0.02 
(0.04) 
0.571 
BOWN 
1.87 
(1.63) 
1.144 
0.34 
(0.06) 
0.682 
-0.06 
(-0.07) 
0.890 
NED 
-0.51 
(-1.08) 
0.467 
-0.35 
(-0.65) 
0.536 
-1.42† 
(-2.03) 
0.699 
BDS 
0.48 
(0.46) 
1.043 
-0.15 
(-0.14) 
1.022 
0.68 
0.51) 
1.333 
FD 
-0.60 
(-1.05) 
0.573 
1.02 
(0.98) 
1.038 
2.57† 
(1.96) 
1.353 
ACOM 
0.59 
(1.30) 
0.452 
-1.74++ 
 (-3.59) 
0.486 
-1.27† 
(-2.00) 
0.633 
RCOM 
-0.10 
(-0.23) 
0.438 
-0.17 
(-0.46) 
0.367 
-1.06† 
(-2.23) 
0.478 
LEV 
0.12 
(1.67) 
0.074 
-0.08 
(-0.19) 
0.424 
0.37 
(0.66) 
0.533 
DIV2TA 
-2.96 
(-1.87) 
1.582 
3.03 
(0.78) 
3.868 
1.64 
(0.33) 
5.045 
Log(TA) 
-0.13 
(-0.57) 
0.235 
-0.42† 
(-2.33) 
0.180 
-0.172 
(-0.73) 
0.235 
FMRISK 
0.66† 
(2.30) 
0.243 
0.76† 
(2.23) 
0.344 
0.90† 
(1.99) 
0.449 
BUSRISK 
0.60† 
(1.97) 
0.600 
0.14 
(0.26) 
0.518 
0.79 
(1.17) 
0.675 
CSURV 
-0.42 
(-0.88) 
0.475 
-0.04 
(-0.14) 
0.315 
1.12++ 
(2.74) 
0.410 
F 
1.93  
(0.006) 
 
4.07  
(0.005) 
 
2.08  
(0.070) 
 
R2 0.47  0.49  0.49  
N 44  44  44  
*** denotes coefficient is significant at 0.01 level (2-talied); ++ denotes coefficient is significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed); † 
denotes coefficient is significant at 0.1 level (2-tailed). Standard errors are also provided for each variable. 
The positive coefficient of FD indicates that gender diversity has a positive effect on 
performance. The result for FD is statistically significant at the 10% level. This finding 
supports the view that gender diversity in the boardroom increases the likelihood of 
discussions and debates which otherwise would not have been initiated if the board were 
comprised only of the traditional “old-boys network”. There is evidence that establishment of 
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board committees (Audit and Remuneration) may have been costly for the small cap 
companies and therefore has a negative effect on company financial performance. 
5.1.7 ROBUSTNESS 
The test for the consistency of the OLS regression was undertaken by Wu-Hausman F test 
and the results reported in Tables 5.7(a) and 5.7(b) for E(xit. eit) ≠ 0). They  show that p-
values are high and the regressor insider ownership is not exogenous. Therefore, the null 
hypothesis that an OLS regression is consistent is rejected. Therefore, the analysis uses 2SLS 
regression with instrumental variables (IV) to overcome the problem of endogeneity of 
insider ownership. Himmelberg et al. (1999) indicate that  omission of intangible assets and 
market power makes insider ownership an endogenous variable in the value model, since the 
correlations between the error term and the ownership variable will exist (i.e. E(xit.ut ≠ 0). 
The existence of high intangible assets and competitive advantage in the product market 
increases corporate value and leads to higher levels of insider ownership so as to align 
incentives and to control for managerial discretion. To overcome the problem of endogeneity 
of insider ownership, this study controls for the effect intangible assets, marketshare, size, 
leverage and business risk have on ownership. Size is the natural log of total revenue. The 
panel data methodology controls heterogeneity through individual effect where the common 
determinants of ownership and value will be included. However, if an endogeneity problem 
stems from the lack of consideration of the potential inverse causality, then ownership 
variables will be correlated with random disturbances (ie, E(xit. eit) ≠ 0), once the individual 
effect has been controlled for. To control for the effect of inverse causality, this study uses a 
2SLS regression technique. In the first stage, ownership is determined by using the OLS 
regression technique and in the second stage, values determined for ownership are used to 
determine performance. The econometric models formulated use Tobin‟s Q, MB and ROA as 
dependent variables. The following variables Log(REV), LEV, Intangible2ta, Marketshare, 
and BUSRISK are treated as instrumental variables. The test for the validity of the 
instrumental variables is reported in Table 5.7 (c). The F statistic has a value of 6.59 which is 
greater than the critical value of rejection at the 5% nominal Wald Test which equals to 
5.44
38
, showing that instruments are valid and therefore reject the null hypothesis that 
instruments are weak. Because there is only one endogenous regressor in the model, the 
                                                 
38
 Refer to Appendix E, Table 2 for the detailed results for the validity of the instrumental variables used.  
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minimum eigenvalue is equal to the F statistic reported above. The test for the 
overidentifying restrictions for the excluded variables shows that the instruments are valid. 
The p-values are high, accepting the null hypothesis, and indicating that instruments are 
valid. This provides evidence that the effect of the unobservable values in the model have 
been captured by these variables, therefore rejecting the hypothesis that E(xit.ut ≠ 0). The 
argument by Demsetz and Lehn that insider ownership does not affect financial performance 
is supported.  
Gugler and Weigand (2003) add that ownership concentration is also a relevant feature of the 
ownership structure that causes endogeneity. In this regard a similar test to that undertaken 
for the insider ownership was also undertaken for block ownership.  The Wu-Hausman F test 
results reported in Tables 5.8(a) and 5.8(b) for E(xit. eit) ≠ 0)  show that p-values are high, and 
the regressor block ownership is not exogenous. Therefore, the analysis rejects the null 
hypothesis that OLS regression is consistent. Therefore, 2SLS regression is used with same 
instrumental variables as described for insider ownership  to overcome the problem of 
endogeneity of block ownership.  
The results for validity of the instrumental variables (Marketshare, intangibles2ta, Log(REV), 
LEV and BUSRISK) are reported  in the Table 5.8c. The results show that  the F statistic has 
a value of 7.05 which is greater than the critical value of rejection of a 5% nominal Wald Test 
equal to 4.84
39
, showing that instruments are valid and therefore rejecting the null hypothesis 
that instruments are weak. The test for the overidentifying restrictions for the excluded 
variables shows that the instruments are valid. The p-values for both Sargan and Basmann 
Chi
2
 statistics are high, accepting the null hypothesis, and indicating that instruments are 
valid. This provides evidence that the effect of the unobservable values in the model have 
been captured by these variables, therefore rejecting the hypothesis that E(xit.ut ≠ 0). The 
argument by Demsetz and Lehn that ownership does not affect performance is supported.  
5.1.8 OLS AND 2SLS REGRESSION RESULTS  
The results of the OLS (Equations 5, 6) and 2SLS (Equation 7) regression are presented in 
Tables 5.7 and 5.8. Tables 5.7(a) and (b) show OLS and 2SLS regression results for IOWN. 
The OLS regression for IOWN shows consistent results across all four performance measures 
                                                 
39
 Refer to Appendix G, Table 1 for the detailed results for the test for the validity of the instrumental variables 
used.  
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(Q, MB, ROA and ROE), that is, BOWN and Marketshare have positive coefficients and are 
statistically significant at 1% level. The coefficient of Log(REV) is negative but not 
statistically significant. Insider ownership is inversely related to size (Log(REV), indicating 
that the fraction of shares held by insiders tends to decline as the company increases in size. 
This indicates that insider own a lower proportion of shares in comparison to the total number 
of share outstanding. BDS and BUSRISK has negative coefficient and are statistically 
significant at 5% level. The possible explanation for this result is that the initial owner retains 
the majority of the shares after the company has gone public and also takes a board position. 
This increases insider ownership. However, as the company matures, more and more non-
executive/independent directors are recruited who have a small fraction of shares awarded 
through performance incentive schemes, thus giving an inverse relationship between board 
size and insider ownership.  The negative coefficient of BUSRISK indicates that managers 
are taking higher risks at an operational level but shareholders are not being compensated for 
the risks being undertaken.  
When insider ownership is considered to be endogenous, variable IOWN* (predicted values 
IOWN) is not statistically significant across all financial performance measures. The 
coefficients of 2SLS regression for the independent variables are listed in columns 4 and 8 of 
Tables 5.7(a) and 5.7(b), respectively. The coefficients of the variables BOWN and DIV2TA 
are positive and are statistically significant at a 1% level. This confirms the earlier results 
reported in Tables 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 that presence of blockholding and dividend payouts leads 
to an improvement in company financial performance. The negative coefficient of NED and 
CSURV shows that compliance with NZSC recommendations has increased costs which have 
a negative effect on company financial performance of small cap companies in New Zealand. 
The negative coefficient of BDS, which is statistically significant at 5% level, indicates that 
large boards have a negative effect on small companies‟ financial performance measured by 
Tobin‟s Q and MB. 
The results in Tables 5.7(a) and (b) do not support the view that insider ownership has had a 
positive effect on company financial performance measured by the dependent variables Q, 
MB, ROA and ROE. In summary,  the findings support the view that there is no link between 
insider ownership and financial performance in New Zealand small cap companies because 
chief executives in New Zealand are awarded performance payments for reasons other than 
meeting performance targets (Gunasekarage & Reed, 2008; Hembry, 2008).  
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Table 5.7(a) : 
OLS and 2SLS Regression Results 
 
IOWN 
(using 
OLS) 
Standard 
Error 
Q 
(using 
2SLS) 
Standard 
Error 
IOWN 
(using 
OLS) 
Standard 
Error 
MB 
(using 
2SLS) 
Standard 
Error  
Const. 
0.33++ 
(3.81) 
0.087 
1.11++ 
(2.40) 
0.461 
0.21*** 
(3.55) 
0.087 
0.27*** 
(3.62) 
0.075 
Q 
-0.10 
(-1.15) 
0.011 
 
 
 
 
 
0.335 
MB   
 
 
0.01 
(0.36) 
0.007 
 
 
IOWN*   
0.10 
(0.50) 
0.177 
 
 
0.14 
(0.55) 
0.257 
BOWN 
0.34*** 
(5.33) 
0.064 
0.55† 
(2.14) 
0.255 
0.33*** 
(5.22) 
0.064 
0.15† 
(2.79 
0.041 
NED 
0.01 
(0.32) 
0.040 
0.03 
(0.18) 
0.167 
0.02 
(0.38) 
0.040 
-0.18 
(-0.76) 
0.242 
BDS 
-0.29++ 
(-3.04) 
0.097 
-0.94++ 
(-2.43) 
0.388 
-0.30++ 
(-3.07) 
0.967 
-0.16† 
(-2.56) 
0.063 
FD   
-0.11 
(-0.26) 
0.398 
 
 
-0.04 
(-0.07) 
0.579) 
ACOM   
-0.05 
(-0.33) 
0.156 
 
 
0.03 
(0.15) 
0.227 
RCOM   
0.11 
(0.67) 
0.170 
 
 
0.07 
(0.31) 
0.248 
LEV 
-0.01 
(-0.10) 
0.017 
 
 
-0.00 
(-0.08) 
0.017 
 
 
DIV2TA   
1.23*** 
(4.62) 
0.266 
 
 
2.31*** 
(3.42) 
0.676 
Log 
(REV) 
-0.020 
(-1.47) 
0.141 
 
 
-0.02 
(-1.31) 
 
 
 
FM 
RISK 
  
0.26++ 
(2.98) 
0.086 
 
 
0.26++ 
(2.99) 
0.089 
BUS 
RISK 
-0.11† 
(-2.50) 
0.052 
 
 
-0.12++ 
(-2.23) 
0.052 
 
 
ComAft   
0.05 
(0.36) 
0.134 
 
 
0.23 
(1.18) 
0.195 
CSURV   
-0.27 
(-1.42) 
0.134 
 
 
-0.03 
(-1.15) 
0.195 
RGDP   
0.51 
(0.59) 
0.859 
 
 
0.50 
(0.59) 
0.858 
Mkt 
share 
0.21++ 
(2.95) 
0.069   0.21++ 
(3.05) 
0.069   
Intangible
2ta 
-0.00 
(-0.05) 
0.012   -0.00 
(-0.03) 
0.012   
Industry 
Dummy40 
  
Yes    Yes 
 
F 7.09 
(0.000) 
 3.76 
(0.000) 
 6.72 
(0.000) 
 3.80 
(0.000) 
 
Test 
E(xit.eit) ± 
0 
  F(1, 539) = 
0.30 
Prob > F = 
0.5726 
   F(1, 539) = 
0.96 
Prob > F = 
0.3276 
 
R2 0.11  0.11  .10  0.11  
N 562  562  562  562  
IOWN* denote predicted values, *** denotes coefficient is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed); ++ denotes coefficient is 
significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed); † denotes coefficient is significant at 0.1 level (2-tailed). Standard errors are also provided 
for each variable. 
 
                                                 
40
 The OLS regression results of the industry dummy variables are reported in Appendix D Table 2. 
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Table 5.7(b):  
OLS and 2SLS Regression Results 
 
IOWN 
(using 
OLS) 
Standard 
Error 
ROA 
(using 
2SLS) 
Standard 
Error 
IOWN 
(using 
OLS) 
Standard 
Error 
ROE 
(using 
2SLS) 
Standard 
Error  
Const. 
0.32*** 
(3.65) 
0.086 
0.27*** 
(3.64 
0.075 
0.38*** 
(3.58) 
0.086 
0.26*** 
(3.93) 
0.482 
ROA 
0.10 
(0.11) 
0.019 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ROE   
 
 
-0.01 
(-0.65) 
0.010 
 
 
IOWN*   
0.01 
(0.10) 
0.105 
 
 
-0.01 
(-0.06) 
0.185 
BOWN 
0.33*** 
(5.20) 
0.064 
0.32++ 
(2.11) 
0.157 
0.34*** 
(5.25) 
0.064 
0.06 
(1.50) 
0.267 
NED 
0.01 
(0.37) 
0.040 
-0.06++ 
(-2.84) 
0.021 
0.01 
(0.34) 
0.040 
-0.07† 
(-2.32) 
0.175 
BDS 
-0.30++ 
(-3.07) 
0.097 
0.32++ 
(2.56) 
0.064 
-0.29++ 
(-3.03) 
0.097 
0.47 
(1.16) 
0.407 
FD   
0.42 
(1.71) 
0.236 
 
 
0.57 
(1.37) 
0.417 
ACOM   
-0.01 
(-0.13) 
0.093 
 
 
0.09 
(0.57) 
0.163 
RCOM   
0.05 
(0.45) 
0.101 
 
 
-0.06 
(-0.35) 
0.178 
LEV 
-0.02 
(-0.13) 
0.017 
 
 
-0.00 
(-0.03) 
0.017 
 
 
DIV2TA   
0.68++ 
(2.95) 
0.210 
 
 
0.52† 
(2.19) 
0.237 
Log 
(REV) 
-0.02 
(-1.30) 
0.013 
 
 
-0.02 
(-1.31) 
0.053 
 
 
FM 
RISK 
  
0.09 
(1.28) 
0.069 
 
 
0.03 
(0.24) 
0.143 
BUS 
RISK 
-0.11† 
(-2.08) 
0.054 
 
 
-0.12† 
(-2.31) 
0.053 
 
 
ComAft   
0.01 
(0.14) 
0.079 
 
 
0.03 
(0.22) 
0.140 
CSURV   
-0.00 
(-0.01) 
0.080 
 
 
-0.02 
(-0.13) 
0.140 
RGDP   
-3.69 
(-1.18) 
3.137 
 
 
-1.53† 
(-2.00) 
0.762 
Mkt 
share 
0.21++ 
(3.04) 
0.069   0.21++ 
(3.04) 
0.069   
Intangible 
2ta 
-0.00 
(-0.02) 
0.012   -0.00 
(-0.01) 
0.011   
Industry  
Dummy41 
  
Yes    Yes 
 
F 6.64 
(0.000) 
 5.45 
(0.000) 
 6.69 
(0.000) 
 4.02 
(0.000) 
 
Test E(xit-eit) 
± 0 
  F(1,539) = 
0.05 
Prob > F = 
0.8195 
   F(1,539) = 
0.07 
Prob > F = 
0.7962 
 
R2 0.10  0.12  .10  0.13  
N 562  562  562  562  
IOWN* denote predicted values, *** denotes coefficient is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed); ++ denotes coefficient is 
significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed); † denotes coefficient is significant at 0.1 level (2-tailed). Standard errors are also provided 
for each variable. 
                                                 
41
 The OLS regression results of the industry variables are reported in Appendix E, Table 1. 
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The coefficients of the independent variables for the OLS (Equation 6) regression for BOWN 
are given below in columns 2 and 6 of Tables 5.8(a) and 5.8(b), respectively. The results are 
consistent across all four financial performance measures (Q, MB, ROA and ROE). The 
positive coefficient of IOWN indicates that insider ownership contributes positively towards 
blockholding. This could be the result of blockholders taking board positions. The result is 
statistically significant at a 1% level. The positive coefficient of Log(REV) indicates that size 
is positively associated with blockholding. The result is statistically significant at a 1% level. 
The negative coefficient of BDS across all financial performance measures suggests that 
large board size in small cap companies contributes negatively towards blockholding. The 
result is statistically significant at 1%.  
The results of 2SLS (Equation 7) regression are given in columns 4 and 8 of Tables 5.8(a) 
and 5.8(b). When block ownership is considered to be endogenous, the 2SLS results show 
consistent results across all four performance measures, that is, Q, MB, ROA and ROE. The 
ownership variables BOWN* and IOWN are statistically insignificant across all financial 
performance measures. The results for validity of the instrumental variables (Marketshare, 
intangibles2ta, Log(REV), LEV and BUSRISK) used are given in the Table 5.8c. The results 
in Table 5.8(a) and (b) also show that the coefficient of independent variable DIV2TA is 
positive for all financial performance measures but are statistically significant for Q and ROA 
only. The negative coefficient of BDS suggests that larger board size in small cap companies 
has a negative effect on company financial performance measured by Tobin‟s Q.  
In summary, the OLS and 2SLS regression of the two ownership variables (IOWN and 
BOWN) shows inconsistent results while insider ownership shows consistent findings. The 
effect of insider ownership on financial performance is insignificant, supporting the findings 
of the survey undertaken by Sheffield in 2007, that there is no link between pay and 
performance in New Zealand. However, the OLS and 2SLS regressions for blockholding 
show inconsistent results. The OLS results show that blockholding contributes positively 
toward company financial performance measured by Tobin‟s Q, therefore it can be regarded 
as an effective mechanism to mitigate agency problems in small cap companies in New 
Zealand. However, 2SLS regressions results in Table 5.8 show that when endogeneity of 
block ownership is considered, the effect of blockholding on financial performance is not 
significant. This supports the findings of Demsetz (1983), Demsetz and Lehn (1985), 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001). There is evidence that the 
variation in performance is explained by variables other than ownership. The results are 
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consistent across different financial performance measures (Q, MB, ROA and ROE) and also 
for OLS and 2SLS regressions. The results show that DIV2TA have a positive effect on 
financial performance. The negative and statistically significant coefficient of CSURV 
supports the view that compliance with NZSC recommendations has been costly for small 
cap companies and therefore has a negative effect on financial performance. The results also 
show that the companies that complied with NZSC recommendations after 2003 have a 
positive effect on financial performance. However, the result is not statistically significant. 
The evidence also supports the view that the principle-based governance approach has 
allowed industry-specific governance structures to be developed in the investment industry 
(IND6) which has a positive effect on financial performance measured by MB. 
Both OLS and 2SLS provide consistent results that board independence is not an optimal 
mechanism for dealing with the agency problem in small cap companies in New Zealand. 
The BDS has a negative coefficient and is statistically significant for the financial 
performance measure Tobin‟s Q. This indicates that large boards are an ineffective 
mechanism for monitoring managers‟ performance and achieving long term strategic goals in 
small cap companies.   
The findings do not support results reported by Morck et al.(1988), McConnell and Servaes 
(1990) and Short and Keasey (1999), indicating that there is a piecewise linear relationship 
between insider ownership and financial performance. Overall, the results support the view 
that compliance with NZSC recommendations has had a negative effect on financial 
performance of small cap companies. The results also support the view that variation in 
company financial performance is explained by factors other than ownership. 
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Table 5.8(a): 
OLS and 2SLS Regression Results 
 
BOWN 
(using 
OLS) 
Standard 
Error 
Q 
(using 
2SLS) 
Standard 
Error 
BOWN 
(using 
OLS) 
Standard 
Error 
MB 
(using 
2SLS) 
Standard 
Error  
Const. 
0.64*** 
(12.66) 
0.050 
0.38*** 
(5.60) 
0.069 
0.69*** 
(14.05) 
0.049 
0.79*** 
(14.81) 
0.054 
Q 
0.02*** 
(3.53) 
0.007 
 
 
 
 
 
0.335 
MB   
 
 
-0.01 
(-0.76) 
0.005 
 
 
IOWN 
0.14*** 
(5.33) 
0.027 
-0.06 
(-0.34) 
0.171 
0.14*** 
(5.22) 
0.027 
0.14 
(0.58) 
0.247 
BOWN*   
0.06 
(0.23) 
0.271 
 
 
0.08 
(0.20) 
0.388 
NED 
-0.02 
(-0.70) 
0.026 
-0.00 
(-0.01) 
0.166 
-0.02 
(-0.86) 
0.026 
-0.16 
(-0.65) 
0.239 
BDS 
-0.25*** 
(-4.02) 
0.062 
-1.04++ 
(-2.67) 
0.389 
-0.25*** 
(-3.98) 
0.063 
0.44 
(0.82) 
0.537 
FD   
-0.20 
(-0.50) 
0.401 
 
 
-0.01 
(-0.02) 
0.578 
ACOM   
-0.07 
(-0.48) 
0.157 
 
 
0.04 
(0.18) 
0.227 
RCOM   
0.12 
(0.69) 
0.171 
 
 
0.08 
(0.32) 
0.248 
LEV 
-0.01 
(-1.33) 
0.011 
 
 
-0.00 
(-0.08) 
0.017 
 
 
DIV2TA   
1.54++ 
(3.30) 
0.467 
 
 
2.30*** 
(3.40) 
0.676 
Log 
(REV) 
0.05*** 
(5.63) 
0.008 
 
 
-0.02 
(-1.33) 
0.011 
 
 
FM 
RISK 
  
0.27*** 
(3.93) 
0.087 
 
 
0.12 
(0.61) 
0.198 
BUS 
RISK 
-0.05 
(-1.32) 
0.034 
 
 
-0.03 
(-0.99) 
0.034 
 
 
ComAft   
0.04 
(0.30) 
0.134 
 
 
0.24 
(1.22) 
0.194 
CSURV   
-0.22 
(-1.61) 
0.134 
 
 
-0.49++ 
(-2.54) 
0.195 
RGDP   
2.47 
(0.47) 
5.296 
 
 
1.48† 
(2.19) 
0.676 
Mkt 
share 
-0.03 
(-0.77) 
0.045   -0.05 
(-1.04) 
0.046   
Intangible2
ta 
-0.00 
(-0.31) 
0.007   -0.03 
(-0.38) 
0.008   
Industry 
Dummy42 
  
Yes    Yes 
 
F 9.53 
(0.000) 
 3.28 
(0.000) 
 8.03 
(0.000) 
 2.73 
(0.000) 
 
Test 
E(xit.eit) ± 0 
  F1,539) = 
0.03 
Prob > F = 
0.8721 
   F(1,539) = 
0.06 
Prob> F = 
0.8140 
 
R2 0.14  0.07  .12  0.08  
N 562  562  562  562  
BOWN* denote predicted values, *** denotes coefficient is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed); ++ denotes coefficient is 
significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed); † denotes coefficient is significant at 0.1 level (2-tailed). Standard errors are also provided 
for each variable. 
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 The OLS regression results for the industry dummy variables are reported in Appendix F, Table 1. 
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Table 5.8(b):  
OLS and 2SLS Regression Results 
 BOWN 
(using 
OLS) 
Standard 
Error 
ROA 
(using 
2SLS) 
Standard 
Error 
BOWN 
(using 
OLS) 
Standard 
Error 
ROE 
(using 
2SLS) 
Standard 
Error  
Const. 0.69*** 
(14.10) 
0.048 0.16++ 
(2.93) 
0.053 0.69*** 
(14.26) 
0.048 0.32*** 
(5.23) 
0.060 
ROA 0.01 
(0.63) 
0.012       
ROE     0.04 
(0.92) 
0.007   
IOWN 0.14++ 
(5.20) 
0.027 0.12 
(1.18) 
0.102 0.14*** 
(5.25) 
0.027 0.06 
(0.31) 
0.180 
BOWN*   0.05 
(0.29) 
0.160   0.09 
(0.32) 
0.281 
NED -0.02 
(-0.78) 
0.026 -0.26++ 
(-2.59) 
0.099 -0.02 
(-0.75) 
0.026 -0.36† 
(-2.06) 
0.175 
BDS -0.25*** 
(-4.03) 
0.063 0.96*** 
(4.15) 
0.232 -0.26*** 
(-4.07) 
0.063 0.37 
(0.91) 
0.410 
FD   0.41 
(1.71) 
0.238   0.51 
(1.23) 
0.420 
ACOM   -0.01 
(-0.08) 
0.093   0.09 
(0.54) 
0.164 
RCOM   0.04 
(0.43) 
0.102   -0.06 
(-0.35) 
0.180 
LEV -0.01 
(-1.19) 
0.011   -0.02 
(-1.56) 
0.011   
DIV2TA   0.86++ 
(3.08) 
0.278   0.51† 
(2.16) 
0.237 
Log 
(REV) 
0.04*** 
(5.04) 
0.009   0.04*** 
(5.07) 
0.009   
FM 
RISK 
  0.04 
 (0.45) 
0.079   0.06 
(0.42) 
0.144 
BUS 
RISK 
-0.03 
(-0.78) 
0.009   -0.02 
(-0.56) 
0.035   
ComAft   0.00 
(0.04) 
0.080   0.02 
(0.12) 
0.141 
CSURV   0.00 
(0.04) 
0.080   0.01 
(0.09) 
0.141 
RGDP   -3.62 
(-1.15) 
3.146   -1.53† 
(-2.00) 
0.763 
Mkt 
share 
-0.04 
(-0.97) 
0.046   -0.05 
(-1.00) 
0.046   
Intangible 
2ta 
-0.00 
(-0.39) 
0.008   -0.00 
(-0.41) 
0.008   
Industry 
Dummy43 
  
Yes    Yes 
 
F 8.01 
(0.000) 
 5.92 
(0.000) 
 8.52 
(0.000) 
 4.47 
(0.000) 
 
Test 
E(xit.eit) ± 0 
  F1,539) = 
0.03 
Prob > F = 
0.9353 
   F(1,539) = 
0.06 
Prob> F = 
0.6782 
 
R2 0.12  0.14  .12  0.10  
N 562  562  562  562  
BOWN* denote predicted values, *** denotes coefficient is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed); ++ denotes coefficient is 
significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed); † denotes coefficient is significant at 0.1 level (2-tailed). Standard errors are also provided 
for each variable. 
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 The OLS regression results of the industry dummy variables are reported in Appendix E, Table 2. 
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 5.2 CONCLUSION 
This chapter explored the governance-performance relationship in small cap companies. Four 
important questions are addressed: (i) Whether small cap companies have complied with the 
NZSC recommendations? (ii) Did compliance with the NZSC recommendations after 2003 
lead to an improvement in small cap companies‟ financial performance? (iii) Whether small 
cap companies that were always in compliance the NZSC recommendations since 1999 have 
better financial performance than companies that were not in compliance? (iv) Can the 
differences in small cap companies‟ financial performance be explained by the differences in 
governance practices in different industries?   
The governance factors, viz, non-executive directors and board committees recommended by 
the NZSC in 2004 are of particular interest.  
The findings reveal that small cap companies in New Zealand, in general, have complied with 
the Securities Commission‟s guidelines. The findings indicate that small cap companies in 
New Zealand have good governance practices, such as non-executive/independent directors 
and board committees dating from 1999. Results show that board independence does not have 
any significant effect on company financial performance across all financial performance 
measures. This finding is consistent with studies conducted in the US, which follows a rule-
based governance system. Further, this finding is consistent with findings reported by 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996); Bhagat and Black (1998); Yermack (1996); Klein (1998), 
Baxter (2006) and Reddy et al. (2008a).  
The results show (Table 5.4) that compliance by small cap companies with NZSC 
recommendations since 1999 has a positive effect on financial performance when measured 
by Tobin‟s Q. The result for the small cap companies that complied with the NZSC 
recommendations after 2003 has a positive coefficient across all financial performance 
measures but is not statistically significant (Table 5.5 and 5.6). The reason could be that the 
costs of establishing good governance structures recommended by the NZSC in 2004 has 
been high and small cap companies have not fully recovered the costs within the time period  
2004-2006 when the data was collected for this study. The companies that survived since 
1999 and complied with the NZSC recommendations had a negative effect on financial 
performance when measured by Tobin‟s Q and MB (Table 5.4 and 5.5). This shows that 
small cap companies already had good monitoring mechanisms in place and NZSC 
recommendations have just increased the costs of compliance. This is supported by the results 
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reported in Table 5.6 which show that small cap company compliance with NZSC 
recommendations has had a negative effect on financial performance as reported in 2006.  
The results show that board committees (ACOM and RCOM) have a negative effect on small 
cap company financial performance. This indicates that board committees have added more 
to costs than to the benefits for small cap companies. The results for non-
executive/independent directors and board committees indicate that small cap companies 
have simply complied with the NZSC recommendations to avoid the market disciplining 
them for not complying rather than establishing company-specific or industry-specific 
governance structures. This is supported by the results of the industry dummy variables. 
There is  evidence that the principle-based governance recommendations have allowed small 
cap companies in the investment industry (IND6) to adopt company-specific governance 
measures only (Table 5.4 and 5.5). This is not surprising as most blockholders tend to belong 
to finance/investment companies. This result is not consistent for all industries, indicating 
that investors have not valued companies belonging to those industries highly for having 
improved governance practices as recommended by the NZSC.  
The empirical results do indicate that leverage and dividend payouts can be utilised to 
minimise agency problems in an efficient manner. This result is consistent across different 
sectors, that is, small cap, large cap and public sector (refer to Chapter 6 for large companies 
and Chapter 7 for public sector entities). 
The OLS regression results show that blockholding is contributing positively towards 
shareholder value. In small cap companies a large part of blockholders‟ wealth is invested in 
the company and therefore blockholders have a far greater incentive to control management 
behaviour. As a result, every shareholder benefits from this situation. However, the 2SLS 
results in Table 5.8 show when endogeneity of block ownership is considered, the results for 
block ownership becomes insignificant. This study supports the proposition postulated by 
Demsetz (1983), Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) and Himmelberg 
et al. (1999) that ownership concentration does not have an influence on company value and 
that companies choose the form of ownership that minimises agency costs.  
Results show that insider ownership is not an optimal mechanism for controlling agency costs 
in New Zealand small cap companies (Table 5.7). This result supports the proposition by 
Davis et al. (2006) that there exists no link between pay-performance in New Zealand 
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companies, indicating there will be no relationship between insider ownership and financial 
performance. 
The results show that small cap company size is inversely related to financial performance, 
providing support for the view that the size of small cap companies is increased by managers 
to derive personal benefits rather than to increase shareholder value. The results show that 
board gender diversity has a positive effect on financial performance and therefore provide 
support for diversity in the boardroom.  
The findings strongly support the view that compliance with NZSC recommendations adds 
costs which has a negative effect on small cap companies‟ financial performance. The 
question left unanswered is why the empirical results for the NZSC recommendations of 
having non-executive/independent directors and board committees do not appear to be 
statistically significantly related to small cap company financial performance. The reason 
could be that non-executive/independent directors and blockholders are substitute governance 
mechanisms. Since blockholders are already providing the level of vigilance required by 
small cap companies, resulting in positive financial performance, the roles of non-executive 
independent directors and board committees tend to be less important. Alternatively, non-
executive/independent directors and board committees may be appointed to fulfil the NZSC 
recommendations and may lack knowledge about the company/industry and therefore add no 
value to the company.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES AND 
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE IN LARGE CAP 
COMPANIES: AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
44 
 
6.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the results of the empirical study of the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and large company performance in New Zealand. A description of 
sample size used in this study is provided in Chapter 4, Table 4.1. Description of the 
governance and performance variables used is provided in Chapter 4, Table 4.2. This chapter 
has three sections. First, a description of the sample descriptive statistics is provided. This is 
followed by a presentation of results from data analyses and discussion and finally, 
conclusion is provided.  
6.1 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
6.1.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The sample comprised 410 large companies listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange for 
the period 1999 to 2007.  Companies that did not have all the required information were 
removed from the sample and, as a result, the final sample comprised 340 company-years 
data or 78.3% of the companies. Table 6.1 provides the sample descriptive statistics.  
Table 6.1 provides a summary of the sample descriptive statistics for the pooled data. The 
mean Tobin‟s Q ratio is 3.26, with a median of 1.83. A Tobin‟s Q ratio greater than one is 
favourable, indicating that the large cap companies did create value for their shareholders. 
The mean MB is 0.50 and median is 0.45 indicating that the market value of companies‟ 
shares is 50% less than the book value of companies‟ equity. The mean of ROA ratio is 2.84 
with a median of 1.85, indicating that large companies on average have generated a positive 
return on total assets employed. The mean (median) of the ROE ratio is 0.13(0.11) indicating 
that large companies on average have generated a positive return on shareholders‟ funds. The 
mean proportion of managerial ownership (IOWN) is 12% but the median is only 1%. In the 
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 A version of this chapter has been accepted for publication in the International Journal of Managerial 
Finance, 2010, vol. 6(3), pp. 190-219. 
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sample, 6.8% of large cap companies have insider ownership equal to zero, 43.4% of the 
companies have at least 1% insider ownership, 14.4% of the companies have insider 
ownership between 1% and 5%, 5% of the companies have insider ownership between 5% 
and 10%, 7.4% of the companies have insider ownership between 10% and 20%, and 22.6% 
of the companies have insider ownership greater than 20%. Overall, 50.3% of the large cap 
companies in New Zealand have insider ownership less than 1% and 64.7% of the large cap 
companies have insider ownership less than 5%. Morck et al (1988) report that 58% of 
companies in the US have an IOWN level of 5% or less and in the UK, the equivalent figure 
is 48% (Short & Keasey, 1999).  This shows that New Zealand has a larger proportion of 
companies with insider ownership of less than 5% compared to the US and the UK.  
Table 6.1:  
Descriptive Statistics 
Variables Mean Median Minimum Maximum Inter-quartile Range 
Dependent      
Q 3.26 1.83 -0.21 40.48 1.09 – 3.78 
MB 0.50 0.45 0.02 1.43 0.33 – 0.64 
ROA 2.84 1.85 0.05 25.62 1.12 – 3.34 
ROE 0.13 0.11 -0.36 0.54 0.07 – 0.22 
Governance      
IOWN 0.12 0.01 0.00 1.00 0.00 – 0.16 
BOWN 0.62 0.65 0.05 0.95 0.47 – 0.77 
NED 0.76 0.80 0.00 1.00 0.64 – 0.88 
BDS 6.98 7.00 3 13 6 – 8 
FD 0.08 0 0 3  
ACOM 0.96 1.00 0 1  
RCOM 0.78 1.00 0 1  
LEV 0.47 0.44 -2.04 0.98 0.32 – 0.63 
DIV2TA 0.06 0.04 0.00 1.00 0.02 – 0.06 
Control      
Log(TA) 5.85 5.75 4.44 8.59 5.26 – 6.29 
FMRISK 0.68 0.35 0.02 5.21 0.18 – 0.79 
BUSRISK 0.92 0.48 0 6.746 0.19 – 1.15 
IND1 0.16 0.00    
IND2 0.08 0.00    
IND3 0.21 0.00    
IND4 0.13 0.00    
IND5 0.37 0.00    
IND6 0.03 0.00    
IND7 0.03 0.00    
Notes: For details regarding the measurement of the variables given above refer to Table 4.2 in Chapter 4. 
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Hossain et al. (2001) studied 633 companies of different sizes and reported mean (median) 
managerial ownership for the period 1991/97 of 6.8% (0.6%) and lower and upper quartiles 
of 0.1 % and 5% respectively. The current figures suggest that managerial ownership in large 
companies has increased slightly over the years. According to Hembry (2008), the trend is 
growing as more companies are linking managerial remuneration with company financial 
performance. Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu (2008)  reported an average insider ownership of 
22% for US companies which is considerably higher than the 10.6% figure reported by 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) and Han and Suk (1998). The reason for reporting a 
larger insider ownership in the US data is because Gugler at al. used a much larger sample 
size than Morck at al. Also, the sample had many smaller companies where insiders have a 
tendency to hold higher stakes. In comparison to the US, the average insider ownership in 
large companies in New Zealand is similar. 
The mean (median) proportion of stock held by the 20 largest shareholders (BOWN) is 62% 
(65%). The inter-quartile range for BOWN is 47%-77%. In the sample, 1.2% of the large cap 
companies have 20 large shareholders holding less than 10% of the shares in the company, 
1.9% of the companies have holding between 10% and 20%, 26.1% of the companies have 
shareholding between 20% and 50%, 51.5% of the companies have 20 large shareholdings of 
between 50% and 80% of the company and 20.3% of the companies have 20 large 
shareholdings of more than 80% of the company. Hossain et al. report a mean (median) 
BOWN of 76.3% (78.3%) and inter-quartile range of 68.7%-87.3%. Chen, Blenman and 
Chen (2008) report that 60% of stocks are held by five largest shareholders which are 
institutions. Although block ownership in New Zealand has declined from an average of 
76.3% during 1991/97 period to 62% in 1999/07, it is still relatively high. In comparison to 
economies with similar financial systems where the fraction of shares held by non-controlling 
shareholder is 80% and 90% for the top 20 US and UK companies, respectively (Kapopoulas 
& Lazaretou, 2007), New Zealand is relatively low. The US legislation restricts equity 
investment by insurance companies to a maximum of 2% of assets in a single company with a 
cap at 20% for investment in equities (Bhabra, 2007). As a consequence, insurance 
companies in the US hold a smaller proportion of stock in comparison to New Zealand. In the 
absence of such restrictions, insurance companies in New Zealand have tended to hold larger 
stakes in companies and therefore have the potential to exert significant influence in 
monitoring managers (Fox & Walker, 1995a). 
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A high level of blockholding in New Zealand companies suggests that there is a need to 
protect minority shareholder rights. European evidence suggests that blockholders have a 
tendency to expropriate minority shareholders (Gugler, 1999; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
Cornett, et al. (2004) provide evidence that management has a tendency to build special 
relationships with blockholders and/or their representative on the board, thus negating the 
positive effect of blockholding on financial performance. A strong minority shareholder will 
safeguard management interest which may increase liquidity in the stock market (Healy, 
2003). In summary, there is evidence that large New Zealand companies increasingly use 
incentive-based mechanisms (such as stock ownership) to motivate managers and directors to 
manage agency conflicts. Since BOWN is relatively high, suggesting IOWN is not a strong 
mechanism in itself to deal with agency problems in large companies in New Zealand.  
The mean (median) proportion of non-executive/independent directors is 76% (80%) with an 
inter-quartile range of 64%-88%. The typical (median) board has seven directors with a fairly 
narrow inter-quartile range of six to eight which is similar to Fox (1996b) who notes that 
board size declined in New Zealand from seven members in 1970 to six members in 1983. 
The median non-executive/independent directors and size of the board remains relatively 
constant through the periods 1991/97 and 1999/07. This indicates that the size of boards of 
large companies in New Zealand is appropriate for the company size and the role board plays 
in terms of managing agency conflict. On average, 96% of the companies have an audit 
committee and 78% have a remuneration committee. A high percentage of the large 
companies have board committees, recognising the important role they play in mitigating 
agency conflict. This is supported by the fact that the NZSC recommendations regarding 
board committees came into effect after 2003; the results show that large companies have had 
board committees since 1999. In 1999, (on average) 86% of the companies in the sample had 
audit committees and 64% had a remuneration committee. In 2006, 95% of companies had an 
audit committee and 91% had a remuneration committee. There is evidence of gender 
diversity in the boards of large companies in New Zealand; 48% of the boards had at least 
one female director. The number of female directors on the boards ranged from zero to three. 
The mean (median) leverage is 47% (44%). The leverage increased from 40.5% in 1991/97 to 
47% in 1999/07. A simple T-test shows that the mean of leverage is significantly different for 
the period 1999/07 compared to the period 1991/97. The result is statistically significant at 
both 1% and 5% confidence levels. An increase in leverage shows that debt is the major 
source of finance for large companies and therefore a sizable proportion of the cash flows are 
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used to service debt. The mean (median) dividend to total assets is 6% (4%) with an inter-
quartile range of 2%-6%, indicating that dividend payout is not high in large companies. This 
may be attributable to the fact that large companies are not making high profits and/or the 
small nature of the New Zealand capital market makes it difficult to raise capital and 
therefore profit is usually retained for future investment purposes. The mean (median) 
Log(TA) is 5.85 (5.75). The mean (median) company level risk is 0.68 (0.35) and the inter-
quartile range 0.18-0.79. The mean (median) business level risk is 0.92 (0.48) and the inter-
quartile range 0.19 to 1.15. 
On average, 16% of the companies in the sample belong to primary industry, 8% energy, 
21% goods, 13% property, 37% service, 3% investment and 3% overseas. This provides an 
opportunity to study whether there are differences in the nature of corporate governance 
practices in different industries in New Zealand.  
6.1.2 PAIRWISE CORRELATION BETWEEN INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
A pairwise correlation matrix for independent and control variables is provided in Table 6.2. 
The highest correlation is between Log(TA) and RCOM at 0.78. This suggests that large 
companies tend to have remuneration committees. The other high correlations are between 
Log(TA) and LEV (0.51) indicating large companies tend to have more debt. With these 
exceptions, other correlations range between –0.40 and 0.41. None of the pairwise 
correlations between independent variables are above 0.78, indicating a low likelihood of 
multicollinearity issues arising in the OLS regressions.  
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Table 6.2:  
Pairwise Correlation Matrix for Independent Variables 
 IOWN BOWN NED BDS FD ACOM RCOM LEV DIV2TA Log(TA) FMRISK BUSRISK 
IOWN -            
BOWN 
0.216*** 
(0.000) 
-           
NED 
-0.014 
(0.793) 
-0.050 
(0.358) 
-          
BDS 
0.051 
(0.345) 
0.309*** 
0.000 
-0.007 
(0.904) 
-         
FD 
-0.125++ 
(0.021) 
0.097 
(0.073) 
0.108++ 
(0.047) 
0.114† 
(0.035) 
-        
ACOM 
--0.165*** 
(0.002) 
-0.045++ 
(0.041) 
0.047 
(0.386) 
0.133++ 
(0.014) 
0.053 
(0.331) 
-       
RCOM 
0.034 
(0.533) 
0.029 
(0.594) 
0.068 
(0.209) 
0.408*** 
(0.000) 
0.191*** 
(0.000) 
0.264*** 
(0.000) 
-      
LEV 
0.015 
(0.787) 
-0.051 
(0.345) 
0.144*** 
(0.008) 
0.207*** 
(0.000) 
0.280*** 
(0.000) 
0.108++ 
(0.046) 
0.277*** 
(0.000) 
-     
DIV2TA 
0.032 
(0.558) 
-0.019 
(0.732) 
-0.069 
(0.207) 
0.008 
(0.878) 
0.044 
(0.415) 
-0.044 
(0.420) 
0.113++ 
(0.037) 
-0.180*** 
(0.001) 
-    
Log(TA) 
-0.294*** 
(0.000) 
0.174*** 
(0.001) 
0.190*** 
(0.000) 
0.360*** 
(0.000) 
0.299*** 
(0.000) 
0.144*** 
(0.000) 
0.780 
(0.142) 
0.512*** 
(0.000) 
-0.243*** 
(0.000) 
-   
FMRISK 
-0.016 
(0.774) 
0.196*** 
(0.000) 
0.172*** 
(0.002) 
0.313*** 
(0.000) 
0.144*** 
(0.008) 
0.057 
(0.298) 
0.289*** 
(0.000) 
0.201*** 
(0.000) 
0.075 
(0.170) 
0.359*** 
(0.000) 
-  
BUSRISK 
0.020 
(0.714) 
-0.052 
(0.339) 
0.047 
(0.338) 
0.081 
(0.137) 
0.023 
(0.680) 
0.023 
(0.682) 
0.085 
(0.117) 
0.152*** 
(0.005) 
0.054 
(0.322) 
0.155*** 
(0.002) 
0.105 
(0.053) 
- 
** denotes correlation is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed); ++ denotes correlation is significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed); † denotes correlation is significant at 0.1 level (2-tailed) 
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6.1.3 OLS REGRESSION OF TOBIN’S Q, MB, ROA AND ROE ON 
OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL VARIABLES 
Table 6.3 presents the OLS regression of Equation 1. Columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 of Table 6.3 
provide coefficients of independent variables that are used in Equation 1. Table 6.3, column 2 
provides coefficients of the independent variables using Tobin‟s Q as a dependent variable. 
The independent variables BOWN, FD and DIV2TA have positive coefficients, indicating 
that these variables have a positive effect on companies‟ financial performance measured by 
Tobin‟s Q. All of these variables are statistically significant at the 1% level. This evidence 
supports the view that blockholders are better monitors of managers‟ performance, which has 
a positive effect on financial performance measured by Tobin‟s Q. Female directors on the 
board (diversity) are seen to have a positive effect on financial performance.  DIV2TA also 
has a positive effect on financial performance measured by Tobin‟s Q, indicating that the 
payment of dividends is regarded by the capital market to be better utilisation of company 
cash flows. The positive coefficient of BUSRISK suggests that shareholders have been 
compensated for the business risk undertaken by the company. The result is statistically 
significant at the 5% level. 
A negative coefficient of Log(TA), which is statistically significant at a 1% level, indicates 
that size has a negative effect on Tobin‟s Q. The coefficients of three industry dummy 
variables are negative and statistically significant at a 10% level.  This indicates that 
governance practices in IND1 (primary), IND2 (energy) and IND6 (investment) contribute 
negatively towards Tobin‟s Q. The coefficient of the RGDP (real annual GDP) is negative 
and statistically significant at 5% level, indicating that growth in the New Zealand economy 
during the period 1999-2007 contributed negatively towards Tobin‟s Q. This may be the case 
because growth in the New Zealand economy was largely attributable to agricultural exports 
and the same growth was not experienced by the others sectors in the economy. The variable 
COMPLIED has a negative coefficient but is not statistically significant. 
Table 6.3, column 4 provides coefficients of independent variables for equation 1 using MB 
as a dependent variable. The variables BOWN, FD, LEV and DIV2TA have positive 
coefficients and all are statistically significant at 1% level, apart from FD which is significant 
at a 5% level. The results indicate that blockholding, gender diversity, leverage and dividend 
payouts contribute positively towards company financial performance measured by MB. 
Company size (log (TA)) also has a negative coefficient, significant at 1% level. This 
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confirms earlier findings that size is not optimal for large companies in New Zealand. The 
coefficient of the RGDP (real annual GDP) is negative and is also statistically significant at a 
5% level. This result indicate that economic growth experienced in New Zealand between the 
period 1999 and 2007 have not been captured by large companies. The coefficient of RGDP 
is negative indicating economic growth has contributed negatively towards large companies‟ 
financial performance measured by Tobin‟s Q and MB. This is not surprising as industry 
effect also shows that companies belonging to primary, energy and investment sectors have 
contributed negatively towards large companies‟ financial performance measured by Tobin‟s 
Q and MB. A plausible reason could be that growth was experienced in certain sectors only 
and also, increased competition in sectors may have affected their financial performance as 
well. 
Table 6.3, column 6 provides coefficients of independent variables for Equation 1 using ROA 
as a dependent variable. The results are similar to columns 2 and 3. The coefficients of FD 
and DIV2TA are positive and statistically significant at a 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
However, coefficient of LEV is negative and is statistically significant at a 1% level. The 
coefficient of the company size (Log(TA)) is negative and is statistically significant at a 1% 
level. 
Table 6.3, column 8 provides coefficients of independent variables for Equation 1 using ROE 
as a dependent variable. The results are similar to columns 2, 4 and 6, however, only 
DIV2TA has a positive coefficient and is statistically significant at a 5% level. None of the 
results are statistically significant.  
Table 6.3 shows consistent results for all three financial performance measures (Q, MB, 
ROA) in Equation 1, that is, BOWN, FD, LEV and DIV2TA variables contribute positively 
towards company financial performance, whereas, Log (TA) contributes negatively towards 
financial performance. There is evidence of negative industry and economy growth effect on 
company financial performance. In summary, only hypotheses H2b, H5b, H7b and H8b are 
supported whilst other hypotheses are rejected. 
OLS results in Table 6.3 show that the tolerance (1-R
2
) range from 0.49 to 0.83 and variance 
inflation factor (VIF) (1/Tolerance) range from 1.20 to 2.04 are within acceptable limits. 
According to Menard (1995), tolerance below 0.2 and VIF above 10 are worthy of concern, 
which need to be investigated. This result indicates that there is no evidence of 
multicollinearity in the data. 
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Table 6.3:  
OLS Regression of Tobin’s Q. MB, ROA and ROE on Ownership and Control 
Variables 
 Q MB ROA ROE 
  
Standard 
Error  
 
Standard 
Error  
 
Standard 
Error  
 Standard 
Error  
Const. 
1.35*** 
(7.71) 
0.160 
0.89*** 
(5.24) 
0.169 
0.07*** 
(4.22) 
0.017 
0.53*** 
(9.59) 
0.053 
IOWN 
0.06 
(0.70) 
0.063 
-0.11 
(-1.77) 
0.006 
-0.01 
(-0.39) 
0.047 
0.01 
(0.62) 
0.020 
BOWN 
0.19++ 
(2.59) 
0.065 
0.23*** 
(3.70) 
0.063 
0.01 
(1.41) 
0.006 
-0.01 
(-0.63) 
0.021 
NED 
-0.08 
(-1.22) 
0.068 
-0.03 
(-0.48) 
0.061 
-0.01 
(-1.47) 
0.007 
-0.01 
(-0.22) 
0.022 
BDS 
-0.17 
(-1.29) 
0.131 
-0.16 
(-1.26) 
0.126 
0.01 
(0.09) 
0.013 
0.01 
(0.10) 
0.041 
FD 
0.43*** 
(3.33) 
0.130 
0.25† 
(1.98) 
0.126 
0.04++ 
(2.74) 
0.012 
0.04 
(0.44) 
0.041 
ACOM 
0.04 
(0.55) 
0.073 
0.04 
(0.51) 
0.070 
0.01 
(0.64) 
0.007 
0.01 
(0.44) 
0.023 
RCOM 
0.21 
(1.52) 
0.140 
0.18 
(1.33) 
0.135 
0.02 
(1.77) 
0.014 
0.01 
(0.09) 
0.044 
LEV 
0.06 
(1.14) 
0.054 
0.23*** 
(4.34) 
0.052 
-0.02*** 
(-3.34) 
0.005 
-0.01 
(-0.23) 
0.017 
DIV2TA 
1.17++ 
(2.76) 
0.429 
1.54*** 
(3.75) 
0.410 
0.29*** 
(6.97) 
0.042 
1.58++ 
(3.37) 
0.486 
Log(TA) 
-0.13*** 
(-5.94) 
0.023 
-0.10*** 
(-4.60) 
0.021 
-0.01*** 
(-3.85) 
0.002 
-0.01 
(-0.88) 
0.007 
FMRISK 
0.04 
(0.49) 
0.083 
0.14 
(1.72) 
0.080 
0.01 
(1.28) 
0.008 
0.02 
(0.80) 
0.026 
BUSRISK 
0.22++ 
(2.35) 
0.067 
0.07 
(1.11) 
0.065 
-0.01 
(-1.09) 
0.007 
-0.02 
(0.80) 
0.021 
COMPLIED 
-0.05 
(-0.34) 
0.140 
-0.09 
(-0.69) 
0.135 
-0.03 
(-1.89) 
0.014 
-0.01 
(-0.19) 
0.044 
SURV 
-0.05 
(-0.38) 
0.036 
-0.03 
(-0.79) 
0.035 
-0.01 
(-0.86) 
0.004 
-0.01 
(-0.67) 
0.011 
RGDP 
-3.69++ 
(-2.94) 
1.249 
-2.91++ 
(-2.44) 
0.1.194 
-0.04 
(-0.29) 
0.122 
0.35 
(0.63) 
0.391 
Industry  
Dummy45 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
F 16.79  
(0.000) 
 11.12 
(0.000) 
 14.93 
(0.000) 
 4.57 
(0.013) 
 
R2 0.51  0.41  0.48  0.17  
N 340  340  340  340  
*** denotes coefficient is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed); ++ denotes coefficient is significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed); † 
denotes coefficient is significant at 0.1 level (2-tailed). Standard errors are also provided for each variable. 
 
                                                 
45
 The OLS regression results of the industry dummy variables are reported in Appendix H, Table 1. 
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6.1.4 OLS REGRESSION OF TOBIN’S Q, MB, ROA AND ROE ON 
OWNERSHIP, CONTROL AND COMPLIANCE VARIABLES 
The effect of the time period after the NZSC corporate governance recommendations became 
effective is captured by the dummy variable AFTER2003. To capture the effect of the NZSC 
recommendation on companies that were always in compliance with the NZSC 
recommendations the dummy variable COMPLIED was also used. The companies that were 
continuously present throughout the sampling period are measured by the dummy variable 
SURV. ComAft is the interaction term that measures the effect on performance of complying 
with NZSC recommendations after 2003. ComAft is calculated by multiplying COMPLIED 
by AFTER2003.  CSURV is the interaction term that measures the effect of complying with 
NZSC recommendations and also surviving the sampling period. CSURV is calculated by 
multiplying COMPLIED by SURV. 
The results of Equation 2 are provided in Table 6.4. The results of all other variables reported 
in Table 6.4 are very similar to the results provided in columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 of Table 6.3. 
However, ComAft has a positive coefficient and is statistically significant at the 5% level, 
providing evidence that company financial performance is positively associated with NZSC 
compliance after 2003. The negative coefficient of the variable Complied (Table 6.3) indicate 
that the companies that were always in compliance with NZSC guidelines since 1999 have 
had a negative effect on financial performance and this is statistically significant at a 1% 
confidence level. This suggests that the time period before 2004 had a negative effect on 
financial performance but the years after 2004 had a positive effect on financial performance. 
This evidence supports the view that the promulgation of the NZSC recommendations has a 
positive effect on company financial performance measured by Tobin‟s Q, MB, ROA and 
ROE. The companies that survived being top of the NZX listings since 1999 did not show 
significant results. Also, the coefficient of CSURV is negative but statistically insignificant. 
The results indicate that the differences in company financial performance can be explained 
by the differences in governance practices of different industries. The negative coefficient of 
all industry dummy variables (apart from IND3) indicates that the costs of compliance with 
NZSC recommendations in these industries has been high and therefore have a negative 
effect on financial performance measured by Tobin‟s Q.  
The negative coefficient of CSURV indicates that the companies that complied with the 
NZSC recommendations and survived the sampling period had incurred high costs to comply, 
which had a negative effect on financial performance.  
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Table 6.4:  
OLS Regression of Tobin’s Q. MB, ROA and ROE on Ownership and Control 
Variables 
 Q MB ROA ROE 
  
Standard 
Error  
 
Standard 
Error  
 
Standard 
Error  
 Standard 
Error  
Const. 
1.28*** 
(7.46) 
0.171 
0.82*** 
(5.02) 
0.164 
0.07*** 
(4.15) 
0.017 
0.52*** 
(9.44) 
0.055 
IOWN 
0.07 
(1.07) 
0.062 
-0.11 
(-1.80) 
0.060 
-0.01 
(-0.23) 
0.006 
0.01 
(0.63) 
0.020 
BOWN 
0.13++ 
(2.02) 
0.064 
0.22++ 
(3.50) 
0.062 
0.01 
(0.99) 
0.006 
-0.02 
(-0.79) 
0.020 
NED 
-0.05 
(-0.79) 
0.068 
0.01 
(0.06) 
0.066 
-0.01 
(-1.27) 
0.007 
0.00 
(0.09) 
0.022 
BDS 
-0.17 
(-1.31) 
0.128 
-0.15 
(-1.25) 
0.123 
-0.00 
(-0.14) 
0.013 
0.01 
(0.12) 
0.041 
FD 
0.43++ 
(3.39) 
0.127 
0.25† 
(2.05) 
0.121 
0.03† 
(2.56) 
0.013 
0.04 
(0.95) 
0.041 
ACOM 
0.01 
(0.12) 
0.063 
-0.02 
(-0.38) 
0.060 
-0.03 
(-0.51) 
0.006 
0.02 
(0.11) 
0.020 
RCOM 
0.19*** 
(3.64) 
0.051 
0.09† 
(1.97) 
0.051 
0.04 
(0.60) 
0.005 
-0.01 
(-0.16) 
0.017 
LEV 
0.05 
(0.92) 
0.054 
0.23*** 
(4.53) 
0.051 
-0.02*** 
(-3.39) 
0.005 
-0.01 
(-0.19) 
0.017 
DIV2TA 
1.07++ 
(2.55) 
0.418 
1.38++ 
(3.45) 
0.401 
0.29*** 
(7.04) 
0.042 
1.44++ 
(3.12) 
0.413 
Log(TA) 
-0.14*** 
(-6.10) 
0.022 
-0.11*** 
(-4.97) 
0.021 
-0.05*** 
(-3.78) 
0.002 
-0.05† 
(-1.99) 
0.025 
FMRISK 
0.03 
(0.36) 
0.081 
0.13 
(1.74) 
0.078 
0.01 
(1.20) 
0.008 
0.02 
(0.80) 
0.026 
BUSRIS
K 
0.24*** 
(3.58) 
0.067 
0.12 
(1.84) 
0.064 
-0.00 
(-0.54) 
0.007 
-0.02 
(-0.74) 
0.021 
ComAft 
0.09*** 
(3.48) 
0.026 
0.11*** 
(4.33) 
0.025 
0.01† 
(2.55) 
0.003 
0.08++ 
(2.70) 
0.029 
CSURV 
-0.05 
(-1.32) 
0.037 
-0.02 
(-0.56) 
0.036 
-0.01 
(-1.47) 
0.004 
-0.01 
(-0.45) 
0.012 
RGDP 
-1.19 
(-0.86) 
1.372 
-0.15 
(-0.11) 
1.314 
0.15 
(1.10) 
0.137 
0.75 
(1.71) 
0.439 
Industry  
Dummy46 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
F 17.46 
(0.000) 
 12.17 
(0.000) 
 14.77 
(0.000) 
 2.22 
(0.002) 
 
R2 0.54  0.45   0.49  0.13  
N 340  340  340  340  
*** denotes coefficient is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed); ++ denotes coefficient is significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed); † 
denotes coefficient is significant at 0.1 level (2-tailed). Standard errors are also provided for each variable. 
                                                 
46
 The OLS regression results of the industry dummy variables are reported in Appendix H, Table 2. 
171 
 
Alternatively, these companies already had good monitoring mechanisms in place and 
compliance with the NZSC recommendations was not highly valued by the market.  
In summary, the OLS regression supports the hypothesis that blockholding (BOWN), 
R\remuneration committee (RCOM), gender diversity (FD), dividend payouts (DIV2TA) and 
complying with the NZSC recommendations after 2003 do have a positive effect on company 
financial performance. Therefore the hypotheses regarding blockholding (H2b), gender 
diversity (H5b), remuneration committee (H6d) and dividend payout (H8b) are supported. 
However, the hypotheses regarding insider ownership (H1b), board independence (H3b), 
board size (H4b), audit committee (H6c), and leverage (H7b) are not supported. The 
Sheffield survey shows that managers in New Zealand are often rewarded for reasons other 
than meeting performance targets, which points to insider ownership not being linked to 
company financial performance in New Zealand (Gunasekarage & Reed, 2008; Hembry, 
2008). There is evidence that governance practices in certain industries (IND1, IND2, IND3 
and IND6) have contributed negatively towards large cap companies‟ financial performance 
measured by Tobin‟s Q. There is evidence that governance practices in IND5 have 
contributed positively towards financial performance measured by Tobin‟s Q. This evidence 
supports the view that the principle-based governance approach has allowed industry-specific 
governance structures to be developed. However, the results show that the industry-specific 
governance structures have both positive and negative effects on financial performance 
measured by Tobin‟s Q. There is consistent evidence of company size having a negative 
effect on financial performance. 
The next stage of the analysis looks at whether there is any evidence of a piecewise 
relationship between insider ownership and company financial performance, similar to the 
studies of Morck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990). 
6.1.5 PIECEWISE REGRESSIONS 
In a recent survey, Denis and  McConnell (2003)  show that there is no consensus about the 
linearity of the relationship between ownership structure and financial performance. 
However, past studies have reported the relationship to be either linear (Elayan et al., 2003; 
Hossain et al., 2001; Kim et al., 1988; Welch, 2003) or non-monotonic (Davies et al., 2005; 
McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Morck et al., 1988). Following on this view, this study also 
investigates whether a piecewise linear relationship exists between insider ownership and 
financial performance in New Zealand as was reported by Morck et al. (1988) and 
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McConnell and Servaes (1990) using the US data and Hossain et al. (2001) for New Zealand 
data. The results of Equation 3 are reported in Table 6.5 and show that there is no evidence of 
a piecewise relationship between insider ownership in large companies in New Zealand and 
financial performance. However, the coefficient of OVER20 (insiders holding over 20% 
shares in the company) is positive and statistically significant at 10% level. This result 
indicates that insider owners with large blockholdings provide better monitoring which has a 
positive effect on financial performance, measured by MB.   
Similar to Morck at al. it was investigated whether a quadratic relationship exists between 
ownership and performance. The results of squared and cubed IOWN (IOWN
2
, IOWN
3
) and 
squared and cubed BOWN (BOWN
2
, BOWN
3
) were insignificant. In summary, the results of 
the OLS regression in Tables 6.3, 6.4 and 6.5 provide consistent evidence that insider 
ownership is not an effective mechanism to control managerial behaviour in large New 
Zealand companies.  This is not surprising, as Hembry (2008) reports that there is no link 
between pay and performance in New Zealand.  
The other results in Table 6.5 are similar to the results reported in Tables 6.3 and 6.4. There is 
consistent evidence that BOWN, FD, DIV2TA and compliance with NZSC recommendations 
after 2003 have had a positive effect on financial performance. There is evidence that having 
remuneration committees has also been beneficial in terms of aligning performance of 
management and has a positive effect on company financial performance measured by 
Tobin‟s Q. Also, there is evidence that leverage has a positive effect on financial performance 
measured by MB and ROE. However, companies that were present in all the years since 1999 
and also complied with NZSC recommendations did not exhibit a positive effect on their 
financial performance associated with CSURV. There is also consistent evidence of company 
size (Log(TA)) having a negative effect on performance company financial performance.  
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Table 6.5:  
Piecewise Regression: OLS Regression of Tobin’s Q, MB, ROA and ROE on Ownership 
and Control Variables 
 Q MB ROA ROE 
  
Standard 
Error 
 
Standard 
Error 
 
Standard 
Error 
 
Standard 
Error 
Const. 
1.13*** 
(75.66) 
0.199 
0.76*** 
(4.05) 
0.188 
0.08*** 
(4.15) 
0.020 
0.34 
(1.54) 
0.221 
IOWN 
-0.01 
(-1.05) 
0.098 
-0.24++ 
(-2.58) 
0.093 
-0.02 
(-1.86) 
0.010 
-0.01 
(-0.15) 
0.109 
LESS1 
0.01 
(0.11) 
0.093 
0.12 
(1.38) 
0.088 
-0.01 
(-1.54) 
0.009 
-0.04 
(-0.40) 
 
0.104 
BT15 
-0.03 
(-0.31) 
0.092 
0.07 
(0.79) 
0.087 
-0.01 
(-1.69) 
0.009 
-0.06 
(-0.56) 
0.102 
BT510 
0.03 
(0.29) 
0.107 
0.07 
(0.65) 
0.101 
-0.02 
(-1.69) 
0.011 
-0.11 
(-0.93) 
0.119 
BT1020 
0.06 
(0.63) 
0.096 
0.09 
(0.96) 
0.091 
-0.01 
(-0.76) 
0.010 
-0.04 
(-0.36) 
0.107 
OVER20 
0.10 
(1.05) 
0.096 
0.19† 
(2.05) 
0.090 
-0.00 
(-0.33) 
0.009 
-0.03 
(-0.27) 
0.079 
BOWN 
0.18++ 
(2.59) 
0.071 
0.23++ 
(3.43) 
0.067 
0.01 
(0.59) 
0.007 
-0.05 
(-0.67) 
0.020 
NED 
-0.04 
(-0.61) 
0.069 
0.01 
(0.15) 
0.066 
-0.01 
(-0.93) 
0.007 
-0.01 
(-0.09) 
0.077 
BDS 
-0.21 
(-1.56) 
0.132 
-0.20 
(-1.58) 
0.125 
0.02 
(0.21) 
0.013 
0.06 
(0.39) 
0.146 
FD 
0.41*** 
(3.11) 
0.131 
0.20 
(1.65) 
0.124 
0.03++ 
(2.54) 
0.012 
0.20 
(1.37) 
0.145 
ACOM 
0.01 
(0.12) 
0.063 
-0.01 
(-0.20) 
0.060 
-0.02 
(-0.33) 
0.006 
0.01 
(0.13) 
0.070 
RCOM 
0.20*** 
(3.67) 
0.055 
0.09 
(1.70) 
0.051 
0.04 
(0.76) 
0.005 
-0.01 
(-0.23) 
0.060 
LEV 
0.05 
(0.94) 
0.054 
0.23*** 
(4.42) 
0.051 
-0.02*** 
(-3.67) 
0.005 
0.07 
(1.14) 
0.060 
DIV2TA 
1.00++ 
(2.37) 
0.423 
1.38*** 
(3.45) 
0.400 
0.29*** 
(6.89) 
0.042 
1.43++ 
(3.05) 
0.493 
Log(TA) 
-0.13*** 
(-5.55) 
0.024 
-0.11*** 
(-5.02) 
0.022 
-0.01*** 
(-3.54) 
0.002 
-0.05† 
(-2.05) 
0.026 
FMRISK 
0.02 
(0.28) 
0.083 
0.13 
(1.71) 
0.078 
0.01 
(1.47) 
0.008 
0.07 
(0.85) 
0.092 
BUSRISK 
0.26*** 
(3.79) 
0.068 
0.14† 
(2.20) 
0.064 
-0.01 
(-0.35) 
0.007 
-0.03 
(-0.46) 
0.075 
ComAft 
0.10*** 
(3.53) 
0.027 
0.12*** 
(4.52) 
0.025 
0.01++ 
(2.75) 
0.002 
0.08++ 
(2.85) 
0.029 
CSURV 
-0.05 
(-1.20) 
0.039 
-0.03 
(-0.74) 
0.036 
-0.01 
(-1.76) 
0.004 
-0.03 
(-0.70) 
0.043 
RGDP 
-1.09 
(-0.79) 
1.381 
-0.28 
(-0.21) 
1.304 
0.14 
(1.05) 
0.136 
1.87 
(1.22) 
1.530 
Industry 
Dummy47 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
F 14.21 
(0.000) 
 10.48 
(0.000) 
 12.47 
(0.000) 
 1.85 
(0.008) 
 
R2 0.54  0.47   0.51  0.14  
N 340  340  340  340  
*** denotes coefficient is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed); ++ denotes coefficient is significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed); † 
denotes coefficient is significant at 0.1 level (2-tailed). Standard errors are also provided for each variable. 
 
                                                 
47
 The OLS regression results of the industry dummy variables are reported in Appendix I, Table 1. 
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6.1.6 OLS REGRESSION OF THE DIFFERENCE IN TOBIN’S Q 
(BETWEEN 2003 AND 2007) ON OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL 
VARIABLES 
Table 6.6 shows the regression results for Equation 4. The dependent variable for 2003 is the 
average of Tobin‟s Q for the years 2000 to 2003 which was regressed on company data for 
2003. The dependent variable for 2007 is the average of the Tobin‟s Q for the year 2004 to 
2007 which was regressed on company data for 2007. The dependent variable DiffAvQ is the 
difference between AvQ(2007) and AvQ(2003). DiffAvQ measures whether the companies 
that complied with NZSC recommendations in 2007 created positive value compared to the 
companies in 2003. The average of AvQ(2003) is 2.49 and for AvQ(2007) is 3.58 and for 
DiffAvQ it is 1.09. Since DiffAvQ is positive it shows that companies in 2007, on average, 
have created more value than in 2003.  
The results in columns 4 and 6 of Table 6.6 suggest that only RCOM has a positive 
coefficient which is statistically significant at 5% confidence level. The results for the 
variable FMRISK is positive and significant at 1% confidence level, thus indicate that 
shareholder value was created by taking extra risk. The results show that an increase in 
company value in 2007 has been influenced by the establishment of remuneration committees 
and also taking risk.  Therefore, remuneration committee is seen to be an important 
mechanism for reducing agency cost related to setting managers‟ remuneration in large 
companies in New Zealand. 
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Table 6.6: 
OLS Regression Estimates Using AvQ(2003), AvQ2007 and FPdiffAV as the Dependent 
Variables 
 AvQ(2003) AvQ(2007) FPdiffAV 
  
Standard  
Error  
 
Standard  
Error  
 
Standard  
Error  
Const. 
0.35 
(0.62 
0.560 
1.83*** 
(4.82) 
0.385 
2.25*** 
(3.04) 
0.753 
IOWN 
0.45 
(1.80) 
0.247 
0.11 
(0.44) 
0.247 
-1.07 
(-1.80) 
0.356 
BOWN 
0.19 
(0.79) 
0.243 
-0.09 
(-0.43) 
0.231 
-0.07 
(-0.15) 
0.406 
NED 
-0.12 
(-0.59) 
0.240 
0.28 
(1.19) 
0.236 
-0.58 
(-1.63) 
0.365 
BDS 
0.19 
(0.40) 
0.260 
-0.35 
(-0.76) 
0.465 
-0.75 
(-0.97) 
0.77 
FD 
0.21 
(0.39) 
0.548 
1.45** 
(2.62) 
0.551 
0.46 
(0.56) 
0.802 
ACOM 
0.14 
(0.76) 
0.190 
-0.31 
(-1.04) 
0.437 
-0.09 
(-1.08) 
0.237 
RCOM 
0.24 
(1.06) 
0.227 
0.42** 
(2.71) 
0.157 
0.48** 
(2.01) 
0.297 
LEV 
0.14 
(0.55) 
0.256 
0.19 
(0.60) 
0.322 
0.22 
(0.46) 
0.480 
DIV2TA 
3.41++ 
(3.83) 
0.890 
0.06 
(0.22) 
0.287 
0.16 
(0.67) 
0.254 
Log(TA) 
-0.10 
(-0.99 
0.090 
-0.32*** 
(-5.16) 
0.041 
-2.14*** 
(-2.33) 
0.081 
FMRISK 
0.01 
(0.12) 
0.060 
0.18*** 
(4.41) 
0.040 
0.32*** 
(3.52) 
0.065 
BUSRISK 
1.06*** 
(3.45) 
0.768 
-11.23 
(-1.41) 
0.816 
-1.58 
(-0.61) 
0.089 
CSURV 
-0.40 
(-0.20) 
0.478 
-0.01 
(-0.07) 
0.119 
0.02 
(0.45) 
0.176 
F 
4.12 
(0.001) 
 
8.81 
(0.000) 
 
1.56 
(0.155) 
 
Adj. R2 (R2) 0.53 (0.69)  0.60 (0.73)   0.16 (0.30)  
N 38  38  38  
*** denotes coefficient is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed); ++ denotes coefficient is significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed); † 
denotes coefficient is significant at 0.1 level (2-tailed). Standard errors are also provided for each variable. 
6.1.7 ROBUSTNESS 
The test for the consistency of the OLS regression for large cap companies was undertaken 
by Wu-Hausman F test, similar to the method reported for small cap companies in Chapter 5 
176 
 
(refer to pages 147-149). The results reported in Tables 6.7(a) and 6.7(b) for the test E(xit.eit) 
≠ 0 has high p-values, suggesting the regressor insider ownership is not exogenous. 
Therefore, the analysis rejects the null hypothesis that OLS regression is consistent. To 
overcome the effect of endogeneity of the insider ownership the 2SLS regression method 
with instrumental variables is employed. Studies undertaken by Demsetz (1983), Demsetz 
and Lehn (1985), Himmelberg et al. (1999),  Palia (2001) and Gugler and Weigand (2003) 
show that problems arise with OLS regression if two or more variables are jointly 
endogenous. They argue that company ownership and financial performance are explained by 
common company characteristics, some of which are unobservable, and the omission of these 
unobservable characteristics in the value model leads to biased conclusions regarding the 
influence of ownership on value because of the relationship between the former and the 
omitted variables (Pindado & de la Torre, 2009). Himmelberg et al. argue that the existence 
of intangible assets and competitive advantage in the product market increases corporate 
value, and leads to higher levels of insider ownership so as to align incentives and to control 
for managerial discretion. Therefore, omission of intangible assets and market power makes 
insider ownership an endogenous variable in the value model, since the correlations between 
the error term and the ownership variable will exist (i.e. E(xit.ut ≠ 0).  
Himmelberg et al. (1999) also argue that if size and leverage are omitted from the value 
model, ownership will be endogenous because both have a negative influence on ownership. 
In fact, size is negatively related to ownership because the larger the company, the larger the 
capital resources that will be required to own a given fraction of the company (Demsetz & 
Lehn, 1985). Moreover, the negative effect of debt on ownership is the result of the higher 
risk associated to a given stake in a more leveraged company, and of the natural risk aversion 
of owners‟ need for more capital resources (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Stulz, 1988). Similar to 
Himmelberg et al. the problem of endogeneity of insider ownership in large cap companies is 
controlled by treating intangible assets, marketshare, Log(REV), leverage and business risk 
as instrumental variables. The panel data methodology allows control for heterogeneity 
through the individual effect, in which the common determinant of ownership and value is 
included. However, if an endogeneity problem stems from the lack of consideration of the 
potential inverse causality, then ownership variables will be correlated with random 
disturbances (i.e., E(xit. eit) ≠ 0), once the individual effect has been controlled for. The test 
for E(xit.uit) ≠ 0 for the validity of the instrumental variables is reported in Table 6.7 (c). The 
F statistic has a value of 5.83 which is greater than the critical value of rejection of a 5% 
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nominal Wald Test which equals to 4.84
48
, showing that the instruments are valid and 
therefore rejecting the null hypothesis that instruments are weak. The test for the 
overidentifying restrictions for the excluded variables shows that the instruments are valid. 
The p-values for both Sargan and Basmann Chi
2
 statistics are high, therefore accepting the 
null hypothesis, and indicating that instruments are valid. This provides evidence that the 
effect of the unobservable values in the model have been captured by the instrumental 
variables, therefore rejecting the hypothesis that E(xit.ut ≠ 0). The argument by Demsetz and 
Lehn that insider ownership does not affect financial performance is supported. 
As with the insider ownership case, Gugler and Weigand (2003) suggest that ownership 
concentration is also a relevant feature of the ownership structure that causes endogeneity. 
Therefore, a similar test to that described above was undertaken for block ownership.  The 
Wu-Hausman F test results reported in Tables 6.8(a) and 6.8(b) for E(xit. eit) ≠ 0)  shows that 
p-values are high, and the regressor block ownership is not exogenous. Therefore, the 
analysis rejects the null hypothesis that OLS regression is consistent. Therefore, 2SLS 
regression is used with the same instrumental variables as described for insider ownership  to 
overcome the problem of endogeneity of block ownership.  
The results for the validity of the instrumental variables (Marketshare, intangibles2ta, 
Log(REV), LEV and BUSRISK) are given in the Table 6.8c. The results show that  the F 
statistic has a value of 9.68 which is greater than the critical value of rejection of a 5% 
nominal Wald Test equal to 4.84
49
, showing that instruments are valid and therefore rejecting 
the null hypothesis that instruments are weak. The test for the overidentifying restrictions for 
the excluded variables shows that the instruments are valid. The p-values for both Sargan and 
Basmann Chi
2
 statistic are high, sustaining the null hypothesis, and indicating that 
instruments are valid. This provides evidence that the effect of the unobservable values in the 
model have been captured by the instrumental variables, therefore rejecting the hypothesis 
that E(xit.ut ≠ 0). This provides evidence that the effect of the unobservable values in the 
model have been captured by these variables, therefore rejecting the hypothesis that E(xit.ut ≠ 
0). The argument by Demsetz and Lehn that block ownership does not affect performance is 
supported.  
                                                 
48
 Refer to Appendix K, Table 1 for the details of the test for the validity of the instrumental variables used. 
49
 Refer to Appendix M, Table 1 for the details of the test for the validity of the instrumental variables used 
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6.1.8 OLS AND 2SLS REGRESSION RESULTS  
The results of the OLS and 2SLS regression are presented in Tables 6.7 and 6.8. Table 6.7 
shows OLS and 2SLS regression results for IOWN. The OLS regression for IOWN shows 
consistent results across all four financial performance measures (Q, MB, ROA and ROE), 
that is, BOWN, LEV and BUSRISK have positive coefficients and are statistically significant 
at 5% level. This supports the view that the presence of blockholders leads to higher insider 
ownership. This could be the case when initial owners take board roles or the blockholder 
representatives take board positions. The positive coefficient of LEV suggests that 
debtholders have incentive to monitor management and therefore, agree to policies that 
reward company insiders with share bonuses to encourage them to work in the interest of the 
company. This supports the findings of  Crutchley and Hansen (1989) that leverage and 
insider ownership are jointly determined. The positive coefficient of BUSRISK suggests that 
there is a positive link between risk and company financial performance. The coefficient of 
Log(REV) is negative and is statistically significant at 1% level. This suggests that insider 
ownership is inversely related to sales, that is, the fraction of shares owned by insiders is 
small compared to total shares issued.  
When insider ownership is considered to be endogenous, variable IOWN* (predicted values 
of IOWN) is not statistically significant across all financial performance measures. The 
coefficients of 2SLS regression for the independent variables are reported in columns 4 and 8 
of Tables 6.7(a) and 6.7(b), respectively. Only coefficients of the variables BOWN, RCOM, 
DIV2TA and Comaft are positive and are statistically significant at 5% level. This confirms 
the findings reported in Tables 6.3, 6.4, and 6.5 that the presence of blockholding, a 
remuneration committee, dividend payouts and compliance with NZSC recommendations 
leads to an improvement in large cap company financial performance. The results indicate 
that BOWN, RCOM and DIV2TA are effective mechanisms in controlling agency costs in 
large companies in New Zealand. The negative coefficient of BDS suggests that board size is 
not optimal in large companies in New Zealand. The average board size of seven members is 
regarded to be optimal for companies in the US, however, in New Zealand, companies are 
much smaller and a board size smaller than seven could be optimal.  The negative 
coefficients of the industry dummy variables IND2, IND3 and IND6 suggest that the 
variation in company financial performance can be explained by the variation in corporate 
practices across different industries. Based on the results reported in Tables 6.7(a) and 6.7(b), 
only hypotheses H1d, H6d, and H8b are supported.  
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Table 6.7(a): 
OLS and 2SLS Regression Results 
 
IOWN 
(using 
OLS) 
Standard 
Error 
Q 
(using 
2SLS) 
Standard 
Error 
IOWN 
(using 
OLS) 
Standard 
Error 
MB 
(using 
2SLS) 
Standard 
Error  
Const. 
0.11 
(0.96) 
0.110 
0.78*** 
(4.73) 
0.166 
0.18 
(1.68) 
0.109 
0.50++ 
(3.23) 
0.154 
Q 
0.13++ 
(3.18) 
0.042 
 
 
 
 
 
0.335 
MB   
 
 
0.02 
(0.39) 
0.048 
 
 
IOWN*   
-0.00 
(-0.02) 
0.065 
 
 
-0.03 
(-0.57) 
0.059 
BOWN 
0.27++ 
(4.21) 
0.064 
0.21++ 
(3.09) 
0.068 
0.28*** 
(4.36) 
0.065 
0.19+ 
(2.90) 
0.065 
NED 
0.03 
(0.52) 
0.063 
-0.11 
(-1.48) 
0.073 
0.01 
(0.21) 
0.063 
-0.03 
(-0.46) 
0.068 
BDS 
0.10 
(0.81) 
0.121 
-0.48*** 
(-3.77) 
0.127 
0.11 
(0.86) 
0.123 
-0.36++ 
(-3.01) 
0.119 
FD   
0.14 
(1.05) 
0.130 
 
 
0.17 
(1.38) 
0.120 
ACOM   
-0.00 
(-0.02) 
0.067 
 
 
0.01 
(0.07) 
0.063 
RCOM   
0.17++ 
(3.09) 
0.056 
 
 
0.12† 
(2.30) 
0.052 
LEV 
0.11† 
(2.22) 
0.048 
 
 
0.10† 
(2.07) 
0.050 
 
 
DIV2TA   
1.72*** 
(4.12) 
0.430 
 
 
1.62*** 
(4.09) 
0.396 
Log 
(REV) 
-0.07*** 
(-3.66) 
0.020 
 
 
-0.08*** 
(-3.86) 
0.020 
 
 
FM 
RISK 
  
-0.03 
(-0.35) 
0.081 
 
 
0.09 
(1.15) 
0.075 
BUS 
RISK 
0.14++ 
(2.35) 
0.061 
 
 
0.19++ 
(3.08) 
0.061 
 
 
ComAft   
0.07++ 
(2.35) 
0.028 
 
 
0.09++ 
(3.48) 
0.026 
CSURV   
-0.03 
(-0.86) 
0.040 
 
 
-0.04 
(-1.01) 
0.037 
RGDP   
-0.35 
(-0.23) 
1.481 
 
 
0.47 
(0.35) 
1.367 
Market 
share 
-0.01 
(-0.31) 
0.021   -0.01 
(-0.51) 
0.012   
Intangible
2ta 
-0.02 
(-0.42) 
0.038   0.01 
(0.23) 
0.039   
Industry 
Dummy50 
  
Yes    Yes 
 
F 5.78 
(0.000) 
 14.53 
(0.000) 
 4.54 
(0.000) 
 11.42 
(0.000) 
 
Test E(xit. 
eit) ≠ 0) 
  F(1, 
539)=0.40 
Prob>F = 
0.0695 
   F(1, 539)= 
0.32 
Prob>F = 
0.5724 
 
R2 0.14  0.45  .11  0.39  
N 562  562  562  562  
IOWN* denote predicted values, *** denotes coefficient is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed); ++ denotes coefficient is significant at 0.05 
level (2-tailed); † denotes coefficient is significant at 0.1level (2-tailed). Standard errors are also provided for each variable. 
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 The OLS regression results of the industry dummy variables are reported in Appendix I, Table 2. 
180 
 
Table 6.7(b):  
OLS and 2SLS Regression Results 
 
IOWN 
(using 
OLS) 
Standard 
Error 
ROA 
(using 
2SLS) 
Standard 
Error 
IOWN 
(using 
OLS) 
Standard 
Error 
ROE 
(using 
2SLS) 
Standard 
Error  
Const. 
0.14 
(1.22) 
0.111 
0.03 
(0.89) 
0.016 
0.10 
(0.70) 
0.178 
0.49*** 
(9.81) 
0.049 
ROA 
0.90† 
(1.98) 
0.457 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ROE   
 
 
0.17 
(0.95) 
0.178 
 
 
IOWN*   
-0.01 
(-0.53) 
0.006 
 
 
-0.00 
(-0.05) 
0.019 
BOWN 
0.29*** 
(4.47) 
0.064 
0.01† 
(1.95) 
0.007 
0.29*** 
(4.46) 
0.064 
-0.01 
(-0.60) 
0.020 
NED 
0.03 
(0.54) 
0.064 
-0.01 
(-1.62) 
0.007 
0.01 
(0.22) 
0.063 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.022 
BDS 
0.11 
(0.90) 
0.122 
-0.02 
(-1.79) 
0.012 
0.10 
(0.84)) 
0.123 
-0.01 
(-0.36) 
0.038 
FD   
0.01 
(0.30) 
0.013 
 
 
0.02 
(0.46) 
0.038 
ACOM   
-0.01 
(-1.02) 
0.007 
 
 
-0.01 
(-0.20) 
0.020 
RCOM   
0.00 
(0.46) 
0.006 
 
 
-0.00 
(-0.11) 
0.017 
LEV 
0.14++ 
(2.69) 
0.051 
 
 
0.11† 
(2.20) 
0.049 
 
 
DIV2TA   
0.38*** 
(8.89) 
0.043 
 
 
0.25† 
(2.36) 
0.008 
Log 
(REV) 
-0.08*** 
(-3.94) 
0.020 
 
 
-0.08*** 
(-3.82) 
0.020 
 
 
FM 
RISK 
  
-0.01 
 (-0.40) 
0.008 
 
 
0.01 
(0.24) 
0.024 
BUS 
RISK 
0.18++ 
(3.07) 
0.060 
 
 
0.19++ 
(3.18) 
0.060 
 
 
ComAft   
0.01† 
(2.24) 
0.003 
 
 
0.02† 
(2.36) 
0.008 
CSURV   
-0.01 
(-1.54) 
0.004 
 
 
-0.01 
(-0.51) 
0.012 
RGDP   
0.18 
(1.26) 
0.146 
 
 
0.78 
(1.78) 
0.438 
Market 
share 
-0.01 
(-0.47) 
0.012   -0.01 
(-0.57) 
0.012   
Intangible 
2ta 
0.01 
(0.34) 
0.038   0.01 
(0.25) 
0.039   
Industry  
Dummy51 
  
Yes    Yes 
 
F 5.01 
(0.000) 
 12.49 
(0.000) 
 4.63 
(0.000) 
 0.98 
(0.4870) 
 
R2 0.12  0.41  0.11  0.06  
Test E(xit. eit) 
≠ 0) 
  F(1, 321) = 
0.28 
Prob>F = 
0.5961 
   F(1, 321) = 
0.00 
Prob>F = 
0.9640 
 
N 340  340  340  340  
IOWN* denote predicted values, *** denotes coefficient is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed); ++ denotes coefficient is 
significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed); † denotes coefficient is significant at 0.1 level (2-tailed). Standard errors are also 
provided for each variable. 
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 The OLS regression results of the industry dummy variables are reported in Appendix J, Table 1. 
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In summary,  the findings support the Sheffield survey undertaken in 2007 that there is no 
link between insider ownership and financial performance in New Zealand because chief 
executives in New Zealand are awarded performance payments for reasons other than 
meeting financial performance targets (Hembry, 2008).  
The coefficients of the independent variables for the OLS regression for BOWN are given in 
columns 2 and 6 of Tables 6.8(a) and 6.8(b). The results are consistent across all four 
financial performance measures (Q, MB, ROA and ROE). The results for the variables 
IOWN, BDS, and Log(REV) are statistically significant and the positive coefficient of 
variables suggests the presence of these variables  leads to a higher level of blockholding in 
large companies in New Zealand. The positive coefficient of the variable IOWN indicates 
that insider ownership contributes positively towards blockholding. This could be the result 
of initial owners holding large block of shares after the company goes public and also taking 
up board positions, thus supporting the relationship between insider ownership and 
blockholding. The result is statistically significant at a 1% level. The positive coefficient of 
BDS indicates that large board size is positively associated with higher level of blockholding. 
This could be the result of outside blockholders or their representative taking board positions, 
thus supporting the board size and blockholding relationship. The result is statistically 
significant at a 1% level. The positive coefficient of Log(REV) suggests that high level of 
sales is positively associated with higher level of blockholding. The result is statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  
In summary, the OLS and 2SLS regression of the two ownership variables (IOWN and 
BOWN) show consistent results across all financial performance measures. The effect of 
insider ownership on financial performance is insignificant, supporting the findings of the 
survey undertaken by Sheffield in 2007, that there is no link between pay and financial 
performance in New Zealand. This supports the findings of Demsetz (1983), Demsetz and 
Lehn (1985), Himmelberg et al. (1999) and Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), that company 
financial performance is better explained by governance mechanisms other than insider 
ownership. However, the OLS and 2SLS regressions for blockholding show consistent 
results. Both OLS  (Tables 6.3 and 6.4) and 2SLS regression results (Table 6.7(a) show that 
blockholding contributes positively towards company financial performance measured by 
Tobin‟s Q, and MB  , and therefore can be regarded as an effective mechanism to mitigate 
agency problems in large companies in New Zealand. Table 6.7(b) also show that 
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blockholding contributes positively to financial performance measured by ROA, however,  
this result is significant only at 10 percent level only. This results does not support the 
findings of Demsetz (1983), Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Himmelberg et al. (1999) and 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001). The findings for BOWN support the view that blockholders 
are vigilant in monitoring agency costs in large publicly listed companies in New Zealand, 
and therefore higher levels of blockholding lead to improved company financial performance 
measured by Tobin‟s Q, MB, and ROA. The results are consistent across different financial 
performance measures (Q, MB, and ROA) and also for OLS (for financial performance 
measured by Tobin‟s Q and MB only ) and 2SLS regressions. The results show that RCOM, 
DIV2TA have a positive effect on financial performance. The results also suggest that the 
large companies that complied with NZSC recommendations after 2003 experienced a 
positive effect on financial performance.  
Both OLS and 2SLS results reveal that board independence is not an optimal mechanism in 
dealing with the agency problem in large companies in New Zealand. The BDS has a 
negative coefficient and is statistically significant for the financial performance measures 
Tobin‟s Q and MB. This indicates that large boards have been ineffective in monitoring 
manager performance and achieving long-term strategic goals.   
The findings provided in Table 6.5 do not support Morck et al. (1988), McConnell and 
Servaes (1990) and Short and Keasey (1999) indicating that there is a piecewise linear 
relationship between insider ownership and financial performance in New Zealand large 
companies. Overall, the results support the view that compliance with NZSC 
recommendations has had a positive effect on performance of large publicly listed 
companies. The results support the view that variation in company financial performance is 
explained by factors other than insider ownership. 
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Table 6.8(a):  
OLS and 2SLS Regression Results 
 
BOWN 
(using 
OLS) 
Standard 
Error 
Q 
(using  
2SLS) 
Standard 
Error 
BOWN 
(using 
OLS) 
Standard 
Error 
MB 
(using 
2SLS) 
Standard 
Error  
Const. 
0.01 
(0.12) 
0.093 
0.84*** 
(5.21) 
0.161 
0.01 
(0.05) 
0.091 
0.57*** 
(3.75) 
0.152 
Q 
0.03 
(0.78) 
0.036 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MB   
 
 
0.07 
(1.83) 
0.039 
 
 
IOWN* 
0.19*** 
(4.21) 
0.045 
0.23*** 
(3.83) 
0.059 
0.19*** 
(4.36) 
0.044 
0.06 
(1.05) 
0.056 
BOWN   
0.16† 
(2.10) 
0.077 
 
 
0.12 
(1.58) 
0.073 
NED 
-0.06 
(-1.14) 
0.053 
-0.12 
(-1.60) 
0.073 
-0.06 
(-1.16) 
0.052 
-0.04 
(-0.62) 
0.069 
BDS 
0.35++ 
(3.06) 
0.100 
-0.41++ 
(-3.30) 
0.123 
0.30++ 
(3.02) 
0.100 
-0.28++ 
(-2.43) 
0.116 
FD   
0.02 
(1.58) 
0.128 
 
 
0.20 
(1.63) 
0.121 
ACOM   
0.04 
(0.59) 
0.066 
 
 
0.02 
(0.25) 
0.062 
RCOM   
0.19++ 
(3.51) 
0.055 
 
 
0.12† 
(2.35) 
0.052 
LEV 
-0.18*** 
(-4.40) 
0.017 
 
 
-0.19*** 
(-4.67) 
0.040 
 
 
DIV2TA   
1.94*** 
(4.58) 
0.423 
 
 
1.70*** 
(4.25) 
0.400 
Log 
(REV) 
0.08*** 
(4.90) 
0.017 
 
 
0.08*** 
(4.87) 
0.017 
 
 
FM 
RISK 
  
-0.01 
(-0.15) 
0.079 
 
 
0.11 
(1.48) 
0.075 
BUS 
RISK 
0.02 
(0.47) 
0.052 
 
 
0.02 
(0.39) 
0.051 
 
 
ComAft   
0.07++ 
(2.40) 
0.028 
 
 
0.09++ 
(3.51) 
0.026 
CSURV   
-0.06 
(-1.46) 
0.039 
 
 
-0.05 
(-1.27) 
0.037 
RGDP   
-0.45 
(-0.31 
1.455 
 
 
0.35 
(0.25) 
1.375 
Market 
share 
-0.02† 
(-2.27) 
0.010   -0.02† 
(-2.11) 
0.010   
Intangible
2ta 
-0.06 
(-1.73) 
0.033   -0.05 
(-1.51) 
0.032   
Industry 
Dummy52 
  
Yes    Yes 
 
F 10.74 
(0.000) 
 15.68 
(0.000) 
 11.13 
(0.000) 
 11.03 
(0.000) 
 
Test E(xit. 
eit) ≠ 0) 
  F(1, 321) = 
4.40 
Prob>F = 
0.0567 
   F(1, 321)= 
2.48 
Prob>F = 
0.1160 
 
R2 0.23  0.45  .24  0.38  
N 340  340  562  340  
BOWN* denote predicted values, *** denotes coefficient is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed); ++ denotes coefficient is 
significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed); † denotes coefficient is significant at 0.1 level (2-tailed). Standard errors are also 
provided for each variable.  
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 The OLS regression results of the industry dummy variables are reported in Appendix L, Table 1. 
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Table 6.8(b):   
OLS and 2SLS Regression Results 
 
BOWN 
(using 
OLS) 
Standard 
Error 
ROA 
(using 
2SLS) 
Standard 
Error 
BOWN 
(using 
OLS) 
Standard 
Error 
ROE 
(using 
2SLS) 
Standard 
Error 
Const. 
0.04 
(0.45) 
0.093 
0.04† 
(2.23) 
0.016 
0.09 
(0.73) 
0.119 
0.48*** 
(9.84) 
0.048 
ROA 
-0.24 
(-0.62) 
0.384       
ROE     
-0.11 
(-0.75) 
0.148   
IOWN 
0.20++ 
(4.47) 
0.045 
0.01 
(0.78) 
0.066 
0.20*** 
(4.46) 
0.044 
0.01 
(0.76) 
0.018 
BOWN*   
0.01 
(1.08) 
0.008   
0.01 
(0.10) 
0.023 
NED 
-0.07 
(-1.32) 
0.053 
-0.01 
(-1.71) 
0.007 
-0.07 
(-1.25) 
0.053 
0.00 
(0.04) 
0.021 
BDS 
0.31++ 
(3.06) 
1.010 
-0.01 
(-1.41) 
0.012 
0.31++ 
(3.09) 
0.100 
-0.02 
(-0.58) 
0.037 
FD   
0.01 
(0.49) 
0.013   
0.02 
(0.48) 
0.039 
ACOM   
-0.01 
(-0.85) 
0.007   
-0.00 
(-0.01) 
0.020 
RCOM   
0.00 
(0.52) 
0.006   
0.00 
(0.04) 
0.017 
LEV 
-0.19*** 
(-4.39) 
0.042   
-0.18*** 
(-4.60) 
0.040   
DIV2TA   
0.38*** 
(9.02) 
0.042   
0.26† 
(2.05) 
0.127 
Log 
(REV) 
0.08*** 
(4.90) 
0.017   
0.08*** 
(4.83) 
0.017   
FM 
RISK 
  
-0.00 
(-0.19) 
0.008   
0.02 
(0.10) 
0.024 
BUS 
RISK 
0.03 
(0.67) 
0.051   
0.02 
(0.64) 
0.051   
ComAft   
0.01† 
(2.24) 
0.003   
0.02† 
(2.34) 
0.008 
CSURV   
-0.01 
(-1.75) 
0.004   
-0.01 
(-0.58) 
0.012 
RGDP   
0.18 
(1.20) 
0.143   
0.80 
(1.83) 
0.438 
Market 
share 
-0.0† 
(-2.36) 
0.010   
-0.02† 
(-2.32) 
0.011   
Intangible
2ta 
-0.05 
(-1.63) 
0.032   
-0.05 
(-1.63) 
0.032   
Industry 
Dummy53 
  Yes    Yes  
F 
10.71 
(0.000) 
 
12.32 
(0.000) 
 
10.73 
(0.000) 
 
1.99 
(0.0530) 
 
R2 0.23  0.41  .23  0.06  
Test E(xit. 
eit) ≠ 0) 
  
F(1, 321) = 
1.17 
Prob>F = 
0.2795 
   
F(1, 321) = 
0.01 
Prob>F = 
0.97170 
 
N 340  562  562  562  
BOWN* denote predicted values, *** denotes coefficient is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed); ++ denotes coefficient is 
significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed); † denotes coefficient is significant at 0.1 level (2-tailed). Standard errors are also 
provided for each variable. 
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 The OLS regression results of the industry dummy variables are reported in Appendix, Table 2. 
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6.2 CONCLUSION 
This chapter explored the efficacy of principle-based corporate governance practices on large 
cap company financial performance, as measured by Tobin‟s Q, market to book (MB), return 
on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). Four important questions were addressed: (i) 
Whether large cap companies have complied with the NZSC recommendations? (ii) Did 
compliance with the NZSC recommendations after 2003 lead to an improvement in large cap 
companies‟ financial performance? (iii) Whether large cap companies that were always in 
compliance with NZSC recommendations from 1999 have better financial performance 
compared to the companies that were not in compliance? (iv) Can the differences in company 
financial performance be explained by the differences in governance practices in different 
industries?   
 The governance factors, viz, non-executive directors and board committees recommended by 
the NZSC in 2004 are of particular interest. The findings reveal that large cap companies in 
New Zealand, in general, have complied with the Securities Commission‟s guidelines. The 
findings indicate that large companies in New Zealand have good governance practices, such 
as non-executive/independent directors and board committees, dating from 1999. Results 
show that board independence, board size and audit committees do not have any significant 
effect on large cap company financial performance across all financial performance 
measures. These findings are similar to the findings reported for the small cap companies in 
Chapter 5.  
The results show (Table 6.4) that the large cap companies that complied with the NZSC 
recommendations after 2003 have improved financial performance. The presence of a 
remuneration committee has a positive effect on company financial performance measured by 
Q and MB (Tables 6.4 and 6.6). The results show that the compliance with NZSC 
recommendations from 1999 had a negative effect on all financial performance measures of 
large cap companies.  Also, the results show that surviving the sampling period and 
compliance with NZSC recommendations had a negative effect on all financial performance 
measures of large cap companies (Tables 6.4 and 6.5). Although many large cap companies 
already had good governance practices, recommended by NZSC since 1999, the above results 
show that the market was not aware of such practices and did not take into account such 
practices when valuing those companies‟ shares. Since the NZSC recommendations were 
published well after 2003 through NZX listings rules, the NZSC website and other media, the 
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results show that the market did consider such practices when valuing the shares of the large 
cap companies.  
The empirical results indicate that other governance mechanisms rather than insider 
ownership can be utilised to minimise agency problems in an efficient manner, viz 
blockholding, dividend payouts and remuneration committees. Business risk is positively 
associated with company financial performance. Since managers‟ skills are specific to the 
company, they will lose more if the company were to fail, and that gives incentive to 
managers to work harder to ensure higher risks are rewarded with higher returns. 
Results show that blockholding contributes positively towards shareholder value. The size of 
the company is inversely related to company financial performance, indicating managers 
have increased company size for personal benefits rather than to increase shareholder value. 
The results for leverage reported in Tables 6.3, 6.3 and 6.5 are mixed. The results show that 
leverage is positively associated with the financial performance measure MB and negatively 
associated with the financial performance measure ROA. Both results are statistically 
significant at a 1% level. The results indicate that the market values the monitoring benefits 
provided by the debtholders, whereas the result of the accounting performance measure 
reflects the cost of debt servicing which outweighs any monitoring benefit that it provides. 
The findings strongly support the view that company financial performance is strongly 
associated with compliance with NZSC recommendations after 2003, indicating performance 
did improve after the new mandatory requirements were introduced. This supports the view 
that NZSC recommendations have a positive influence on company financial performance 
measured by Tobin‟s Q, MB and ROA. The results also show that the presence of 
remuneration committee and board diversity has a positive effect on financial performance of 
large cap companies. Results also support that blockholding and dividend payouts contribute 
positively towards company financial performance.  
The question left unanswered is why the empirical results for the NZSC recommendations to 
have non-executive/independent directors and audit committees do not have a positive effect 
on large cap company financial performance? The reason could be that the non-
executive/independent directors and blockholding are substitute governance mechanisms. 
Since blockholders are already providing the level of vigilance required by the market, the 
role non-executive/independent directors play in monitoring is not regarded highly by the 
market. The audit committees are also seen to be adding to the costs of compliance rather 
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than adding to company financial performance.  Alternatively, it could be non-
executive/independent directors and audit committees are appointed to fulfil the NZSC 
recommendations and they add no value to large cap companies‟ financial performance.  
Lastly, jurisdictions around the world are adopting the International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS). In New Zealand, the Accounting Standards Review Board (ASRB) in 
December 2002 determined that entities required to comply with NZ GAAP under the 
Financial Reporting Act 1993 would be required to apply NZ IFRS in the preparation of their 
financial statements for periods commencing on or after January 2007, with the option to 
apply from reporting periods beginning on or after 1 January 2005. NZSC (2008) provides 
evidence that a number of companies that have balance dates from 31 March 2006 to 30 
September 2006, have complied with the NZ IFRS and others have complied with the NZ 
GAAP. Compliance with NZ IFRS will have an impact on the way financial data is collated 
and reported. The effect on data collected on the change in reporting requirements from NZ 
GAAP to NZ IFRS is difficult to determine. Therefore, readers should apply discretion when 
trying to duplicate or extend this study. There is a discontinuity in the data series relating to 
the introduction of IFRS. 
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CHAPTER 7  
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE PRACTICES AND 
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE IN PUBLIC SECTOR 
CORPORATE ENTITIES: AN EMPIRICAL 
INVESTIGATION
54
 
 
7.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the results of the empirical study of the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and public sector corporate entities financial performance in New 
Zealand. A description of the sample size used in this study is provided in Chapter 4, Table 
4.1. A description of the governance and financial performance variables used is provided in 
Chapter 4, Table 4.2. This chapter has three sections. First, a description of the sample 
descriptive statistics is provided. This is followed by a presentation of results from data 
analyses and discussion and finally, the conclusion is provided.  
7.1 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
7.1.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The sample comprised 183 entities, two entities that did not have all the required information 
were removed, and a total of 181 entity-years data are included in the sample.  However, the 
number of Crown corporate entities increased during the sampling period from 15 in 2000 to 
30 in 2007. Table 4.1 (Chapter 4) shows that the number of entities available each year is not 
consistent across the sampling period. Previous research suggests that if all companies‟ data 
are not included in the historical research, it may cause survivorship bias (Kothari, Shanken 
& Sloan1995).  To capture the effect of an increase in the number of Crown entities on the 
empirical results, a dummy variable SURV is used. SURV is equal to “1” if the entities data 
is available for all the years from 2000 to 2007, otherwise equal to “0”.  
A summary of sample size used in this study is provided in Table 7.1. It shows that 
approximately $36 billion of taxpayers‟ funds are invested in the assets of Crown entities and 
therefore it is important to utilise these assets efficiently. Table 7.2 presents a summary of 
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descriptive statistics for the panel data, including means, medians, minimum, maximum, and 
inter-quartile ranges.  
Table 7.1: 
Sample Size of Public Sector Corporate Entities 
Year Sample Size Size of Companies in Terms of Total 
Assets ($000) 
2000 15 9,394,578 
2001 17 9,989,651 
2002 19 10,240,896 
2003 22 13,017,895 
2004 23 13,896,581 
2005 27 17,545,963 
2006 30 21,220,520 
2007 28 35,157,710 
Total 181 116,567,213 
 
Table 7.2: 
Descriptive Statistics for the Pooled Sample of Public Sector Corporate Entities 
Variables Mean Median Minimum Maximum Inter-quartile Range 
Dependent      
ROA 0.094 0.045 -0.162 2.384 0.019 – 0.076 
ROE 0.271 0.076 -0.319 13.637 0.033 – 0.149 
S2TA 0.190 0.132 -0.161 2.454 0.082 – 0.267 
OPROA 1.127 1.034 0.021 11.934 0.455 – 1.362 
C2REV 0.840 0.854 0.099 2.951 0.769 – 0.900 
Governance      
NED 7.03 7 4 10 6 – 8 
BDS 7.05 7 4 10 6 – 8 
FD 2.26 2 0 5 2 – 3 
ACOM 0.76 1 0 1  
RCOM 0.62 1 0 1  
LEV 0.390 0.345 -0.540 0.950 0.240 – 0.520 
DIV2TA 0.046 0.006 0.000 1.292 0.000 – 0.520 
CR 1.719 1.200 0.094 42.860 0.882 – 1.728 
Control      
Log(TA) 5.193 5.002 4.027 7.031 4.534 – 5.880 
FMRISK 0.060 0.035 0.002 0.583 0.017 – 0.058 
INDPS 0.63 1 0 1  
Notes: For details regarding the methods used to measure the variables stated above, refer to Table 4.2 in Chapter 4. 
The mean (median) ROA is 9.4% (4.5%) and the mean (median) ROE is 27.1% (7.6%). The 
mean (median) OPROA is 19% (13.2%). The mean (median) S2TA is 1.13% (1.03%). All 
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the dependent variables have positive values, showing that public corporate entities are 
generating a positive return on the investment made and this distribution is skewed to the 
right because the mean is much larger than the median. The mean (median) of C2REV is 0.84 
(0.85). This shows that operating costs are 84% of the revenue and on average Crown entities 
contribute 16 cents towards operating profit. The average (median) board size is 7.05 (7) and 
the inter-quartile range is 6 to 8 members. This is consistent with the average board size of 
the publicly listed small cap and large companies on the New Zealand Stock Exchange 
(NZX) (Reddy et al., 2008a, 2008b). 
The size of boards in the publicly listed companies ranges from 3 to 13, whereas in the public 
corporate entities, it ranges from 4 to 10. MacCarthaigh (2009) reports a similar board size 
for the public sector corporate entities in Ireland. 
The average (median) number of female directors on the board is 2.26 (2) with an inter-
quartile range of 2 to 3 members. The results obtained from CCMAU show that public sector 
boards have both gender and ethnic diversity (CCMAU, 2009). On average, 76% of the 
boards have an audit committee (ACOM) and 62% have a remuneration committee (RCOM). 
This shows that the majority of public sector corporate entities in New Zealand have 
complied with the NZSC‟s recommendations for good governance practices. On average, 
63% of the companies in the sample are SOEs and the remaining 37% are Crown companies. 
Leverage (LEV) is a proxy for measuring the level of commitment provided by bondholders. 
The average (median) ratio was 0.39 (0.35). This shows that on average, public corporate 
entities borrow 39 cents in every dollar of assets. The mean (median) DIV2TA ratio is 0.05 
(0.01), indicating that public corporate entities pay on average a dividend of five cents on 
every dollar of assets they hold. The current ratio (CR) is a proxy for measuring the level of 
commitment provided by the suppliers, employees, and short-term creditors. The short term 
liquidity ratio is a measure of organisations meeting their commitments. The average 
(median) current ratio is 1.7 (1.2). This shows that public corporate entities are able to meet 
their short term commitments. The mean (median) Log(TA) is 5.19 (5). The operational risk 
faced by public corporate entities on average (median) is around 6% (3.5%). 
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7.2.2 AVERAGE STATISTICS AND PAIRWISE CORRELATION 
BETWEEN INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Table 7.3 provides cross-section average statistics for the dependent and independent 
variables for the period 2000 to 2007. On average, the number of board members in public 
sector corporate entities increased from 6.75 in 2000 to 7.14 in 2007. The number of female 
directors on the boards also increased from 1.56 in 2000 to 2.39 in 2007. The number of 
entities that have an audit committee increased from 56% in 2007 to 79% in 2007 and 
remuneration committees increased from 44% in 2000 to 68% in 2007. The averages of the 
variables BDS and NED are the same, indicating that all board members for the public sector 
corporate entities are appointed outside the public sector and have no prior affiliation with the 
respective public sector corporate entity to which they are appointed. However, there are 
concerns that directors in public sector corporate entities are appointed more for political or 
diversity reasons rather than balancing the skills required for effective governance (Norman, 
2006). According to Norman (2006) the appointment process  has created a culture of a high 
turnover of directors and limited engagement by directors in terms of assessing long-term 
strategy.  
Table 7.3: 
Cross-section Average Statistics of Public Sector Corporate Entities 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
ROA 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.17 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.08 
ROE 0.24 0.10 0.10 0.73 0.32 0.31 0.26 0.20 
OPROA 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.26 0.21 0.19 0.21 0.17 
S2TA 0.99 0.98 1.11 1.57 1.09 1.21 1.15 0.35 
NED 6.75 6.88 7.00 6.95 7.04 7.11 7.10 7.14 
BDS 6.75 6.88 7.11 6.95 7.04 7.11 7.10 7.14 
FD 1.56 2.00 2.32 2.23 2.30 2.37 2.50 2.39 
CR 1.57 1.62 1.05 1.18 1.24 2.95 1.83 1.79 
LEV 0.41 0.39 0.38 0.44 0.40 0.40 0.37 0.37 
DIV2TA 0.04 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.09 0.07 0.55 
Log(TA) 5.24 5.25 5.16 5.17 5.19 5.13 5.13 5.30 
ACOM 0.56 0.65 0.74 0.73 0.83 0.85 0.80 0.79 
RCOM 0.44 0.53 0.58 0.55 0.70 0.70 0.67 0.68 
FMRISK 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08 
INDPS 0.63 0.59 0.58 0.64 0.65 0.67 0.63 0.61 
Notes: For details regarding the methods used to measure the variables stated above, refer to Table 4.2 in Chapter 4. 
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A pairwise correlation matrix for the independent variables is provided in Table 7.4. The 
highest correlations are between RCOM and ACOM at 0.72, indicating that those entities 
with a remuneration committee also tend to have an audit committee.  The correlation 
between INDPS and Log(TA) at 0.54 indicates that size is specific to industry. The 
correlation between Log(TA) and BDS is 0.53, indicating that large companies tends to have 
larger boards.  The correlation between FMRISK and DIV2TA is 0.44, which indicates that 
as the risk level of the company increases so do the dividend payouts. The correlation 
between FMRISK and BDS is 0.41. This indicates that as the risk level of the entity increases 
so does the board size. Apart from these exceptions, other correlations range between the 
absolute values of 0.01 to 0.32. 
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Table 7.4:  
Pairwise Correlation Matrix for the Independent Variables 
 NED BDS ACOM RCOM FD CR LEV DIV2TA Log(TA) FMRISK INDPS 
NED 
-           
BDS 
-0.024 
(0.751) 
- 
 
         
ACOM 
0.077 
(0.305) 
-0.118 
(0.114) 
-         
RCOM 
0.049 
(0.513) 
0.316*** 
(0.000) 
0.209*** 
(0.000) 
-        
FD 
0.097 
(0.194) 
0.259*** 
(0.001) 
0.184*** 
(0.013) 
0.721*** 
(0.000) 
-       
CR 
-0.019 
(0.797) 
-0.107 
(0.155) 
0.021 
(0.776) 
-0.118 
(0.115) 
-0.081 
(0.280) 
-      
LEV 
0.010 
(0.892) 
0.169++ 
(0.024) 
0.067 
(0.374) 
0.240*** 
(0.003) 
0.072 
(0.337) 
-0.225*** 
(0.002) 
-     
DIV2TA 
0.015 
(0.894) 
-0.189*** 
(0.000) 
0.185*** 
(0.013) 
0.050 
(0.504) 
0.026 
(0.730) 
-0.072 
(0.332) 
0.185*** 
(0.013) 
-    
Log(TA) 
-0.123 
(0.101) 
0.529*** 
(0.000) 
0.161† 
(0.031) 
0.368*** 
(0.000) 
0.330*** 
(0.000) 
-0.137 
(0.068) 
0.177++ 
(0.017) 
-0.113 
(0.131) 
-   
FMRISK 
-0.056 
(0.458) 
-0.406*** 
(0.000) 
0.106 
(0.156) 
-0.079 
(0.302) 
-0.048 
(0.521) 
0.069 
(0.360) 
0.050 
(0.507) 
0.442*** 
(0.000) 
-0.131 
(0.081) 
-  
INDPS 
-0.098 
(0.110) 
0.208*** 
(0.000) 
-0.038 
(0.610) 
0.177++ 
(0.017) 
0.126 
(0.093) 
0.004 
(0.962) 
0.312*** 
(0.000) 
0.158++ 
(0.034) 
0.537*** 
(0.000) 
0.009 
(0.903) 
- 
Notes: For details regarding the methods used to measure the variables stated above, refer to Table 4.2 in Chapter 4. *** denotes correlation is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed); ++ denotes correlation is  
significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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7.2.3 OLS REGRESSION OF ROA, ROE S2TA, OPROA AND 
C2REV ON GOVERNANCE AND CONTROL VARIABLES 
Table 7.5 reports the results of the OLS regression between the dependent variables 
(ROA, ROE, OPROA, S2TA and C2REV) and the independent variables. The results 
show that LEV, DIV2TA, FMRISK and INDPS have positive coefficients, indicating 
their use increases financial performance measured by ROA, ROE, OPROA, S2TA 
and C2REV. The results are statistically significant at a 5% level. Leverage is seen to 
create positive value for public sector corporate entities. Using leverage encourages 
managers of public sector corporate entities to work harder to generate and pay off the 
entities‟ cash flows to the outside investors. It also allows managers‟ performance to 
be monitored by the external parties.  Dividends are seen to create positive value for 
public sector corporate entities. Requiring entities to make regular dividend payments 
encourages better utilisation of the free cash flows. Also the positive coefficient of 
FMRISK which is statistically significant at a 5% level indicates that entities have 
created value by taking additional operational risks. The results for the dependent 
variable C2REV show that higher operational risks contribute towards higher cost 
efficiency and the efficiency which is attributable to SOEs only.  
The positive coefficient of INDPS indicates that an industry effect is present and 
positive performance is related only to SOEs. This evidence provides support for the 
view that a principle-based governance approach has allowed industry-specific 
governance structures to be developed and such structures are having a positive effect 
on entities‟ financial performance across all financial performance measures.  
The negative coefficient of Log(TA) indicates that larger entities have a negative 
effect on performance measured by ROA, ROE, OPROA and S2TA. The results are 
statistically significant at a 1% for OPROA and S2TA, 5% level for ROA and 10% 
level for ROE.. This may be the case because the government‟s focus is on delivering 
social objectives such as creating employment, which may require keeping the size of 
the entity large when that is not optimal. However, the result for Log(TA) is 
consistent for all sectors (small cap and large cap companies, as well as public sector 
corporate entities) indicating size has a negative effect on financial performance. This 
indicates that public sector corporate entities in New Zealand are not at their optimal 
size. The result of RCOM is interesting as it has a positive coefficient and is 
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statistically significant at 1% level. This shows that the presence of remuneration 
committees does have a positive effect on financial performance measured by S2TA. 
This result is interesting as New Public Management (NPM) recognises that 
incentives are an important means of changing behaviours and formation of a 
remuneration committee is a reflection of this view. The result for RCOM is 
consistent with the results for small cap companies (Chapter 5) and large cap 
companies (Chapter 6) showing that remuneration committees have a positive effect 
on financial performance. 
The negative coefficient of CR indicates that entities have not utilised current 
resources in an efficient manner. The results are statistically significant at a 10% 
level. The results for CR show that public sector corporate entities could better utilise 
current resources and better manage relationships with stakeholders. 
The results of the efficiency measure (C2REV) are similar to other entity financial 
performance measures. A negative and statistically significant coefficient for BDS 
shows that a large board size reduces agency costs. The non-executive/independent 
directors on public sector corporate entities‟ boards are providing the required level of 
monitoring of managers‟ behaviour which is leading to improved financial 
performance. A negative coefficient of FMRISK, which is statistically significant, 
suggests that agency costs can be reduced by taking higher risks. A negative 
coefficient of INDPS, which is statistically significant at a 5% level, suggests that cost 
reduction is specific to certain industries only. In summary, the above results provide 
support to hypotheses H4c (Board size), H6f (Remuneration Committee), H7c 
(Leverage), and H8c (Dividends). 
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Table 7.5: 
OLS Regression of ROA ROE, S2TA, OPROA and C2REV as the Dependent 
Variables and Governance and Control Variables 
 ROA ROE OPROA S2TA C2REV 
  
Standard 
Error 
 
Standard 
Error 
 
Standard 
Error 
 
Standard 
Error 
 
Standard 
Error 
Const. 
-0.23 
(-1.37) 
0.166 
-0.33 
(-0.98) 
0.334 
0.19 
(0.95) 
0.196 
1.19++ 
(2.82) 
0.423 
0.19 
(0.95) 
0.203) 
NED 
0.27 
(1.70) 
0.156 
0.45 
(1.42) 
0.318 
0.03 
(0.13) 
0.186) 
-0.31 
(-0.77) 
0.403 
0.21 
(1.06) 
0.193 
BDS 
0.06 
(0.31) 
0.050 
-0.06 
(-0.62) 
0.102 
0.06 
(1.00) 
0.059 
0.21 
(1.64) 
0.129 
-0.14† 
(-2.32) 
0.062 
FD 
-0.02 
(-0.55) 
0.027 
-0.06 
(-1.13) 
0.054 
-0.02 
(-0.78) 
0.032 
-0.05 
(-0.80) 
0.068 
0.01 
(0.25) 
0.032 
ACOM 
-0.00 
(-0.04) 
0.009 
0.00 
(0.05) 
0.957 
-0.01 
(-0.23) 
0.012 
-0.04 
(-1.48) 
0.025 
-0.02 
(-1.69) 
0.012 
RCOM 
0.00 
(0.04) 
0.008 
0.01 
(0.42) 
0.017 
0.02 
(1.48) 
0.010 
0.10*** 
(4.78) 
0.021 
0.02 
(1.46) 
0.010 
LEV 
0.03† 
(2.15) 
0.014 
0.13*** 
(4.34) 
0.029 
0.02 
(1.27) 
0.017 
0.11++ 
(2.96) 
0.037 
0.03 
(1.38) 
0.018 
DIV2TA 
0.15† 
(1.99) 
0.078 
0.45++ 
(2.89) 
0.157 
0.17† 
(1.95) 
0.092 
0.82*** 
(4.12) 
0.198 
0.18 
(1.84) 
0.095 
CR 
-0.03† 
(-1.95) 
0.017 
-0.08† 
(-2.27) 
0.035 
-0.07++ 
(-3.35) 
0.021 
-0.10† 
(-2.15) 
0.044 
0.07++ 
(3.22) 
0.021 
Log(TA) 
-0.01++ 
(-2.68) 
0.005 
-0.02† 
(2.28) 
0.011 
-0.05*** 
(-7.45) 
0.006 
-0.17*** 
(-12.19) 
0.013 
-0.01 
(-0.55) 
0.006 
FM 
RISK 
1.46*** 
(15.86) 
0.092 
2.73++ 
(14.66) 
0.186 
1.26*** 
(11.54) 
0.109 
1.07*** 
(4.52) 
0.236 
-0.69*** 
(-6.06) 
0.113 
Complied 
0.00 
(0.04) 
0.009 
0.00 
(0.14) 
0.019 
-0.00 
(-0.10) 
0.011 
-0.021 
(-1.77) 
0.012 
-0.03 
(-1.38) 
0.025 
INDPS 
0.03*** 
(4.07) 
0.007 
0.06++ 
(3.96) 
0.015 
0.05*** 
(5.91) 
0.008 
0.05++ 
(2.52) 
0.019 
-0.03++ 
(-2.79) 
0.009 
F 
41.66 
(0.000) 
 
43.44 
(0.000) 
 
31.24 
(0.000) 
 
32.70 
(0.000) 
 
6.95 
(0.000) 
 
Adj. R
2 
(
R
2)
 
0.71 
(0.73) 
 
0.72 
(0.74) 
 
0.65 
(0.67) 
 
0.66 
(0.68) 
 
0.27 
(0.30) 
 
N 181  181  181  181  181  
Notes: For details regarding the methods used to measure the variables stated above, refer to Table 4.2 in Chapter 4. *** denotes 
coefficient is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed); ++ denotes coefficient is significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed); † denotes coefficient 
is significant at 0.1 level (2-tailed). Standard errors are also provided for each variable. 
 
7.2.4 TEST FOR MULTICOLINEARITY  
Table 7.6 provides values for the VIF and tolerance statistics for Equation 8 and it is 
apparent that none of the values are of concern. Also, the pairwise correlation for the 
independent variables provided in Table 7.4 show that none of the values are above 
0.8. Therefore, it is concluded that multicollinearity is not an issue for the models 
estimated. 
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Table 7.6: 
OLS Regression Results of Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
ROA 
Standard  
Error 
Collinearity Statistics  
Tolerance VIF 
Const. -0.23 
(-1.37) 
0.166 
 
 
NED 0.27 
(1.70) 
0.156 0.951 
1.051 
BDS 0.06 
(0.31) 
0.050 0.575 
1.738 
FD -0.02 
(-0.55) 
0.027 0.861 
1.162 
ACOM -0.00 
(-0.04) 
0.009 0.423 
2.366 
RCOM 0.00 
(0.04) 
0.008 0.446 
2.244 
LEV 0.03† 
(2.15) 
0.014 0.699 
1.430 
DIV2TA 0.15† 
(1.99) 
0.078 0.718 
1.393 
CR -0.03† 
(-1.95) 
0.017 0.694 
1.440 
Log(TA) 0.01++ 
(-2.68) 
0.005 0.428 
2.338 
RMRISK 1.46*** 
(15.86) 
0.092 0.705 
1.419 
INDPS 0.03*** 
(4.07) 
0.007 0.570 
1.736 
F-Value 
(p-value) 
41.66 
(0.000) 
 
 
 
Adj. R2 
(R2) 
0.71 
(0.73) 
 
 
 
N 181    
Notes: For details regarding the methods used to measure the variables stated above, refer to Table 4.2 in Chapter 
4. *** denotes coefficient is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed); ++ denotes coefficient is significant at 0.05 level 
(2-tailed); † denotes coefficient is significant at 0.1 level (2-tailed). Standard errors are also provided for each 
variable. 
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7.2.6 OLS REGRESSION OF THE DIFFERENCE IN ROA 
(BETWEEN 2003 AND 2007) ON GOVERNANCE AND CONTROL 
VARIABLES  
Table 7.7 reports the regression results of Equation 10. The dependent variable 
AvROA2003 is the average ROA for the years 2000 to 2003 which is regressed on the 
entities‟ data for 2003. The dependent variable AvROA2007 is the average ROA for 
the years 2004 to 2007, which is regressed on the entities‟ data for 2007. DiffAvROA 
is the difference in the entities‟ performance between 2003 and 2007. It is determined 
by subtracting AvROA2007 from AvROA2003 (DiffAvROA = AvROA2007 – 
AvROA2003). DiffAvROA measures whether public sector corporate entities that 
complied with the NZSC recommendations in 2007 created positive value compared 
to the companies in 2003.  
The AvROA2003 is 0.06, AvROA2007 is 0.11 and DiffAvROA is 0.06. Since 
DiffAvROA is positive, it indicates that entities in 2007, on average, created more 
value measured by ROA than in 2003. The results in columns 4 and 6 of Table 7.7 
show that FMRISK has a positive value and is statistically significant at a 5% level.  
The results indicate that an increase in entities‟ value in 2007 is largely attributed to 
the risk undertaken at the operational level. By taking higher a level of risk, managers 
were able to create a higher value for the public sector corporate entities.  
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Table 7.7:   
OLS regression Results Using Average ROA 2003 (AvROA2003), Average ROA 
2007 (AvROA2007) and DiffAvROA as the Dependent Variables 
 AvROA 
2003 
Standard 
Error 
AvROA 
2007 
Standard 
Error 
DiffAv 
ROA 
Standard 
Error 
Constant 0.32 
(0.84) 
0.385 0.17 
(0.45) 
0.383 -0.23 
(-0.57) 
0.398 
NED 0.04 
(0.58) 
0.061 -0.31 
(-0.80) 
0.391 0.08 
(0.19) 
0.406 
BDS -0.65 
(-0.69) 
0.947 0.12 
(1.22) 
0.099 0.08 
(0.76) 
0.103 
FD -0.03 
(-1.07) 
0.031 0.01 
(0.10) 
0.059 0.01 
(0.02) 
0.061 
ACOM -0.01 
(-1.35) 
0.012 -0.05 
(-1.20) 
0.038 -0.01 
(-0.26) 
0.039 
RCOM 0.01 
(0.17) 
0.009 0.03 
(0.93) 
0.033 0.01 
(0.19) 
0.035 
LEV -0.01 
(-0.45) 
0.017 0.06 
(1.62) 
0.037 0.01 
(0.37) 
0.038 
DIV2TA 0.34++ 
(4.78) 
0.072 0.43+ 
(2.51) 
0.171 -0.12 
(-0.68) 
0.178 
CR 0.03 
(0.50) 
0.007 0.00 
(-0.45) 
0.004 0.00 
(-0.64) 
0.004 
Log(TA) 0.01 
(0.06) 
0.006 0.02 
(0.22) 
0.009 0.01 
(1.21) 
0.010 
FMRISK -0.02 
(-0.13) 
0.148 0.45++ 
(6.95) 
0.065 0.45++ 
(6.69) 
0.067 
COMPLIED   -0.03 
(-1.46) 
0.023 -0.02 
(-0.87) 
0.023 
SURV   0.04 
(0.68) 
0.022 -0.01 
(-0.54) 
0.022 
F-value 
(p-value) 
5.06 
(0.009) 
 5.72 
(0.002) 
 5.73 
(0.004) 
 
Adj. R2 
(R2) 
0.67 
(0.84) 
 0.71 
(0.86) 
 0.71 
(0.86) 
 
N 21  26  26  
Notes: For details regarding the methods used to measure the variables stated above, refer to Table 4.2 in Chapter 
4. *** Statistical significance at 0.01 level (2-tailed), ++ Statistical significance at 0.05 level (2-tailed), † Statistical 
significance at 0.1 level (2-tailed) 
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7.2.5 OLS REGRESSION FOR DEPENDENT AND 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES (WITH FOUR ADDITIONAL 
VARIABLES, THAT IS, INTANGIBLE2TA, MARKETSHARE, 
AFTER2003 AND SURV) 
Results in Table 7.8 show that increasing the number of independent variables 
(Marketshare, Intangible2ta, AFTER2003 and SURV) has improved the predictive 
power of the model. In all the cases, adjusted R squared increased compared to the 
results reported in Table 7.5. The other results provided in Table 7.8 are very similar 
to results provided in Table 7.5. The results show that LEV, FMRISK, Marketshare, 
SURV and INDPS have positive coefficients, indicating that their use increases 
financial performance as measured by ROA, ROE, OPROA and S2TA. The results 
are statistically significant at the 5% level. The results show that the use of leverage 
creates positive value for the entity. The results are interesting for Marketshare, 
indicating higher levels of market power have a positive effect on value. The positive 
coefficient of FMRISK shows that the entities have created value from taking 
additional operational risks. The positive coefficient of SURV indicates that the 
entities that survived the sampling period contributed positively towards financial 
performance measured by ROA, ROE, OPROA and S2TA. However, the positive 
coefficient of INDPS indicates that the industry effect is present and that positive 
financial performance is related to SOEs only. The positive coefficient of 
Intangible2ta indicates that a higher level of intangible assets leads to a positive effect 
on entities‟ financial performance. However, Intangible2ta is only statistically 
significant for the financial performance measures ROE and C2REV.  
The negative coefficient of Log(TA) indicates that increased organisation size has a 
negative effect on financial performance measured by ROA, ROE, OPROA and 
S2TA. The results are statistically significant at a 1% level. The negative coefficient 
of AFTER2003 indicates that since 2003 entities have not created value. The results 
are statistically significant at the 10% level. This is of concern because it was assumed 
that implementing NZSC‟s recommendations would improve governance and also 
lead to higher financial performance. The reason for the negative coefficient could be 
that public sector corporate entities have incurred higher costs of restructuring and 
implementing NZSC recommendations, which have had a negative effect on financial 
performance.  Therefore, the beneficial effects of complying with NZSC 
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recommendations has been not been reflected in the financial performance of the 
entities. The negative coefficient of CR, which is statistically significant at a 10% 
level, indicates that entities have not utilised the current resources in an efficient 
manner.  
The result for RCOM is interesting as it has a positive coefficient that is statistically 
significant for the organisations‟ performance measure. This shows that the presence 
of a remuneration committee does have a positive effect on financial performance 
measured by S2TA.  
The results for the efficiency measure (C2REV) are similar to other entity financial 
performance measures. A negative and statistically significant coefficient of BDS 
shows that a large board size reduces agency costs. A negative coefficient for ACOM 
suggests that the audit committee has potential to mitigate agency costs in public 
sector corporate entities. The coefficient of FMRISK is statistically significant and 
negative, suggesting that agency costs can be reduced by taking higher risks. The 
positive coefficient of CR indicates that current assets are not utilised in an efficient 
manner and lead to cost inefficiencies. The positive coefficient for Intangible2ta that 
is statistically significant indicates that entities have not used intangible assets 
efficiently, which increases costs. A negative coefficient of INDPS, which is 
statistically significant at a 10% level, suggests that cost reduction is specific to SOEs 
only.  
In summary, the above results provide support to hypotheses H4c (Board Size), H6e 
(Audit Committee), H6f (Remuneration Committee), H7c (Leverage), and H8c 
(Dividends). There is evidence that additional variables Marketshare, Intangible2ta, 
AFTER2003 and SURV have improved the predictive power of the model. The 
adjusted R squared improved for all financial performance measures. The result for 
SURV is interesting as it provides evidence that the entities that survived the sampling 
period contributed positively towards financial performance. The result is consistent 
for all financial performance measures. The result for AFTER2003 shows that the 
period after 2003 has not contributed positively towards the entities‟ financial 
performance. A plausible explanation is that entities who comply with the NZSC 
recommendations have had to set up structures which have added more to costs than 
to benefits.  
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Table 7.8:  
OLS Regression of ROA ROE, S2TA, OPROA and C2REV as the Dependent 
Variables and Four Additional Governance and Control Variables 
 ROA ROE OPROA S2TA C2REV 
  
Standard 
Error 
 
Standard 
Error 
 
Standard 
Error 
 
Standard 
Error 
 
Standard 
Error 
Const. 
-0.10 
(-0.71) 
0.146 
-0.06 
(-0.19) 
0.305 
0.29 
(1.69) 
0.171 
1.73*** 
(5.20) 
0.333 
0.31 
(1.64) 
0.189 
NED 
0.21 
(1.54) 
0.136 
0.34 
(1.18) 
0.285 
-0.04 
(-0.22) 
0.159 
-0.53 
(-1.71) 
0.311 
0.18 
(1.04) 
0.177 
BDS 
-0.02 
(-0.43) 
0.045 
-0.14 
(-1.53) 
0.094 
0.03 
(0.58) 
0.053 
0.09 
(0.85) 
0.103 
-0.18++ 
(-3.10) 
0.059 
FD 
0.03 
(1.01) 
0.025 
0.01 
(0.13) 
0.052 
0.03 
(1.05) 
0.029 
-0.03 
(-0.44) 
0.057 
-0.04 
(-1.20) 
0.032 
ACOM 
0.01 
(1.14) 
0.009 
0.02 
(1.10) 
0.018 
0.01 
(0.83) 
0.010 
-0.01 
(-0.38) 
0.019 
-0.02† 
(-1.99) 
0.011 
RCOM 
-0.01 
(-1.35) 
0.008 
-0.02 
(-0.973) 
0.016 
0.01 
(0.68) 
0.009 
0.06++ 
(3.32) 
0.017 
0.01 
(0.67) 
0.010 
LEV 
0.03† 
(2.12) 
0.013 
0.11*** 
(4.042) 
0.027 
0.03 
(1.65) 
0.015 
0.11*** 
(3.67) 
0.030 
0.01 
(0.55) 
0.017 
DIV 
2TA 
-0.01 
(-0.14) 
0.072 
0.16 
(1.04) 
0.150 
-0.01 
(-0.161) 
0.084 
0.28 
(1.73) 
0.163 
0.19† 
(2.02) 
0.093 
CR 
-0.02 
(-1.00) 
0.016 
-0.05 
(-1.49) 
0.333 
-0.05++ 
(-2.56) 
0.018 
-0.08++ 
(-2.30) 
0.036 
0.05† 
(2.43) 
0.020 
Log 
(TA) 
-
0.04*** 
(-6.36) 
0.006 
-
0.07*** 
(-5.39) 
0.012 
-
0.07*** 
(10.51) 
0.007 
-
0.25*** 
(-19.09) 
0.013 
-0.01 
(-0.604) 
0.007 
FM 
RISK 
1.61*** 
(17.39) 
0.093 
2.82*** 
(14.54) 
0.193 
1.55*** 
(14.36) 
0.108 
1.48*** 
(7.03) 
0.211 
-
1.04*** 
(-8.68) 
0.120 
Market 
share 
1.54*** 
(3.79) 
0.407 
3.05*** 
(3.59) 
0.849 
1.28++ 
(2.71) 
0.474 
7.98*** 
(8.62) 
0.926 
1.24† 
(2.36) 
0.526 
Intangi
ble2ta 
0.03 
(1.76) 
0.016 
0.11++ 
(3.203) 
0.033 
-0.00 
(-0.04) 
0.018 
0.01 
(0.29) 
0.036 
0.07† 
(3.23) 
0.020 
AFTER 
2003 
-0.01† 
(-2.06) 
0.005 
-0.02† 
(-2.09) 
0.011 
-0.01 
(-1.42) 
0.006 
-0.02† 
(-2.05) 
0.012 
0.01 
(0.68) 
0.007 
SURV 
0.04*** 
(4.49) 
0.008 
0.05++ 
(2.89) 
0.016 
0.06*** 
(6.04) 
0.009 
0.06++ 
(3.34) 
0.018 
-
0.05*** 
(-4.71) 
0.010 
INDPS 
0.07*** 
(7.42) 
0.009 
0.12*** 
(6.53) 
0.018 
0.09*** 
(8.83) 
0.010 
0.19*** 
(9.42) 
0.020 
-0.02† 
(-2.16) 
0.011 
F 
36.22 
(0.000) 
 
43.19 
(0.000) 
 
36.22 
(0.000) 
 
48.77 
(0.000) 
 
8.71 
(0.000) 
 
Adj. R2 
(R2) 
0.75 
(0.77) 
 
0.78 
(0.80) 
 
0.75 
(0.77) 
 
0.80 
(0.82) 
 
0.39 
(0.44) 
 
N 181  181  181  181  181  
Notes: For details regarding the methods used to measure the variables stated above, refer to Table 4.2 in Chapter 
4. *** denotes coefficient is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed); ++ denotes coefficient is significant at 0.05 level 
(2-tailed); † denotes coefficient is significant at 0.1 level (2-tailed). Standard errors are also provided for each 
variable. 
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7.2.6 OLS REGRESSION FOR DEPENDENT AND 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES (WITH TWO NEW VARIABLES, 
THAT IS, COMAFT AND CSURV) 
Table 7.9 provides results for two additional variables compared to Table 7.8, that is, 
ComAft and CSURV. ComAft captures the effect of compliance with the NZSC 
recommendations after 2003 on entities‟ financial performance. CSURV measures the 
effect of surviving the sampling period and also complying with the NZSC 
recommendations on financial performance.  
The coefficient of ComAft is negative and statistically significant; indicating that 
compliance with the NZSC‟s recommendations after 2003 has a negative effect on 
entity financial performance measured by ROA and ROE. The reason could be that 
the cost of compliance is high or entity operational costs are too high at the outset. As 
indicated earlier, public sector entities‟ size is not optimal. Alternatively, public sector 
organisations have to meet government‟s social objectives, which may allow them to 
operate at sub-optimal level. The coefficient of CSURV is positive indicating that 
survival through the sampling period and compliance with NZSC recommendations 
has a positive effect on entity performance measured by ROA, ROE, OPROA and 
S2TA. However, the results for CSURV are not statistically significant. 
The results show that LEV, FMRISK, Marketshare, and IND have positive 
coefficients, indicating their use increases entity financial performance, as measured 
by ROA, ROE, OPROA and S2TA. The results are statistically significant at a 5% 
level or less. The coefficients of CR and Log(TA) are negative and are statistically 
significant at the 1% or less level. The coefficient of the variable ComAft is negative 
and is also statistically significant indicating that compliance with NZSC‟s 
recommendations has not created value. The results of NED, FD and ACOM are not 
statistically significant.  However, the result of RCOM has a positive coefficient that 
is statistically significant for the entities‟ financial performance measured by S2TA. 
The results of the efficiency measure (C2REV) are similar to other financial 
performance measures. A negative and statistically significant result for BDS, 
ACOM, FMRISK and INDPS shows that their use reduces agency costs in public 
corporate entities.  In summary, the above results also provide support to hypotheses 
H4c (Board size), H6e (Audit Committee), H6f (Remuneration Committee), H7c 
(Leverage), and H8c (Dividend). The result for ComAft provides support for the view 
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that compliance with the NZSC recommendations has added more to costs than to the 
benefits. 
 
Table 7.9:  
OLS Regression of ROA ROE, S2TA, OPROA and C2REV as the Dependent 
Variables and Governance and Two Additional Control Variables 
 ROA ROE OPROA S2TA C2REV 
  
Standard 
Error 
 
Standard 
Error 
 
Standard 
Error 
 
Standard 
Error 
 
Standard 
Error 
Const. 
-0.06 
(-0.39) 
0.158 
-0.01 
(0.98) 
0.319 
0.36 
(1.89) 
0.191 
1.79*** 
(5.08) 
0.353 
0.25 
(1.13) 
0.204 
NED 
0.19 
(1.28) 
0.147 
0.30 
(1.03) 
0.296 
-0.07 
(-0.38) 
0.178 
-0.56 
(-1.69) 
0.328 
0.20 
1.05) 
0.190 
BDS 
-0.01 
(-0.08) 
0.049 
-0.12 
(-1.20) 
0.099 
0.05 
(0.78) 
0.059 
0.11 
(0.97) 
0.110 
-0.19++ 
(-2.91) 
0.064 
FD 
-0.01 
(-0.37) 
0.026 
-0.05 
(-0.89) 
0.053 
-0.02 
(-0.56) 
0.032 
-0.10 
(-1.67) 
0.059 
0.01 
(0.19) 
0.034 
ACOM 
0.01 
(0.44) 
0.012 
0.02 
(0.85) 
0.024 
-0.01 
(-0.52) 
0.014 
-0.01 
(-0.27) 
0.026 
-0.01 
(-0.51) 
0.015 
RCOM 
-0.01 
(-1.36) 
0.008 
-0.02 
(-1.01) 
0.016 
0.01 
(0.47) 
0.010 
0.06++ 
(3.04) 
0.018 
0.01 
(0.78) 
0.011 
LEV 
0.03† 
(2.00) 
0.014 
0.11*** 
(3.91) 
0.028 
0.03 
(1.53) 
0.017 
0.11++ 
(3.45) 
0.031 
0.01 
(0.52) 
0.018 
DIV2T
A 
0.04 
(0.54) 
0.077 
0.24 
(1.52) 
0.155 
0.05 
(0.58) 
0.093 
0.38† 
(2.23) 
0.172 
0.13 
(1.33) 
0.099 
CR 
-0.03 
(-1.85) 
0.016 
-0.07† 
(-2.14) 
0.033 
-0.07++ 
(-3.45) 
0.020 
-0.11++ 
(-3.05) 
0.037 
0.07++ 
(3.29) 
0.021 
Log 
(TA) 
-
0.04*** 
(-5.60) 
0.006 
-
0.06*** 
(-4.91) 
0.013 
-
0.07*** 
(-9.01) 
0.008 
-
0.25*** 
(-17.25) 
0.014 
-0.01 
(-0.79) 
0.008 
FM 
RISK 
1.48*** 
(15.28) 
0.097 
2.62*** 
(13.38) 
0.196 
1.37*** 
(11.70) 
0.117 
1.22*** 
(5.64) 
0.217 
0.88++ 
(6.69) 
0.126 
Market 
share 
2.02*** 
(4.72) 
0.428 
3.78*** 
(4.38) 
0.864 
1.93*** 
(3.73) 
0.518 
8.92*** 
(9.33) 
0.957 
0.67 
(1.20) 
0.555 
Intangi
ble2ta 
0.03 
(1.54) 
0.017 
0.10++ 
(3.01) 
0.034 
-0.03 
(-0.15) 
0.020 
0.01 
(0.17) 
0.038 
0.07++ 
(3.12) 
0.022 
ComAft 
-0.01++ 
(-2.12) 
0.006 
-0.03† 
(-2.11) 
0.013 
-0.01 
(-1.31) 
0.008 
-0.02 
(-1.71) 
0.014 
0.01 
(0.18) 
0.008 
CSURV 
0.01 
(0.95) 
0.010 
0.01 
(0.33) 
0.019 
0.02 
(1.83) 
0.012 
0.00 
(0.15) 
0.021 
-0.02 
(-1.23) 
0.012 
INDPS 
0.06*** 
(6.67) 
0.006 
0.12*** 
(6.07) 
0.019 
0.09*** 
(7.71) 
0.012 
0.18*** 
(8.55) 
0.021 
-0.02 
(-1.83) 
0.012 
F 
38.02 
(0.000) 
 
39.55 
(0.000) 
 
27.22 
(0.000) 
 
43.11 
(0.000) 
 
6.16 
(0.000) 
 
Adj. R2 
(R2) 
0.76 
(0.78) 
 
0.76 
(0.78) 
 
0.69 
(0.71) 
 
0.78 
(0.80) 
 
0.30 
(0.36) 
 
N 181  181  181  181  181  
Notes: For details regarding the methods used to measure the variables stated above, refer to Table 4.2 in Chapter 
4. *** denotes coefficient is significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed); ++ denotes coefficient is significant at 0.05 level 
(2-tailed); † denotes coefficient is significant at 0.1 level (2-tailed). Standard errors are also provided for each 
variable. 
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7.3 CONCLUSION 
The results highlight the governance mechanisms that have potential to provide 
effective monitoring of agents in public sector settings. A number of mechanisms 
were examined including board independence, board size, board diversity, board 
committees (Audit and Remuneration), leverage, dividends, current ratio, industry, 
year, compliance and survivorship.  
Four important questions were addressed: (i) Whether public sector corporate entities 
have complied with the NZSC recommendations? (ii) Did compliance with the NZSC 
recommendations after 2003 lead to an improvement in public sector corporate 
entities‟ financial performance? (iii) Whether public sector corporate entities that 
were always in compliance with NZSC recommendations from 2000 have better 
financial performance compared to the entities that were not in compliance? (iv) Can 
the differences in entity financial performance be explained by the differences in 
governance practices in different industries?   
The findings indicate that public sector corporate entities have universally adopted 
Securities Commission recommendations to establish subcommittees for audit and 
remuneration, and to have a majority of independent directors on the board which, on 
average, has seven members. Seventy six percent of the entities in the sample have 
audit committees and sixty seven percent have a remuneration committee.  
The results reported in Tables 7.5, 7.8 and 7.9 shows that leverage has a positive 
effect on financial performance and is statistically significant. By allowing public 
sector corporate entities to borrow money rather than relying on taxpayer funds has 
had a positive effect on entities‟ financial performance. Also, this allows public sector 
corporate entities‟ performance to be monitored by the external parties similar to the 
private sector companies. Results also show that existence of a remuneration 
committee has a positive effect on financial performance when measured by S2TA. 
Having a remuneration committee allows managers‟ performance in public sector 
corporate entities to be set along similar guidelines to their private sector counterparts. 
Results show that dividend payouts contribute positively towards the financial 
performance of entities.  
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Board size and audit committees have a positive effect on reducing agency costs when 
measured by C2REV. However, results show that ACOM (audit committee) is not 
statistically significant for other financial performance measures because the New 
Zealand Audit Office is responsible for providing an independent review of financial 
accounts for public sector corporate entities, and therefore the role an audit committee 
performs is not seen to be important in public sector corporate entities.  
Results also show that business risk and industry have a positive effect on financial 
performance and therefore can be used as a mechanism to reduce agency costs in 
public sector corporate entities. This result indicates that managers tend to work 
harder when entities take higher risks because their skills are specific to the entity and 
they could lose more if the entity were to fail.  Also, governance practices in SOEs 
have a positive effect on financial performance. This result is similar to the results 
reported in Chapter 5 (small cap companies) and Chapter 6 (large cap companies) that 
a principle-based governance approach has allowed different industries to develop 
industry-specific governance structures. However, this evidence is relevant to certain 
industries only. The results for entity size are consistent across all financial 
performance measures and show a negative effect. Therefore, size having negative 
effect on financial performance is consistent for all sectors, that is, small and large cap 
companies and public sector corporate entities. 
The result for the variable SURV is interesting as it indicates that entities that 
survived the sampling period tend to have a statistically superior performance (Table 
7.8). A significant number of entities in the sample either did not have all the required 
information available or were not established and this tends to have had a bearing on 
the results obtained. The result of the variable AFTER2003 is interesting as well as it 
shows that the variable is statistically significant and has a negative effect on the 
financial performance of entities (Table 7.8). One possible explanation is that public 
sector corporate entities have incurred high costs in setting up structures in order to 
comply with the NZSC guidelines. The effect of compliance on the financial 
performance of entities measured by ROA, ROE, OPROA and S2TA has been 
negligible. This is supported by the result of ComAft, which has a negative coefficient 
and is statistically significant at a 5% level (Table 7.9). This indicates that compliance 
with NZSC recommendations after 2003 has had a negative effect on financial 
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performance measured by ROA and ROE. The results (Table 7.7) show that an 
increase in the financial performance of public sector corporate entities in 2007 is 
better explained by the level of risk (FMRISK) undertaken rather than compliance 
with the NZSC recommendations, such as, NED or board committees.  
In summary, there is strong evidence to support the view that public sector corporate 
entities have adopted the corporate governance guidelines that were introduced by the 
NZSC in 2004. The presence of an audit and a remuneration committee has a positive 
effect on the financial performance of the entity measured by C2REV and S2TA, 
respectively. Also, the results for BDS show that larger boards tend to have a positive 
effect on financial performance measured by C2REV.  The results support the use of 
leverage and dividends as governance mechanisms to control agency problems in 
public sector corporate entities. Leverage and dividends have positive effects on the 
financial performance the entities. Compliance with NZSC recommendations after 
2003 has had a negative effect on the financial performance of the entities.  
Finally, it is noted that the results are timely given the current government in New 
Zealand has directed public sector business to improve financial performance. The 
extent to which CCMAU and policy units can work on governance issues to lift 
performance will extend our knowledge of the standard of governance practised in 
public sector corporate entities in New Zealand and provide future research 
opportunities. 
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CHAPTER 8 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
8.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides a summary of findings of the empirical studies reported in 
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 regarding corporate governance practices and financial 
performance of publicly listed companies and public sector corporate entities in New 
Zealand. Relevant conclusions that have policy implications for governance practices 
and reform in New Zealand are noted. Consideration is given to the contribution of 
this research. Finally, the chapter concludes with comments concerning possible 
future directions for governance research. 
8.1 FOCUS OF THIS STUDY 
Research in corporate governance was motivated by renewed public interest after high 
profile corporate failures and scandals
55
 occurred internationally. There were strong 
calls for greater accountability and transparency concerning the way corporations are 
controlled and managed. In response, a range of laws impacting corporate governance 
were passed in several countries. In recent years, there has been a strong trend 
towards the adoption of „soft laws‟ (Mörth, 2004) or „soft regulations‟ (Sahlin-
Andersson, 2004) in the form of codes/principles and guidelines. The codes/principles 
and guidelines are basically „a non-binding set of principles, standards or best 
practices, issued by a collective body and relate to the internal governance of 
corporations‟ (Weil & Manges, 2003). The view taken was that the codes/principles-
based governance approaches allow companies and/or industries to develop 
governance structures that are specific to their context. 
                                                 
55
 Examples of international high profile corporate failures scandals include Adelphia (US), Enron 
(US), Tyco (US), WorldCom (US), BBCI (UK), British & Commonwealth (UK), Maxwell (UK), 
Mirror Group (UK), Polly Peck (UK), Holzmann (Germany), Metallgesellschaft (Germany), 
Bayerische Hypo – and Vereinsbank (Germany), OneTel (Australia), HIH (Australia), Ansett 
(Australia), Parmalat (Italy), to mention a few. 
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To improve the standard of governance practised in New Zealand, the NZSC in 2004 
issued nine high-level statements or principles, each supported by suggestions or 
guidelines as to how the principles should be implemented. It was assumed that the 
adoption of principles and guidelines would result in good governance practices 
leading to improved financial performance. It was recognised that the board of 
directors is an important internal governance mechanism and can play a more 
proactive part in discharging a fiduciary role for improving company financial 
performance. In this regard, the NZSC recommendations focused on making boards 
more independent of management by having an independent chair, non-
executive/independent directors and non-executive/independent directors as members 
of board committees, such as, audit, remuneration and nomination.  
This thesis first reports on an investigation into whether corporate governance 
practices recommended by the NZSC in 2004 have been adopted by small cap 
companies, large cap companies and public sector corporate entities in New Zealand. 
Second, an examination of whether compliance with the NZSC recommendations has 
improved company financial performance is undertaken. Third, the issue of whether 
differences in company financial performance can be explained by differences in 
governance practices of different industries is investigated. The governance factors, 
viz, non-executive/independent directors and board committees recommended by the 
NZSC in 2004 are of particular interest in this regard.  
This research also examines other governance mechanisms that prior research has 
found to be important for mitigating the agency problem. These mechanisms include 
insider ownership, block ownership, board size, board gender diversity, leverage, and 
dividends policy. Also investigated are the moderating effects of company size, 
industries, risks (business and market), economic growth rate and unobserved 
company characteristics (such as intangible assets to total assets and marketshare) on 
company financial performance.  
The data for the small and large cap companies are obtained from NZX Deep Archive. 
The sampling period for the small cap companies is 1999 to 2006 whereas the large 
cap companies are 1999 to 2007. The data for public sector corporate entities are 
obtained from the entities‟ annual reports for the period 2000 to 2007. Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regression techniques on pooled data are used to test the hypotheses. 
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Importantly, tests for multicollinearity indicate no concern regarding the data. The 
two stage least squares (2SLS) regression technique is used to control for the effect of 
endogeneity and reverse causality of ownership on company financial performance.  
8.2 SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
The findings reveal that small cap companies, large cap companies and public sector 
corporate entities, in general, have complied with the NZSC‟s guidelines. The 
findings also indicate that publicly listed companies and public sector corporate 
entities have good governance practices such as non-executive/independent directors 
and board committees dating from 1999 and 2000, respectively. The empirical 
examination of the hypotheses developed from the conceptual framework presented in 
this thesis reveal mixed results.  
8.2.1 COMPLIANCE AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
The empirical results (Table 6.4) show that compliance with NZSC recommendations 
after 2003 has a positive effect on the financial performance of large cap companies. 
This finding is consistent for all financial performance measures of large cap 
companies. This evidence provides support for the view that compliance with the 
NZSC recommendation has improved the standard of governance practised in large 
cap companies leading to an improvement in financial performance.  
However, the results for small cap companies and public sector corporate entities are 
not supported. The results show the coefficient of the variable ComAft for small cap 
companies (Table 5.4) are positive but not statistically significant. Also, with NZSC 
recommendations since 1999 had a positive effect on small cap companies‟ financial 
performance as measured by Tobin‟s Q. This finding suggests that small cap 
companies that were always in compliance were easily able to adapt to the NZSC 
recommendations without having to incur a high level of costs to set up new 
structures to meet compliance requirements.  Since post-compliance company data 
were available for the period 2004-2007, results suggest that companies that complied 
after 2003 had to incur costs for setting up new structures and were not able to fully 
recover those costs within the period for which data was available.   
The results for public sector corporate entities (Table 7.9) show that compliance with 
the NZSC recommendations after 2003 has had a negative effect on financial 
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performance measured by ROA and ROE. The results also show that the entities that 
were always in compliance with the NZSC recommendations since 2000 (Table 7.5) 
experienced a negligible effect on financial performance. This result is not surprising 
because the public sector is inherently inefficient (Bhatta, 2003) and many public 
sector corporate entities are underperforming relative to comparable private sector 
companies (Weldon, 2007). For this reason, compliance with the NZSC 
recommendations has not shown any beneficial effect on financial performance. Also, 
public sector corporate entities incurred a high restructuring costs in addition to costs 
incurred for establishing principle-based governance structures to support the NZSC 
recommendations. The results indicate that the beneficial effect of improved 
governance practices of public corporate entities has not been sufficient to outweigh 
the costs of implementing such structures. 
8.2.2 INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS, BOARD COMMITTEES 
AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
To make the board independent of management, the NZSC recommended that a 
majority of directors should be non-executive and a minimum of one third should be 
independent. In addition, boards are required to have an audit committee, whose 
members should be non-executive and independent directors with the majority being 
independent. Large boards are also required to have both remuneration and 
nomination committees.   
Results show that board independence does not have a significant effect on financial 
performance across all sectors and for all financial performance measures. This 
finding is consistent with studies conducted in the US by Agrawal and Knoeber 
(1996); Bhagat and Black (1998); Yermack (1996); Klein (1998), Baxter (2006), 
which follows a rule-based governance system. Research findings in the US indicate 
there may be a substitution effect between block ownership and board independence 
(Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Rediker & Seth, 1995).  This shows that the level of 
direct monitoring provided by blockholders tends to outweigh the level of monitoring 
provided by independent directors. Results indicate (Tables 5.2 and 6.2) that block 
ownership and board independence are negatively correlated, providing support for a 
substitution effect between block ownership and board independence in New Zealand 
similar to the US experience. This result supports the view that owners have simply 
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complied with the NZSC recommendations by appointing non-executive/independent 
directors on boards rather than requiring them to provide active monitoring.  
Since directors for public sector corporate entities are appointed for political and 
diversity reasons, in addition to promoting board effectiveness, this raises further 
concerns regarding the selection criteria used by CCMAU for board appointments. 
The current process for selecting board members may contribute to the poor financial 
performance experienced by the majority of public sector corporate entities.  
Results show that audit committees do not have a statistically significant effect on the 
financial performance of small cap companies, large cap companies and public sector 
corporate entities. Baxter (2006) suggests that the presence of audit committees may 
have led to an improvement in the quality of financial reporting. The NZSC reports do 
provide support for the view that there has been an improvement in the quality of 
financial reporting by small cap and large cap companies (NZSC2007). However, 
requiring a majority of the members of an audit committee to be independent imposes 
an extra cost burden on small cap companies, large cap companies and public sector 
corporate entities, especially in an environment where the pool of directors available 
for board appointments is only small. For this reason the beneficial effect of an audit 
committee is not fully reflected in the results. 
Results show that remuneration committees do have a statistically significant effect on 
the financial performance of small cap companies, large cap companies and public 
sector corporate entities. These finding supports those reported by Main and Johnston 
(1998), Weir and Laing (2000) and Klein (2002b). The concerns surrounding whether 
boards have been setting appropriate performance-related compensation has been 
widely debated in the popular media and by academics.  This finding provides support 
for the view that remuneration committees, whose members are mainly independent 
directors, are vigilant in setting compensation that is acceptable to the shareholders. 
8.2.3 BOARD SIZE, BOARD DIVERSITY AND FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE 
Results show that board size does not have a statistically significant effect on the 
financial performance of small cap and large cap companies. This raises the question 
of whether an average board size of approximately seven members is appropriate for 
publicly listed companies in New Zealand. However, results for public sector 
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corporate entities indicate that board size is positively related to reducing agency costs 
measured by C2REV. This finding supports the view that an average board size of 
seven members is appropriate for public sector corporate entities. 
Results also show that board (gender) diversity has a statistically significant effect on 
the financial performance of large cap companies. There is also evidence that board 
(gender) diversity has contributed positively towards an improvement in financial 
performance of small cap companies in 2007 (Table 5. 6). This findings supports the 
earlier findings reported by Burke (2000a) and Reddy et al. (2008a). However, 
descriptive statistics (Table 5.1 and 6.1) show that the number of female directors on 
boards of small cap and large cap companies range from 0 to 2 which is regarded as 
low level. Based on this finding it would be appropriate for small cap and large cap 
companies to increase board diversity to improve their financial performance.   
However, results show that board gender diversity is not significantly related to 
financial performance in public sector corporate entities. This is not surprising if 
members of public sector boards are appointed for political and diversity reasons 
rather than being able to contribute to policies and long-term strategy issues.  
8.2.4 INSIDER OWNERSHIP AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
Descriptive statistics (Tables 5.1 and 6.1) suggest that the majority of listed 
companies in New Zealand have some sort of insider ownership structure in place. 
Table 8.1 below provides a summary of insider ownership statistics for small cap and 
large cap companies. Results provided in Chapters 5 and 6 show that insider 
ownership has no effect on the financial performance of small cap and large cap 
companies.  
Table 8.1:  
A Summary of Insider Ownership Statistics 
% of  
Insider Ownership 
% of 
Small Cap Companies 
% of 
Large Cap Companies 
0%  9.1 6.8 
Between 0% and1% 17.6 43.4 
Between 1% and 5% 11.4 14.4 
Between 5% and 10% 8.9 5.4 
Between 10% and 20% 10.9 7.4 
Over 20% 42.6 22.6 
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Some researchers have reported that the relationship between insider ownership and 
financial performance is non-linear (Chen et al., 1993; Griffith, 1999; McConnell & 
Servaes, 1990; Morck et al., 1988; Short & Keasey, 1999). Results of the piecewise 
regression for insider ownership reported in Table 5.5 (small cap companies) and 
Table 6.5 (large cap companies) show that there is no evidence of a non-linear 
relationship between insider ownership and financial performance in listed companies 
in New Zealand. Empirical findings (Tables 5.7(a) & 5.7(b) and Tables 6.7(a) and 6.7 
(b)) also support the view that there is no evidence of endogeneity associated with 
insider ownership of small cap and large cap companies.  
These finding provide support for the views espoused by Hembry (2008), 
Gunasekarage and Reed (2008) and Davis et al. (2006) that there exists no link 
between pay and corporate financial performance in New Zealand. This is consistent 
with the view that there will be no relationship between insider ownership and 
financial performance. The evidence provides support for the view that other 
mechanisms may be utilised to align shareholders‟ and managers‟ interests rather than 
giving managers‟ equity stakes in companies. By utilising other governance 
mechanisms shareholders may be able to effectively align their interests with those of 
managers.  
8.2.5 BLOCK OWNERSHIP AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
Descriptive statistics (Tables 5.1 and 6.1) suggest that block ownership is an 
important feature of the ownership structure of small cap and large cap companies in 
New Zealand. Table 8.2 below provides a summary of the block ownership statistics 
for small cap and large cap companies.  
Table 8.2:  
A Summary of Block Ownership Statistics 
% of  
Block ownership 
% of 
Small Cap Companies 
% of 
Large cap Companies 
Between 0% and10% 0.14 0.0 
Between 10% and 20% 0.7 0.3 
Between 20% and 50% 12.5 28.3 
Over 50% 85.4 71.4 
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Results reported in Chapters 5 and 6 show that block ownership has a positive effect 
on small cap and large cap companies‟ financial performance. The descriptive 
statistics provided in Table 8.2 above show that 97% of companies have blockholding 
of 20% or more. These numbers provide support for the view that blockholders with 
large stakes are more effective in mitigating agency costs because it is easier for a few 
shareholders to monitor management than when ownership is dispersed. The test 
results (Tables 5.8(a) and 5.8(b) and Tables 6.8(a) and 6.8(b)) support the view that 
there is no evidence of endogeneity associated with block ownership in small cap and 
large cap companies. 
8.2.6 LEVERAGE, DIVIDENDS AND FINANCIAL 
PERFORMANCE 
Results show that leverage and dividends contribute positively towards financial 
performance of small cap and large companies as well as for public sector corporate 
entities. This suggests that both leverage and dividends are effective mechanisms for 
minimising agency costs in small cap and large cap companies and public sector 
corporate entities.  
8.2.7 MODERATING EFFECTS OF CONTROL VARIABLES ON 
FINACIAL PERFORMANCE  
A number of control variables are used in this thesis including Log(TA), FMRISK, 
BUSRISK, RGDP, IND, Marketshare and Intangible2ta. The results show that size 
has a negative effect on financial performance of small cap and large cap companies 
and public sector corporate entities. The results for the business (operational level) 
risk shows it has a positive effect on financial performance of large cap companies 
and public sector corporate entities. Business risk has a negative effect on financial 
performance of small cap companies. However, results of market risk (FMRISK) 
show that it has a positive effect on financial performance of small cap companies 
only.  
Results for RGDP show that growth of the New Zealand economy contributes 
positively towards financial performance of small cap companies whereas growth of 
the economy has a negative effect on the financial performance of large cap 
companies. However, growth was experienced in certain sectors of the economy only 
and the results show that companies belonging to those sectors may have only 
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benefited. Results for the industry dummy variables are interesting as they show that 
the governance practices in certain industries may be able to explain the differences in 
financial performance of companies in those industries. Governance practices of small 
cap companies belonging to the finance/investment sector (IND6) contribute 
positively towards financial performance measured by MB. Also governance practices 
of SOEs contribute positively towards all financial performance measures. However, 
results show that governance practices of large cap companies belonging to goods 
(IND2) and investment (IND6) sectors have contributed negatively towards financial 
performance measured by Tobin‟s Q. This result is not attributable to all industries. 
This supports the view that some companies may have simply complied with the 
NZSC recommendations with an assumption they will be disciplined by the market if 
they do not do so. Therefore, such practices have contributed more towards costs 
rather than improving financial performance.  
Table 8.3 below provides a summary of the hypotheses that have been supported by 
this thesis and those that have not supported. 
Table 8.3: 
 A Summary of Hypotheses that has been Supported by this Thesis 
Hypothesis Small Cap 
Companies 
Large Cap 
Companies 
Public Sector 
Corporate Entities 
Insider 
Ownership 
No No NA 
Endogeneity of 
Insider 
Ownership 
Yes 
 
Yes NA 
Block Ownership Yes Yes NA 
Endogeneity of 
Block Ownership 
Yes Yes NA 
Board 
Independence 
No No No 
Board Size No No Yes  (for C2REV only) 
Board Diversity Yes (for 2007 only) Yes No 
Audit Committee No No Yes 
(For S2TA only) 
Remuneration 
Committee 
Yes (for Q only) Yes (for Q and MB 
only) 
Yes (for all) 
Leverage Yes (for Q only) Yes (for MB only) Yes (all) 
Dividends Yes (all) Yes (all) Yes (all) 
Note: Yes represents hypothesis is supported; No represent hypothesis is rejected; NA represent not applicable. 
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8.3 CONTRIBUTIONS 
The major contributions to new knowledge and deeper understanding of issues 
concerning prior research fall into three categories. 
First, the relationship between governance and performance has previously been 
considered in relation to companies listed on the stock exchange, is now known to be 
applicable to Crown companies and State Owned Enterprises.  This is of considerable 
importance, not only in terms of offering support for more market oriented reforms in 
the public sector, but even more so it also provides a more robust approach to 
addressing stakeholder interests. A parallel development of governance arrangements 
in both the private and the public sector reflects that good governance is an intrinsic 
part of the organisational infrastructure of the country. Adoption of current corporate 
governance practices across the board allows public and private sector entities to learn 
from each other sharing the best practices in each sector and helping to improve 
performance and value for the nation. This type systemic development provide 
valuable insights relative to the full spectrum of governance arrangements and the 
understanding of the corresponding impact on outcomes and the facilitation of policy 
development that are beneficial for all economic entities.  
Second, it is now known that the difference between voluntary acceptances of 
guidelines in a principle-based approach is similar to the outcomes under a rule-based 
regulatory regime.  This debunks the mythology in favour of one framework over 
another and focuses attention on minimising the costs to achieve the gains available. 
The high level of anticipatory implementation of best practice and then rapid adoption 
of the promulgated guidelines is important.  Potentially, it reflects a New Zealand 
psyche but more likely it is seen as directors moving to promote shareholder interests. 
Whilst the „comply or explain‟ provision allows companies to disclose relevant and 
quality information, it also encourages new forms of stakeholder engagement. 
Therefore the onus, under the principle-based approach shifts to companies not only 
providing timely disclosures but also to increasing the quality and range of 
disclosures. By taking responsibility at the company-level for the disclosure leads to 
some extent to an improvement in corporate moral and ethical attitude allowing 
managers to think about issues at hand. 
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Third, it is now known that the wholesale adoption rather than tailored options 
available while costing shareholders money provides a level of uniformity across 
governance regimes.  Prior expectations may well have been that companies would 
have looked for the lowest level of compliance required rather than moving rapidly to 
a uniform highest required level. The gap between current practice and the desired 
standard of governance is a reflection of the lack of understanding of the environment 
in which companies operate relating to both the internal and external, and the impact 
the environment has on governance frameworks. A better understanding of the 
environment and integration of governance, strategy and operations should lead to 
enhanced practices in the future.  
8.4 POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
The findings of this thesis have policy implications in New Zealand for publicly listed 
companies and public sector corporate entities.  
Existing guidelines encourage development of industry-specific approaches. Evidence 
shows that companies in certain industries have developed industry-specific 
governance structures while others have simply complied with NZSC 
recommendations. One explanation for this outcome could be that it is too costly for 
one company to develop alternative approaches hence most have chosen to comply 
rather than adapt.  
Appropriate support for companies and industries to develop governance structures 
that are reflective of their specific characteristics will lead to better governance 
practices in the future and minimise compliance costs. In addition, clarity from the 
market regulator on what constitutes a good rationale for industry-specific guidelines 
will facilitate more confidence in the adaptation process.  
To improve accountability and transparency of managerial decision making to 
shareholders, the NZSC recommended that boards should be comprised of non-
executive and independent directors and have audit committees whose members 
should be independent. Similarly it is recommended that large boards should also 
have remuneration and nomination committees. However, the availability of a small 
pool of directors for board positions in publicly listed companies has created three 
different types of problems: (i) difficulty in finding directors who are totally 
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independent; (ii) the creation of an “overboarding problem” where some directors sit 
on too many different companies‟ boards; and (iii) the appointment of independent 
directors who lack appropriate skills.   
Information and education is required for both companies and investors regarding the 
workings of principle-based guidelines. Training of would-be directors on 
directorship processes and the review of director remuneration to reflect risks and 
responsibilities has the potential to improve the supply of more skilled independent 
directors. One of the NZX listing requirements of companies is that they comply with 
NZSC recommendations, but the cost of compliance appears in several instances to 
have outweighed the benefits. There is evidence that most of the compliance costs 
incurred by companies stem from the confusion in understanding the workings of the 
„comply or explain rule‟ and the fear of discipline processes. 
The bias towards diversity and political affiliation in the selection process of board 
members in public sector corporate entities tends to affect board performance and 
financial performance. Important areas for the future reform of public sector boards 
should include: (i) an increased emphasis on selecting board members based on skills 
required; (ii) increased board autonomy to deliver on entities‟ agreed outcomes as set 
out in the SOIs; (iii) ability to set the long term strategic plan; and (iv) increased 
tenure for members serving on public sector boards. Addressing these issues will lead 
to an improvement in the application of principle-based governance approaches. 
8.5 FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH  
This research could be extended in various dimensions and some possible directions 
are identified below.  
Firstly, the focus of this thesis was on the NZSC recommendations and the effect 
compliance has had on the financial performance of publicly listed companies and 
public sector corporate entities. Since the NZSC recommended that principle-based 
governance approaches could be adopted by all economic entities in New Zealand, 
future research could extend the agency theory and empirical models developed in 
this thesis to other sectors which have not drawn much attention from governance 
researchers to date. Focusing future research on family-owned companies, not-for-
profit organisations, those registered with the Charities Commission, charitable trusts, 
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co-operatives and indigenous organisations such as mandated iwi organisations will 
add to the body of knowledge regarding: (i) the nature of governance practices in 
these organisations; (ii) the effects such practices have on mitigating agency costs in 
those organisations; and (iii) the effects such practices have on financial performance. 
Secondly, undertaking similar studies overseas in such countries as Australia and the 
Pacific Islands will contribute to our understanding of the workings of governance 
practices in environments that are similar to New Zealand. In addition similar country 
studies will highlight any similarities and differences in practices. 
Thirdly, the understanding of the inner workings of the boards could be explored by 
undertaking a case study approach. The case study approach would enable the 
capturing of shifting ideas, paradigms, social norms and mode of thinking emerging in 
specific social and historical contexts.  
Fourthly, further study could examine evidence of whether board members are acting 
or have acted ethically and morally in their decision making. Boards need to consider 
principles, values, duties and norms when making decisions and on a normative basis, 
companies stand to lose considerably if they engage in unethical practices. 
8.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Economic entities are a country‟s foundation, as their success is instrumental in 
determining standards of living, employment, education and health. The governance 
of such entities is acknowledged as an important key to their success. The NZSC 
recommendations played an important role in setting guidelines aimed at ensuring 
world best governance standards in terms of efficiency, transparency and investor 
confidence. This thesis (i) confirms that the standard of corporate governance 
practised in New Zealand is similar to that practised in other developed countries; (ii) 
acknowledges that the application of principle-based governance approaches in the 
New Zealand context is effective and efficient; (iii) observes that similar governance 
mechanisms are applied despite differences in the environment between large and 
small economies; (iv) substantiates the appropriate application of agency theory to 
public sector corporate entities; and (v) highlights the importance of board diversity.   
Therefore this research offers insights to policy makers around the world who are 
interested in adopting similar corporate governance practices. Within New Zealand, 
221 
 
the working of the principle-based type of regulations is better informed. The 
theoretical framework, models and the research findings provided in the thesis will 
stimulate future scholars, practitioners and regulators alike. 
There are gains to be made to shareholders from improved governance practices. 
Future reform including appropriate sectoral reform will increase these benefits for 
both companies and the wider economy. 
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APPENDIX A 
 Table 1: A list of SOEs as at July 2008 
 
SOEs When Established Established Under   
SOE Act 
1986 
 
(√) 
SOE 
Amendment 
ACT 2004 
(√) 
Established 
under 
Companies 
Act 1993 
(√) 
AgriQuality Ltd Established in 1998. Merged with 
ASURE NZ Ltd in October 2005 
√ √ √ 
Airways 
Corporation of 
NZ Ltd 
Established in 1987 √ √ √ 
ACP Was established as a Crown-owned 
company in 1991. Became a SOE in 
2005. Not subject to Ombudsmen 
Act 1975 
 √ √ 
Asure New 
Zealand Ltd 
 √ √ √ 
AsureQuality 
NZ Ltd 
AgriQuality Ltd and Asure NZ Ltd 
merged in 2005 
 √ √ 
ECNZ  Residual entity. In 1999, its 
operating assets were transferred 
into three new SOEs, that is, 
Genesis Power Ltd, Meridian Energy 
Ltd and Mighty River Power Ltd. 
√ √ √ 
Genesis Power 
Ltd 
Established in 1998 √ √ √ 
Landcorp 
Farming Ltd 
Established in 1987 √ √ √ 
Learning Media 
Ltd 
Initially incorporated as a Crown-
owned company in 1993 pursuant 
to the Education Act 1989. Became 
a SOE in 2005. 
 √ √ 
Meridian Established in 1999 √ √ √ 
Metservice Established in 1992 √ √ √ 
Mighty River 
Power 
Established in 1999 √ √ √ 
NZ Post Ltd Established in 1987 √ √ √ 
ONTRACK  
(NZ Railways 
Corporation) 
Statutory corporation pursuant to 
the New Zealand Railways 
Corporation Act 1981 
√ √ √ 
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Quotable Value Was originally established as a 
Crown-owned company in 1998. 
Became a SOE in 2005 
 √ √ 
Solid Energy Established in 1987 √ √ √ 
Timberlands Established in 1990 √ √ √ 
Transpower Established in 1994 √ √ √ 
Kordia Established in 2006  √ √ 
(Source: www.comu.govt.nz; www.ssc.govt.nz) 
  
254 
 
 Appendix B 
Table 1: Crown Companies as at July 2008 
 
Crown Entity Companies:  Established under the 
Crown Research Institutes 
Act 1992 
Established 
Under 
Crown Entities 
Act 2004 
(√) 
Established 
under 
Companies 
Act 1993 
 
(√) 
 (i). Crown Research Institutes (CRIs) 
Ag Research Ltd √ √ √ 
NZ Institute of Crop & Food 
Research Ltd 
√ √ √ 
Institute of Environmental 
Science & Research Ltd (ESR) 
√  √ 
Institute of Geological & Nuclear 
Sciences Ltd (GNS) 
√ √ √ 
Horticulture & Food Research 
Institute of NZ Ltd 
(HortResearch) 
√ √ √ 
Industrial Research Ltd (IRL) √ √ √ 
Landcare Research NZ Ltd 
(Landcare) 
√ √ √ 
National Institute of Water & 
Atmospheric Research Ltd 
√  √ 
NZ Forest Research Institute Ltd 
(SCION) 
√ √ √ 
(ii). Other Crown Entity Companies 
NZ Venture Investment Fund Ltd 
(NZVIF) 
Established in 2002 √ √ 
Radio NZ Ltd (RNZ) Radio NZ Act 1995 √ √ 
TVNZ TVNZ Act 2003 √ √ 
Research and Education 
Advanced Network NZ Ltd 
(REANNZ) 
Public Finance Act 1989 and 
Established as a Crown-
owned company in 2004 
√ √ 
(iii). Autonomous Crown Entities 
Public Trust Public Trust Act 2001 √  
NZ Lotteries Commission (NZLC) Gambling Act 2003 √  
(Source: www.comu.govt.nz)
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APPENDIX C 
Table 1: OLS Results for the Industry Dummy Variables Used in Table 5.3 
 Q MB ROA ROE  Q MB ROA 
  
Standard 
Error  
 
Standard 
Error  
  
Standard 
Error  
 
IND1 
-0.04 
(-0.31) 
0.126 
0.03 
(0.80) 
0.036 
0.04 
(1.26) 
0.033 
0.15 
(1.27) 
0.119 
IND2 
0.14 
(1.05) 
0.132 
0.08 
(1.74) 
0.045 
0.12 
(0.95) 
0.127 
0.05 
(1.03) 
0.049 
IND3 
0.26 
(1.49) 
0.174 
0.04 
(1.74) 
0.084 
0.10 
(1.77) 
0.057 
0.19 
(1.67) 
0.114 
IND5 
0.15 
(1.35) 
0.109 
0.04 
(1.27) 
0.034 
-0.01 
(-0.12) 
0.059 
0.09 
(1.12 
0.082 
IND6 
0.29 
(1.76) 
0.167 
0.07† 
(1.99) 
0.038 
-0.06 
(-0.61) 
0.094 
-0.36 
(-0.79) 
0.460 
 
Table 2: OLS Results for the Industry Dummy Variables Used in Table 5.4 
 Q MB ROA ROE  Q MB ROA 
  
Standard 
Error  
 
Standard 
Error  
  
Standard 
Error  
 
IND1 
-0.12 
(-0.76) 
0.156 
0.33 
(0.64) 
0.036 
0.04 
(1.43) 
0.033 
0.17 
(1.11) 
0.155 
IND2 
0.01 
(0.05) 
0.138 
0.07 
(1.58) 
0.044 
0.17 
(1.23) 
0.139 
0.30 
(1.68) 
0.177 
IND3 
0.15 
(0.52) 
0.290 
0.06 
(0.46) 
0.038 
0.14 
(1.74) 
0.080 
0.22 
(1.43) 
0.156 
IND5 
0.07 
(0.48) 
0.136 
0.04 
(1.06) 
0.034 
0.02 
(0.39) 
0.059 
0.11 
(1.03) 
0.108 
IND6 
0.21 
(1.09) 
0.204 
0.07† 
(1.95) 
0.038 
-0.02 
(-0.25) 
0.090 
-0.58 
(-2.52) 
0.229 
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APPENDIX D 
Table 1: OLS Results for the Industry Dummy Variables Used in Table 5.5 
 Q MB ROA ROE 
  
Standard 
Error  
 
Standard 
Error  
 
Standard 
Error  
 Standard 
Error  
IND1 
-0.15 
(-0.97) 
0.151 
0.07 
(1.52) 
0.036 
0.04 
(1.31) 
0.083 
0.24 
(1.20) 
0.203 
IND2 
0.01 
(0.09) 
0.136 
0.30 
(1.02) 
0.290 
0.20 
(1.15) 
0.170 
0.29 
(1.58) 
0.181 
IND3 
0.16 
(0.54) 
0.289 
0.06 
(1.47) 
0.038 
0.14 
(1.66) 
0.085 
0.23 
(1.22) 
0.189 
IND5 
0.07 
(0.50) 
0.130 
0.04 
(1.10) 
0.034 
0.02 
(0.41) 
0.060 
0.12 
(0.83) 
0.147 
IND6 
0.24 
(1.19) 
0.202 
0.07† 
(1.95) 
0.038 
-0.04 
(-0.45) 
0.083 
-0.57 
(-2.32) 
0.243 
 
Table 2: OLS 2SLS Results for the Industry Dummy Variables Used in Table 5.7(a) 
 
IOWN 
(using OLS) 
Standard 
Error 
Q 
(using 
2SLS) 
Standard 
Error 
IOWN 
(using 
OLS) 
Standard 
Error 
MB 
(using 
2SLS) 
Standard 
Error  
IND1   
0.14 
(0.54) 
0.262 
 
 
0.01 
(0.13) 
0.381 
IND3   
0.37 
(1.35) 
0.272 
 
 
-0.09 
(-0.23) 
0.394 
IND4   
-0.23 
(-0.67) 
0.345 
 
 
0.04 
(0.83) 
0.56 
IND5   
0.25 
(1.01) 
0.243 
 
 
-0.31 
(-0.89) 
0.354 
IND6   
0.56 
(1.73) 
0.270 
 
 
-0.01 
(-0.01) 
0.392 
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APPENDIX E 
Table 1: OLS 2SLS Results for the Industry Dummy Variables Used in Table 5.7(b) 
 
IOWN 
(using OLS) 
Standard 
Error 
Q 
(using 2SLS) 
Standard 
Error 
IOWN 
(using 
OLS) 
Standard 
Error 
MB 
(using 2SLS) 
Standard 
Error  
IND1   
-0.09 
(-0.61) 
0.156 
 
 
-0.16 
(-0.58) 
0.274 
IND2         
IND3   
0.01 
(0.08) 
0.162 
 
 
-0.08 
(-0.30) 
0.285 
IND4   
0.04 
(0.18) 
0.205 
 
 
-0.09 
(-0.26) 
0.362 
IND5   
-0.11 
(-0.78) 
0.145 
 
 
0.16 
(0.62) 
0.255 
IND6   
-0.28 
(-1.78) 
0.160 
 
 
-1.01*** 
(-3.58) 
0.283 
 
Table 2: Results of the Test for the Validity of the Instrumental Variables Used When 
IOWN is Endogenous 
F(5, 535) = 6.59209 
Prob > F = 0.00 
First-stage regression summary statistics 
Variable R
2
 Adj. R
2
 Partial R
2
 F(4, 535) Prob > F 
IOWN 0.1967 0.1651 0.047 6.59209 0.000 
Minimum eigenvalue statistics = 6.59209 
Critical Values  
Ho: Instruments are weak 
# of endogenous regressors: 1 
# of excluded instruments:   5 
 5% 10% 20% 30% 
2SLS relative bias 16.85 10.27 6.71 5.34 
 5% 10% 20% 30% 
2SLS size of nominal 5% Wald Test 24.58 13.96 10.26 8.31 
LIML size of nominal 5% Wald Test 5.44 3.87 3.30 2.98 
Test of overidentifying restrictions: 
Sargan (Score) Chi2(3) 1.78054 (p = 0.6192) 
Basmann Chi2(3) 1.7157   (p = 0.6334) 
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APPENDIX F 
Table 1: OLS 2SLS Results for the Industry Dummy Variables Used in Table 5.8(a) 
 
IOWN 
(using OLS) 
Standard 
Error 
Q 
(using 2SLS) 
Standard 
Error 
IOWN 
(using 
OLS) 
Standard 
Error 
MB 
(using 2SLS) 
Standard 
Error  
IND1   
0.12 
(0.546) 
0.264 
 
 
-0.78 
(-1.04) 
0.034 
IND2         
IND3   
0.34 
(1.25) 
0.273 
 
 
-0.07 
(-0.18) 
0.395 
IND4   
-0.25 
(-0.72) 
0.347 
 
 
-1.27 
(-1.53) 
0.044 
IND5   
0.26 
(1.05) 
0.245 
 
 
-0.32 
(-0.89) 
0.355 
IND6   
0.52 
(1.41) 
0.271 
 
 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.393 
 
Table 2: OLS 2SLS Results for the Industry Dummy Variables Used in Table 5.8(b) 
 
IOWN 
(using OLS) 
Standard 
Error 
Q 
(using 2SLS) 
Standard 
Error 
IOWN 
(using 
OLS) 
Standard 
Error 
MB 
(using 2SLS) 
Standard 
Error  
IND1   -0.09 
(-0.56) 
0.156   -0.16 
(-0.59) 
0.276 
IND2         
IND3   -0.00 
(-0.01) 
0.162   -0.12 
(-0.41) 
0.286 
IND4   0.03 
(0.17) 
0.206   -0.10 
(-0.28 
0.364 
IND5   -0.09 
(-0.65) 
0.145   -0.13 
(-0.51) 
0.257 
IND6   -0.28 
(-1.74) 
0.161   -1.03*** 
(-3.62) 
0.285 
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APPENDIX G 
Table 1: Results of the test for the validity of the instrumental variables used when 
BOWN is endogenous 
 
F(5, 535) = 7.0479 
Prob > F = 0.000 
First-stage regression summary statistics 
Variable R
2
 Adj. R
2
 Partial R
2
 F(4, 535) Prob > F 
IOWN 0.1768 0.1466 0.0618 7.0479 0.000 
Minimum eigenvalue statistics = 6.59209 
Critical Values  
Ho: Instruments are weak 
# of endogenous regressors: 1 
# of excluded instruments:   5 
 5% 10% 20% 30% 
2SLS relative bias 18.37 10.83 6.77 5.25 
 5% 10% 20% 30% 
2SLS size of nominal 5% Wald Test 26.87 15.09 10.98 8.84 
LIML size of nominal 5% Wald Test 4.84 3.56 3.05 2.77 
Test of overidentifying restrictions: 
Sargan (Score) Chi2(3) 1.00338   (p = 0.9093) 
Basmann Chi2(3) 0.96548   (p = 0.9150) 
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APPENDIX H 
Table 1: OLS Results for the Industry Dummy Variables Used in Table 6.3 
 Q MB ROA ROE  Q MB ROA 
  
Standard 
Error  
 
Standard 
Error  
  
Standard 
Error  
 
IND1 
-0.16† 
(-2.12) 
0.061 
-0.02 
(-0.26) 
0.072 
0.00 
(0.05) 
0.007 
-0.02 
(-0.66) 
0.023 
IND2 
-0.19† 
(-2.30) 
0.082 
-0.05 
(-0.68) 
0.080 
-0.01 
(-0.56) 
0.008 
-0.02 
(-0.70) 
0.026 
IND3 
-0.02 
(-0.22) 
0.074 
0.07 
(0.96) 
0.072 
0.01 
(1.83) 
0.007 
-0.01 
(-0.38) 
0.024 
IND4 
-0.16 
(-1.78) 
0.087 
-0.04 
(-0.51) 
0.084 
0.00 
(0.06) 
0.009 
-0.02 
(-0.69) 
0.028 
IND5 
-0.12 
(-1.69) 
0.069 
0.07 
(1.11) 
0.067 
0.00 
(0.43) 
0.007 
-0.02 
(-0.74) 
0.022 
IND6 
-0.27† 
(-2.56) 
0.105 
-0.16 
(-1.55) 
0.101 
0.01 
(0.65) 
0.010 
-0.01 
(-0.36) 
0.033 
 
Table 2: OLS Results for the Industry Dummy Variables Used in Table 6.4 
 Q MB ROA ROE  Q MB ROA 
  
Standard 
Error  
 
Standard 
Error  
  
Standard 
Error  
 
IND1 
-0.17† 
(-2.35) 
0.073 
-0.03 
(-0.40) 
0.070 
-0.00 
(-0.10) 
0.007 
-0.02 
(-0.75) 
0.023 
IND2 
-0.21++ 
(-2.57) 
0.081 
-0.07 
(-0.87) 
0.078 
-0.01 
(-0.72) 
0.008 
-0.02 
(-0.82) 
0.026 
IND3 
-0.04 
(-0.56) 
0.074 
0.05 
(0.76) 
0.071 
0.01 
(1.58) 
0.007 
-0.01 
(-0.53) 
0.023 
IND4 
-0.18† 
(-2.06) 
0.085 
-0.06 
(-0.75) 
0.082 
-0.00 
(-0.08) 
0.008 
-0.02 
(-0.83) 
0.027 
IND5 
0.21† 
(1.92) 
0.068 
0.07 
(1.04) 
0.065 
0.02 
(0.35) 
0.007 
-0.02 
(-0.80) 
0.022 
IND6 
-0.27++ 
(-2.67) 
0.103 
-0.16 
(-1.64) 
0.098 
0.01 
(0.62) 
0.010 
-0.01 
(-0.39) 
0.033 
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APPENDIX I 
Table 1: OLS Results for the Industry Dummy Variables Used in Table 6.5 
 Q MB ROA ROE 
  
Standard 
Error  
 
Standard 
Error  
 
Standard 
Error  
 Standard 
Error  
IND1 
-0.07 
(-0.91) 
0.071 
-0.01 
(-0.17) 
0.067 
-0.00 
(-0.05) 
0.007 
-0.04 
(-0.47) 
0.078 
IND2 
-0.14 
(-1.71) 
0.080 
-0.06 
(-0.18) 
0.076 
-0.01 
(-0.82) 
0.008 
-0.07 
(-0.78) 
0.089 
IND3 
0.04 
(0.48) 
0.075 
0.05 
(0.72) 
0.071 
0.01 
(1.29) 
0.007 
-0.02 
(-0.14) 
0.083 
IND4 
-0.08 
(-0.98) 
0.084 
-0.07 
(-0.78) 
0.079 
-0.00 
(-0.05) 
0.008 
-0.07 
(-0.74) 
0.093 
IND5 
-0.05 
(-0.76) 
0.066 
0.07 
(1.18) 
0.062 
0.02 
(0.33) 
0.006 
-0.02 
(-0.33) 
0.073 
IND6 
-0.21† 
(-2.03) 
0.102 
-0.19† 
(-2.02) 
0.096 
0.01 
(0.73) 
0.010 
-0.01 
(-0.13) 
0.113 
 
Table 2: OLS 2SLS Results for the Industry Dummy Variables Used in Table 6.7(a) 
 
IOWN 
(using OLS) 
Standard 
Error 
Q 
(using 2SLS) 
Standard 
Error 
IOWN 
(using 
OLS) 
Standard 
Error 
MB 
(using 2SLS) 
Standard 
Error  
IND1   
-0.11 
(-1.38) 
0.079 
 
 
-0.04 
(-0.52) 
0.072 
IND2   
-0.27++ 
(-3.11) 
0.087 
 
 
-0.14 
(-1.80) 
0.080 
IND3   
0.10 
(1.25) 
0.079 
 
 
0.10 
(1.36) 
0.073 
IND4   
-0.21† 
(-2.26) 
0.091 
 
 
-0.11 
(-1.37) 
0.084 
IND5   
-0.12 
(-1.57) 
0.073 
 
 
0.08 
(1.01) 
0.067 
IND6   
-0.34++ 
(-3.06) 
0.110 
 
 
-0.24† 
(-2.33) 
0.101 
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APPENDIX J 
Table 1: OLS 2SLS Results for the Industry Dummy Variables Used in Table 6.7(b) 
 
IOWN 
(using OLS) 
Standard 
Error 
Q 
(using 2SLS) 
Standard 
Error 
IOWN 
(using 
OLS) 
Standard 
Error 
MB 
(using 2SLS) 
Standard 
Error  
IND1   
0.01 
(1.11) 
0.008 
 
 
-0.01 
(-0.31) 
0.023 
IND2   
-0.01 
(-0.74) 
0.009 
 
 
-0.02 
(-0.69) 
0.026 
IND3   
0.02† 
(2.74) 
0.008 
 
 
-0.00 
(-0.02) 
0.024 
IND4   
0.01 
(0.46) 
0.009 
 
 
-0.02 
(-0.58) 
0.027 
IND5   
0.01 
(0.67) 
0.007 
 
 
-0.01 
(-0.51) 
0.021 
IND6   
0.01 
(0.86) 
0.011 
 
 
-0.01 
(-0.23) 
0.032 
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APPENDIX K  
Table 1: Results of the test for the validity of the instrumental variables used when 
IOWN is endogenous 
F(5, 316) = 5.83325 
Prob > F = 0.00 
First-stage regression summary statistics 
Variable R
2
 Adj. R
2
 Partial R
2
 F(4, 535) Prob > F 
IOWN 0.3169 0.2695 0.0843 5.83325 0.000 
Minimum eigenvalue statistics = 5.83325 
Critical Values  
Ho: Instruments are weak 
# of endogenous regressors: 1 
# of excluded instruments:   5 
 5% 10% 20% 30% 
2SLS relative bias 18.37 10.83 6.77 5.25 
 5% 10% 20% 30% 
2SLS size of nominal 5% Wald Test 26.87 15.09 10.98 8.84 
LIML size of nominal 5% Wald Test 4.84 3.56 3.05 2.77 
Test of overidentifying restrictions: 
Sargan (Score) Chi2(4) 3.26588  (p = 0.5144) 
Basmann Chi2(4) 3.07448  (p = 0.5454) 
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APPENDIX L 
Table 1: OLS 2SLS Results for the Industry Dummy Variables Used in Table 6.8(a) 
 
IOWN 
(using OLS) 
Standard 
Error 
Q 
(using 2SLS) 
Standard 
Error 
IOWN 
(using 
OLS) 
Standard 
Error 
MB 
(using 2SLS) 
Standard 
Error  
IND1   
-0.16† 
(-2.04) 
0.078 
 
 
-0.07 
(-0.93) 
0.073 
IND2   
-0.32++ 
(-3.74) 
0.085 
 
 
-0.17† 
(-2.06) 
0.080 
IND3   
0.03 
(0.34) 
0.079 
 
 
0.06 
(0.84) 
0.075 
IND4   
-0.24++ 
(-2.73) 
0.089 
 
 
-0.15 
(-1.76) 
0.084 
IND5   
-0.15† 
(-2.13) 
0.072 
 
 
0.04 
(0.64) 
0.068 
IND6   
-0.35++ 
(-3.22) 
0.108 
 
 
-0.25† 
(-2.42) 
0.102 
 
 
Table 2: OLS 2SLS Results for the Industry Dummy Variables Used in Table 6.8(b) 
 
IOWN 
(using OLS) 
Standard 
Error 
Q 
(using 2SLS) 
Standard 
Error 
IOWN 
(using 
OLS) 
Standard 
Error 
MB 
(using 2SLS) 
Standard 
Error  
IND1   
0.01 
(0.78) 
0.008   
-0.01 
(-0.29) 
0.023 
IND2   
-0.01 
(-0.97) 
0.009   
-0.02 
(-0.75) 
0.026 
IND3   
0.02† 
(2.31) 
0.008   
-0.01 
(-0.07) 
0.024 
IND4   
0.00 
(0.19) 
0.009   
0.01 
(-0.48) 
0.027 
IND5   
0.00 
(0.39) 
0.007   
-0.01 
(-0.48) 
0.021 
IND6   
0.01 
(0.80) 
0.010   
-0.01 
(-0.21) 
0.032 
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APPENDIX M 
 Table 1: Results of the test for the validity of the instrumental variables used when 
BOWN is endogenous 
 
F(5, 316) = 9.68 
Prob > F = 0.000 
First-stage regression summary statistics 
Variable R
2
 Adj. R
2
 Partial R
2
 F(4, 535) Prob > F 
IOWN 0.4070 0.3638 0.1328 9.67795 0.000 
Minimum eigenvalue statistics = 9.67795 
Critical Values  
Ho: Instruments are weak 
# of endogenous regressors: 1 
# of excluded instruments:   5 
 5% 10% 20% 30% 
2SLS relative bias 18.37 10.83 6.77 5.25 
 5% 10% 20% 30% 
2SLS size of nominal 5% Wald Test 26.87 15.09 10.98 8.84 
LIML size of nominal 5% Wald Test 4.84 3.56 3.05 2.77 
Test of overidentifying restrictions: 
Sargan (Score) Chi2(4) 6.40827   (p = 0.1707) 
Basmann Chi2(4) 6.407033   (p = 0.1940) 
 
 
